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I, Latham, deal in sonorous legal-sounding phrase 
In high and mighty cases, long or short. 
With noble speeches that go on for days and days. 
But you should hear me on the Arbitration Court. 
From The Masque of the Boobooks (1958) 
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INTRODUCTION 
Twenty years before S.M. Bruce became Prime Minister 
of Australia, the Ministry led by Sir Edmund Barton took the 
decision to establish a Commonwealth industrial arbitration 
system. In the following years successive Prime Ministers and 
Attorneys-General found that they had to devote an enormous 
amount of time to resolving the difficulties that arose from 
industrial regulation and industrial conflict. Thus most of 
the problems faced by the Bruce-Page Ministry in the field of 
industrial relations were not new and its decisions and actions 
were influenced by the ideas and the constitutional, legis-
lative and administrative acts of earlier governments. Con-
sequently, it will be necessary in this thesis to make a very 
general survey of the role of the Commonwealth Government in 
industrial relations in the period 1903-1923. This survey will 
be followed by a few comments on the Ministers and public 
servants who determined the Government's arbitration policy 
in the early years of Bruce's Prime Ministership. It will then 
be possible to turn to the main subject of the thesis and 
study the ways in which the Government, in the years 1923-1929, 
interpreted and responded to the role that it had inherited in 
the unhappy and difficult area of industrial relations. 
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Despite the protracted and bitter interstate strikes 
in the shipping and pastoral industries of the early 1890s, 
neither industrial relations in general nor industrial arbit-
ration in particular aroused much interest at the Federal 
Conventions. Some delegates opposed compulsory arbitration 
in principle, while others believed that it could safely be 
left to the States. But two delegates of exceptional stub-
borness, Charles Kingston of South Australia and H.B. Higgins 
of Victoria, were convinced that the new Commonwealth Parliament 
should be empowered to establish courts of conciliation and 
arbitration. On three occasions their proposals were easily 
defeated but in January, 1898, they finally secured a slight 
majority,^ As a result, the Constitution of Australia, which 
came into force in 1901, gave the Commonwealth Parliament 
power to legislate regarding "conciliation and arbitration 
for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes 
p 
extending beyond the limits of any one State". 
Higgins had argued in 1898 that, by supporting his 
proposal, the delegates would merely be leaving it open for 
the Parliament, if it wished, to legislate on the subject of 
arbitration. The proposal had not been supported by Barton, 
However, Kingston was a Minister in the Barton Government and 
he wasted little time in drafting a comprehensive arbitration 
1. See J.A. La Nauze. The Making of the Australian 
Constitution. Melbourne, l9V2. pp. 1^^-153, 
zu'f-b, 
2. Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia. 
^Section ixxxv). 
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bill. It was presented to the Federal Parliament by the 
Attorney-General, Alfred Deakin, in July, 1903. A few weeks 
later the Labour Party moved that the provisions of the Bill 
should extend to State railway employees, the motion was 
carried, and the Bill lapsed. It was re-introduced by Deakin, 
with some changes, in March, 1904. The rights of the State 
railway workers and the question of preference of employment 
to unionists were debated ad nauseam and there were two changes 
of government before the Bill finally became law in September, 
1904. In spite of the political conflict and controversy 
which it had provoked, its supporters had great expectations. 
Deakin declared that it marked "the beginning of a new phase 
of civilization, the establishment of a People's Peace 
which will transform industrial society .iust as the King's 
Peace transformed civil society".^ 
The provisions of the 1904 Arbitration Act can be 
divided into four categories. Firstly, it prohibited all 
strikes and lockouts and stipulated that a maximum fine of 
£1,000 could be imposed on both individuals and organizations 
that engaged in stoppages. In reality, the Commonwealth 
Parliament only had power to prohibit interstate stoppages. 
Secondly, the Act set down the constitution and powers 
of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. The 
Court was to consist of a President, who would be a Justice 
1. C.P.D. V. 15, 30 July, 1903, p.2864. 
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of the High Court and who would be appointed for a seven year 
term. The President could appoint a Deputy President. The 
Court would be able to compel parties involved in an indust-
rial dispute to appear before it and it could make awards 
which would be binding on these partieso Awards could sub-
sequently be varied and they could be made common rules^ 
binding on all employers and employees in particular indust-
ries, In its awards the Court could specify minimum rates of 
wages and it could direct that preference of employment be 
given to members of the claimant organizations, other things 
being equal« It could impose penalties for contempt or for 
breaches of awards. It could direct that a dispute be 
referred to a State authority, but once an award was made it 
was to prevail over any inconsistent State law or awardo The 
/ 
Court would not be bound by the rules of evidence and parties 
were not to be represented by lawyers. 
Thirdly, several sections of the Act dealt with 
registered organizations. An association of 100 or more 
employees, or an association of employers who together had 
at least 100 employees, could be registered with the Court 
as organizations. They could then submit to the Court any 
dispute in which they were interested, they could be repre-
sented in the hearings, and they could sue for the recovery 
of dues, levies and fines^ Moreover, once they were regis-
tered, no rival organization covering the same classes of 
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employees or employers could be registered. An organization 
could be deregistered if its rules imposed unreasonable con-
ditions on members, did not permit the admission of new 
members, or did not provide for regular audits of accounts, 
and also if it refused to obey an order of the Court. 
Finally, the Act encouraged conciliation and in-
dustrial agreements. Organizations could make agreements 
which could be filed in the Court, and if they were broken 
the Court could then impose penalties. It could also order 
an agreement to be varied to bring it into conformity with 
a common rule. 
In 1905 Richard O'Connor was appointed President 
of the Federal Arbitration Court. In 1907 he was succeeded 
by Higgins, who held office until 1921. For some years the 
President was underworked, but during World War I he became 
greatly overworked and there were more and more complaints 
of long delays before hearings took place. Only one award 
was handed down in 1906 and only three in 1911, but the number 
had grown to 8 by 1913 and 32 by 1920. Similarly, only three 
industrial agreements were filed in the Court in 1908, but 
there were 109 in 1913 and 183 in 1920. The increasing 
activity of the Court resulted from the strong support that 
it received from most unions, especially after Higgins 
enunciated his ideas on the living wage in the Harvester 
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Judgement of 1907.^ The State authorities did not follow 
p 
the Harvester Judgement, at least for several years, and 
the Federal Court acquired a favourable reputation among the 
unions which it retained until the 1920s. Most unions re-
gistered in the Federal Court at an early date: the 
Australian Workers Union in 1905, the Amalgamated Society 
of Engineers in 1905, the Federated Carters and Drivers Union 
in 1906, the Federated Seamen's Union in 1906, the Waterside 
Workers Federation in 1907, the Amalgamated Timber Workers 
Union in 1907 and the Federated Enginedrivers and Firemen*s 
Association in 1908. By 1914 there were 106 unions registered 
in the Court, but only one employers' association of any 
significance.^ 
The debates on the 1904 Arbitration Act had revealed 
some major differences between the political parties. In 
particular. Labour parliamentarians clashed with most of 
1. 2 C.A.R. 1. The Harvester Judgement was not concerned 
with industrial arbitration, but with the provisions of 
the 1906 Excise Tariff Act. The Act was later held to be 
unconstitutional. However, in the 1908 Marine Cooks case 
and subsequent arbitration cases, Higgins reaffirmed the 
principles set down in the Harvester Judgement and made 
use of his findings on the cost of living. 
2. See P.G. Macarthy, "Victorian wages boards; their origins 
and the doctrine of the living wage." Journal of Indus-
trial Relations, v.10 (1968) pp. 116-341 F.i;. Macarthy. 
"Wage determinations in New South Wales - 1890-1921." 
Journal of Industrial Relations, v.10 (1968) pp. 189-205 
3. The Commonwealth Steamship Owners Federation was regis-
tered in 1905. Four small employers' organizations had 
also been registered by 1914. See Report of Proceedings 
taken under the Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-
1911 and the Arbitration (Public Service) Act.Melbourne, 
1914 
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their opponents on the questions of preference to unionists 
and the rights of State railway workers. The divisions on 
these and other issues, which continued for many years, meant 
that each time a party came to power it sooner or later sought 
to amend the Arbitration Act. But an even more fundamental 
division between parties gradually became apparent. The 
leaders of the Liberal Party, and later the Nationalist Party, 
alleged that Australia was becoming a country of strikes and 
demanded that the Court and, in extreme cases, the Government 
take action to bring the strikes to an end. Labour leaders 
minimized the seriousness of industrial unrest and believed 
that, when large strikes did occur, the Government should 
mediate but should avoid all "provocative acts". They regar-
ded the Arbitration Court not so much as an arbitral or judicial 
authority, but rather as a legislative body, which should be 
able to regulate in detail the conditions of labour in as 
many industries as possible. Thus, while non-Labour Govern-
ments believed that the greatest problem was the failure of 
the Court to prevent serious strikes. Labour Governments were 
chiefly concerned with removing the constitutional and statutory 
limitations on the power of the Court to regulate labour 
conditions. 
The judgements of the High Court relating to the 
Commonwealth's arbitration power were numerous, complex and 
often conflicting and created, in Higgins' words, a "Serbonian 
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bog of technicalities", which restricted and frustrated the 
work of the Arbitration Court. Labour leaders condemned the 
conservative High Court, In 1912 the Attorney-General, 
W.M. Hughes, lamented "The history of our efforts at legis-
lation under Section 51 (xxxv) has been most varied, disastrous 
and almost pathetico"^ Yet as the years passed the High 
Court tended more and more to give a wide interpretation to 
the arbitration power, with Griffith and Barton fighting a 
losing battle to limit the functions of the Court to the 
settlement of genuine interstate stoppages. After 1920 the 
Isaacs-Higgins approach prevailed, and only Gavan Duffy con-
tinued to hold the narrow interpretation of Section 51 (xxxv). 
By the 1920s the High Court's interpretations of 
each of the words "interstate", "industrial" and "disputes" 
had given the Arbitration Court a much wider jurisdiction 
than had been intended by most of the delegates at the Federal 
Conventions. In 1914 the High Court stated that an interstate 
dispute was simply a dispute that, at a given moment, existed 
in more than one State. Griffith and Barton were thus over-
ruled in holding that in the building industry, where the 
questions in dispute must be local and where there was no 
interstate competition, an interstate dispute was an impos-
p 
sibility. 
1. C.P.D. V. 68, 20 Nov. 1912, p. 5684 
2. 18 C.L.R. 255. (1914 Builders' Labourers Case). 
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The Court was frequently asked to define the word 
"industrial". It did not consider that the word limited the 
Arbitration Court's jurisdiction to disputes involving manual 
employees, and declared that the Court could regulate the 
conditions of actors, journalists and bank employees. The 
justices disagreed on two questions. Griffith and Barton 
held that industrial disputes were disputes between employers 
and employees in profit-making enterprises. Isaacs and Rich, 
on the other hand, argued that industrial disputes could 
take place in all operations where capital and labour were 
in co-operation and where there was disagreement over the 
terms and conditions of that co-operation. Thus it did not 
matter whether the employer was public or private and the 
dispute did not have to be between employers and employees, 
but could be between different classes of employees. The 
latter view triumphed in 1919, when it was decided that an 
award of the Federal Arbitration Court could extend to the 
employees of municipal corporations,^ Related to this was 
the great question, which had brought down Deakin's Govern-
ment in 1904, of whether the Court could regulate the condi-
tions of State employees. In 1906 the High Court declared 
p 
that it did not have this power. It reversed its decision 
in the 1920 Engineers Case, and decreed that a State could 
be a party to a dispute before the Federal Court, provided 
that the dispute related to the State's industrial rather 
1. 26 C.L.R. 508.(1919 Municipalities Case). 
2. 4 C.L.R. 488.(1906 Railway Servants Case). 
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than governmental functions.^ This decision brought the 
employees of the State railways within the jurisdiction of 
the Federal Court. 
The Court was again divided in its interpretation 
of the word "dispute". Griffith and Barton asserted that 
there had to be genuine discontent on the part of the member-
ship of the union, and the rejection of a union's log of claims 
by the employers was not sufficient evidence of a dispute. 
But after 1914 this became the minority view and it was 
accepted that the Court could deal with artificial or "paper 
disputes". The rejection of a log of claims was proof of a 
dispute and it was not necessary to have a disturbance of any 
kind. The change in the High Court's position was partly 
due to a change in its attitude towards unions. In 1917 
Higgins stated that the union was not merely the delegate of 
its members, but was a party principal. It was therefore 
sufficient if a union was in dispute with an employer, even 
if individual unionists had no grievances,'^ Extending this 
argument, it was later held that a union could have a dispute 
with an employer who employed non-unionists and consequently 
the Court could regulate the conditions of non-unionists as 
well as unionists. 
1. 28 C.L.R. 129. (1920 Engineers Case). 
2. 16 C.L.R. 591. (1912 Merchant Service Guild Case), 
18 Unn?. 273. (Holyman's Case). 
3. 23 C.L.R. 22, (1917 Pastoralists Case). 
4. 35 C.L.R. 528. (1925 Burwood Cinema Case). 
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While many of the High Court's decisions extended 
the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Court, there were two 
cases which resulted in a considerable reduction of its 
powers. In Whybrow's case (1910)^ the Court declared that 
the Commonwealth's arbitral power was a judicial, not a 
legislative, power. The awards of the Federal Court could 
only apply to the parties in dispute and they could not 
include matters which had not been among the claims and 
counter-claims of the parties. The Court could therefore 
not make a common rule and unions were forced to devote time 
and money to submitting their claims to as many employers as 
they could identify. Moreover, they had to make their claims 
as comprehensive and as ambitious as possible, as if the 
Court was later to vary the award it would only grant con-
ditions which had been among the original demands. Another 
important consequence of Whybrow's Case concerned the relations 
between Federal and State tribunals. The awards of the Federal 
Court could no longer be classed as laws, which would prevail 
over State laws or awards. Instead, the Court held that where 
there was conflict the State laws would prevail, but there 
was no conflict if it was possible to obey both Federal and 
State awards. This ingenious decision encouraged unions to 
seek awards from both the Federal Court and State authorities, 
as employers would have to obey whichever award gave the 
highest wages, shortest working week and best conditions. 
1. 10 C.L.R. 266. 
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. In 1918 the High Court, in Alexander's Case,^ 
stated that an arbitrator could only exercise judicial power 
if he held office for life. As the President of the Arbit-
ration Court was appointed for seven year terms, the respon-
sibility of imposing penalties for breaches or non-observance 
of the Arbitration Act or of the Court's awards and orders 
I 
had to be left to other courts and magistrates. This decision 
greatly weakened the authority of the Federal Arbitration 
Court. 
The second Fisher Labour Government (1910-15) was 
particularly concerned about the limited powers of the 
Arbitration Court. A growing number of unions was turning 
to Federal arbitration, yet at the same time the High Court 
seemed determined to reduce the Arbitration Court to ineffective-
ness. On five occasions Hughes introduced Bills to amend the 
Arbitration Act. The legislation was designed to prevent 
appeals to the High Court after awards had been made, to 
enable registered organizations to be associated with political 
parties, to open the way for craft awards as well as industrial 
awards, and to give the Court jurisdiction over Commonwealth 
public servants. Four of the Bills were passed,' 
The Constitution remained the great obstacle for 
Hughes and his colleagues and in 1911 and 1913 referenda were 
held in the hope of amending Section 51 (xxxv). There were 
1. 25 C.L.R. 434. 
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differences between the two proposed amendments, but basically 
the Government was seeking power for the Commonwealth over 
labour and employment in all industries and occupations, wages, 
and the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes. Both 
amendments referred specifically to disputes in State railways. 
The proposals were opposed by the Liberal Party and a section 
of the Labour Party on the grounds that they would drastically 
reduce the powers of the State Governments. Although they were 
both defeated, there was a much higher "yes" vote in 1913 than 
in 1911.^ 
The leaders of the Liberal Party agreed that it was 
p 
unfortunate that the Court could not declare a common rule. 
However, they insisted that it v/as not the Constitution that 
was making arbitration ineffective. Littleton Groom attacked 
Labour politicians who "in seeking to extend the powers of the 
Court beyond the intention of the Constitution find themselves 
in hopeless difficulties and then accuse the High Court of 
technicalities".^ Instead, the Liberals raised the spectre 
of union militancy and growing industrial unrest. In 191^ -
Joseph Cook asserted "In this decade strikes have multiplied, 
tension has increased, class feeling has become more acute. 
1. See G.S. Knovdes, "The Commonwealth of Australia Cons-
titution Act." Canberra, 1937. pp. 214-16, 230-33. 
2. C.P.D. V. 58, 21 Oct. 1910, p. 5035. 
3. C.P.D. V. 75, 18 Nov, 1914, p. 724. 
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Every one of the results predicted for the establishment of 
the Arbitration Court has been falsified."^ 
Cook, like many of his colleagues, was most incon-
sistent in his attitude to industrial unrest. He believed 
that the Federal Court should only have jurisdiction over 
interstate disputes, yet he blamed the Court for not reducing 
the number of local strikes. There were one or tv/o genuine 
interstate disputes in the decade before 1914, but all the 
great stoppages were confined to one State and could not be 
dealt with by the Federal Court. The Commonwealth Government 
was not involved in the miners' strikes of 1909 and 1914, 
the waterside workers' strikes of 1908 and 1911 or the Brisbane 
trajnway lockout of 1912. Hughes, who was an outstanding 
negotiator, played an important part in some of these 
stoppages, but in his capacity as a union official, not as 
o 
a Commonwealth Minister. In 1911 he hinted that he would 
be prepared to institute proceedings against his own union, 
but ujitil the strike extended to a second State he had to 
stand by helplessly.^ 
After 1914 the position changed and the Commonwealth 
Government, armed with emergency powers, was directly involved 
in the great strikes of 1916-20. In November, 1916, the New 
1. C.P.D. V. 75. 26 Nov., 1914, p.1156. 
2. See L.F. Fitzhardinge. William Morris Hughes; a 
political biography, v. 1. Sydney, 1964. 
5. C.P.D. V. 61, 31 Oct. 1911, p.1981, 
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South Wales coalminers stopped work and within a few days 
hun^dreds of factories were closed and 250,000 men were idle. 
Hughes, who was by then both Prime Minister and Attorney-
General, acted swiftly. He commandeered all large coal 
supplies, imposed severe gas and electricity restrictions, 
presided at compulsory conferences, and set up a tribunal 
under Justice Edmunds to hear the miners' claims. The strike 
ended after a month, with Edmunds conceding most of the men's 
demands, thereby provoking the conservative press to denounce 
Hughes' intervention.^ In the great general strike of 
August, 1917, which extended to every State, Hughes took a 
much stronger stand against the unions. He consistently 
argued that the Government was not concerned with the merits 
of the original dispute, but with the challenge to con-
stitutional government at a time of crisis. He took over 
control of the whole of the coal stocks and imposed coal 
restrictions. Regulations were issued establishing a National 
Service Bureau, prohibiting interference with the loading 
of ships, and empoY/ering the Government to repeal the prefer-
ence clauses in the awards of the striking unions. In 
addition, as Attorney-General, Hughes applied to the Arbitra-
tion Court for the deregistration of the Waterside Workers 
1. "Prussianism is triumphant. The men have obtained by 
force the satisfaction of their demands .... The gentle 
process of passing it on is to be brought into play 
once more.^' Argus. 1 Dec. 1916, p.6. 
2. C.P.D. V. 82, 15 Aug. 1917, p.1062; Argus. 11 Aug 1917, 
^7177 15 Aug. 1917, p.7. 
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Federation. The application was dismissed but the Govern-
ment's measures, especially the protection which it gave to 
the thousands of volunteers, ensured that the strike would 
collapse. The War Precautions Act remained in force until 
1920, and this enabled the Government to intervene effectively 
in the maritime strikes of 1919-20. In the 1919 seamen's 
strike Watt and Millen again imposed coal restrictions, 
summoned compulsory conferences and negotiated directly with 
a trade union delegation. Moreover, the Secretary of the 
Seamen's Union was twice prosecuted for offences under the 
Arbitration Act and he was sentenced to three months' 
imprisonment. After three months the Government's offer 
was accepted. Finally, in the marine engineers' strike of 
1919-20 Hughes negotiated with both sides, froze the unions' 
funds and, after the engineers gave in, set up a tribunal 
under Sir John Monash to hear their claims. 
By 1920 the future of the arbitration system was 
in doubt. By his repeated interventions Hughes had drawn 
attention to the inability of the Court to settle major 
stoppages and had established a pattern of Government response, 
involving Ministerial negotiations, drastic regulations 
restricting union activities, prosecutions and special 
tribunals or conferences. But this response required the 
use of wartime powers and in 1919 Hughes realized that he 
could not postpone much longer the repeal of the War 
Precautions Act. He therefore sought an amendment of the 
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Constitution once again. It was proposed that the Common-
Y/ealth should have power to deal with "industrial matters", 
including labour, employment and unemployment, the terms and 
conditions of labour in any industry or occupation, and 
industrial disputes. The Government would only be granted 
the additional powers for three years, by which time a 
Constitutional Convention would be held. Despite qualified 
Labour Party support, the proposal was rejected at a referen-
dum in October, 1919.^ 
Hughes was forced to turn once again to legislation. 
In 1920 three important measures passed through the Federal 
Parliament. The Arbitration (Public Service) Act empowered 
the Government to appoint a Public Service Arbitrator who 
would deal with the plaints of the Commonwealth public service 
unions. The Act was intended to relieve some of the conges-
tion in the Arbitration Court and was part of a general 
attempt to introduce an element of expertise into industrial 
regulation. The 1920 Arbitration Act provided for the 
appointment of an unspecified number of Deputy Presidents. 
TYJO other sections were strenuously opposed by the Labour 
Party. It extended the definition of "strike" and "lockout" 
to include an ujireasonable refusal to accept or give work. 
Secondly, in future only the Full Court, and not just the 
President, could increase standard hours or reduce them to 
less than 48 a week. 
1. Knowles. op.cit. pp.257-60 
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The 1920 Industrial Peace Act had first been drafted 
in 1917.^ Hughes believed that many of the problems as-
sociated with arbitration arose from Higgins' willingness 
to regulate the minutiae of industrial conditions, even though 
he had no experience of the industry concerned. He proposed 
that a Commonwealth Industrial Council, on which employers 
and employees would be represented, should make general 
rulings on the basic wage, standard hours and the cost of 
living, while Industrial Boards regulated each industry. The 
disappearance of the Arbitration Court was implicit in this 
proposal. However, the 1920 Act merely provided for Common-
wealth and local tribunals for particular industries to 
supplement the work of the Court. Some of the provisions of 
the Act were almost certainly unconstitutional, but they were 
never challenged. Four tribunals were set up under the 
Industrial Peace Act in 1920-21 and they regulated conditions 
p 
in the coal industry throughout the 1920s. Hughes quickly 
1. Notes by Sir Robert Garran, 6 Nov. 1917.(A.N.L.' MS 
256/2/7409); W.M. Hughes to H.B. Higgins, 5 April 1918. 
(A.N.L. MS 1057/1/315); 1917 Federal Conciliation and 
Arbitration Bill (draft). (C.A.O. A2863). 
2. The Coal Industry Special Tribunal (set up in Sept. 1920) 
regulated the conditions of the miners, and the other 
tribunals dealt with the en^inedrivers and firemen, the 
engineers, and the workers in the coke industry. A 
Mechanics (Coal Industry) Special Tribunal was set up 
in Feb. 1927. Memorandum by (Jarran, 29 Oct. 1929. 
(C.A.O. A432 29/3892). All' the special tribunals were 
headed bv Charles Hibble (1866-1932). a Newcastle 
lawyer wno had been involved in arbitration in the coal 
industry since 1911. 
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lost enthusiasm for the scheme and refused to grant a tribunal 
to the seamen.^ It was obvious that unions would treat the 
Arbitration Court with contempt if they knew that its awards 
could be superseded by those of a special tribunal. 
The Industrial Peace Act was one episode in the Prime 
Minister's long public feud with the President of the Arbit-
ration Court. The self-righteous Higgins and the volatile 
Hughes were each prepared to denounce the other in articles or 
press statements, in the Court or in Parliament. Hughes was 
infuriated by Higgins' refusal to deregister the Waterside 
Workers Federation in 1917 and by his apparent reluctance 
to condemn union militancy. He may also have felt, especially 
in 1920-21, that Higgins' generous awards could ruin the 
national economy. Ironically, Higgins' criticisms of Hughes 
were in a similar vein. He argued, with a good deal of evidence, 
that Hughes had furthered the cause of union militancy by inter-
vening in strikes. In particular, he attacked the practice of 
appointing special tribunals. "A special tribunal is a device 
whereby the Government tries to save face when yielding to a 
strike. It secures present ease by encouraging further and 
far greater trouble. The Government will induce stoppages if 
1. Argus. 11 Feb. 1921, p.7. 
2. Hughes openly expressed his disgust in Parliament: "I have 
not read the' whole of Justice Higgins' judgement being too 
overcome by what I did read to proceed any further. Should 
the last part of it be as bad as the first, I may give the 
House the chance to consider the desirability of dispensing 
with his services." C.P.D. v. 83, 26 Sept. 1917, p.2735 
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it holds out the possibility of a second tribunal to supple-
ment and supersede the decisions of the legitimate tribunal."^ 
In March, 1921, Higgins resigned as President of the Court. 
Higgins' successor was Charles Powers. Aged 68, 
Powers had been the first Commonwealth Crown Solicitor, a 
Justice of the High Court since 1912, and Deputy President of 
the Arbitration Court from 1915 to 1920. In June, 1922, Hughes 
appointed as Deputy Presidents Sir John Quick, a constitutional 
authority and former politician, and Noel Webb, Deputy President 
of the South Australian Industrial Court, Like Higgins, the 
three men were all strong supporters of Federal arbitration 
and they were regarded quite favourably by the unions. But 
they did not have Higgins' strength of character, they showed 
considerable ineptitude in dealing with militant unions, and 
their almost pathetic preoccupation with the dignity of their 
office only succeeded in lessening the authority of the Court.^ 
1. H.B. Higgins, A new province for law and order. London, 
1922. p.120. 
2. Sir Charles Powers (1853-1930). Queensland parliamentarian 
1888-95 and Minister 1889-90, Queensland Crown Solicitor 
1898-1903, Commonwealth Crown Solicitor 1903-12. Sir John 
Quick (1852-1932), 
printer, journalist, Victorian parliam-
entarian 1880-89, active in Federation movement. Member of 
the House of Representatives 1901-13, author of many legal 
works including The annotated Constitution of the Common-
wealth of Australia. Sydney, 1901. Noel Webb. Deputy 
President, South Australian Industrial Court 1916-22. 
3. The Solicitor-General considered that Powers and his 
deputies were very childish and at times relations between 
the Court and the' Attorney-General's Department were very 
strained. Garran to C. Powers, 7 Dec., 1922, Powers to 
Garran^ll Dec., 1922. (C.A.O. A432 29/3413); Garran to L. Groom, 14 Dec. 1922, (A.N.L. MS 236/2/841). 
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Two years after Higgins' resignation his old adver-
sary fell from power. As a result of the general election of 
December, 1922, the Country Party, led by Dr. Earle Page, held 
the balance of power. The Party would not support Hughes, and 
in February, 1923, he resigned. A coalition government was 
formed by his Treasurer, S.M. Bruce. 
Every generalization about the men in Bruce's Cabinet 
must be qualified. Most of them were relatively young and in-
experienced, but there were exceptions such as George Pearce, 
Littleton Groom and Austen Chapman. The Ministers were not 
all "hard-faced businessmen",^ for they included several 
farmers, a few lawyers, two doctors, a journalist and three 
skilled tradesmen. They were mostly rather shadowy figures, 
with more aptitude for administration than for policy-making, 
but the two leaders, together with H.S. Pratten and P.G. Stewart, 
were men of strong characters with definite ideas on a wide 
range of subjects. On most matters the Cabinet adopted a 
conservative stance, although Stewart held some radical views 
on questions affecting rural development. After his departure 
in 1924 the Cabinet was remarkably united and the occasional 
policy and personal differences were mostly kept suppressed. 
The unity and conservatism of the Cabinet were 
evident in its approach to industrial arbitration. The 
1. D. Carboch. The fall of the Bruce-Page Governments 
Melbo^urne, 1958, p.148. 
2. For a study of the increasing conservatism of the Country 
Party after it had attained office, see B.D. Graham. The 






criticisms of Country Party Ministers gradually died away and 
arbitration never caused any divisions along party lines within 
the Cabineto With the exception of Pratten, Pearce and Groom, 
none of the Ministers had any experience of the working of 
arbitration or the weaknesses of arbitration legislation, and 
most of them never acquired much interest in the subject. 
Their positive contributions to industrial legislation and 
policy were negligible. But they were all concerned about 
industrial unrest, and their stubbornly conservative attitude 
towards the question of strike penalties eventually frustrated 
the attempts of the Attorney-General to cope with the great 
stoppages of 1927-29. 
The Cabinet was dominated by its youngest member. 
In 1923 Bruce was 59 and had been in Parliament for five years, 
the last two as Treasurer. With a background of wealth and 
privilege, his life had been a series of successes, whether 
in school, sport, law, business or politics,^ Lacking warmth 
and hating familiarity, he had few friends but many admirers. 
Good-looking, urbane, authoritative, his cool and self-
disparaging manner and his genuine indifference to criticism 
tended to conceal his supreme self-confidence and his political 
astuteness and toughness. Bruce had spent most of his adult 
life in England and he was extremely ignorant about Australian 
affairs. However, he had an exceptionally good memory and a 
1. Stanley M. Bruce, 1st Viscount Bruce (1883-1967). The only 
biography as yet is C. Edwards. Bruce of Melbourne; man 
of two worlds. London, 1965. 
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barrister's ability to take in rapidly the main points in a 
brief, so that he could speak with complete assurance on 
almost any topic. In 1918 he had known little about arbitra-
tion, but by 1920 he was addressing Parliament on the subject,^ 
and even at this stage he managed to avoid the hackneyed 
phrases of the employers. In fact, despite his Flinders Lane 
background, his relations with employers were•sometimes strained 
and he was always more courteous to union leaders. Employers 
might find Bruce arrogant and insulting, unionists might be 
irritated by his English accent and aloof manner, but both 
sides admired the ease with which he distinguished the essential 
questions at issue in an industrial dispute. 
Within Bruce's ov/n department there was no-one who 
could give him expert advice on industrial matters. The Prime 
Minister's Department was mainly staffed by poorly-educated 
clerks who handled its extensive correspondence, ensuring 
that letters were directed to the most appropriate department. 
The Department was headed by Percy Deane and Frank Strahan, 
both of whom were young men of considerable ability, but they 
were treated as personal servants by Bruce, who did not expect 
them to advise him on major policy questions and who was even 
reluctant to allow them to draft important letters. In any 
case, the suave and gregarious Deane was more interested in 
1. C.P.D. V.92, 5 Aug. 1920, p.3329; v.93, 2 Sept. 1920, 
pTTOS 
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political intrigue than in policy-making. He detested Bruce.^ 
Bruce's chief adviser within the Cabinet on matters 
relating to industrial arbitration Y/as the Attorney-General, 
Littleton Groom, who in 1923 was aged 56, was a kindly, mild-
mannered, religious and hard-working man. He had represented 
the Darling Downs electorate since 1901, had first become a 
Minister in 1905, and had served as Attorney-General under 
n 
Deakin and Hughes. But Groom was a mediocre Attorney-General 
and did not carry much authority in Cabinet, Parliament or in 
his Department. He was not an experienced barrister, he con-
tributed little to the drafting of legislation, and he lacked 
the legal knowledge and the confidence necessary to give 
immediate opinions to his colleagues and subordinates. His 
extreme caution irritated both Ministers and the press, which 
referred to him as "little Miss Groom" or "the Ministerial 
.lellyfish",^ Groom had participated in all the debates on 
the Arbitration Act and he had a reasonable knowledge of the 
inadequacies of arbitration law. He had occasionally met 
deputations of employers and unionists, but he had never 
mediated in a major industrial stoppage. He was always happy 
to leave such a difficult task to the Prime Minister, 
1. Conversation vdth A-Ir. F. Strahan, 30 July, 1972, 
2. Sir Littleton E. Groom (1867-1936). L.F. Fitzhardinge 
edited a short biography, Nation building in Australia. 
Sydney, 1941, Groom is the subject of a doctoral thesis 
being ^vritten at the Australian National University by 
D. Garment, 
3. Herald. 17 Nov. 1925, p.6, Labor Call. 17 Dec. 1925, p.4, 
,'/es:ern Champion. 2 Jan. 
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The weaknesses of the Attorney-General were to some 
extent balanced by the expertise of his principal advisers, 
who were men of much greater ability, education and experience 
than the senior officers of other departments. Yet, although 
the staff of the Attorney-General's Department had increased 
considerably during the War, it was greatly overworked and 
there was insufficient specialization. There were only about 
12 men in the Central Office, and while some of them were 
experts in certain branches of the law, they were all expected 
to engage in drafting, advising, preparation for litigation 
and administrative work. The tardiness of other departments 
in sending in their instructions regarding proposed legis-
lation was a major cause of departmental inefficiency. "Again 
and again members of the staff are badly overv/orked during the 
Parliamentary sessions and legislation is produced and drafted 
hurriedly under conditions of the greatest pressure. In the 
meantime, administrative work falls into arrears, and corres-
pondence sometimes has to lie for a considerable period without 
answer."^ In addition, officers found difficulty in keeping 
abreast of developments in the law, and it was hardly sur-
prising that their legislation was frequently challenged in 
the High Court. 
Officers in the Central Office, Crown Solicitor's 
Office and Investigation Branch of the Department were often 
asked to report on alleged breaches of the Arbitration Act. 
1. J.G. Latham to G.S. Knowles, 5 Oct. 1954. (A.N.L. MS 
1009/55). 
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However, none of these men were experts in arbitration law, 
which was still a very new field. The Secretary of the 
Department referred all questions on arbitration law to 
Alexander Stewart, the Industrial Registrar. Stewart, a 
Ballarat lawyer who had held this position since 1907,^ had 
been closely associated with Higgins and was an ardent defender 
of Federal arbitration. Conscious of his expertise, he had 
no qualms in sending long submissions to the Minister suggest-
p 
ing important changes in policy and legislation. Stewart 
was considered to be hostile to certain employers,-^ As an 
officer of the Arbitration Court he worked under the direc-
tions of the President rather than the Department. 
Unlike Stewart, the three men who headed the Attorney-
General's Department believed strongly that arbitration policy 
was a question for Cabinet, not for public servants. Neverthe-
less, the borderline between policy and administration is a 
vague one, and these men had some influence on Government 
1. Alexander Stewart (1872-1929). The first Industrial 
Registrar had been G.H. Castle, who was Commonwealth 
Crown Solicitor from 1915 to 1926. 
2. A.M. Stewart to Latham, 17 May, 1926, Stewart to 
Latham, 29 Sept. 1927. (C.A.O". A432 29/3407). 
3. Victorian Chamber of Manufactures Gazette. 27 Nov. 1928; 
L. Smith, Secretary,•Central Council of Employers of 
Australia, to Latham, 23 April, 1928. W.R. Schwilk,' 
Secretary, Employers^ Federation of N.S.W., to Latham, 
26 March', 1929. ' (C.A.O. A432 29/1231). 
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policy-making. The Secretary of the Department was Sir Robert 
Garran, who was also Parliamentary Draftsman and Solicitor-
General.^ In the history of the Commonwealth no public 
servant has ever attained the fame and prestige of Garran. 
A graduate of Sydney University, he had been Secretary of the 
Drafting Committee at the Federal Conventions of 1897-98 and 
had written the authoritative work on the Australian Cons-
n 
titutiono He had become the first Commonwealth public 
servant in 1901 and headed the Attorney-General's Department 
for 51 years. Throughout this period he was directly concerned 
with all major legislation and litigation involving the Common-
wealth Government, and several Prime Ministers, including both 
Hughes and Bruce, treated him as their chief adviser on a wide 
range of policy matters. Erudite, cultured,^ with an un-
assuming manner and a dry humour, Garran was held in awe by 
parliamentarians, public servants and the press. In 1923 he 
was 56 and he was increasingly concentrating on major policies 
and leaving the routine administration of the Department to 
1. Sir Robert Garran (1867-1957). The office of Solicitor-
General was created in 1917. Shortly before he died, 
Garran wrote an autobiography entitled Prosper the Common-
wealth. Sydney, 1958. 
2. In collaboration with Quick. See p.19 footnote 2. 
5. Garran had an outstanding knowledge of German literature. 
He lectured on the work of Heine TAge. 30 April. 1925, 
p.13) and his translations of the songs of Schubert and 
Schumann were published in 1946. 
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his deputy and heir apparent, George Knowles. Knowles, 41, 
f^fas educated at Melbourne University and had risen rapidly 
tlirough the Department since joining it in 1907. A prodigious 
worker and outstanding draftsman, he was popular with his 
subordinates, although it was sometimes felt that he should 
delegate more responsibilities to them,^ The third officer 
who worked closely with the Attorney-General was Martin 
_ 2 
Boniwell, the Chief Clerk, Most of the arbitration legis-
lation of the 1920s was drafted by either Knowles or Boniwell, 
In view of their backgrounds, their training and the positions 
that they held, it was inevitable that Garran, Knowles and 
Boniwell should adopt a conservative and legalistic approach 
to industrial relations. Their contacts with unionists were 
limited and they were not concerned with flexibility, com-
promise or the "psychology of unionists". Instead, they 
regarded it as their duty to accept the stated objectives of 
the Arbitration Act, to identify weaknesses in the Act, to 
find evidence of breaches of the law, and to ensure that 
penalties for such breaches were enforced, 
Bruce and Groom and their advisers inherited from 
Hughes many problems and doubts arising from the contro-
1. Conversation with Mr. 7/.D. Fanning, 5 Dec. 1972. Sir 
George S. Knowles (1882-1947) succeeded Garran in 1931 
and neld the three offices of Secretary, Parliamentary 
Draftsman and Solicitor-General until 1946, He was 
then appointed the first Australian High Commissioner 
to South Africa, 
2. I^ a^rtin Boniwell (1883-1967) joined the Department in 
1912 and became Chief Clerk in 1921. He was later to 
be the Commonwealth Public Service Arbitrator 1959-46, 
and Parliamentary Draftsman 1946-49. 
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Yersial role of the Commonwealth Government in industrial 
relations. In particular, thej had to offer some answers 
to the questions that had become acute between 1914 and 
1920. Should the Federal Arbitration Court be retained? 
Should it be replaced by a system of wages boards or special 
tribunals? Should arbitration be left entirely to the 
States? Would it be preferable to return to a system of 
collective bargaining? If the Court was retained, should 
the Government again seek to extend its constitutional 
powers? If another referendum was pointless, how was the 
Government to deal with the problems of duplication and 
overlapping jurisdictions and the Court's inability to 
declare a common rule or to impose penalties? How could 
legislation overcome the delays and congestion in the Court, 
the serious economic consequences of some of its awards, and 
the continuance of industrial stoppages in defiance of both 
the Act and of awards? In major disputes, should the Govern-
ment remain aloof, leaving the settlement to the Court or 
the parties involved, or should it intervene by summoning 
conferences, putting forward proposals, protecting strike 
breakers and prosecuting strikers? Throughout its seven 
years in office the Bruce-Page Government was never able to 
avoid these questions for long. 
The questions can be divided into two classes. 
Many of them relate to the structure of industrial relations, 
to the need to create a system that would remove social 
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injustice and would settle industrial disputes both quickly 
and permanently. The other questions are concerned with 
the substance of industrial relations, that is, with the 
causes and results of strikes and lockouts and the action 
that the Government could take to end the stoppages. Despite 
their inter-connection, the two classes of questions will 
generally be considered separately in this thesis. In 
Chapters 1, 3, 4 and 6 a study will be made of the attempts 
of the Bruce-Page Government to change the constitutional 
and legislative basis of the Commonwealth industrial arbit-
ration system. Chapters 2 and 5 will be concerned with the 
intervention of the Government in the great disputes of 
1924-25 and 1927-29 and with the effect of these events on 
the Government's whole outlook on industrial relations» 
CHAPTER 1 
LITTLETON GROOM AND THE STRUCTURE OF 
INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION 
In the decade that followed the First World War 
conserYative individuals and organizations in many countries 
were extremely critical of the wide scope of governmental 
activities. Wartime governments had been forced to regulate 
the lives of their citizens to an unprecedented degree and 
it was not surprising that, with peace, there was an insistent 
demand that they relinquish the extensive powers and controls 
that they had assumed since 1914. Most governments found it 
necessary, however reluctantly, to make some concessions to 
this demand. In Britain, for example, the Baldwin Government, 
urged on by both employers and trade unionists, withdrew 
almost completely from the field of industrial regulation, 
a field in which the Lloyd George Government had been extremely 
active since the early years of the War.^ 
In Australia there was a similar questioning of the 
functions of government by men of a conservative disposition. 
The Prime Minister, W.M. Hughes, was increasingly criticised 
by employers, manufacturers, importers and pastoralists on 
account of his "socialistic" enthusiasm for the State enter-
prises which had been set up during the War. Such criticism 
1. See V.L. Allen. Trade unions and the government. London, 
1960, Chapter 3. 
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contributed to his downfall in February, 1923. The leaders 
of the new government, S.M. Bruce and Earle Page, despite 
their dissimilar characters, both felt the need to rationalize, 
to coordinate and to tidy up after the excesses of the Hughes 
regime. They believed that priority should be given to 
stabilising the relationship between the Commonwealth and the 
States, to tackling vigorously the question of populating and 
developing Australia and to abandoning those activities that 
were not the proper concern of the Commonwealth Government,' 
The Bruce-Page Government could not be accused of dilatoriness. 
Commonwealth-State relations and national development were 
examined in detail at the 1923 Premiers' ConferencQ,, with 
the Commonwealth Government committing itself to an active 
role in many spheres of economic life. On the other hand, 
the Government was almost as quick to make important changes 
in the management of the Commonwealth Bank and the Commonwealth 
Shipping Line and to arrange the sale of the Williamstown 
Dockyards and the Geelong Woollen Mills, suggesting that in 
some respects it had a more laissez-faire conception of 
government. ^  
The Commonwealth Government had accepted a role in 
industrial relations several years before it became involved 
in banking, shipping or manufacturing. But its efforts to 
1. For a study of Bruce's "ideology" and his view of the 
functions of government, see D.J.E. Potts. A study of 
three Nationalists in the Bruce-Page Government of 1923-
1929. M.A. thesis, University of Melbourne, 1972. 
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promote conciliation and arbitration were no less contro-
versial and it was inevitable that industrial relations should 
loom large in the plans of the new Government. At the 1922 
elections Hughes had committed his Government to maintaining 
the Commonwealth Arbitration Court,^ but after February 1923 
Bruce was free to consider the question of whether the Common-
wealth should continue to exercise the conciliation and arbi-
tration power granted to it by the Constitution. Critics of 
Federal arbitration were quick to see this and were determined 
to force Bruce to commit himself immediately, one way or the 
other, on this fundamental question. 
The most formidable opponent of Federal arbitration 
throughout the life of the Bruce-Page Government was Thomas 
Bavin. Bavin had had a varied career as a barrister, professor, 
secretary to a Prime Minister, journalist, conscriptionist and 
political maverick. In 1923, at the age of 49, he was New 
South Ylales Attorney-General and the strong man in the 
Nationalist Government. Bavin was critical of the whole idea 
of industrial arbitration: it was a negative system which 
prevented injustice and hardship and protected the mediocre 
man, but did not promote efficiency or recognize merit. 
Judges were unqualified to deal with the minute details of 
industry, which were better left to employers and employees, 
1. S.M.H. 25 Oct. 1922, p.13. 
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He opposed the extension of the arbitration system to cover 
the public service and semi-professional occupations, but 
recognized that the complete abolition of the system did not 
come within the realm of practical politics. It was conse-
quently the Federal arbitration system, rather than the 
general principle of arbitration, that Bavin continually 
attacked. He claimed that the Federal arbitration power 
had been an almost unmitigated disaster for Australian 
industries. The framers of the Constitution had intended 
it to be a reserve power, to be used only when the States 
could not effectively deal with a dispute. Instead, 95 per 
cent of the disputes dealt with by the Federal Court were 
not genuine interstate disputes at all. Industrial peace 
could not be promoted by a system that tended to make every 
dispute extend throughout Australia, that organized employers 
and wage-earners into huge, hostile bodies, and that made 
more and more difficult any close, personal association 
between employer and employee. Granting the Commonwealth 
complete industrial powers would mean the end of the Federal 
system in Australia and would prevent the Commonwealth 
Parliament from concentrating on national issues, such as 
defence and foreign relations. The only remedy to a chaotic 
situation was to confine the work of the Commonwealth Court 
to the shipping and shearing industries, with the States 
having full powers over industrial relations in all other 
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industries.^ 
The Country Party platform called for the replace-
ment of arbitration courts by conciliatory committees without 
compulsory powers. Bavin and other opponents of Federal 
arbitration therefore looked to Page as the man most likely 
to bring to an end, or at least to limit, the activities of 
the Federal Court. Even before Hughes had resigned. Bavin 
had visited Melbourne and had a long discussion with Page 
about arbitration, in case questions of policy were to 
arise during Page's negotiations with Bruce and the other 
Nationalists. In the next month he journeyed to Brisbane 
and sought the support of the Labour Premier, E.G. Theodore.^ 
In early March, 1923, Bavin arranged a conference with the 
Attorneys-General of Victoria, South"Australia and Western 
Australia, each of whom shared his hostility towards Federal 
arbitration. After two days' talks they presented to Bruce 
proposals that they hoped would be accepted at the forth-
coming Premiers' Conference.' L. 
1. S.M.H. 21 Feb. 1923, p.13, 22 March 1923, p.8. 
2. Ibid. 21 Feb. 1923, p.14. 
3. Ibid. 3 March 1923, p.13-
4. Ibid. 8 March 1923, p.9. 
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The State Attorneys-General stated that their 
objective was to expedite the settlement of industrial 
disputes, to prevent the overlapping of State and Federal 
jurisdictions and to protect responsible government in the 
States by exempting State instrumentalities from the juris-
diction of Federal tribunals. They argued that Federal 
control was necessary only in industries in which it was 
usual for employees to migrate from one State to another. 
An amendment of the Constitution would ultimately be 
needed to limit the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to 
these industries. In the meantime they urged that the 
Commonwealth Arbitration Act and the Industrial Peace Act 
be amended to limit their application to disputes in 
industries in which employees travelled from one State to 
another, and also to exclude explicitly industries carried 
on by State governments or by State statutory bodies.^ 
The Commonwealth Attorney-General's Department 
drafted a reply to the memorandum, which was approved by 
Bruce in April, 1923. The reply stated that the Common-
wealth Government was in full sympathy with the objects of 
the four State Attorneys-General. The main difficulties 
were the overlapping of Commonwealth and State awards, 
differing awards of State tribunals in industries in which 
1. Memorandum of State Attorneys-General, March 1923. 
(C.A.0.a432 29/3031). 
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there was interstate competition, the limitation of the 
Federal power to the methods of conciliation and arbitra-
tion and the absence of any machinery for adjusting and 
harmonizing inequalities between different awards. The 
Goverment agreed that the only effective and permanent 
solution was an amendment of the Constitution. But it 
asserted bluntly that full industrial powers to the States 
was out of the question and ultimately it might be necessary 
to give full control to the Commonwealth. In the meantime 
it conceded that it would be more satisfactory to divide 
industries, rather than industrial disputes, into Federal 
or State categories. However, the Commonwealth Government 
could not accept the contention of the States that the sole 
criterion of whether an industry was federal or not depended 
on the mobility of its employees. The conditions under 
which an industry could be better controlled on a Federal 
rather than a State basis were continually changing and no 
permanent definition of Federal industries could be formu-
lated. The Government proposed that a court or commission 
be appointed, composed of both Federal and State represen-
tatives, which would list from time to time the Federal 
industries. In addition, the Court could determine the 
basic wage and standard hours for the whole of Australia 
and hear appeals, instituted by either the parties to awards 
or by governments, whenever coordination of awards was 
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thought to be necessary. Until the list of Federal in-
dustries was drawn up, it was essential that the Commonwealth 
Arbitration Court should retain its existing powers.^ 
The Commonwealth Government's proposal was announced 
publicly by Bruce in early May, 1923, and was submitted to 
the State Attorneys-General at the Premiers' Conference later 
that month. The five Nationalist Attorneys-General adhered 
to their earlier memorandum and for two days there was a 
complete deadlock. Finally, the State representatives 
reluctantly accepted what was basically the Commonwealth 
proposal. The Conference agreed that, subject to agreement 
on the list of Federal industries and the principles on which 
revisions of the list were to be made, the Commonwealth 
Government should introduce legislation to amend the 
Constitution. The amendments would (i) incorporate the 
list of Federal industries and the principles of revision, 
(ii) provide for the establishment of a tribunal represent-
ing the Commonwealth and the States which would revise the 
list at intervals of not less than five years, (iii) give 
the Commonwealth Parliament legislative power over indust-
rial conditions in Federal industries, (iv) give the composite 
tribunal jurisdiction to review determinations of State 
1. Memorandum entitled "Commonwealth and State industrial 
powers", n.d. (C.A.O. A432 29/3031). 
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authorities, or to make an order where there was no State 
industrial authority, in cases where an industry in one 
State was prejudiced by interstate competition as a result 
of a State determination, (v) provide for the exclusion of 
State instrumentalities, including local authorities, from 
the industrial power of the Commonwealth,^ Littleton 
Groom_, the Commonwealth Attorney-General, promised to sub-
mit a list of Federal industries to the States within a 
o 
few months. 
The State representatives were generally un-
enthusiastic about the decision of the Premiers' Conference. 
Bavin said he would support an amendment of the Constitution, 
as it would remove the greatest evil: the overlapping of 
Federal and State jurisdictions. But he voiced a common 
complaint in regretting that another tribunal was to be 
created, increasing the scope for unnecessary litigation.^ 
The Metal Trades Employers Association denounced the 
proposals, declaring that it would rather submit to all 
industries coming within the Federal jurisdiction than con-
tinue with both Federal and State tribunals, 
1. Notes by Groom, 28 May 1923. (C.A.O. A432 29/3031). 
2. S.M.H. 30 May 1923, p.l3. 
3. Ibid. 
4. H.A. Smedley, Secretary, Metal Trades Employers ^ ^ , , 
Association of N.S.W. to Groom, 1 June 1923. (M.T.I.A.) 
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The proposals of the 1925 Premiers' Conference 
came to nothing. The New South Wales Government took steps 
to draw up a list of Federal industries, but no list was 
submitted to the Commonwealth Government by any of the 
State Governments. In the first half of 1924 Bavin again 
arranged a number of conferences with State Ministers^ but 
by June, 1924, he was asserting, somewhat bitterly, that 
only the Federal Government could remedy what was an intoler-
n 
able situation. The advent to power of Labour Governments 
in South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania in the 
course of 1924 probably brought to an end his proselytizing 
work on behalf of the 1923 proposals. The Labour Party was 
committed to full Commonwealth control over industrial 
matters, so that it was unlikely that the four Labour 
Attorneys-General would agree with Bavin on a list of Federal 
industries. 
Groom made some rough lists of Federal and State 
industries, but he did not present them to Cabinet. He had 
always been a strong advocate of Federal arbitration and 
his lists would have horrified Bavin, Sir Arthur Robinson 
and the other Nationalist Attorneys-General. In listing 
his Federal industries he wrote that they should include 
1. S.M.H. 12 Feb., 1924, p.9. 
2. Ibid. 18 June, 1924, p.13. 
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any industry that was affected by interstate trade, a 
definition that did not leave very much to the States. 
Apart from the shipping and pastoral industries he considered 
that ship-building, iron and steel manufacture, engineering, 
saw mills, flour mills, manufactured foods, meat works, the 
boot trade, felt-hatting, banks and insurance, journalism and 
the coal, glass, gas, rubber, tanning and theatrical indus-
tries should come within Federal jurisdiction.^ 
The failure of the Commonwealth Government to 
decide upon and submit to the States a list of Federal 
industries appears to have been due to two factors. The 
Cabinet was divided over the whole question. Groom favoured 
extensive Commonwealth industrial powers and more than once 
he raised the possibility of the States voluntarily granting 
p 
to the Commonwealth full powers. Yet in 1924 Page was 
stressing to Bruce that the unanimous view of their supporters, 
which he shared, was that the States should handle arbitra-
tion.^ It is probable that other Country Party Ministers, 
particularly P.G. Stewart, had the same belief. Secondly, 
it is doubtful if the Government was able to devote the 
necessary time to examining in detail a proposal that en-
tailed a referendum and that was full of political risks. 
1. List of federal industries. (A.N.L. MS 236/2/7291). 
2. Groom to Smedley, 20 Nov. 1923. (M.T.I.A.). 
3. E.C.G. Page to S.M. Bruce, 25 April 1924. (A.N.L. MS 
1633/25251 
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Bruce was absent from Australia at the Imperial Conference 
from September, 1925, to March, 1924, and four months later 
Groom left to attend the League of Nations Assembly. Before 
his departure Groom had been preoccupied, not with arbitra-
tion, but with the 1924 Bankruptcy Bill, while Bruce openly 
confessed that so far he had found the arbitration question 
almost insoluble.^ 
Thus after nearly two years in office the Bruce-
Page Govermient had completely failed to make a decision 
about the future of the Federal arbitration system. All 
the same, the events of 1925 were of some significance. 
The Nationalist Party organization, the Country Party 
Ministers and all employer organizations favoured the with-
drawal of the Commonwealth from almost the whole field of 
industrial relations. Yet Bruce, who claimed to be opposed 
to centralism and who had not been involved in the establish-
ment of the Federal arbitration system, showed no sympathy 
whatsoever for this view and refused even to discuss it. 
He was not prepared to go to the other extreme and advocate 
complete Federal control of arbitration. Such a proposal 
would have caused an uproar in his Party and antagonized 
most of the interest groups that supported it. Nevertheless, 
by summarily rejecting the idea of State control of arbi-
tration, Bruce had committed himself to the retention and 
1. Notes of d-eptation to Prime Minister from Central 
Council of Employers of Australia, 17 June 1924. 
(C.A.O. A458 fe02/l). 
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possibly the strengthening of Federal arbitration, at least 
for several years. Any other course would leave him open to 
the accusation that he had surrendered to pressure from 
Bavin, or Page, or the employers. 
The employers increasingly became disgruntled over 
the inactivity of both the Commonwealth and State Govern-
ments following the 1925 Premiers' Conference. At a public 
meeting in Sydney in June 1924, leading businessmen stated 
that Bruce's sympathy and fine words were not enough,^ and 
in the next few months such bodies as the Graziers' Association 
of New South Wales and the New South Wales and South Aust-
ralian Employers' Federation passed resolutions deploring 
the Federal Government's indecision in its approach to the 
p 
greatest problem facing Australian industry.^ This impatience 
with the Federal Government was shared by many other organiza-
tions, for all employer bodies were united in their attitude 
to Federal arbitration. At almost every conference of such 
interstate organizations as the Central Council of Employers 
of Australia, the Associated Chambers of Manufacturers, the 
Associated Chambers of Commerce, the Metal Trades Employers 
Association and the Graziers' Federal Council resolutions 
1. S.M.H. 18 June 1924, p.13. 
2. J. Allen, Secretary, Graziers' Association of N.S.W., to 
Bruce, 19 Sept. 1924. (C.A.O. A458 B502/1); resolutions 
moved at 12th annual conference of Central Comcil oi 
Employers of Australia, Oct. 1924. (A.C.E.F.). 
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were passed condemning the overlapping of Federal and State 
arbitration and demanding that the Federal .iurisdiction be 
limited to shipping and, perhaps, to shearing. Several 
deputations expressed these views to Bruce in 1924 and he 
received numerous letters on the subject, all substantially 
the same. No one could doubt the intensity of the employers' 
opposition to the conflicting arbitration systems or their 
conviction that State industrial regulation was preferable 
to Federal control. But when they came to amplify their 
statements, whether at conferences or during deputations to 
Ministers, their argmnents and examples were invariably 
poorly prepared, confusing and even contradictory.^ One 
delegate began his remarks by saying they realized Bruce 
knew as much about the subject as they did and, despite 
Bruce's frequent requests for precise information, it is 
doubtful if he learned very much from the employers' deputa-
tions. 
1. For instance, at the 1924 conference of the Central 
Council of Employers discussion was hampered by the 
confusion among the delegates on the questions of the 
Commonwealth's constitutional powers and the ideal 
remedies for their problems in the area of industrial 
relations. 
2. Notes of deputation to Prime Minister from Central 
Council of Employers of Australia, 17 June 1924 
(C.A.O. A458 E502/1). 
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Nevertheless, the employers' grievances were 
certainly genuine. The gist of their criticism was that the 
overlapping of awards led to continual confusion and uncer-
tainty among workers and management, enabled workers to 
obtain the advantages of two or more awards, caused resent-
ment ajnong workers who saw men engaged in the same class of 
work receiving higher wages or better conditions, and resulted 
in endless disputes within the factory and workshop and often 
litigation about the meaning and incidence of awards. While 
admitting the seriousness of such complaints, Commonwealth 
Ministers could not help observing that overlapping had not 
been a cause of large strikes. In 1920, when the Queensland 
branch of the Australian Workers' Union received a State 
award with higher rates than the Federal award, there had 
been strikes when the shearers moved south into New South 
Wales and were paid the lower rates.^ But the great majority 
of serious strikes in 1925 and 1924, as in earlier years, 
were in the coal mining and shipping industries, which were 
almost entirely regulated by Federal tribunals and where 
overlapping was not a serious problem. In the field of 
industrial relations the Federal Government was mainly 
concerned with major strikes in key industries, and Bruce 
might have moved much more swiftly if he had thought over-
lapping was a cause of such stoppages. 
1. See M. Perlman. Judges in industry, tfelbourne, 1954. 
pp.70-76. 
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The overlapping of Federal and State awards took 
two forms, "both of which were criticized by employers. An 
employee could work under two awards, obtaining the benefits 
of both and often avoiding the drawbacks of either. In 1925 
it was estimated that of 220,200 persons working under 
Commonwealth awards, 133,000 were also working under State 
awards.^ The High Court in Whybrow's case laid down that 
a Federal award could not conflict with a State law (which 
included an award or a wages board determination) but that 
the test of inconsistency was whether it was possible to 
obey both awards or not. For instance, if one award laid 
down a 44 hour week and the other laid down a 48 jaour week, 
it was possible to obey both awards if the employee worked 
44 hours, as the hours prescribed were the maximum hours. 
Similarly, if one award provided for a wage of £4 and the 
other a wage of £5, it was possible to obey both awards if 
the employee was paid £5, as the wage was a minimum wage. 
Thus the unions had nothing to lose and much to gain by 
moving back and forth between Federal and State tribunals, 
"picking the eyes" of both awards. The problem was aggravated 
by the marked differences between State and Federal awards. 
A typical example were mechanical engineers, who were paid 
£6.6.6 under a Federal award and £5.10.6 under the New South 
Wales award. 
1. W.H. Moore and E.C. Dyason. "Industrial relations in 
Australia", p.27. (A'.N.L. MS 1009/28). (Henceforth 
referred to as M.D.R.). 
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The second form of overlapping occurred when an 
employee worked under a single awai'd but discovered that 
his workmate, or men with the same tasks in a neighbouring 
factory, worked under a different award, with better rates 
or conditions. This was an obvious source of discontent 
and there was constant pressure on management to raise the 
level of the poorer paid worker in the interest of industrial 
peace. The problem was particularly acute with respect to 
hours, with different workers in the same factory working 
44, 45, 46i and 48 hours.^ 
Overlapping increased production costs, as under 
the first form employers were legally obliged to pay higher 
wages or grant better conditions than was intended by either 
tribunal, and under the second form there was strong pressure 
on them to try and lessen resentment and harmonize conditions 
by improving the rates or conditions of certain workers, it 
also increased costs by causing numerous minor stoppages and 
delays and by necessitating the appointment of industrial 
officers who spent all their time trying to unravel and 
observe complicated and conflicting awards. Employers com-
plained that industrial relations occupied most of their 
p 
time, so that the rest of their work suffered. One employer 
1. Statement issued by Central Council of Employers of 
Australia. (M.D.R. Appendix E,4). 
2. G. Delprat, General Manager of B.H.P., said that for 
eight years he had continually been involved in industrial 
litigaiion and he had never had less than two cases pend-
ing. F.A.W. Gisborne. "Arbitration in Australia". 
Edinburgh Review V. 241 (April 1925) p.245. 
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told Bruce: "What we must have is simplicity and stability. 
We must be relieved of the need to waste a big proportion of 
our time in discussing law, travelling to Court, waiting at 
Court, appealing against Court decrees and fighting over 
legal technicalities. m1 
While the consequences of overlapping were extremely 
serious and were felt by as many as 60 industries in Victoria 
alone, the employers' case suffered from their inability to 
distinguish the results of conflicting Federal and State 
jurisdiction from the drawbacks of arbitration generally. 
For instance, they mentioned that carters and drivers who 
worked under the timberworkers' award worked 44 hours and 
those who worked under the carters and drivers' award worked p 
48 hours. Yet both were Federal awards. Many employers 
cited the various rates of pay received by different carters 
and drivers, due to the fact they were covered by four 
Federal awards and several State awards.^ This highlighted 
the crux of the problem: employers suffered mainly from 
1. Smedley to Bruce, 18 May 1923. (M.T.I.A.) 
2. Central Council of Employers statement, op. cit. 
3. Ibid; Western Australian Employers' Federation, 
"Industrial arbitration; some notes on the operation 
of the system in Western Australia." (M.D.R. 
Appendix E.l). 
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the overlapping of awards per se, and while this was aggra-
vated by the overlapping of Federal and State jurisdiction, 
the problem would remain even if dual control came to an end. 
The Federal Court could be abolished, but the employees in 
a large organization such as B.H.P. or H.V. McKay would 
continue to work under dozens of different State awards, 
many of them overlapping and conflicting. The existence 
of both craft and industry awards led to considerable dis-
content and confusion,^ but this was a problem created 
largely by the tribunals and not by governments. 
In their submissions the employers concentrated 
on the troubles they faced as a result of the division of 
the arbitration power between the Commonwealth and the 
States, and did not give any lengthy explanation of the 
superiority of State tribunals. Traditionally, the Federal 
Court had paid higher rates than the State tribunals and 
the employers had little liking for the two Presidents, 
Higgins and Powers. By 1925 the differences between the 
Federal and State basic wages were not great and the 
Queensland Arbitration Court for some years had awarded 
higher rates than the Federal Court. But the traditional 
view that the Federal Court was more sympathetic to the 
1, Higgins awarded the first craft award (to the engine-
drivers) in 191$ because he felt that the interests of 
skilled craftsmen could be overlooked in industry awards. 
But the worst cases of overlapping arose from the 
existence of the two types of awards. 
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employees persisted up to 1926, Some employers complained 
that Federal awards were far more oomplicated than State 
awards,^ In the smaller States it was believed that the 
State tribunals were more familiar with local conditions 
and could deal with disputes far more speedily and cheaply 
than the Federal Court. It was claimed that some Federal 
wages were based on the cost of living figures in Melboirrnt^  
and that these were higher than in the other States® In 
Victoria and Tasmania employers' criticism of the Federal 
Court was linlied to their opposition to arbitration in 
general and their support for the wages board system. 
Finally, employers criticized the Federal Court because nf 
its inability to make a common rule,^ but this defect would 
have been overcome if full industrial powers had been ^ n-veri 
to the Commonwealth, 
The views of the trade unions and the political 
parties regarding Commonwealth or State control of inauscrial 
arbitration were no less emphatic than those of the employe^^:% 
Deputations from the Melbourne Trades Hall Council and the 
1. Smedley to Bruce, 18 May 1923 (M.T.I.A.) 
2. G.H. Boykett. Secretary, South Australian Employer.^" 
Federation, to L. Smith. (M.D.R. Appendix E.4)« 
3. Western Australian Employers' Federation. Notes, oo.cit 
4. Ibid.' 
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Commonwealth Council of Federated Trade Unions told Bruce 
in 1923 and 1925 that although they favoured a system of 
industrial boards rather than an Arbitration Court, they 
believed that the Commonwealth should have full industrial 
powers.^ The Labour Party had always held this viewo 
In practice, the labour movement was not quite so united, 
as unionists in Queensland and Western Australia were 
showing a preference for State awards. The Australian 
National Federation and also some of the State organizations 
of the Nationalist Party passed resolutions in 1923 and 
1924 calling for an amendment of the Constitution to limit 
the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to industries of a 
genuinely interstate character and to exempt all State 
instrumentalities from Federal jurisdiction. In New South 
Wales the Consultative Council told Bruce in March 192^ -
that action was needed urgently and it was critical of 
the Government's 1923 proposals. However, it was well 
known that the influence of the Nationalist organization 
on policy-making was negligible. 
In January 1925 Groom returned to Australia and 
he and Bruce agreed that a decision about the future of 
1. Notes of deputation to Prime Minister from Melbourne 
Trades Hall Council, 25 March 1923. (C.A.O. CP 317/5); 
Age. 14 Feb. 1925, p.l7-
2. A. Parkhill, Secretary, Consultative Council, to Bruce, 
8 March 1924. (C.A.O". A458 B502/1); Australian National 
Review. 20 Nov. 1924, p.15. 
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the Federal arbitration system could not be postponed much 
longer. A strike of the Seamen's j^'ederation was holding 
up shipping in every major port in the country^ and con-
demnation of the arbitration system that failed to prevent 
such strikes was being voiced by the press, employer organi-
zations, primary producers' groups and Nationalist and 
Country Party politicians. In public references to arbitra-
tion Bruce implied that the Goverment no longer felt bound 
p 
by the 1923 proposals, but he characteristically avoided 
committing the Government until a detailed and expert study 
had been made of the whole arbitration system. 
The terms of reference of this study showed that 
Bruce was interested in all aspects of arbitration. Previous 
Goverments, and particularly their Attorneys-General, had 
been concerned largely with the legal problems associated 
with arbitration - the overlapping of Federal and State 
jurisdictions, the common rule, penalties, and the constitu-
tion of the Court. Bruce asked for a report on these problems 
but, in addition, he requested a general review of the effects 
of industrial regulation on the Australian economy. The 
Commonwealth Government had always been concerned about the 
economic consequences of industrial stoppages. But Hughes 
1. See below. Chapter 2. 
2. S.M.H. 27 Jan. 1925, p.9. 
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and his predecessors had shown little interest in the economic 
effects of the means used to prevent stoppages, perhaps 
assuming that no award could be as costly as a strike. The 
employers had always complained about the repercussions of 
Court awards on particular industries and on the whole 
economy, and in 1925 the Government finally decided to 
investigate the question. 
The Government's action was prompted by a general 
interest in a complex question rather than by any sudden 
concern about the state of the economy. Australia had to 
a large degree recovered from the boom and depression period 
of 1919-1922 and in 1924-25 was probably in a more prosperous 
position than at any other time in the 1920s.^ In December, 
1924, Bruce stated that Australia's prospects had never been 
so bright. He went on to say that prices were high for the 
country's staple products, methods of production and organi-
zation were being rapidly improved, more money would be 
available for development and the establishment of new 
industries, and the burden of taxation and debt would be p 
lightened. Much of what Bruce said was indisputable. 
There were bumper harvests in 1924/25 and the price of wool 
reached a record level. By 1924 productivity and real wages 
1. See C.B. Schedvin. Australia and the great depression, 
Sydney, 1970. pp.53-59. 
2. Argus. 5 Dec. 1924, pp.11-12. 
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had at last passed the 1911 mark. Coal production reached 
a record level in 1924 and the output of steel was increasing 
rapidly. In manufacturing the boom caused by the War and the 
1920 tariff was ending, but the rate of investment in manu-
facturing in the mid 1920s was still high and the market was 
expanding, with a mass market developing for motor vehicles 
and electrical goods,^ Due to rapidly increasing customs 
revenue, the Commonwealth Government had a budget surplus of 
£4.5iii. in 1925/24 and Elm. in 1924/25. Page was able to 
abolish land tax on crown leaseholds in 1923, reduce income 
tax rates in 1924 and 1925, and raise the taxable limit in 
1924. 
However, in some respects the economic position 
was unsatisfactory. Certain industries were in difficulties. 
Shipbuilding had lapsed in the early 1920s, coalmining was 
increasingly suffering from a surplus of labour and excessive 
capital, the engineering trades languished with the return 
of foreign competition, and the wool textile industry was 
faced with decreasing output and increasing unemployment. 
Many manufacturing industries were feeling the effects of 
over-capitalization, a shortage of skilled labour and in-
creased costs at a time when import prices were falling, and 
1. See C. Forster. Industrial development in Australia, 
1920-1930. Canberra, 1964. Chapters 2, 5. 
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in 1925 it was necessary for the Government to make further 
tariff increases.^ Perhaps the must serious problem was 
the continuance of the high unemployment rate. In 1924/25 
the proportion of Australian unionists unemployed fluctuated 
between 9.3 and 10.5 per cent. The percentage was much 
n 
higher in New South Wales and relatively high in Victoriao 
The Government's interest in the economic as well 
as the legal aspects of arbitration was reflected in the 
choice of the two men who were asked to prepare a report on 
industrial relations in Australia. William Harrison Moore 
had been Professor of Law at the University of Melbourne 
since 1892, had written extensively on Australian constitu-
tional law, and had a deep understanding of politics through 
6 
his friendship with many Federal and Victorial politicians.^ 
E.G. Dyason was a leading Melbourne stockbroker who often 
contributed articles to economic journals and whose advice 
was to be sought by the Comonwealth Government on a number 
of subsequent occasions.^ Their 60 page report, divided 
1. See C. Forster, op.cit. pp.79, 95-96, 99, 110. 
2. Labour Report, no. 16, pp.118-21. 
3. Harrison Moore (1867-1935) was knighted later in 1925 
and retired as Professor of Law in the same year« He 
represented Australia at the League of Nations Assembly 
in 1927-29. He was the author of The Constitution of 
the Commonwealth of Australia (1902K 
4. Edward Dyason (1886-1949) was for many years a mining 
engineer and was President of the Victorian Chamber of 
Mines 1918-20. In the 1920s he founded the stock-
broking firm of Edward Dyason & Co. ^ d became the 
director of many companies. He was President of the 
Economics Socieiy 1950-32. 
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into Economic and Legal sections, together with its 
appendices, was presented to the Government in March, 1925.^ 
The Economic section of the report was rather 
negative in tone. Moore and Dyason came to the conclusion 
that labour regulation had had little effect on the productive 
capacity of workers, on the proportion of production going 
to labour, on the unemployment levels, or on the number of 
industrial stoppages. More positively, they suggested that 
the arbitration system had prevented the violent fluctuation 
in nominal wages that had occurred in other countries and 
that it had raised real wages in States such as Victoria 
and Tasmania, or in industries where the level of wages was 
unduly low, to approximately the general level. They recom-
mended that the Government should publicize the distinction 
between nominal and real wages and also the fact that most 
strikes, since 1919, had ended in victory for the employers. 
They urged that an Economic Service be set up to assess 
quantitatively the factors such as wages, prices, tariffs 
and unemployment, on which the Arbitration Court's judge-
ments were based. 
1. The report was entitled "Industrial relations in Aust-
ralia". It was printed, but the authors were not 
identified. However, the appendices and a letter from 
Dyason to Garran, 10 Feb. 1925 (C.A.O. A432 29/3407) 
clearly indicate that Moore and Dyason were members oi 
"the Committee" which produced the report. If there 
were any other members they were extremely silent and 
inactive® 
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Perhaps the most important point which Moore and 
Dyason made in the Economic Section of their Report was the 
economic insignificance of industrial stoppages compared 
with the serious effects of Australia's high level of unem-
ployment. The numiber of days lost per worker through strikes 
had averaged 1.5 over the last 11 years, while the loss 
through unemployment had been 15 times greater. They there-
fore felt that legislation aimed at reducing the number of 
stoppages was unnecessary, especially as most strikes took 
place in the mining industry and were due to the peculiar 
circumstances of that industry.^ In fact, they suggested 
that as the burden of unemployment fell primarily on the 
workers, while strikes were aimed at the employers, legis-
lation that neglected unemployment but increased penalties 
p 
on strikes was based on class interest. 
The Legal section of the Report, which was much 
longer, dealt with the constitutional question of the 
division of the arbitration power between the Commonwealth 
and the States. But it was not restricted to that question, 
for it discussed at some length the problems of overlapping 
awards, the common rule, the basic wage, the enforcement of 
1. Moore-Dyason Report, p.17. 
2. Ibid. Appendix A.l. 
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awards and the constitution of the Federal Court, in most 
cases suggesting amendments that could be made to the 
Arbitration Act. 
In dealing with the division of the arbitration 
pov/er Moore and Dyason's reasoning was tortuous and con-
fusing and the ideas that they rejected were much more 
clear than those that they favoured. They opposed the 1925 
scheme and they also opposed placing all industries under 
Commonwealth control. They argued that the number of 
genuine interstate strikes was minimal, that industrial 
operations was so vast and complicated a subject that it 
would take up all the time of the Commonwealth Parliament, 
that in any case the States would still be responsible 
for apprenticeship, unemployment, workers' compensation 
and factory legislation, that full control for the Common-
wealth could destroy the federal system and lead to the 
creation of two great opposing organizations of employers 
and unions, and that the Nationalist Party and the employers 
favoured a restriction, not an extension, of Commonwealth 
powers. Although a single authority should ideally deal 
with industrial disputes, they decided that the dual 
system would have to continue. Disputes in certain indus-
tries tended to be national in their extent or effects and 
they specified shearing, shipping, stevedoring and coal-
mining. Moore and Dyason therefore recommended that the 
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Constitution be amended to give the Commonwealth Parliament 
power to make laws for the prevention and settlement of 
industrial disputes in these four industries. The power 
was not to be limited to the methods of conciliation and 
arbitration, nor was it to be confined to interstate dis-
putes,^ But it was astonishing that the power should be 
limited to disputes, rather than industrial matters, for 
it was a standard criticism of Section 51 (xzxv) of the 
Constitution that before there could be industrial peace 
there had to be industrial war. Even more astonishing was 
the fact that Moore and Dyason believed that Section 51 
(xxxv) should be retained, as otherwise it would be alleged 
that the Government was seeking to abolish arbitration 
generally. This may have been true, but to add a second 
section to the Constitution referring to industrial disputes 
would have compounded the problems and satisfied no one. 
Turning from the general constitutional question, 
an important part of the Report dealt with the overlapping 
of awards, which Moore and Dyason recognized as the most 
serious defect of the dual arbitration system. In addition 
to the usual complaints, they expressed the opinion that 
when depositories of law and justice presented themselves 
as rival shops it must result in a serious lack of respect 
for the system, and this was particularly grave as the 
1. Moore-Dyason Report, pp.45-46. 
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system was weak in sanctions and depended on the respect and 
prestige that it could command. They put forward four pro-
posals which they thought could facilitate the co-ordination 
of Commonwealth and State awards. Three involved amendments 
to the Arbitration Act, and the fourth required a constitu-
tional amendment. One difficulty in the way of co-ordinating 
awards was that they were not coextensive, owing to the in-
ability of the Federal Court to make a common rule. The 
situation became chaotic when Federal awards were varied 
several times, with each variation prescribing different 
rates and each applying to only some of the original parties. 
Moore believed that the High Court was moving towards a 
position where the common rule would not be held to be ultra 
vires, but it would be premature for the Goverment to act 
on this assumption. Nevertheless, he thought that the law 
might be amended by resorting to the Equity notion of repre-
sentative action.^ This would mean that where there was a 
large number of parties to a dispute, the plaint could be 
submitted to only a select number of them, as representative 
of the others, 
Moore and Dyason believed that the Arbitration Act 
should provide more guidance to the Court than simply stating 
that awards were to be made on the basis of "equity, good 
conscience and the substantial merits of the case." They 
1. Moore-Dyason Report, Appendix C.5. 
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especially criticized the Court's doctrine of the living 
wage on the grounds that capacity to pay, not the cost of 
living, should be the deciding factor in altering wage 
rates. They therefore thought the Court should be made 
aware of the importance of the actual production of the 
country as the ultimate fund from which workers' real wages 
were paid. They recommended an amendment to the Act stating 
that "in making every award (the Court) shall have regard 
to the standard of living, the productivity of industry, 
and the public welfare."^ 
The most original ideas in the Report were con-
tained in the section dealing with the enforcement of 
awards. It referred to some of the practical difficulties 
that had been encountered. For instance, a union could 
only be successfully prosecuted for striking if it was 
proved that it had authorized the acts of its members and 
that the members were acting in combination, not separately. 
In any case, there was a general reluctance to put the 
penal provisions of the Act into operation and the Court 
had no authority to deal with sympathy strikes. The problems 
of enforcement would become more acute if worsening economic 
conditions prevented the Court from improving or even main-
taining the workers' wages and conditions. Moore and Dyason 
were very critical of penalties bein^ imposed on individuals. 
1. Moore-Dyason Report, p.48. 
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They suggested that to forbid men to withhold their co-
operation in economic services was a form of conscription 
of labour. The imposition of penalties on large numbers 
of men, most of whom had always been law-abiding, would 
cause strong revulsion against the system and would engender 
class hostility and conflict. The preservation of indus-
trial peace was different from the ordinary preservation 
of law and order. Compulsion was only effective if there 
was widespread public opinion in favour of the application 
of the law, irrespective of personal sympathy with either 
side or personal views on the merits of the claims. The 
dislocation caused by strikes had been comparatively small 
and, as a result, public opinion did not support the auto-
matic application of legal penalties. The framers of the 
Arbitration Act had seen arbitration as a substitute for 
stoppages, but a large section of the public regarded it 
merely as an alternative to stoppages, and it was therefore 
more realistic to remove the penalties on strikes and 
lockouts.^ 
Moore and Dyason believed that the most effective 
sanctions were not those which imposed the ordinary penal-
ties of criminal law but those which deprived organizations 
of the benefits arising under the Arbitration Act. There 
was evidence that many unions did fear the loss of an award 
1. Moore-Dyason Report, pp.48-50. 
63 
or deregistration. They recommended that registration be 
conditional on security being given for the observance of 
the Act and that a bond should be required for all organiza-
tions that were parties to awards. In proceedings against 
organizations for forfeit of their bond or deregistration, 
acts done by members of the organization should be deemed 
to be acts of the organization itself, unless it was proved 
that the organization had done everything possible to 
prevent its members from committing a breach of the award. 
Moore and Dyason felt that the Court would exercise stronger 
curbs on union militancy if the Act required the rules of 
organizations to provide for greater control over the rank 
and file and close supervision of finances. However, it 
was not thought necessary to provide for official control 
of union elections.^ 
Moore and Dyason were rather undecided about the 
ideal constitution of the Court. An arbitrator did not 
need high legal attainments, it was undesirable for judges 
to be brought within the political battlefield, and there 
was much to be said for having a trained economist as 
arbitrator. On the other hand, it was most inconvenient 
for the Court not to have judicial powers when the line 
between judicial powers and powers incidental to arbitra-
tion was often obscure. In addition, permanent tenure 
1. Moore-Dyason Report, pp.52-61. 
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would be necessary to attract able men, as otherwise they 
would always fear that controversial awards would lead to 
their non-appointment when their term expired. Moore and 
Dyason therefore recommended that members of the Arbitration 
Court should have the tenure of High Court judges but that 
pensions be provided to encourage them to retire when age 
or illness weakened their capacity.^ 
Scattered through the Legal Section of the Report 
were a few other ideas of some significance. The Crown 
should be able to intervene in any proceedings in the Court 
involving the public interest, counsel should be allowed 
to appear by leave of the Court, and the Full Court should 
be constituted from time to time to deal with matters of 
general importance. Finally, the Report was very critical 
of the Industrial Peace Act and recommended that sections 
of it be repealed. The Act invited resort to different 
tribunals and gave dangerous powers to Ministers, who could 
act in collusion with the chairmen of tribunals and grant 
demands without enquiry. 
The Moore-Dyason Report had no influence on 
attitudes towards arbitration outside the Government, for 
it remained a confidential document; in fact, its very 
existence was never made public. But within the Government 
its influence was powerful, at least up to 1929. Many of 
1. Moore-Dyason Report, pp.62-63. 
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its recommendations were incorporated wholesale into sub-
sequent legislation and Ministers often referred to it for 
points for speeches. Groom's successor made a most detailed 
study of it and in 1927 used it to support his case for the 
reduction of arbitration penalties. The Report had been 
preceded by an immense amount of research and its appendices 
contained statistical and other information drawn from a 
very wide range of sources. The Report had weaknesses. It 
was written hurriedly and its arguments and conclusions 
could have been presented more logically. It was extremely 
tentative on some of the economic questions and on other 
matters it was equivocal. But, despite these weaknesses, 
it was the only comprehensive study of arbitration made 
under the Bruce-Page Government and it provided much of the 
framework for the debate on arbitration in the following 
years. 
There were not a great many completely original 
ideas in the Report and its importance was partly due to 
the fact that it channeled into the Goverment the ideas 
and data of a great many authorities. For instance, the 
Economic section was based heavily on the work of the 
statistician, J.T. Sutcliffe and the English economist, 
A. Pigou. The proposals relating to overlapping, the 
common rule, the basic wage and penalties were influenced 
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1 ? 
by the writings of Higgins, Jethro Brown, G.S. Beebj and 
T. McCawlej.^ The submissions of employer organizations 
were collected together and examined, although they seem to 
have strengthened rather than changed the views that Moore 
already held. The two men do not appear to have given any 
serious considerations to the proposals of trade unionists, 
although they certainly took into account the attitudes of 
unionists towards strike penalties. 
As the inquiry was confidential, the only sub-
missions came from within the Government. A.M. Stewart, 
the Industrial Registrar, argued strongly in favour of 
Commonwealth supremacy in industrial relations, but his 
1. William Jethro Brown (1868-1930), Professor of Law and 
Modern History, University of Tasmania 1893-1900, Pro-
fessor of Law'. Adelaide University 1906-16, President 
of the South Australian Industrial Court 1916-27. 
Author of many works on jurisprudence and industrial 
relations. 
2. Sir George Beeby (1869-1942), accountant, journalist. 
New South Wales' parliamentarian 1907-20, Minister in 
McGowen Labour Government 1910-12 and Holman Nationa-
list Government 1916-19, Judge of New South Wales 
Industrial Arbitration Court 1920-26, Judge of Common-
wealth Arbitration Court 1926-41, Chief Judge 1939-41. 
5. Thomas McCawley (1881-1925), Queensland Crown Solicitor 
1910-15, Judge' of Queensland Supreme Court 1917-25, 
Chief Justice 1922-25, President of Queensland Court 
of Industrial Arbitration 1917-25. 
4 A.M. Stewart. "Amendments which might be made to^ t^he 
present Act without any constitutional amendment." 
CM.D.R. Appendix C.4)'. 
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views had little influence. Moore and Dyason accepted his 
view that a Federal award should override a State award 
and that the Court should have judicial pov/er, but Stewart 
was not alone in making these suggestions. The Report 
specifically rejected his proposal that the Act should 
provide for the appointment of conciliation commissioners, 
shop committees and other conciliation machinery, arguing 
that the value of conciliation depended on its voluntary 
character. 
The other submission, drawn up by Sir Robert 
Garran and M.C. Boniwell, was very different in tone.^ 
The Attorney-General's Department favoured a hard-line 
policy towards the unions and almost all its recommendations 
involved the imposition of penalties. It suggested that 
the Commonwealth should have jurisdiction over all dis-
putes in interstate or overseas shipping and that in such 
disputes, or where there was interference with a Common-
wealth service, the Government should have the power to 
suspend or cancel a union's registration. The suggestion, 
which reflected the Department's preoccupation with shipping 
strikes, was not approved by Moore. Garran urged that the 
Court should demand a bond for the observance of each award. 
1. Attorney-General's Department. "Suggestions for amend-
ment of' the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration 
Act", 2 Feb. 1925. (M.D.R. Appendix C.7). 
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cancel awards on deregistration, vest the property of a 
deregistered union in a voluntary association, cancel the 
union membership of an individual convicted of striking, 
and issue injunctions restraining any person from instiga-
ting or aiding a strike, with imprisonment or deportation 
as penalties. He also claimed that offences against the 
Act and failure to comply with an award by members of an 
organization should be grounds for deregistration, and 
that the rules of a registered union should provide for 
the election of officers under the supervision of the 
Commonwealth Electoral Office, and for control of members 
by their Committee of Management. The proposals relating 
to bonds, cancellation of awards, deregistration, and con-
trol of rank and file unionists were incorporated in the 
Moore-Dyason Report. 
The most original proposals of Moore and Dyason 
were those aimed at overcoming the overlapping of Federal 
and State awards and those suggesting that penalties should 
be confined to deregistration, cancellation of awards, or 
forfeiture of bonds. Some employers had rejected the idea 
of penalties on the grounds of their one-sidedness,^ but 
the Moore-Dyason argument, with its emphasis on public 
opinion, the distinction between arbitration law and other 
laws, and the economic insignificance of strikes, was a 
1. Western Australian Employers' Federation. Notes, op.cit 
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novel oneo The subject of penalties was one of the two 
areas of disagreement between Moore and Dyason and the 
Attorney-General's Department. The other was over the 
extent of Commonwealth jurisdiction, for the Department 
had made no attempt to define and delimit Federal indus-
tries. It was left to Groom and his colleagues in Cabinet 
to decide which view should prevail. 
Bruce had first hinted that the Government was 
considering the amendment of the Arbitration Act in 
January, 1925. In a speech in Melbourne he stated that 
although the arbitration system had been found to be in-
effective, the complete abolition of arbitration was out 
of the question, for it would lead to class war and 
ultimately either to the degradation of the worker or to 
Bolshevism. But it was essential to find some way to deal 
with the overlapping of awards and to secure their obser-
vance by employees as well as employers. Greater power 
should be given to the Court to enforce awards and greater 
recognition should be given by the law to trade unions and 
their management.^ Bruce's speech was criticized for its 
p 
vagueness but it did, in fact, summarize the objectives 
of the 1925 Arbitration Bill. 
1. S.M.H. 27 Jan. 1925, p.9., Herald. 27 Jan. 1925, p.6. 
2. 30 Jan. 1925, p.9. Liberty and Progress, v.22, 
31 Jan. 1925, pp.1-2. 
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The Government received the Moore-Dyason Report 
in March, 1925. In the following month Groom asked Justice 
Powers for his ideas on the amendment of the Act. Powers' 
chief concern was that the Court should be given judicial 
power so that it could enforce its awards and orders. He 
wrote "The Court cannot interpret its own awards, cancel 
its awards, interpret sections of the Arbitration Act, 
compel persons to attend conferences, compel witnesses to 
answer questions, enforce awards by punishing for breaches, 
enforce orders, deal with offences against the Act, deal 
with organizations and members who disobey awards or orders, 
ensure decorum and respect by punishing for contempt of 
Court, protect witnesses or decide appeals from the Registrar"."^ 
It ?/as even doubtful if the Court could deregister unions. 
The simplest solution was to give the judges life tenure. 
The Deputy Presidents of the Court, Quick and Webb, supported 
Powers' appeal for judicial powers, with Webb describing to 
Groom in dramatic terms the humiliation that they suffered 
p 
because of the Court's impotence. 
Powers made numerous other suggestions. He and 
the Deputy Presidents believed that the best solution to 
overlapping was to give the Commonwealth power over all 
industrial matters. ' The Court should have authority to 
1. C. Powers to Groom, 5 May, 1925. (A.N.L. MS 1009/28). 
2. N. Webb to Groom, 20 Feb. 1925 (A.N.L. MS 236/2/3140). 
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consider the question of excess profits and to allow higher 
rates where the industry could afford them, especially as 
the CouTt had fixed wages at less than the basic wage in 
some mining cases where the businesses ?/ere in difficulties« 
Power was needed to increase an organization's security to 
£500 or £1,000, to cancel awards where employees refused to 
work or to obey av/ards, to deregister organizations that 
nad passed rules or orders contrary to an award or instruc-
tirig or advising members to refuse vrork in accordance with 
an award, and to disallow union rules that were contrary to 
law or were tyrannical or oppressive. Powers also suggested 
that the Act should provide that awards were to lapse when 
an organization was deregistered, that unions should be 
liable for the actions of their branch officers, and that 
they should be able to dismiss members v/ho committed breaches 
of awards. 
The Goverrjnent did not seek the views of any other 
individual or organization. Employer organizations, such 
as the Central Council of Employers of Australia, the Associated 
Chambers of Manufactures, and the Commonwealth Steamship 
Ovmers Association continued to send submissions and deputa-
tions.^ Their viev/s were noted but they had no direct 
1923 ReT3ort of Commonwealth Steamship Owners Federation 
(C.S.O.A.); Employers' Federation of N.S.W., Industrial 
Bulletin. Jan. 1925, pp.12-14; W.C. Myhill, Secretary, 
L-e:al -rades Employers Association of N.S.W., to ^ 
Edwards, Secretary, N.S.W. Chamber of Manufactures, 
27 Feb. 1925. (M.T.I.A.J 
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influence on the drafting of the Bill,' 
Among the employers' demands can be discerned con-
flicting ideas about the groups within unions that were 
responsible for strikes, and these conflicting ideas were 
also present in the thinking of Commonwealth Ministers. 
The Court, the employers, the Attorney-General's Department 
and Moore and Dyason all urged that unions be liable for 
the acts of their members, and not merely for the acts of 
their officials, and that union rules should provide for 
the tight control of their rank and file by the committee 
of management. Powers in particular had known many disputes 
in v/hich irresponsible unionists had acted in defiance of 
the instructions of their officials. On the other hand, 
there v/as a widely-held belief among employers, newspaper 
editors and men in Government that strikes were caused by 
the power of agitators who occupied official positions 
within the unions and who manipulated "the sane, decent 
rank and file". Many of those who held this belief came 
to have a great faith in the power of the secret ballot 
to overcome militant officialdom, 
Bruce was a strong believer in the secret balloi: 
and all references to the impending amendments to the 
Arbitration Act mentioned that they would include provisions 
for union ballots. Some of his supporters were more sceptical. 
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The Nationalist backbencher, J.G. Latham, saw Bruce and 
told him of the doubts, which he shared, expressed by Judge 
Rolin of the New South Wales Industrial Arbitration Court. 
Rolin said that a secret ballot would be futile as the 
union could simply refuse to take it or it could draw up 
a roll of voters to suit its own purposes. Above all, he 
criticized the assumption that the ballot would always show 
a aajority against the strike. There were no grounds for 
this ass^uaption and an affirmative vote would endow a strike 
with a legality which under the Act it did not possess, 
Latham fo^und that, while Bruce admitted that the proposal 
might have weaknesses, he remained committed to it.^ 
Powers' submission was received by the Government 
on 6 May 1925. Ten days later Groom presented the first 
draft of the Arbitration Bill to Cabinet, together with the 
p 
comments of Moore and Dyason, The later drafts of the 
Bill were coapleted and discussed by Cabinet in June 1925. 
Cabinet agreed with Groom that it should not seek, by 
referendum, full industrial powers for the Commonwealth, 
The proposal that- the Commonwealth arbitration power be 
limited to two or three industries was likewise rejected. 
1. T. Rolin to Latham, 22 Oct. 1925. Latham to Rolin, 
29 Oct. 1925. (A.N.L. MS 1009/1). 
2. Draft of 1925 Arbitration Bill. (C.A.O. A2863). 
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Instead, it was decided that the Amending Bill should be a 
less radical measure. Its main objects would be to revise 
the constitution of the Court, to minimize the overlapping 
of awards, to allow the Commonwealth Government to inter-
vene in Court proceedings, and to ensure the observance of 
awards. 
The Court was to be reconstituted in order to 
give it .iu-dicial powers. It would consist of three judgesj 
one of whom would be President, who were to be barristers 
or solicitors of at least five years' standing, and who 
could not be removed from their office except by the 
Governor General on the grounds of proved mis-behaviour 
or incapacity. Provision was made for Justice Powers and 
his colleagues to continue to hold office until their terms 
of appointment had expired in June, 1926.^ Thi s amendment 
had been expected, for the Court, the employers, the unions 
and the Attorney-General's Department had all agreed that 
it was important that the Court have judicial power. 
The Moore-Dyason report had made five recommenda-
tions dealing with the overlapping of awards and two of them 
were included in the Bill, It stated that where a State law 
or award or determination dealt with a matter covered in an 
award or order of the Federal Court, the latter should pre-
vail and the State law or award should be inoperative. 
1. 1925 Arbitration Bill, circulated 17 Sept. 1925. 
Clauses 9-12. 
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This was to be the position regardless of whether the State 
law or award was made before or after the Federal awardo^ 
A second clause provided that in every dispute the Court 
v/as to consider if there was anything in the nature of the 
industry or any other reason why the dispute should be 
dealt with by the Federal Court rather than by a State 
authority and, if not, it should dismiss the case,^ 
The Government's concern about the effect of 
Court awards on the national economy had been manifest in 
the commissioning of the Moore-Dyason report and two of 
the report's suggestions in this field were inserted in 
the Bill. If the Minister believed that the public welfare 
was likely to be affected by an award or order of the Court, 
the Commonwealth Government was to have power to intervene 
in the Court's proceedings and to make any representations 
to safeguard the public welfare,^ The Government would 
also be able to intervene to prevent the filing of an in-
dustrial agreement.' L. 
The bulk.of the Bill was concerned with the enforce^ 
ment of awards - in fact, 25 clauses dealt with this problem -
and offences and penalties were multiplied in the most 
1. 1925 Arbitration Bill. Clause 19. 
2. Ibid. Clause 24. 
3. Ibid. Clause 20. 
4. Ibid. Clause 45. 
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drastic manner. Groom had clearly been unconvinced by 
Moore and Dyason, and the hard-line policy of Garran and 
his colleagues was to be applied with a vengeance. The 
penalties for strikes and lockouts were to remain, with 
the penalties for individual strikers reduced to £25. 
In the case of organizations that could not pay fines, 
process was to be issued against the property of the 
organization and its members could also be liable for the 
deficiency. In any dispute an organization was to enter 
into a bond with the Registrar for the performance of the 
award, the bond to be forfeited if two or more members of 
the organization engaged in a strike or lockout. The 
Court could disallow any rules of an organization that 
were contrary to law or an award, were tyrannical or 
oppressive, or prevented members from observing the law 
or the conditions of an award. Organizations that had 
done anything in the nature of a strike or lockout, or 
passed rules contrary to the terms of an award or requiring 
members to refuse to work in accordance with an award, 
could be deregistered or their awards could be cancelled 
or suspended. When a union was deregistered, its award 
would cease to be binding on employers. 
Several clauses were aimed at reducing the power 
of both the officials and the rank and file of the unions. 
Officials who ordered or advised members not to abide by 
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the terms of an award would be liable to 6 months' imprison-
ment. The Court would be able to order a union to take a 
secret ballot on any matter in dispute. The rules of every 
registered organization were to enable any member to demand 
a secret ballot, and were to provide for absent voting at 
elections, for inspection of books and registers by any 
members, and for reasonable facilities for the admission of 
new members. The Court could enquire into the finances of 
an organization and was to be supplied with its annual 
reports, balance sheets and membership lists. The unions 
were to be forced to take responsibility for the acts of 
their rank and file, as several clauses provided that acts 
done by members of an organization were to be deemed to be 
acts of the organization itself, unless it was proved that 
the organization had made bona fide attempts to prevent 
members from committing a breach of the award. When a penalty 
was imposed on an individual for an offence under the Act, 
the organization to which he belonged could be liable to an 
additional penalty.^ 
There were a few miscellaneous clauses. The Court 
was to have jurisdiction over any dispute, whether inter-
state or not, relating to employment in shipping involved 
in interstate or overseas trade. Two further suggestions 
of Moore and Dyason were adopted, enabling the Full Court 
1. 1925 Arbitration Bill. Clauses 5-8, 21-22, 26-41, 44. 
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to make general rulings and permitting the appearance of 
counsel with the leave of the Court. An attempt was made 
to lessen the grievances of employers against retrospective 
payments by stipulating that employees or their unions 
?/ere to notify their employers that they were members of 
the unions and that employers would not be liable for back 
payments for the period prior to the notification. 
The 1925 Arbitration Bill was hardly an outstand-
ing piece of legislation. The last major amendment of the 
Arbitration Act had been in 1920. In the intervening five 
years there had been a change of Government, there had been 
some large strikes, and there had been an almost continuous 
public debate about the future of the arbitration system, 
let when the Government finally decided to amend the Act 
it took no steps to obtain and co-ordinate the views of the 
many interested pressure groups. Instead, a Bill was drafted 
in a few days and the draftsmen took the rather easy course 
of basing it almost entirely on three documents: Garran's 
submission of February 1925, Powers' submission of May 1925, 
and the Moore-Dyason Report. The only additions were the 
clauses providing for secret ballots, inserted at the in-
sistence of Bruce, the clause relating to retrospective 
payments, and one or two additional penal clauses. All the 
other clauses can be found, almost word for word, in the 
three documents. Of course, the latter contained suggestions 
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that were passed over in the drafting of the Bill, Garran's 
belief that the GoYernment should be able to deregister 
unions in certain circumstances was considered too extreme. 
Powers' suggestion that the Court should take into considera-
tion excess profits and, more surprisingly, Moore and Dyason's 
assertion that it should consider productivity, were ignored. 
Stewart's ideas on conciliation were rejected and Moore's 
remedies for overlapping were only partially accepted. But 
when it came to the penal provisions of the Bill suggestions 
contained in all three documents were seized upon, so that 
the final Bill contained far more penalties than even Garran 
had recommended. Striking trade unions would have been 
liable for prosecution under six or more clauses. 
The independent experts had concluded that stoppages 
were not serious in Australia and they condemned, in terms 
of both expediency and justice, the suggestion that legis-
lation should be designed primarily to penalize strikers. 
Commonwealth Ministers, who were faced with four great 
maritime strikes in less than twelve months, could not view 
the question so calmly. They believed that the authority 
of their Government was under serious challenge and they 
were conscious of an approaching election in which a loss 
of authority could mean loss of power. Their experiences 
with one union distorted their attitudes to all unions and 
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thej therefore accepted a Bill which represented an attack, 
on an unprecedented scale, on the power, leadership, internal 
administration and general activities of the unions. It was 
a bold decision, as the Labour Party would be bound to de-
nounce the legislation as a threat to the million voters 
who were unionists. Moreover, the Government could not 
entirely be sure of the support of the employers, as the 
Bill completely ignored their demand for the limitation of 
the Commonwealth arbitration power. 
As it eventuated, the Government had no opportunity 
of making its arbitration policy known to Parliament or to 
the electorate. Groom was preparing his second reading 
speech when, on 18th September, 1925, Bruce suddenly announ-
ced that Parliament would be dissolved almost immediately and 
a general election would be held. Groom had to lay aside his 
speech and concentrate on much more dramatic issues, including 
the future of his political career. 
CHAPTER 2 
S.M. BRUCE AND THE SUBSTANCE OF INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION 
Some conservative supporters of the Bruce-Page 
Government believed that the role of Government in industrial 
relations should be confined to setting up machinery for the 
settlement of industrial disputes. Once the Arbitration 
Court had been established, it was the duty of the Government 
to remain aloof from disputes. It should not concern itself 
with the causes of a dispute, with the points at issue, or 
with the order or award made by the Court, and under no cir-
cumstances should it align itself with either side or inter-
vene to bring about a settlement independently of the Court. 
The Country Party parliamentarian Henry Gregory claimed that 
too often appeals had been made to the Prime Minister to 
intervene and bring pressure on one side to secure peace, 
"It is unjust to have political pressure brought to bear on 
one section when we have an Arbitration Court which makes 
awards for both s i d e s . O t h e r conservatives felt that 
arbitration tribunals had failed and the only hope of indus-
trial peace lay in the exercise of governmental power. The 
Argus deplored the hiatus between the functions of the Court * 
and those of the Executive and complained that "arbitration 
1. C.P.D. V. 119, 21 Sept. 1928, p.7113. 
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law enjoins governments to stand aloof in a spirit of dis-
passionate detachment while anarchy develops and obscure 
people become dictators".^ 
In practice the Government was just as much inter-
ested in the substance as in the structure of industrial 
arbitration. In fact, Ministers spent far more time in 
discussing the causes and results of disputes than in con-
sidering reforms of the constitution and procedures of the 
Arbitration Court. Moreover, they had no qualms about 
resorting to legislative intervention in their attempts to 
deal with these causes and results. All the clauses in the 
1925 Arbitration Bill regulating union elections, providing 
for secret ballots during strikes, and imposing penalties 
of unprecedented severity on officials who incited strikes, 
were included because the Government believed that strikes 
were caused by the extremists who were able to work their 
way into official positions in unions, and to persuade their 
moderate but pliable members to cease work on the slightest 
pretext. Similarly, suggestions that the Act be amended to 
force the Court to consider the productivity of the industry 
or the economic effect of their awards, or to allow the 
Government to intervene in Court proceedings, showed that 
the Government, with its responsibilities for the economic 
welfare of the country, was actively concerned with both 
1. Argus. 1 Dec. 1924, p.10. 
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the criteria used by the Court and with the essential content 
of its awards. 
Govermient intervention in industrial relations 
could take three forms. Legislative intervention could be 
justified on the grounds that the Government was merely 
trying to influence the Court to modify its past practices 
and to consider factors which, sometimes deliberately, it 
had neglected in the past. Executive intervention in Court 
proceedings, a very radical proposal, was more serious in 
that the Government risked aligning itself with one side or 
the other, although it would at least be assisting the Court 
by supplying it with economic data. However, with the third 
form of intervention, executive intervention in strikes and 
lockouts, the Government would not only be identified with 
one side or the other but it would often create situations 
where the authority of the Court was weakened or even des-
troyed. This would occur, for instance, if the Government 
forced employers to grant strikers conditions which had 
been refused by the Court. Whenever the Government inter-
vened it would be seen as an alternative to the Court, perhaps 
willing to concede what the Court had refused. The result 
would be similar to that caused by the overlapping of Federal 
and State jurisdictions: the Court would no longer be the 
sole and final authority in industrial matters. 
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When Bruce first became Prime Minister he seemed 
to believe strongly that intervention by the Commonwealth 
Government in industrial disputes was indefensible. He was 
fortunate in that his first two years in office were relatively 
free of serious strikes. In 1925 far less workers were invol-
ved in strikes than in any year since the War. The number of 
strikes and also the number of men involved doubled in 1924, 
but most of them were of very short duration. From February, 
1923, to November, 1924, there were only four large disputes. 
The nine month lockout at the B.H.P. Steelworks at Newcastle 
ended a few days before the Government came into office. In 
the Melbourne police strike of November, 1923, Page and George 
Pearce, the Minister for Home Affairs, had many meetings with 
Victorian Ministers, cancelled leave for the military forces 
and brought in troops to protect Commonwealth property. But 
the Victorian Government preferred to enlist special constables 
rather than the military forces to restore law and order. In 
January, 1924, a strike of cokeworkers, who were demanding a 
46 hour week, led to 3000 men being idle on the Illawarra 
coalfield. The strike lasted four months, but there was never 
any possibility of the Commonwealth Government becoming involved. 
Bruce's views on intervention were most clearly 
expressed during an extremely serious stoppage on the South 
Maitland coalfield in 1923. The stoppage, variously described 
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as a strike and a lockout, arose largely because of attempts 
by the Miners' Federation to combat intermittency of employ-
ment by spreading the work evenly between its members, and 
the owners' insistence that the colliery managers should 
have complete freedom to select and dismiss employees.^ The 
stoppage began in early April, 1923, and within a week 18 of 
the 20 Maitland mines and 7000 miners were idle. In June, 
1923, a deputation of Cessnock citizens saw Bruce at Newcastle 
and asked him to appoint a tribunal or to use his influence 
to bring the two sides together. Bruce replied that he would 
make no comment on who was right or wrong; it was an indus-
trial dispute and it would be quite improper for him to 
express any views about it. The dispute was a serious one 
but the Government would only be justified in intervening 
in a strike of a nation-wide character. In any case, the 
Government could quite easily come in at the wrong moment 
and do more harm than good. Later in Parliament, in an 
obvious reference to Hughes, Bruce said there had been too 
much Ministerial interference in industrial disputes in the 
past and generally, in such cases, the dispute was settled 
on an unsound economic basis.^ The Maitland strike was 
1. S.M.H. 28 April 1923, p.13, 30 April 1923, p.9. See 
R. Gollan. The coalminers of New South Wales, Melbourne, 
1963, pp. 173-74. 
2. Minutes of deputation to Prime Minister, 1 June 1923, 
(C.A.O. CP317/5). 
3. C.P.D. V. 103, 13 June 1923, pp. 50-52. 
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finally settled in July, 1923, on terms proposed by the New 
South Wales Deputy Premier.^ 
The first dispute of a nation-wide character faced 
by the Bruce-Page Government began on 3rd November, 1924, 
when the Waterside Y/orkers Federation ordered an overtime 
strike on all vessels in all the major ports in Australia, 
The cause of the strike had arisen several years earlier. 
The waterside workers had taken a prominent part in the 1917 
general strike, and following its collapse the shipowners 
established labour bureaux in Melbourne and Sydney to ensure 
that the strike-breakers or loyalists who had loaded the 
ships continued to receive employment. The Melbourne bureau 
was abolished in 1919 and the interstate shipowners closed 
their Sydney bureau in 1920. But the overseas shipovmers 
continued to maintain their Sydney bureau and employed about 
1200 returned soldiers, as well as a few hundred of the 
loyalists of 1917. 
Gradually the Waterside Workers Federation re-
established itself in the favour of the Court, In June, 
1923, Justice Powers said that there had been no trouble 
on the Sydney wharves for years, that the men had been 
sufficiently punished for the wrong they did in 1917, and 
that the embittered determination of the shipowners to 
employ anyone rather than the members of the Federation 
1. S.M.H. 19 July 1923, p.10. 
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was most ^imfair. But he did not award preference of employ-
-j 
ment to the Federation.^ In December, 1923, he modified 
his judgement, reasoning that the returned soldiers who Y/ere 
members of the Federation were sujrely more entitled to 
« 
employment than the loyalists who had worked in safety on 
the wharves in 1917. He therefore ordered that in Sydney 
returned soldiers and sailors who were members of the 
Federation should have preference over all other persons, p 
with the exception of other returned soldiers. In August, 
1924, the High Court held that the Arbitration Court had 
power to msj^ e such an a w a r d . P o w e r s ' order meant that 
the loyalists had little chance of continued employment on 
the wharves and in September, 1924, the Commonwealth and 
New South Wales Governments each paid £5000 to 219 of the 
loyalists as compensation.^ From the viev/point of the 
'.Vaterside 7/orkers Federation Powers' order had only slightly 
improved the position, as the Overseas Shipping Labour 
B-ureau was still in existence. Under the Arbitration Act 
the Gou-rt had no power to make an award which would dis-
criminate against re teamed soldiers, so it seemed that the 
only chsjice that the Federation had to secure the abolition 
of the Bureau lay in direct action. 
1. 18 C.A.R. 1216. 
2. 18 C.A.R. 1238. 
3. 34 C.L.R. 482. 
4. C-arran. Memorandum: Compensation to loyalists, n.d. 
(C.A.O. A458 C502/2); Bruce to G.A. Maxwell, 20 Dec. 
1924. (C.A.O. A458 D502/4). 
After two weeks the Federation ended the overtime 
strike on the interstate ships,^ bui; the ban on the over-
seas ships continued into December, 1924. An overtime ban 
was far more serious for overseas ships than for Australian 
ships, as the former were much more concerned with the 
speed of the turn around and with maintaining sailing 
schedules. Powers called several conferences but he failed 
to obtain a settlement. He was very critical of the ship-
owners for qualifying his grant of preference by only giving 
work to the returned soldiers in the Federation who regis-
tered with the Bureau. "They ask for bread and (the ship-
owners) give them a stone", he declared dramatically.^ But 
as the Federation was breaking the award by striking he 
would not vary his order. 
The strike had continued for a month before Bruce 
became involved. In a speech at Dandenong on 4th December, 
1924, he expressed his grave concern about the strike.^ 
Overseas markets would be lost if Australia acquired a 
reputation for its shipping hold-ups. If wool, wheat and 
other products could not be exported prices would fall, 
money would become scarce and unemployment would increase. 
Bruce then abandoned his dictum that he should not express 
1. S.M.H. 18 Nov. 1924, p.9. 
2. 20 C.A.R. 745. 
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his views about an industrial dispute. In words similar 
to those used by Powers, he asserted that the trouble was 
due to extremists in the ranks of both the shipowners and 
the waterside workers, and appealed for a compromise.^ 
Whether intended or not, Bruce's comments quickly 
led to his involvement in the strike. On the nezt day the 
Chairman of the Overseas Shipping Representatives Assoc-
iation asked for an assurance that newspaper reports of 
criticism by Bruce of the shipowners were incorrect, only 
p 
to be told that they were accurate. The same day a cable 
arrived from Lord Inchcape, Chairman of the P. & 0. Company 
and the dominant figure in British shipping, Inchcape said 
the shipowners had no intention of being extreme and he 
welcomed any suggestions that Bruce might have for a settle-
ment.-^ Bruce replied that the shipowners should accept 
Powers' award in both the letter and the spirit and should 
not challenge the Court's jurisdiction, advice which 
Inchcape passed on to his agents in Australia.'^ 
On 11th December, 1924, Bruce decided to take 
further action and sent a long and very important cable to 
Lord Inchcape. After politely suggesting that the agents 
1. S.M.H. 5 Dec. 1924, p.10 
2. J. Clarence, Chairman, Overseas Shipping Representatives 
Association, to Bruce, 5 Dec. 1924, Bruce to Clarence, 
5 Dec. 1924. (C.A.O. A458 F502/2). 
3. Lord Inchcape to Bruce, 5 Dec. 1924. (C.A.O. A458 F502/2). 
4. Bruce to Inchcape, 8 'Dec. 1924, Inchcape to Bruce, 9 Dec»1924 
(C.A.O. A458 F502/2), 
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oi the shipping companies lacked impartiality, he stated 
that Powers' award had removed the necessity for the Bureau. 
Yifhile its establishment in 1917 had been perfectly justified, 
it was no longer being used to protect the loyalists but to 
discipline the militant section of trade union leaders. The 
unions justifiably saw the Bureau as an excrescence on the 
whole industrial system of Australia, opposed to both its 
customs and its legally recognized principles. It was quite 
probable that, in every industry, employers would like to 
have similar methods of disciplining an unreasonable union, 
but this was not practicable. Bruce concluded by saying 
that he was convinced that industrial peace on the waterfront 
was impossible as long as the Bureau existed and while it 
remained it strengthened the hand of the extremist laboujr 
leaders.^ Inchcape, ?/ho in Labour eyes was the archetypal 
captain of industry, showed surprising meekness and instructed 
o 
his agents to be guided by Bruce. 
Bruce expected Powers to complete the settlement 
by making an order relating to pick-up places which would 
exclude the Bureau. But both the shipowners and the Federa--
tion, neither wishing to show weakness by offering to negociatey 
asked Bruce to suimnon a conference publicly.^ Bruce did 
1. Bruce to Inchcape, 11 Dec. 1924. (C.A.O. A458 F502/2) 
2. Inchcape to Bruce, 11 Dec. 1924. (C.A.O. A458 F502/2) 
5. Clarence to Bruce, 11 Dec. 1924. (C.A.O. A458 F502/2) 
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so but refused to take an active part in the proceedings; 
he disparaged his knowledge of the questions in dispute and 
insisted that E.J. Hollowaj, the Secretary of the Melbourne 
Trades Hall Council, act as chairman. Garran was called in 
several times during the conference. On 13th December, 1924, 
an agreement was announced. The shipowners promised to 
abolish the Overseas Shipping Labour Bureau. The Federation 
agreed to return to work, to accept as members all men 
registered at the Bureau until March, 1925, and to refrain 
from all sectional strikes and sympathy strikes.^ The 
overtime strike came to an end in the next few days. 
The fact that Bruce summoned the conference which 
conceded the waterside workers' demand was not regarded 
favourably by some of his supporters. The President of the 
Sydney Chamber of Commerce compared the settlement to those 
brought about by Lloyd George and Hughes, in which the strikers 
o 
gained everything that they demanded. The New South Wales 
Premier, Sir George Fuller, said that he regretted that the 
Overseas Bureau was to be abolished and he promised that 
preference to returned soldiers would be enforced.^ 
The dispute continued well into 1925. The Bureau 
men, who had formed a Returned Soldiers and Sailors Waterside 
1. S.M.H. 15 Dec. 1924, p.10. 
2. Commerce, v. 7, 7 Jan. 1925, p.329. 
' * 
3. S.M.H. 17 Dec. 1924, p.15 
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Workers Union, claimed that they had been betrayed and an-
nounced that they would not accept the terms of the settle-
ment.^ The New South Wal es Government was openly sympathetic 
with the new Union and in January, 1925, gave it premises for 
a new bureau. It stated that it would administer strictly 
the 1919 Returned Soldiers and Sailors Act. The shipowners 
were placed in an embarrassing position and had to tell the 
pick-up officers simply to call for returned soldiers, 
regardless of their union. The result was that when Federation 
men were employed there were claims that the Act was being 
broken and when Bureau men were selected there was the 
likelihood of ships being declared "black" by the Federation 
throughout Australia. Inevitably, there were violent clashes 
p 
between members of the two unions on the wharves. The dis-
pute ended with a test case in the Central Summons Court. 
The Returned Soldiers and Sailors Waterside Workers Union 
charged one of the stevedoring companies with not giving 
preference to returned soldiers. On 27th February, 1925? the 
charge was dismissed on the grounds that there was no proof 
that the Federation men employed were not returned soldiers^ 
Immediately the great majority of Bureau men Joined the 
Federation. After a struggle lasting nearly eight years $ 
1. S.M.H. 16 Dec. 1924, p.9. 
2. IMd. 13 Jan. 1925, p.9. 
3. Ibid. 28 Feb. 1925. p.17. 
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the Yifaterside Workers Federation had at last re-established 
its hegemony on the wharves. 
It is difficult to assess the importance of Bruce's 
role in the waterside workers' dispute. Bruce himself always 
believed that his intervention had been decisive.^ Holloway, 
however, later revealed that the conference had been preceded 
by informal disucssions and that the shipowners had agreed to 
"bury the Bureau". Holloway, of course, did not realize 
that Bruce's intervention had begun a week before the confer-
ence, with his cables to Inchcape. It is possible that the 
strike had completely broken down the shipowners' resistance. 
But it was significant that the day before Bruce cabled 
Inchcape a conference called by Powers had been abortive® It 
would seem that the shipov/ners were really shocked to find 
that they did not have the support of the Nationalist Prime 
Minister and when Inchcape sided with Bruce they had no choice 
but to surrender. The strike was unique in two ways. It 
was the only time that Bruce decided that the unionists had 
the better case and it was the only time that his mediation 
contributed to the settlement of a dispute. This pointed to 
the weakness of Government intervention: Bruce obviously had 
much greater influence with the employers than with the 
1. Edwards, op.cit. p.141. 
2o E.J. Holloway. From Labour Council to Privy Council, 
Chapter 10. ' (A.N.L. MS 2098). 
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unionists, but his influence was only effective when he dis-
agreed with the employers. He often said that the Labour 
leaders had far more power to settle disputes than Government 
Ministers, and this was true if one accepted his assumption 
that the unions were almost always in the wrong. In subse-
quent disputes Bruce often managed to avoid discussing the 
merits of the dispute, but there was little doubt as to where 
his sympathies lay. 
The settlement of the strike had varied consequences. 
In some ways the conference called by Bruce was a mistake, for 
it angered Powers and delighted his critics as being a delib-
erate snub to the Court, whereas Bruce was actually very much 
concerned with upholding the authority of the Court. It also 
created a precedent for governmental mediation which was to 
be cited in several later disputes. On the other hand, the 
Waterside Workers Federation made some effort to observe the 
agreement and in 1925 assisted the Government by leading the 
union opposition to the Seamen's Union. But within two years 
the waterside workers had reverted to their militant role and 
Bruce's hostility to the Federation in 1928 may be partly 
explained by the assistance which he gave it in 1924, assis-
tance which seemed to be quickly forgotten. 
The waterside workers' strike co-incided with growing 
trouble in the shipping industry which came to a head in 
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January, 1925. Since 1919 the Federated Seamen's Union had 
"been the most militant union in Australia and in 1925 its 
activities demanded the constant attention of the Cabinet, 
coloured all discussions about arbitration, damaged Common-
wealth-State relations, provoked emergency legislation, 
involved the Government in controversial legal proceedings 
and provided the pretext for a general election. In 1925 
industrial conflict overshadowed everything else and the 
leaders of the small Seamen's Union became as much household 
names as Nellie Melba, Bill Ponsford, "Boy" Charlton and 
Bruce himself. 
The seamen had taken part in some full-scale strikes, 
but their militancy was usually expressed in various activities 
that were given the label "job control", a term that appeared 
in press headlines almost every day. Job control was usually 
taken to mean sudden stoppages, either of single ships or all 
the ships of one company, with the men refusing to sail until 
the crew was strengthened or improved conditions were granted. 
At the basis of many of these irritation strikes was the 
seamen's determination to ensure that they all had a fair 
share of work by limiting the freedom of the ships' officers 
to select crews. For instance, seamen frequently refused to 
accept employment if it meant they were replacing a crew 
member who had been dismissed. At other times the stoppages 
were a kind of flexing of the muscles, with no purpose other 
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than to show defiance of the capatalists whose cargoes they 
carried or the rich passengers whose surroundings contrasted 
greatly with the crews' quarters. The sailings of many ships 
were delayed because one or two of the crew would suddenly 
walk off, without making any demands, or because a search 
would have to be made of the waterfront hotels and one or 
two intoxicated firemen carried aboard to complete the crew's 
complement. 
The Seamen's Union was sometimes depicted as a 
monolithic organization ruled by two Bolsheviks. In reality 
it was a divided, undisciplined body. The Sydney and Fremantle 
branches were the most strike-prone, while the Port Adelaide 
branch was relatively moderate. The officials of the large 
Sydney branch frequently challenged the authority of the 
Federal officials, while the officials of the Victorian branch, 
most of whom had the name O'Neill, were continually feuding 
with each other. In the large branches charges of drunkenness, 
embezzlement and arson were freely made against some of the 
leaders.^ The Union as a whole tended to be divided between 
the firemen and the more moderate seamen. Meetings were 
frequently stormy and decisions often depended on which ships 
1. C. O'Neill to A.P. Walsh, 3 Dec. 1925. (A.N.L. MS 2125/63); 
T. Walsh, Rule-busting, fund-busting and union-smashing, 
n.d. (A.N.L. MS 2123/124). 
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happened to be in port. The Union was unique in that com-
paratively few of its members were Aastralian-born, a majority 
being Liverpool-born Irishmen with little understanding and 
no respect for the arbitration system.^ The tradition of 
job control gave irresponsible elements in the rank and file 
great scope to act independently of their executives. The 
Arbitration Court recognized this and while Powers' awards 
ordered an end to job control he was rather reluctant to 
blame the leaders of the Union for all stoppages.^ 
Conservative politicians and newspapers preferred 
to attribute every strike and every delayed sailing to the 
ideas and persuasive powers of the leaders of the Seamen's 
Union, The President of the Union was Tom Walsh. Nearly 60 
years old, Walsh was an Irishman who had come to Australia 
in the 1890s. He had become an official of the Union in 
Newcastle in 1907, the General Secretary in 1919 and President 
in 1921. Married to the suffragette-socialist Adela Pankhurst, 
he had been a wavering member of the Communist Party and 
although his membership had lapsed by 1925 he retained his 
Marxist rhetoric, his speeches proclaiming the necessity for 
revolution and the futility of the reformism of the Labour Party. 
1, See I. Boraston. Industrial relations in the Australian 
interstate shipping industrv. M.Ec. thesis, Monash 
University, 1968. Chapter 5. 
2. 19 C.A.R. 581, 582. 
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Walsh had first become well-known in the bitter seamen's strike 
of 1919, when he was gaoled, and in the following years 
his name was never out of the newspapers for long. Cartoons 
portrayed him as a wild-eyed, bearded Bolshevik but he was 
really a rather frail man, who read and wrote on an encyclo-
paedic range of subjects, and who excelled as an advocate in 
the Court which he so frequently denouncedo^ By 1924 Walsh 
had to share his position as the bete noire of the Australian 
middle classes with another official. Thirty years younger 
than Walsh, Jacob Johnson (Johansen to his enemies) was a 
Dutchman who had come to Australia in 1910 and had become 
Assistant Secretary of the Sydney branch in 1921, A member 
of the British Socialist Party, Johnson was a phlegmatic man 
who coldly asserted the necessity for class warfare. Despite 
his lowly office, it gradually became apparent that he was 
the most consistent proponent of strikes and job control and 
a bitter critic of his more conciliatory colleagues. Walsh 
disliked "the Dutchman", but it was not until 1926 that their 
1. Thomas Walsh (1871-1945). In the 1930s Walsh became in-
volved in the New Guard and made frequent speeches attack-
ing communism. In 1939-40 he visited Japan and subse-
quently spoke and wrote in support of Japan's expansionist 
policy". He was associated with the Australia First" 
Movement. See D. Mitchell, The fighting Pankhursts, 
London, 1967. 
2. Herald. 4 Feb. 1925, p.l. 11 Dec. 1925, P»l. 
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names were liniied as rivals rather than as revolutionary 
comrades. 
There had been a decline in the number of irritation 
strikes by the seamen in 1923, but there was a resurgence in 
the last months of 1924. The waterside workers' dispute had 
been about a single and straightforward issue but the seam.en 
were involved in up to a dozen co-incidental but unconnected 
strikes. In two or three of them they had definite grievances, 
but these were obscured by the other stoppages, the aims of 
which were trivial, unreasonable or simply non-existent. 
The first and by far the longest dispute arose when 
the Commonwealth Shipping Line chartered three British vessels 
manned by crews on wages far below the Australian rates. The 
Seamen's Union claimed that the chartering had been unwarranted, 
as the Line had vessels lying idle in the Eastern ports, and 
in any case the crews should be paid Australian wages. The 
first of the chartered ships, the Volumnia. reached Fremantle 
in October, 1924, and the Seamen's Union persuaded its crew 
to leave the ship.^ The captain prosecuted 23 members of 
the crew under the Merchant Shipping Act and they were sentenced 
to two weeks* imprisonment. The Volumnia eventually left 
Fremantle with a volunteer crew in February, 1925, but it was 
declared "black" in every port, the seamen and the waterside 
1. S.M.H. 29 Oct. 1924, p.13, 30 Oct. 1924, p.8, 
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workers demanding that the original crew be reinstated. In 
Sydney its cargo was partly transhipped to the Eromsjiga, which 
in turn was declared "black", and the ban on the two ships was 
not lifted until July, 1925. The other two chartered vessels, 
which reached Australia in November, 1924, and January, 1925, 
were boycotted temporarily at Fremantle and Port Adelaide, but 
the Waterside Workers Federation, anxious to prevent the ship-
owners from having any excuse to revoke the December agreement, 
ordered the ships to be unloaded,^ 
A number of minor disputes began in December, 1924o 
The Seamen's Union put a ban on the Newcastle and Hunter 
River Company's vessels because it was using seamen to load 
and unload its cargoes. In Melbourne a ship was held up 
because the crew demanded that an engineer be dismissed,^ in 
Brisbane three ships were idle because the crews claimed over-
time pay when sailings were deferred, and in Fremantle three 
ships were held up as a reprisal against the waterside workers 
for working one of the Commonwealth Line's chartered steamers.^ 
1. S.M.H. 1 Jan. 1925, p.5; Walsh to J. Garden. Secretary, 
I 7 0 . Trades and Labour Council, 16 Feb. 1925. (A.N.U« 
T62/28). 
2. S.M.H. 1 Dec. 1924, p.9, 6 Dec. 1924, p.17. 
3. IMd. 16 Lec. 1924, p.9. 
4. IMd. 22 Dec. 1924, p.9. 
5. IMd. 50 Dec. 1924, p.7. 
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In January, 1925, two New Zealand ships were idle in Melbourne 
because the seamen demanded Australian rates, and one of the 
crews was imprisoned for two weeks for disobeying the captain's 
ordero^ 
On 1st January, 1925, the position on the waterfront 
worsened when the Seamen's Union demanded that crews be picked 
up at the Communist Hall in Sydney and the Union's rooms in 
Melbourne, and not at the wharves. The Union claimed that men 
had been victimized on the wharves, but the shipowners asserted 
that the Union was seeking to restrict tne rights of the ships' 
officers to select the crews. The shipowners suggested as a 
compromise that the crews be picked up at the Mercantile Marine 
offices in each capital city port and Powers made an award to 
that effect on 12th January, But the men in Sydney, Melbourne 
and Brisbane refused to obey the award. The cumulative effect 
of all these disputes was that by early January, 1925, 47 
vessels were held up in every State except Tasmania, including 
17 ships in Sydney and 16 in Melbourne.^ 
The Commonwealth Government first became involved in 
the seamen's strike in order to fulfil one of its undisputed 
functions: the maintenance of Commonwealth services. In late 
1. 12 Jan. 1925, p.10. 
2. 21 C.A.R. 1. 
5. Argus. 9 Jan. 1925, pp.9-10.' 
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NoYember, 1924, the seamen employed by the Fremantle Harbour 
Trust went on strike. On 1st December, 1924, frantic tele-
grams were sent to Bruce from the Chairman of the Overseas 
Shipping Representatives Association and from the Fremantle 
Quarantine Offices stating that the seamen had sealed off the 
port and that Commonwealth officers were being hampered by a 
lack of police protection,^ Later reports claimed that mobs 
were roaming the wharves, casting off the lines of ships 
attempting to berth, and preventing pilots, quarantine officers 
and customs officials from going aboard. Efforts to persuade 
the Western Australian Labour Government to provide police 
protection had failed. Bruce immediately sent a telegram to 
Philip Collier, the Western Australian Premier, reminding him 
that the safeguarding of Commonwealth officers was a direct 
responsibility of the State Government and demanding that 
n 
protection be immediately provided. Pearce was in Perth 
at the time and reported regularly to Bruce. After two days 
he found that the trouble was virtually over, with the mails 
being handled, quarantine officers working without interrup-
tion and customs officials using a private launch to board 
ships, 
1. Clarence to Bruce, 1 Dec. 1924, C. Park, Acting Director-
General of Health, to Sir Neville Howse, 2 Dec. 1924, 
Clarence to P. Deane, 2 Dec. 1924. (C.A.O. A458 F502/2). 
2. Bruce to P. Collier, 2 Dec. 1924. (C.A.O. A458 F502/2). 
3. Pearce to Bruce, 5 Dec. 1924. (C.A.O. A458 F502/2). 
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As more and more ships were held up in the first 
week of 1925 pressure on the Commonwealth Government to inter-
vene mounted. Much of this pressure was concerned with 
communication between Tasmania and the mainland. The Tasmanian 
Premier, J.A. Lyons, Nationalist politicians, businessmen and 
shipping officials appealed to Bruce to take action to rescue 
the hundreds of tourists, woolbuyers and other people stranded 
in Tasmania and to ensure that the State did not run out of 
essential supplies.^ The President of the Hobart Chamber 
of Commerce called for the suspension of the Navigation Act, 
n 
SO that foreign ships could engage in interstate trade. 
Other demands were concerned with the question of governmental 
authority. One Nationalist backbencher asked Bruce whether 
he proposed to allow V/alsh to run the country^ and other 
Government supporters raised the same question, although more 
diplomatically and rhetorically. The Sydney Morning Herald 
described the Government's attitude as "remarkable" and accused 
it of compromising with arrogance and insincerity.^ The Argus 
1. S. Jackson to Bruce, 5 Jan. 1925, Sir Alfred Ashbolt to 
Bruce, 6 Jan. 1925, H.J.M. Payne to Bruce. 6 Jan. 1925, 
J.A. Lyons to Bruce, 7 Jan. 1925, F.D. Valentine to Bruce, 
7 Jan." 1925. (C.A.O. A458 G502/2). 
2. F.W. Hermitage, President, Hobart Chamber .of Commerce, to 
Bruce, 6 Jan. 1925. (C.A.O. A458 G502/2). 
5. Jackson to Bruce, 6 Jan. 1925. (C.A.O. A458 G502/2). 
4. Payne to Bruce, 6 Jan. 1925, W. Marks to Bruce, 7 Jan. 
1925. (C.A.O. A458 G502/2). 
5. S.M.H. 6 Jan. 1925, p.8. 
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declared that the first duty of GoYerment was to maintain 
the transport services, but the Government seemed indifferent 
to the fate of the shipping industry,^ Hughes described 
the policy of the Government as one of drift, and remarked 
that only an overwhelming display of public indignation 
p 
would force it to take action. 
The Government was not quite as inactive as it 
seemed, for at an early stage it took action to deal with 
the problem of Tasmania. On 6th January, 1925, Bruce told 
the Commonwealth Shipping Board to divert one of its streamers, 
which was sailing from Adelaide to Melbourne, to the Tasmanian 
ports. The Chairman of the Board stated that this would 
involve the ship in heavy risks, greatly increase expenses, 
offend the consignees in Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane, and 
probably lead to the vessel being declared "black" by the 
Seamen's Union. But Bruce repeated his order and the Board 
gave in, after making a formal protest against the Government's 
interference in the management of the line. The position 
in Tasmania became more serious when a ship carrying sugar 
1. Argus. 6 Jan. 1925. p.8. 
2. S.M.H. 15 Jan. 1925, p.8. 
3. Bruce to H.B. Larkin, Chairman, Commonwealth Shipping 
Board, 6 Jan. 1925, Larkin to Bruce, 7 Jan. 1925, Bruce 
to Larkin, 7 Jan. 1925, W. Lewis, Secretary, Commonwealth 
Shipping Board, to Bruce, 9 Jan. 1925. (C.A.O. A458 
G50572)! 
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was held up in Sydney, as it seemed that the Tasmanian jam 
factories would have to close down and thousands of small 
fruitgrowers would be ruined. Bruce immediately asked 
Theodore to arrange for a supply of sugar to be sent to 
Tasmania and 500 tons were despatched within a day.^ Bruce 
also asked Lyons to determine how many people needed to 
return urgently to the mainland and was told that there were 
o about a thousand. 
Until the Federal Cabinet met on 15th January, 
1925, there was no consultation between Ministers about the 
Government's policy towards the strike. A suggestion by 
H.E. Pratten, the Minister for Trade and Customs, that the 
Government should suspend the Navigation Act was publicly 
rejected by Bruce.^ It was Bruce alone, unassisted by 
either his Ministers or his departmental officers, who 
drafted the telegrams and letters to the Tasmanian Premier, 
politicians and business leaders, and it was Bruce who, on 
his own initiative, ordered the diversion of the Commonwealth 
Line steamer. He also took a close interest in the moves 
1. Bruce to E.G. Theodore, 14 Jan. 1925, Theodore to Bruce, 
14 Jan. 1925, Theodore to Bruce, 16 Jan. 1925. (C.A.O. 
A458 G502/2). 
2. Bruce to Lyons, 15 Jan. 1925, Lyons to Bruce, 14 Jan. 
1925. (C.'A.O. A458 G502/2) 
5. S.M.H. 5 Jan. 1925, p.15, 6 Jan. 1925, p.9. 
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that were being made to settle the strike and told Garran to 
report regularly on the proceedings in the Arbitration Courto^ 
On 12th January Garran told him that it was clear that the 
seamen had no intention of obeying any award that Powers 
should make, and Bruce decided that the Government should 
apply for the deregistration of the Seamen's Union. The 
application was made the same day. The counsel for the 
Government told the Court that the Government had been reluc-
tant to intervene, but with the whole of sea communications 
interrupted it was necessary to do so in the interests of the -p 
public, 
Bruce issued a statement in which he used the same 
argument. The paralysis of shipping had reached critical 
proportions and the position in Tasmania was very grave. The 
seamen were defying the arbitration law and were showing no 
regard for the sufferings of workers and their families. 
Cabinet discussions began the next day, with the strike the 
first item on the agenda. Garran and Captain J.K. Davis, 
the Director of Navigation, were frequently consulted. After 
two days it was decided that, in addition to the measures 
already initiated by Bruce, the Government should charter a 
1. Garran to Groom, 8 Jan. 1925. (A.N.L. MS 236/1/2299). 
2. 15 Jan. 1925, p.9, 
3. S.M.H. 15 Jan. 1925, p.9. 
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ship to maintain communications with Tasmania and should 
prosecute ?felsh for inciting to strike. 
On 16th January, 1925, the Government chartered 
the Nairana and advertised in Melbourne for a crew. There 
were 300 volunteers and no trouble was found in selecting 
a competent crew.^ The ship did not carry any cargo, but 
spent the next two weeks conveying passengers between 
Launceston and Melbourne. -Bruce continued to receive re-
quests to send ships to the smaller northern ports and the 
Tasmanian Shipping Committee took the opportunity to send 
long letters enumerating Tasmania's difficulties and calling 
for the repeal of the Navigation Act. But the Government's 
action had effectively dealt with the two great problems of 
the stranded tourists and diminishing food supplies, and by 
the last week in January conditions in Tasmania were normal 
again. 
Bruce's decision to seek the deregistration of the 
Seamen's Union was surprising in that he could have safely 
left it to the shipowners to make the application. (The 
Commonwealth Steamship Owners Federation did in fact make 
a similar application a few days later.) It suggests that 
1. S.M.H. 17 Jan. 1925, p.17. 
2. J.G. Turner, Chairman, Tasmanian Shipping Committee, to 
Bruce, 8 Jan. 1925, Turner to Bruce, 14 Jan. 1925,, 
Turner to Bruce, 2? Jan. 1925. (C.A.O. A458 G502/2). 
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he felt that strong action by the Government was necessary 
to satisfy his supporters and perhaps to intimidate the 
Union. It was not surprising that he should see in deregis-
tration a solution to the strike, for Powers, Garran and the 
employers' organizations had all referred to it on various 
occasions as the most drastic and effective penalty that 
could be imposed on a union. The case appeared before Powers 
on 25rd January, 1925. On the previous day the Federal 
Committee of Management of the Seamen's Union had met and 
all the officials, including Walsh, had agreed that deregis-
tration would place the Union in an extremely weak position 
and would leave the way open for the formation of a rival 
union. But they felt that their hands were tied, as the 
members in Sydney and Fremantle would not accept the Court's 
pick-up places and it looked as though deregistration was 
unavoidable. Nevertheless, the Committee recommended to 
the branches that the order of the Court be obeyed and Walsh 
told the Court that the men would return to work under the 
terms of the award.^ Powers withheld judgement and after 
a few days' resistance the branches agreed to obey his award. 
By the end of the month only two or three ships were still 
held up and on 6th February, 1925, Powers dismissed the 
application for deregistration.^ 
1. Minutes of Committee of Management, Federated Seamen's 
Union, 18-22 Jan. 1925. (A.N.L. MSS 2123/98). 
2. S.M.H. 28 Jan. 1925, p.13, 2 Feb. 1925, p.9. 
3. 21 C.A.R. 16 
A LIMB OF THE LAW. 
( . " I T I Z E . X : ••Offirrr. officcr. these dreadful do'nifi.^ hare hecn cioino on tor days, and this 
your heat: Why haren't you done somethin'j?" 
P O L I C E M . ^ . X B R U C E (v:\th deep emotion)-. ••/ hare. I hare! To the rery hist minute 
I K'lited in the hope that a c o m promise minht l e enected hctu'ern the j'nrtirs. 
Int action hccamc imperatire. I hare applied to hare the ruffi'tn drrenistercd." 
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Powers' decision was denounced in many quarters. 
W, Brooks of the New South Wales Employers' Federation 
blamed the ineptitude and inactivity of the Court for 
Australia's industrial troubles,^ Bavin accused Powers of p 
timidity and the Sydnev Morning Herald, in an abusive 
editorial, declared that the Court would be held in derision 
by all honest men.^ Commonwealth Ministers were more dis-
creet. They had little doubt that an opportunity for another 
application for the deregistration of the Seamen's Union 
would soon arise and at least their action had brought the 
strike to an end. In the meantime, if the Union itself could 
not be penalized, there seemed a good chance that.the law 
could deal severely with some of its officials. 
On 14th January, 1925, following the decision of 
Cabinet on the previous day, Garran ordered three charges 
to be laid against Walsh, one of which was subsequently 
withdrawn.^ Walsh was charged with having unlawfully urged 
J. Morris, the General Secretary of the Waterside Workers 
Federation, and J. O'Neill, the Secretary of the Victorian 
branch of the Seamen's Union, to strike, this being an offence 
under both the Crimes Act and the Arbitration Act. Normally 
1. S.M.H. 7 Feb. 1925, p.16. 
2. Ibid. 6 March, 1925, p.9. 
3. Ibid. 7 Feb. 1925, p.16. 
4. G.H. Castle to Garran, 15 Jan. 1925. (C.A.O. MP401/1 
CL5508). 
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it was a difficult charge to prove, as press reports of 
union meetings could not be used as evidence and no unionist 
was likely to give evidence against his leaders. But Walsh's 
offence took place at Fremantle in December, 1924, when he 
was seeking to persuade the waterside workers to support 
the seamen's ban on the Commonwealth Line vessels, and it 
was an easy matter for the Crown Solicitor's Office to obtain 
copies of the telegrams which Walsh sent to Melbourne.^ The 
charge was heard in the Melbourne City Court in February, 
1925, and Walsh was found guilty and fined £150. Subsequently, 
the High Court quashed the conviction relating to O'Neill and 
p 
upheld that relating to Morris. By then Walsh was involved 
in further legal troubles and no attempt was made to collect 
the fine until 1926.^ 
Garran thought that Johnson could be charged with 
the same offence as Walsh, as officers of the Levuka claimed 
that he had come aboard and addressed the seamen, ordering 
them not to sail unless four of the crew were repatriated to 
their home ports. But the opinion of counsel was that. 
1. Brief for 0. Dixon; R. Martin. Advice on evidence, 25 
Jan. 1925. (C.A.O. MP401/1 CL5508). 
2. 56 C.L.R, 464. 
5. G.S. Knowles to Castle, 25 Sept. 1925, Garran to Castle, 
15 Jan. 1926. (C.A.O. MP401/1 CL5508). 
4. Garran to Castle, 9 Feb. 1925. (C.A.O. A467/12). 
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while the offence almost certainly took place, the mere facts 
that Johnson boarded the ship and tnat the men subsequently 
walked off were not enough, for the Court would require evidence 
of what took place at the actual meeting,^ No charge was 
therefore laid against Johnson. 
From February to May, 1925, the Commonwealth Attorney-
General's Department kept a close watch on the activities of 
the Seamen's Union, recording instances of job control which 
could be used in any further proceedings for the deregistra-
tion of the Union. The main instance was the continued black 
ban on the Volumnia and Eromanga, both berthed at Sydney. 
Throughout March, 1925, Bruce was touring Western Australia 
and South Australia but Deane, the Secretary of the Prime 
Minister's Department, sent him detailed reports about the 
p 
various shipping holdups. Bruce made it clear that he 
expected the Attorney-General's Department to renew the 
application for deregistration and G.S. Knowles, who was 
acting in Garran's position, had to write several letters 
justifying the Department's apparent inaction,'^ He informed 
1. Castle to Garran, 13 Feb. 1925. (C.A.O. A467/12). 
2. Deane to Bruce, 21 March, 1925, Deane to Bruce, 24 March, 
1925. (C.A.O. A458 F502/2). 
3. Knowles to Deane, 21 March 1925, Knowles to Deane, 
23 March, 1925, toowles to Deane, 26 March, 1925.' 
(C.A.O. A458 F502/2); Knowles to Groom, 24 March, 
1925. (A.N.L. MS 236/1/2334). 
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Deane that the Union was undoubtedly pursuing a policy of 
deliberate pinpricks but there was no act which could be 
relied on to secure its deregistration, Stewart had told 
him that the shipowners were waiting for evidence for a 
further application. As they were much more closely in 
touch with the actions of the Union, but had not yet obtained 
sufficient evidence, it would be pointless for the Government 
to institute proceedings. One factor which the shipowners, 
and presumably Knowles, were keeping in mind was that much 
would depend on which member of the Court heard the applica-
tion: Quick condemned the continuance of the Volmnnia. 
trouble and referred to deregistration as a possible 
solution,^ but Powers had said on several occasions that 
deregistration was an extreme penalty, which could cause 
the worst industrial v/ar ever knov/n. 
In the end it was neither Powers nor Quick but 
Webb who heard the application for the deregistration of 
the Seamen's Union. In May the Commonwealth Shipping 
Board applied for the Union's deregistration, on the grounds 
that it had committed breaches of the Arbitration Act and 
awards, had practised job control, had acted in a manner 
inconsistent with industrial peace, had disregarded orders 
1. S.M.H. 24 March, 1925, p.9. 
2. 21 C.A.R. 10. 
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of the Supreme Court of New South Wales and the High Court, 
and had delayed the sailings of vessels for no reason.^ 
The application cited the ban on the Volumnia and the Eromanga, 
as well as other stoppages. The Commonwealth Steamship 
Owners Association made a similar application. On 30th May, 
1925, the High Court answered several questions submitted 
by Webb relating to the application. It decided that the 
acts of deregistration and of cancelling awards were not 
judicial and were therefore within the powers of a Deputy 
o 
President. The Seamen's Union decided not to oppose the 
application for deregistration, as further expenditure on 
legal proceedings was unwarranted. On 5th June, 1925, 
Webb, "with great regret", deregistered the Federated 
Seamen's Union and cancelled its award. He deplored the 
fact that the fine body of Australian seamen had, through 
the actions of their officers, been deprived of their status 
and of the protection of awards, and asserted that their 
conditions had been obtained through constitutional methods, 
and not through the methods of Walsh and Johnson,^ It was 
1. Statement setting out grounds on which Commonwealth 
Shipping Board intends to ask Court to cancel regis-
tration of Seamen's Union, 11 May, 1925. (C.A.O. 
MP401 CL4021); Lewis to Deane, '4 June, 1925. (C.A.O. 
A458 1502/2). 
2. 36 C.L.R. 442 
3. 21 C.A.R. 724 
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the first time that a union had been deregistered in the 
history of the Federal Arbitration Court. 
It is difficult to ascertain what the Commonwealth 
Government and its advisers hoped would result from the de-
registration of the Seamen's Union. It was a definite step 
towards restoring some of the prestige of the Arbitration 
Court which was at an extremely low ebb. The very act of 
deregistration showed that the Court was capable of strong 
and decisive action and, as a result of that act, the Court 
would no longer be defied, abused and ignored by the Union, 
But whether the Union would modify its practices now that 
it was outside the Court was a very different, and for the 
Government, more important question. Every shipping stop-
page caused loss and inconvenience of varying degrees of 
severity to varying numbers of Australians. Almost every 
day the newspapers contained the headlines "Job Control 
Again", and increasingly the authority of the Government 
was being questioned. Deregistration was most likely to 
succeed if a union was divided and if there was a large 
army of unemployed men. A rival union composed of the 
moderate elements of the old union would obviously receive 
favoured treatment from the employers and in time could be 
registered by the Court, which would almost certainly mean 
the end of the old union. It was well-known that there were 
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moderate men in the Seamen's Union who hated the militant 
leaders, but whether they had enough support to secede and 
set up a new union was doubtful. Alternatiyely, the employers, 
no longer bound by the award, could ruthlessly lower rates 
and dismiss difficult workers, replacing them with unemployecL 
non-unionists who v/ould be far more manageable. But the 
seamen were still protected to a large extent by the / -
tion Act, and the employment of non-unionists ¥/ould lead to 
continual strife on the waterfront. The two barristers Y/hc 
represented the Commonwealth Steamship Owners Associaxion 
had no illusions about deregistration. Owen Dixon toid t.^ c 
shipoYrners that no action by the Court but only economic 
pressure would have any real effect on the Seamen's Union" 
and R.G. Menzies stated publicly that registration v.as oi 
little use unless the union was dissolved, Bruce taid 
Garran may have shared these views but they gave ihe impres-
sion that deregistration was a panacea. 
Any hopes that deregistration would weaken the 
Seamen's Union's propensity to strike were soon disappointea. 
A week after the deregistration order a ship was held up in 
Melbouirne because its owners would not include in the crew's 
articles a clause guaranteeing the seamen the conditions 
1. Minutes of Commonwealth Steamship Owners Fecoration, 
• 20 Feb. 1925. (C.S.O.A.) 
2, 17 June, 1925, p.12, 
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prescribed in the cancelled award.^ A few days later the 
crew walked off a ship in Sydney for the same reason, and 
predictions "began to be made that there would be a crisis 
in July or August, 1925, when the articles of most of the 
interstate ships expired. But the Seamen's Union was 
impatient and on 30th June, 1925, a stormy meeting of the 
Sydney branch decided unanimously to stop work on all 
vessels within a fortnight -unless the owners agreed to the 
revision of the articles.^ This decision was endorsed by 
the other branches and ignored by the shipowners. The 
strike began on 14th July, 1925, and within two days 50 
vessels and 2,500 seamen were idle in all the major ports 
in Australia. By the end of the month 120 vessels were 
held up, including 67 in Sydney and 22 in Melbourne. 
20,000 men consisting of seamen, waterside workers, other 
maritime workers and 12,000 miners, were out of v/ork as a 
result of the strike. Altogether, it was the biggest 
shipping holdup in Australia since 1917.^ 
As in January, 1925, the Goverrmient was under 
press^ Jure throughout the strike to take action to safeguard. 
1. S.M.H. 13 June, 1925, p.l5. 
2c Ibid. 20 June, 1925, p.l5. 
3. IMd. 1 July, 1925, p.9. 
4. Ibid. 17 July, 1925, p.12. 
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Tasmania's interests, but in this strike it felt that no 
action was necessary. As early as 50th June Lyons asked 
Bruce for an assurance that the transport services between 
the mainland and Tasmania would be maintained, as otherwise 
the State's fruitgrovrers would be ruined,^ A number of 
near-hysterical appeals for assistance followed from Yarioutj 
Tasmanian producers' organizations. But the Seamen*3 
Union announced that the Tasmanian trade was not to be 
interfered with, and although three ships were held up in 
Hobart, the Director of Navigation thought that the fru:.L-
growers could easily recruit volunteers to man them. Bnico 
told the Tasmanians that the Commonwealth Government couJd 
only assume responsibility for the conveyance of passengers, 
mails and essential food requirements; it could not "keep 
the whole of the wheels of commerce and transport going as 
z 
if normal conditions prevailed."^ Both Lyons and Walsh 
suggested that Commonwealth Line vessels could be used to 
carry Tasmanian produce to the mainland, but this time 
Bruce refused to give any orders to the Commonv/ealth Ship-
ping Board,^ In early August, 1925, Lyons reported that 
1. Lyons to Bruce, 50 June, 1925. (C.A.O. A458 J502/2K 
2. Stanley merchants to Bruce, 15 July, 1925, Turner to 
Bruce," 24 July, 1925, V.J. Skinner to Bruce, 24 July, 
1925. (C.A.C. A458 J502/2). 
5. Bruce to Skinner, 27 July, 1925. (C.A.O. A458 J502/2). 
4. Bruce to Lyons, 27 July. 1925, Bruce to Walsh, 27 Jaly, 
1925. (C.A.O. A458 J502/2). 
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Tasmanian stocks of wheat and flour were running low,^ but 
the strike ended before it was necessary for the Common-
wealth Government to take relief measures. 
Whereas the January strike of the seamen caused 
the Government to take drastic executive action, the July 
strike provoked it into taking emergency legislative action. 
The strike began, rather fitfully, in the middle of June, 
1925, and on 25th June the Government introduced in Parlia-
ment a bill to amend the Immigration Act. By 14th July 
shipping was at a complete standstill and the next day a 
bill was brought forward to amend the Navigation Act. 
The 1925 Immigration Bill contained a clause 
enabling the Governor-General to prohibit the immigration 
of specified aliens, either because the persons were con-
sidered undesirable or on account of the economic, indus-
p 
trial or other conditions existing in Australia. There 
was little criticism of this clause. But the Bill also 
provided that the Governor-General could issue a proclamation 
that there was a serious industrial disturbance in existence 
and, while the proclamation was in force, the Minister could 
1. Lyons to Bruce, 4 Aug. 1925. (C.A.O. A458 J502/2). 
2 . This clause had been drafted by the home and Territories 
Department long before the seamen's strike. F.J. Quinlan, 
Chief Clerk. Home and Territories Department, to Garran. 
2 5 May, 1 9 2 5 o ( C . A . O . A 2 8 6 3 1 9 2 5 Immigration Bill file). 
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order any aliens who he believed had "been hindering the 
transport of goods, the conveyance of passengers or the 
provision of Commonwealth services, to appear before a 
board to show cause why they should not be deportedo^ In 
introducing the Bill Bruce said that half Australia's 
industrial troubles were caused by alien agitators who 
introduced doctrines and an atmosphere inconsistent with 
Australian social principles and ideals. In a more 
practical vein, Page stressed that strikes and job control 
were hindering the import of capital into Australia and 
were preventing the establishment of new industries. He 
made the valid point that most stoppages occurred in the 
two industries, coalmining and transport, in which the 
unions were mostly led by migrants,^ Groom argued that 
the Labour Party had expelled the Communists from its ranks 
and the nation should have the same r i g h t , a rather 
dubious analogy that was repeated by many Nationalists« 
Government supporters admitted that the Bill gave the 
Government extreme powers but claimed that public opinion 
and the need to retain electoral support would prevent it 
1. Clause 7 was first inserted in the draft Bill on 
24 June, 1925. (C.A.O. A2865 1925 Immigration Bill 
file). 
2. C.P.D. V. 110, 25 June, 1925, p.461. 
3. I M . 110» 8 J^ly. 1925, p.779. 
4. IMd. 16 July, 1925, p.1190. 
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from abusing these powers. The Labour Party and the trade 
unions attacked the Bill fiercely. They asserted tnat ILS 
purpose was to cripple the unions; that it treated unionises 
as criminals, while ignoring monopolists and price-fixera; 
that it discriminated against British-born Australians, 
some of whom had lived in Australia for decades; and tnat 
it violated British justice by being retrospective in ii,. 
application and by providing for trial by a board of CTO;..!-., -
ment nominees rather than by a jury. Many Labour speakers 
enjoyed naming the distinguished Australians (Hughes -m: 
the "alien" most frequently cited) who could be depoi, ocu 
if the Bill became law. Finally, they rejected Bruce 
notion that at any one time there existed certain hom-^ -
geneous "Australian ideals" to which all but crimintJs 
subscribed. The Immigration Bill was passed by Parliajie.vi 
on 17th July, 1925. Although it was assumed on all sitie^  
that it was aimed directly at Walsh, Johnson and pei-irdr,... 
Jock Garden, the Secretary of the New South Wales Labou-v 
Council, no attempt was made during the strike to use the 
new powers which the Goverment had acquired. 
The failure of the Government to put the iiiMif::-
ration Act into force during the July, 1925, strike re,.i:,^  
that its purpose was not to expedite the settlement of tli'.' 
particular dispute but to overcome the wider problem of the 
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recurring strikes of the Seamen's Union. The Act was a 
gesture of strength by the Government which would mollify 
the criticism of its supporters and, hopefully, would deter 
the Union from embarking on another strike as soon as the 
present dispute was settled. That it was not an empty 
threat, as later events showed, merely underlined the fact 
that it was an act of desperation by a Government which for 
nine months had to spend much of its time and energies in 
combating one union. It was a desperate act because, with 
an election forthcoming, it would inevitably be portrayed 
by the Labour Party as an attack on unionism and also 
because, if it was put into operation, it could well provoke 
a general strike. The Government's willingness to take 
such risks indicated its deep concern that its inaction 
was being interpreted as weakness and that the Seamen's 
Union was holding it up to ridicule. 
The Immigration Act also indicated that the Govern-
ment took the view that strikes were caused, not through a 
lack of discipline in the unions, as Higgins and Powers had 
generally believed, but through a lack of democracy in the 
unions. Under the trade and commerce power the Government 
could probably have introduced sweeping legislation to 
regulate the organization and management of the Seamen's 
Union. Instead, its legislation was directed at the Union's 
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officials, reflecting a belief that union officials were 
more militant than the rant and file, that the leaders 
suppressed the views of the ordinary members and that the 
latter would welcome their liberation from the Union Tzars. 
The weakness of the Act was pointed out in Parliament by 
experienced ujiionists such as Hughes and Frank Anstey. 
They did not dispute that small groups generally determined 
the policies of unions, as with most organizations, but it 
did not follow that the ideas and attitudes of the raxik 
and file were at variance with those of their leaders. 
Moreover, as far as the Seamen's Union was concerned, yValsh 
and Johnson might have had great influence, but they were 
not the only militant officials in the Union and some of 
the others were Australian-born. They argued that it was 
doubtful if the removal of Walsh and Johnson would lead to 
any marked change in the Union's policies and behaviour.^ 
It is fairly certain that the Immigration Act 
was a product of the Bruce-Garran partnership, an alliance 
which was very active throughout 1925. Bruce had never 
hesitated to by-pass Groom and to deal directly with Garran, 
particularly during a dispute when swift action was necessary. 
It will be recalled that Garran had advocated deportation 
as a penalty for aliens who instigated strikes as early as 
1. C.P.D. V. 110, 2 July, 1925, pp.675, 678. 
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January, 1925,^ while Bruce, in his repeated references to 
the need for secret ballots, had sho^ Tn that he believed that 
union officials exercised excessive power and influence, 
Garran's support for the Bill would have been essential, as 
the constitutional validity of the deportation clauses was 
by no means certain. In fact, in Parliament Groom appeared 
to be very unsure of himself in discussing the legality of 
the Bill, and although the evidence is not conclusive, it 
may be hypothesised that the Bill represented the triumph 
of the policies of Bruce and Garran over the doubts of Groom. 
In contrast to the Immigration Bill, the Navigation 
Bill was intended specifically to deal with the July, 1925, 
dispute. It had only one important provision. Under the 
Navigation Act Australian coastal shipping had become the 
monopoly of Australian shipov/ners and seamen, as the Act 
required ships engaged in the coastal trade to be licensed, 
and licences were only given to ships in cases where crew 
sizes, accommodation and other facilities conformed with the 
provisions of the Act. The new Bill simply gave the Governor-
General power by proclamation to suspend the coastal clauses 
of the Act if he thought that it was in the public interest. 
Pratten, who introduced the Bill, did not refer to the current 
seamen's strike and stated that the Government was merely 
asking for a reserve power which it hoped that it would never 
1. See above p.68. 
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have to use.^ But it was obvious that the Governmeiit believed 
that the power might be immediately required, as the Bill 
was rushed through Parliament in two days, with the Labour 
Party opposing it vigorously all the way. Garran had dis-
cussions the next day with A.S. Elford of the Commonwealth 
Steamship Owners Association, but no use was made of the 
Act during the strike. The reason for this was that the 
Royal Assent to the Act was needed and it was not received 
from England until 26th July,-^ by which time negotiations 
for a settlement were in progress. Bruce v/rote to all the 
Premiers stating that if the conference was abortive the 
Act would be put into operation and he would rely on the 
State Governments to inform him of shortages of food and 
other necessities and any breakdown in essential services.^' 
But two days later the strike was settled. The 1925 Navi-
gation Act had weaknesses v/hich were obvious at the time: 
it would not help the Australian shipovmers in the least and 
the overseas shipowners would probably refuse to enter the 
coastal trade, as it would only be for the duration of the 
strike and it would almost certainly lead to a "black" ban 
on their other vessels. 
1. G.P.D. V. 110, 16 July 1925, p.1250. 
2. S.M.H. 17 July, 1925, p.H. 
5. L.S. Amery to Lord Stonehaven, 25 July, 1925. (C.A.O. 
A458 J50272). 
4. Bruce to Premiers of all States, 28 July, 1925. (C.A.O. 
A458 J502/2). 
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Throughout the seamen's dispute the Government 
maintained an ujicompromising attitude. Following negotia-
tions in early July, 1925, initiated by the new Labour Premier 
of New South Vfeles, J.T. Lang, the Commonwealth Shipping 
Board made an agreement with the maritime unions, excluding 
the Seamen's Union, whereby the Board would endorse the crews' 
articles with the terms of the former award, and the unions 
guaranteed that they would not countenance any action by the 
Seamen's Union to flout the agreement or to delay shipping,^ 
As a result of the agreement, the Commonwealth-Lines' steamers 
were not involved in the strike. Bruce demanded that the 
Board give the fullest explanation for its action, and his 
references to "far-reaching results", "radical departure 
from the usual conditions governing employment" and to the 
fact that the Seamen's Union was not a party to the agreement, 
showed that he strongly disapproved of it. The Board sent 
a brief reply, stating that its action was taken as a last 
resort and up to that time the agreement had been most success-
ful.^ Bruce was probably unconvinced but having m.ade the 
Board independent of Government control, there was nothing 
further that he could do, 
1. S.M.H. 7 July, 1925, p.11. 
2. Bruce to Sir William Clarkson, Deputy Chairman, Common--
wealth Shipping Board, 9 July, 1925. (C.A.O. A458 J502/2). 
3. Clarkson to Bruce, 10 July, 1925. (C.A.O. A458 J502/2). 
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The Commonwealth Government, unlike the New South 
Wales Government, refused to perform a mediating role in the 
strike. A deputation of trade union leaders saw Bruce on 
50th June, 1925, and two weeks later Matthew Charlton, the 
Leader of the Federal Parliamentary Labour Party, moved that 
the Prime Minister should convene a conference. On both 
occasions Bruce said that the Government would not interfere 
and that it was up to the unions to bring the Seamen's Union 
into line.^ The Government had to uphold the authority of 
the Court and it could not assist a deregistered union to 
receive every advantage that it had received under the old 
award. Garran assured Powers that the Government had no 
intention of following the Hughes practice and setting up 
a special tribunal. On 22nd July negotiations began 
between the shipowners and union leaders, presided over by 
J.M. Baddeley, the New South Wales Minister for Labour. 
There were predictions that discussions would go on for a 
fortnight, and this provoked Bruce into telling both sides 
that every day of the strike increased the number of unem-
ployed and brought greater privation to the community, and 
1. Minutes of deputation of trade unionists to Prime 
Minister, 50 June, 1925. (C.A.O. A458 J502/2); 
C.P.D. V. 110, 15 July, 1925, p.1092. 
2. Garran to Groom, 20 July, 1925. (A.N.L. MS 256/2/5141). 
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an immediate settlement was a vital necessity.^ Nevertheless, 
the conference took a further week uefore agreement was reached. 
The seamen promised to abandon job control and the rotary 
system of manning ships, while the shipowners agreed to retain 
fortnightly pay and conceded the Union a monthly stop-v/ork 
meeting. Branch meetings of the seamen ratified the agree-
ment and by 7th August, 1925, the ships were being manned again. 
The seamen's strike was followed by two weeks of 
industrial peace. Then another strike began which cast a 
great shadow over Australian politics until December, 1925. 
On 20th August, 1925, British seamen on almost all overseas 
ships in Sydney refused duty because the National Maritime 
Board in England had reduced their wages from £10 to £9 per 
month. Walsh and Johnson addressed the men and promised them 
the support of all Australian unionis 
ts.^ Within a day or 
two British seamen had walked off their ships in Melbourne 
and other ports, and at the same time similar events were 
taking place in South Africa, New Zealand and, on a relatively 
1. Bruce to E.J. Holloway, Secretary, Melbourne Trades Hall. 
Council, 23 July, 1925, Bruce to W.T. Appleton, Chairman, 
Commonwealth Steamship Owners Federation, 23 July, 1925. 
(C.A.O. A458 J502/2). 
2. S.M.H. 1 Aug., 1925, p.15. 
3. S.M.H. 22 Aug. 1925, p.15. 
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small scale, in Britain itself. By 26th August, 1925, 25 
overseas vessels were idle in Australia and by 17th September 
the number had grown to 39. Throughout the strike a few 
British ships were able to sail, manned either by their 
original crews or by volunteers, but it was not until November, 
1925, that the number of idle ships began to decline. The 
strikers had the moral and financial support of many Aust-
ralian unions, the major exception being the V/aterside Workers 
Federation, which was becoming extremely annoyed by the 
endless succession of shipping strikes and the consequent 
unemployment for its members. 
There was very little that the Commonwealth Govern-
ment could do to assist the settlement of the strike. On 
22nd August, 1925, Havelock Wilson, the veteran leader of 
the British National Sailors and Firemen's Union, sent a 
cable to Bruce explaining that both the shipowners and the 
maritime unions were represented on the National Maritime 
Board and the wage reduction was confirmed by the Executive 
Coujicil and the annual general meeting of his Union; it had 
also been accepted by 50,000 seamen who signed their articles. 
He asked Bruce to give full protection to the British seamen 
who were working and to restrain Walsh and other Australian 
ujiionists from interfering.^ Bruce made much of the argu-
1. J. Havelock Wilson to Bruce, 22 Aug. 1925. (C.A.O. A458 
K502/2). 
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ment that the strikers were rebelling against their leaders 
and were thereby violatii^ one oi the principles of unionism.^ 
The strikers replied that Wilson was both an autocrat and a 
reactionary, who was paid and feted by the shipowners. 
Bruce admitted that the seamen's wages seemed to be unbeliev-
ably low, but throughout the strike he supported the ship-
owners' argument that the strikers' action was futile, as any 
changes in rates could only be made by their union in England.^ 
Both Powers and Baddeley convened conferences but they were 
"unsuccessful, Australian courts sentenced hundreds of the 
seamen to imprisoriment, which, together with decreasing funds 
and increasing numbers of volujiteers, weakened the strikers' 
morale. They finally conceded defeat on 30th November, 1925? 
and the owners agreed to repatriate the men stranded in 
Australia and to make no fujrther prosecutions. 
Tnroughout the strike the Government's main concern 
was to ensujfe that the seamen who refused to strike, the 
volunteers and the waterside workers should be protected. On 
23rd Augu-st, 1925, Bruce sent a telegram to all the Premiers 
asking for an assurance that the seamen who were willing to 
carry out their contracts should be protected from any 
1. S.M.H. 24 Aug. 1925, p.9. 
2. I M - 26 Aug. 1925, pp.13-14. 
3. Ibid. 3 I^ 'ov. 1925, p.-l, 6 Nov. 1925, p.H. 
- 130 -
intimidation.^ Three Premiers promised to preserve the 
peace, but all of the five Labour Premiers suspected that 
Bruce was making political capital out of the strike. Collier 
said he resented the suggestion that his Government would not 
do its duty. During the strike there were allegations that 
the Western Australian and Queensland Governments were not 
preventing intimidation. On 30th September the shipov/ners 
claimed that at Fremantle a large band of strikers had boarded 
a ship and forced the crew to join them, and said that the 
Commissioner of Police admitted he could not cope with the 
situation.^ Bruce demanded an explanation from Collier, 
who angrily replied that the report was not true, that police 
protection had been ample and there had been no disorder, and 
suggested that Bruce's practice of publishing his telegrams 
in the press before he had received a reply could easily be 
misconstrued as political propaganda.^ Later in October 
Bruce asked the Queensland Premier, Y L McCormack, to provide 
protection to ens^ oire that ships with refrigerated cargoes at 
Cairns, ToTrnsville and Bowen were refuelled, but AfcCormack 
1. Bruce to Premiers of all States, 23 Aug. 1925. (C.A.O. 
A458 K502/2). 
2. S.M.H. 29 Aug. 1925, p.15. 
3. A.W. Johnson, Chairman, Overseas Shipping Representatives 
Association, to Bruce, 30 Sept. 1925. (C.A.O. A458 
S502/2). 
4. Collier to Bruce, 3 Oct. 1925. (C.A.O. A458 S502/2). 
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replied that there had been no breaches of peace at these 
ports and the Government would maintain law and order with-
out help from the Commonwealth Government.^ In many Queens-
land ports there were threats of violence throughout October, 
1925, as farmers and canegrowers left their farms to work 
on the wharves, either protecting the waterside workers or 
loading their produce on to the ships themselves. Graziers 
were attacked at Gladstone, at Townsville strikers damaged 
a ship and pelted its crew with coal and at Bowen seamen 
p 
emptied railway trucks of coal. There were very few 
clashes between strikers and farmers, but the press created 
an atmosphere of incipient violence which was attributed to 
the inaction of the State Labour Government. 
The role of the Commonwealth Government in the 
British seamen's strike was therefore a very limited one. 
But it provided the pretext for the Government to take two 
measures aimed at dealing ruthlessly with the leadership of 
the Australian seamen, the power of the Communists in the 
unions, the long succession of industrial stoppages and the 
alleged inability of State Labour Governments to cope 
effectively with the growing problem of law and order. 
1. Bruce to W. McCormack, 22 Oct. 1925, McCormack to Bruce, 
23 Oct. 1925. (A458 S502/2). 
2. S.M.H. 26 Oct. 1925, p.11, 28 Oct. 1925, p.15, 2 Nov. 
1925, p.9. 
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The British seamen's strike began on 21st August, 
1925, and the press gave much publicity to the fact that 
Walsh and Johnson had addressed the strikers in Sydney. On 
24th August the Overseas Shipping Representatives Association 
told Bruce that it was the extremist leaders of the Seamen's 
Union of Australia who had instigated the strike and demanded 
that the Government take immediate action against these 
fomenters of industrial strife.^ On the same day Bruce 
said that extremists such as Walsh and Johnson were under-
mining the authority of the properly constituted leaders of 
the British union, and contrasted the industrial peace brought 
about by Havelock Wilson with the constant strikes and un-
employment of the Australian seajnen. On the next day 
Cabinet discussed the strike and after an hour had decided 
on its course of action. The Governor-General immediately 
issued a proclamation that there existed a serious industrial 
disturbance. That evening Garran left for Sydney and on 
27th August Bruce announced the names of the members of the 
Deportation Board. On 51st August Walsh and Johnson were 
each issued with suimnons to show cause why they should not 
be deported. 
When Garran went to Sydney he saw Lang and asked 
for permission to offer the Chairmanship of the Board to 
1. Johnson to Bruce, 24 Aug. 1925. (A458 S502/2). 
2. S.M.H. 24 Aug. 1925, p.9. 
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the New South Wales Chief Justice. Lang told him that he 
had no desire to block the Commonwealth but he did not want 
the State brought into the dispute at all.^ He subsequently 
made his views public, remarking that he was prepared to see 
that the laws of the Commonwealth were observed, but he 
could not allow his State or his Party to be identified with 
a Nationalist attempt to deport its political and industrial 
opponents, Bruce condemned Lang's failure to guarantee 
that the necessary police would be provided if any deporta-
tions were ordered and immediately introduced a Peace 
Officers Bill. The Bill, which passed through Parliament 
in three days, simply empowered the Attorney-General to 
appoint Commonwealth peace officers with the powers of police 
constables and officers. It is difficult to avoid the con-
clusion that Lang was approached because Bruce knew he could 
not co-operate and it was a good opportunity to publicize 
the partisanship that he felt Labour Goverrunents were 
exercising in the enforcement of Commonwealth laws. The 
members of the Deportation Board (a barrister, an accountant 
and a former police magistrate) were easily depicted as the 
willing agents of the Government because they were not 
widely known. But if Bruce had really wanted a chairman 
1. Garran to Bruce, 26 Aug. 1925. (C.A.O. A458 0502/2); 
Garran to Groom, 26 Aug. 1925. (A.N.L. MS 256/2/5142). 
2. S.M.H. 28 Aug. 1925, p.11. 
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with the prestige of a Supreme Court Judge it would have 
been a simple matter for him to havt requested the co-
operation of the Victorian Nationalist Government. 
Garran spent much of the next three months in 
Sydney attending the deportation proceedings. Groom remained 
in Melbourne and although Garran reported to him regularly 
it.was Garran and Bruce who marshalled the attack on Walsh 
and Johnson. Garran and two of his staff worked long nights 
collecting and collating the evidence of pressmen, ship-
owners and others, and Garran set out their objective in 
terms v/hich showed his personal enthusiasm for the task: 
"Our object is to get a compact, strong and complete case 
which will not only impress the Board but impress the public 
as to the shocking nature of these men's past performances 
and the disastrous consequences if they are allowed to con-
tinue. Prosecutions, fines, imprisoiunent have all proved 
useless; the only course for the community, for self-
protection, is to expel them from the community I 
think the case will be so overwhelming there should be no 
doubt of the recommendation. After that there may be trouble 
and the Government ought to be prepared for any eventualities." 
The Board began its hearings on 3rd September, 1925, and they 
continued, with an extensive daily press coverage, until 
10th November. The Commonwealth's case was not merely based 
1. Garran to Groom, 29 Aug. 1925. (A.N.L. MS 236/2/3146). 
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on the events that led up to the British seamen's strike, 
but went back to the 1919 seamen's strike and referred to 
awards and undertakings made in the Arbitration Court from 
1921 to 1925, the deregistration proceedings, the big strikes 
of 1924 and 1925 and the editorials written by Walsh in the 
Australian Seamen's Journal. The main argument of the 
defence counsel was that the British seamen were determined 
to strike and the speeches by Walsh and Johnson did not 
influence them one way or the other. Every possible delay-
ing tactic was used but eventually the Board refused to 
hear any more evidence. The Board reported to the Government 
that T/alsh and Johnson had both encouraged the British 
seamen's strike even if they had nothing to do with its 
inception. This, together with their past record of hos-
tility to conciliation and arbitration, showed that their 
continued presence in Australia would be injurious to the 
public welfare. As neither man was born in Australia, the 
Board recommended that they should be deported.^ 
l^lfhile the deportation case was proceeding Bruce 
had taken another unexpected decision. On 18th September 
he announced that a general election would be held to decide 
whether the people wanted to be governed by Parliament or 
by outside agitators. He went on to say that the Labour 
Party and trade union leaders had consistently championed 
1. A.S. Canning, F.J. Kindon, N.H. Rowland to Pearce, 
16 Nov. 1925. (C.A.O. A4b7/12). 
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the advocates of revolution, State Govermients had refused 
to co-operate to enforce the law, and the time had come to 
appeal for a mandate to authorize the Government to take any 
action necessary to maintain the supremacy of Parliament and 
laYi and order,^ Bruce's policy speech on 5th October had 
the same theme. The Government would defeat all groups and 
influences seeking to exacerbate class struggles, and would 
eradicate both Communist and reactionary attempts to revo-
lutionize Australia's political and economic system. He 
sought approval for the steps the Government h^d taken to 
deport Walsh and Johnson. Turning specifically to arbit-
ration, Bruce said that the Arbitration Act would be ajnended 
to extend the use of the secret ballot, thereby reducing the 
power of union officials, and to give the President and 
Deputy Presidents judicial tenure, so that they could police 
the arbitration system. 
Throughout the election campaign Ministers con-
centrated on the disastrous effects of industrial conflict, 
but paid little attention to the arbitration system which 
was supposed to prevent such conflict. Page asked whether 
chaos and industrial unrest were to rule at the will of a 
1. S.M.H. 19 Sept. 1925, p.15. 
2. Bruce. 1925 general election policy speech. 
(A.N.L. MS 1009/26). 
' ' ^ ' ' 1 ' ' ' n i l ' : S T A I I T o v M ' l i r ; T i : i ; M !•• I J 'K i d i^ ; D I ' M . K i r n o N R A C K 
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few foreign extremists, with a consequent diminution in 
production and a decline of living standards.^ The Country 
Party Ministers tended to be more practical in their approach 
to industrial unrest, describing its effects on national 
finance, production and exports, while Nationalist Ministers 
made heavy use of vague abstrations, such as "insidious 
doctrines", "the social fabric" and "national ideals". The 
Government appealed to patriotism or xenophobia: Bruce re-
ferred to industrial extremists as "puppets of men overseas" 
and said that no "dirty, greasy foreigner" should interfere 
o 
with Australia's industrial system. For the first time 
Communism was a major issue in an election. Ministers 
declared that there was no room in Australia for class hatred, 
class consciousness or class legislation. Garden's boast 
that the Communists controlled almost all the unions in 
Australia was frequently quoted, usually with the qualifica-
tion that of course the actual number of Communists was very 
small and ninety per cent of Australian workmen were "sane, 
intelligent and honest men". Government candidates pointed 
to Communist support of the Labour Party as evidence that 
the aims of the two parties were basically the same. They 
also claimed that the holdup of customs and quarantine 
officers in Fremantle and of mails in Rockhampton, together 
1. S.M.H. 21 Sept. 1925, p.ll. 
2. Argus. 8 Sept. 1925, p.ll. 
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with Lang's refusal to assist the deportation proceedings, 
showed that Laoour Governments were under the control of 
union extremists. 
During the campaign Bruce enlarged on his promises 
in the field of industrial arbitration. Comprehensive 
legislation would "be introduced to make the obstruction of 
foreign and interstate trade, interferences with Common-
wealth mails, and acts of violence and intimidation against 
the carrying on of national activities and industries 
offences under Commonwealth law. The Arbitration Act would 
be amended to overcome the overlapping of Federal and State 
awards.^ With the New South Wales Government committed to 
introducing the 44 ho^ar week, the question of working hours 
was becoming a controversial issue in Australian politics.' 
Both Bruce and Page said the subject should not be one for 
political argument at all and they promised'to call a con-
ference of Commonwealth and State Arbitration Court judges • 
to determine the working hours for the whole of Australia, 
on the basis of the health, efficiency and productivity of 
o 
the workers. 
Labour candidates rejected Bruce's claim that the 
question to be decided in the election was whether Communism 
1. S.M.H. 14 Oct, 1925, pp.15-16. 
2. I M i . 22 Oct. 1925, p.11, A ^ . 28 Oct. 1925, p.l5. 
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was to prevail over constitutional government and the rule 
01 law. But theJ could not deny that there was serious 
industrial conflict in Australia, and it was here that they 
were on uncertain ground. They had no love for ?/alsh and 
Johnson, who had often ridiculed the Labour Party, and they 
made no attempt to justify the strikes of the Australian 
seamen, beyond asserting that the shipowners were equally 
to blame. They had to oppose the Goyernment's legislation 
aimed at these strikes, but could offer no alternative 
suggestions, and found themselves in the uncomfortable 
position of defending the status quo. The Labour Party's 
position was f^ jrther ?/eakened by the continuance of the 
British seamen's strike throughout the campaign and by the 
frequent allegations of violence and lack of police protec-
tion in Western Australia and Queensland up to within a few 
days of the election. Charlton made two specific promises 
relating to arbitration: a Labour Government would seek 
the amendment of the Constitution to empower the Government 
to bring about uniform working hours and would amend the 
Arbitration Act to abolish cumbersome procedures and to 
enable a single judge to alter standard hours or wages.^ 
The 1925 election csjnpaign was a turbulent one, 
with both sides appealing to basic fears and principles, and 
both engaging in an unusually high degree of personal 
1. S.M.H. 10 Oct. 1925, pp.15-16. 
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Yilification. The Goverment asked for a mandate to govern 
rather than a mandate to introduce definite measures. The 
electorate did not object to the 'vagueness of its promises, 
for on 14th Ilovember, 1925, the Government parties were 
returned with an increased majority, the Labour Party losing 
eight seats. The Government now had a majority of 25 in the 
House of Representatives and 22 in the Senate. 
Two days after the election the Deportation Board 
submitted its report on Johnson. The report on Walsh had 
been received in late October, 1925, but Bruce decided that, 
as the election position was so satisfactory, it would be a 
mistake to introduce a new issue, and the Board's recommen-
dation was therefore kept secret until after the election.^ 
Apparently, 3ru.ee contemplated sending Walsh and Johnson out 
of the couJitry before they had a chance to appeal, but 
decided that such an action could hardly be taken by a Govern-
ment which had just been re-elected on a law and order 
p 
platform. Walsh and Johnson were arrested on 20th November, 
1925, BJid on 1st December the High Co"Lirt began hearing their 
appeal against the Board's decision. On 11th December the 
Go^ art j^risTiimously decided that both men should be immediately 
1. Bruce to Pearce, 26 Oct. 1925. (A.N.L. US 213/5). 
2. Edwards, or. cit, pp.116-17. 
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released, although it did not give its reasons until a week 
later. The Court was not concerned with industrial conflict 
or with the social consequences of the two men's actions but 
solely vdth the question of whether the Iminigration Act and 
the deportation proceedings were a valid exercise of the 
Commonwealth's immigration power. Its judgements were con-
flicting and complex. All the justices except Higgins held 
that the Act was not ultra vires but all agreed that a person 
who came to Australia before Federation, as Walsh had, could 
not be treated by the Commonwealth as an immigrant, Isaacs 
and Rich agreed that Johnson was an immigrant but the con-
viction was quashed, as the summons had not specified precisely 
the nature of the charge.^ 
The High Court's decision came as a shock to Bruce 
and Garran. Garran's pride as a constitutional authority was 
hurt and he made caustic references to the justices "sitting 
up there after the battle". He also resented press and 
parliamentary criticism of his Department. Bruce had not 
overlooked the political advantages of the deportation pro-
ceedings but he genuinely believed that Walsh and Johnson 
exercised great influence over unionists and that their re-
moval would cause a lessening of industrial conflict. He 
1. 37 C.L.R. 56. 

































tended to think in terms of panaceas and in the second half 
of 1925 deportation had replaced deregistration as the cure 
for strikes. He probably depended too much on the press for 
his information about the Seamen's Union, and the press 
greatly exaggerated the power of Walsh and Johnson and neg-
lected officials like Fleming, Casey and J. O'Neill, who 
were their equals in militancyo But years later, with the 
advantage of hindsight, Bruce still regretted that he had 
failed to rid Australia of Walsh and Johnson,^ 
On the same day as the High Court handed down its 
judgements it was announced that Sir Littleton Groom had 
resigned as Attorney-General. The co-incidence naturally 
gave rise to speculation that he had been made a scapegoat 
for the Government's failure in the Court, and Groom's 
2 
references to poor health were treated with scepticism® 
Actually, Bruce had summoned Groom from Sydney on 5th December^ 
a week before the Court gave its decision, and asked for his 
resignation. In old age Bruce confirmed that the High Court 
case had no bearing on the matter, and that no particular 
action by Groom, but rather Bruce's dissatisfaction with his 
work generally, was the reason for his dismissal.-^ Groom, 
1. Edwards, op.cit. p.116. 
2. Quick to Groom, 24 Dec. 1925. (A.N.L. MS 236/2/3505). 
3. Bruce to Edwards, 3 June, 1964. (A.N.L.). 
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who looked back with nostalgia to the days of Deakinite 
Liberalism,^ had few, if any, friends in the Cabinet and he 
had doubts about the Government's tough policy of prosecution, 
deregistration and deportation. But he was extremely reluc-
tant to give up office, and Hughes was no longer the only 
enemy of the Government among the Nationalists in the House 
of Representatives, 
1. Groom to Quick, 20 Dec. 1925^ (A.N.L. MS 236/2/3292). 
CHAPTER 3 
J. G-. LATHAA-l AI@ THE 1926 REFEREKDM 
On 18th December, 1925, John Greig Latham was 
sworn in as Commonwealth Attorney-General. His rise to power 
had been extremely rapid, for he had only "been in Parliament 
for three years and a member of the Nationalist Party for 
five months when Bruce chose him to be one of the six Nation-
alist Ministers. His rise did not cease with his entry into 
the Cabinet. Due to his exceptional talents and the impor-
tance of his portfolio in a period of continuous industrial 
J^inrest, he was soon acclaimed as one of the few outstanding 
Ministers. By 1928 the press was referring to the Bruce-Page-
Latham GoYernment and it was generally assumied that, should 
Bruce retire, Latham would succeed him as the Leader of the 
Nationalist Party. 
Latham's abilities and character, his unique 
position, in some ways at least, within the Cabinet, and his 
important role in the industrial conflict of the late 1920s, 
can best be -understood by examining his background and early 
career, which immediately set him apart from most of his 
colleagues,^ Born in Melbourne in 1877, the son of an 
Si-'- John Latham (1877-1964). Apart from Zelman Cowen's 
brief study. Sir John Latham and other pa-pers, Melbo'urne 
1965, no biography of Latham has been published. The 
followir^ Daragraphs are based mainly on the voluminous 
Latham Papers in the National Library. 
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extremely devout Methodist tinsmith, he grew up in an en-
vironment 01 Puritanism and frugality. Educated at State 
schools (apart from two years on a scholarship at Scotch 
College), he won a scholarship to the University of Melbourne 
and graduated with a Master of Arts in 1899. After teaching 
in the country for two years, he returned to the University 
and received his Bachelor of Laws in 1902. But his results 
in Law did not compare with the success that he had achieved 
in philosophy and logic, and it was not surprising that from 
1903 to 1910 he should hold teaching positions in the latter 
disciplines, first as a tutor at Ormond College and later as 
a University lecturer. He was offered the Chair of Philosophy 
at the University of Adelaide, but declined it as he did not 
wish to give up his legal practice. In 1910 Latham was 
appointed a LectuTer in the Law of Contracts and Personal 
Property, a part-time position which he held until 1920. 
Both as a student and a lecturer he was actively involved 
in many University societies and activities, particularly 
debating and lacrosse (he was captain of the Victorian team), 
and from the beginning he showed a willingness to hold office 
in various kinds of organizations. 
Latham was called to the Bar in 1904, but his 
progress in the legal profession was slow and he appeared 
mainly in Courts of Petty Sessions and the County Court. 
However, he was making a name for himself in other fields 
- 1 4 6 -
and showing a capacity for hard work which he retained all 
his life. He "became involved in the Liberal Party organiza-
tion and was one of the protegees of Alfred Deakin. Deakin 
encouraged his interest in journalism and in 1907 he began 
to write articles for the Argus, became the Melbourne cor-
respondent for the London Standard and, together with Walter 
Murdoch, Bernard O'Dowd and three others, edited a short-
lived magazine. But it was as a rationalist that Latham 
became most widely known in Melbourne. Through his reading 
of philosophy, psychology, history and anthropology he came 
to reject the Christian faith^ and, to his father's horror, 
consistently opposed all attempts by the Churches to extend 
their domain. He founded the Victorian Rationalist Society, 
led a campaign against the establishment of a Faculty of 
Divinity in the University, and from 1907 to 1914 was secretary 
of the Education Act Defence League. The League fought a 
long and successful battle to prevent the Victorian Govern-
ment amending the Education Act so as to allow unsectarian 
Scripture lessons to be taught by State School teachers. As 
the most prominent member of the League, Latham spent much 
of his free time addressing meetings, writing letters to the 
press, drafting circulars and generally arousing the hostility 
of conservative and respectable sections of Melbourne society. 
1. Latham to T. Latham, 25 July, 1909. (A.N.L. MS 1009/1). 
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During the war Latham became more involved in national 
politics. He was active in pro-conscription organizations, 
through which he became a friend of Bavin. In 1917 he was 
appointed an Honorary Lieutenant Commander in the Navy (at a 
salary of his own choosing), assigned to intelligence work at 
the Navy Office in Melbourne, and in 1918 he was suddenly 
ordered to leave for the Imperial War Conference as the adviser 
to the Minister for the Navy, Sir Joseph Cook. Latham's ex-
periences at the Conference and at the 1919 Paris Peace Con-
ference were among the highlights of his life. The work he 
did at both Conferences was of undoubted importance for the 
future of Australian defence and foreign relations. He prepared 
many memoranda for Hughes on the German colonies and the Pacific 
Islands, and he was co-author of the scheme for classifying 
mandatory territories which was adopted by the Peace Conference. 
He was also the British Secretary of the Czechoslovakian 
Commission. Life in London and Paris was extremely exciting, 
the days spent at meetings which were changing the course of 
history, the evenings spent at concerts, plays or in dining 
and arguing with Haldane, Conan Doyle, Lowes Dickinson, T,E. 
Lawrence and others, and free week-ends occupied in cycling 
round the countryside with Garran and Frederic Eggleston. 
Altogether, Latham was rather overwhelmed by his experiences, 
by being present at historic occasions and above all by working 
closely with famous statesmen such as Lloyd George, Balfour, 
Smuts and Clemenceau. 
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If Latham suffered from the colonial's inferiority 
complex in England, he returned to Australia with much greater 
self-confidence and increased determination to enter politics. 
He also returned with an intense dislike of Hughes, believing 
that his autocratic methods and his lack of diplomatic finesse 
had dajnaged Australia's interests.^ Latham founded the 
Victorian branch of the League of Nations Union and addressed 
many gatherings on both the League and the Peace Conference. 
Meanwhile, his legal practice was growing rapidly and he was 
soon appearing in the High Court and Victorian Supreme Court 
as frequently as Dixon, Menzies and Sir Edward Mitchell. He 
was not a jury advocate, but he was involved in a wide range 
of commercial, tax, patent, estate and arbitration cases and 
also such famous constitutional cases as the Engineers Case 
and MacArthur's Case. He was made a King's Counsel in 1922. 
The previous year he had declined a Supreme Court judgeship 
2 on accoujit of his political ambitions. 
Ever since 1907 Latham had considered standing for 
the Federal Parliament, but his election to the seat of 
Kooyong at the 1922 elections came as a surprise, as he de-
feated the sitting Nationalist member. He stood as a 
Progressive Liberal, supported by the Liberal Union. The 
1. Latham to E. Latham, 21 Feb. 1919. (A.N.L. MS 1009/21). 
2. H. Lawson to Latham, 24 Dec. 1921, Latham to A. Robinson, 
30 Dec. 1921. (A.N..L. MS 1009/1). 
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platforms of iDoth Latham and the Union were negative: 
opposition to the Hughes Government on account of its reck-
less extravagance, its expansion of the Public Service, its 
irregular handling of the War Service Homes schemes and of 
wireless contracts, its arbitration policy and its socialistic 
economic ventures. During the campaign Latham said that he 
disagreed with the principles of the Labour Party, while no 
Nationalist Party principles had yet been discovered. He 
readily accepted Page's invitation to attend Country Party 
meetings and he played an extremely important role in Page's 
negotiations with Bruce, with Page seeking his advice on 
almost every small point that arose.^ Thus Latham had a 
most auspicious beginning to his career as a backbencher. 
His record in the next three years was an impressive one: 
he was regarded as an expert on foreign affairs and the 
Leagu.e of Nations, while his knowledge of law was only 
matched by the blind barrister, G.A. Max-well. This expertise 
was appreciated by the Government in the debates on the 
Immigration Bill and the Peace Officers Bill, when Latham's 
speeches were quoted by several Nationalists and when Labour 
members acknowledged him as the Government's unofficial 
spokesman on the law.^ Outside Parliament, Bruce sought 
1. See E. Page, Truant suTgeon. Sydney, 1965. p.92., 
Graham. OTD.CIT! pp.ldb-YU. 
2. C.P.D. V. 110, 16 July 1925, p.1200. 
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Latham's advice about amending the Arbitration Act and incor-
porated in his policy speech many suggestions made by Latham.^ 
V/ith the deposition of Hughes, Latham's antagonism to the 
Nationalist Party melted away, but he did not join the Party 
until June, 1925, by which time predictions were being ffiade 
that a place would soon be found for him in the Cabinet. 
Latham was the first practising -barrister to be 
Attorney-General since Sir William Irvine's brief tenure in 
1913-14. Like Irvine, he conformed in appearance and manner 
with the popular image of the lawyer. He was 48, but he 
looked younger, and the press made many allusions to his 
youth. He was tall, thin, with a pale complexion, sombre 
grey eyes and a puritanical mouth. His voice was nasal and 
monotonous and his speeches, both in Parliament and at election 
meetings, were invariably described as low-toned, academic 
with no rhetoric but a pitiless logic as he unfolded his 
case step by step.^ He could occasionally be amusing but, 
like Bruce, his manner was generally formal and reserved; he 
detested back-slappers and was reluctant to use Christian 
names, even with his close friends. 
1. Bruce to Latham, 3 Oct. 1925. (A.N.L. MS 1009/26). 
2. S.M.H. 10 June, 1925. p.14. 
3. See Edwards, op.cit. p.69, Herald, 7 Dec. 1922, 
Sun. 22 July, 1925, p.9. 
- 151 -
In both character and experience Latham was well 
fitted to be Attorney-General. Even his opponents acknowledged 
that he was a man of exceptional integrity, although at times 
he could be moralizing and self-righteous. Another legacy of 
his Fjritan background was his love of hard work, which dis-
mayed some of his Cabinet colleagues. He liked lon^ j Cabinet 
meetings, was irritated by superficial argument, and believed 
that decisions should only be based on the most thorough study 
of all the possible consequences of the alternative proposals 
which were before the Government,^ His speeches and Cabinet 
submissions were so thoroughly prepared that every question 
or criticism could be answered without a moment's delay. He 
alarmed his officers by reading files on very routine matters. 
The danger with a Minister who relishes work is that he will 
become lost in detail, fail to delegate work, and find that 
he is unable to make swift decisions on really important 
matters. Yet there is no evidence that this ever happened to 
I^thsjn. At the Paris Peace Conference he had won the admira-
tion of Sir Maurice Han±ey and even Wilson and Lloyd George 
by his ability to summarize a complicated argument and to 
set out clear proposals for action. He showed the sairie ab^ Lli.xy 
as a Minister, together with a promptness in handling corres-
pondence which shamed Garran. Moreover, he found time to 
read widely on the law (duTing elections he relaxed with 
1. See P. Heydon. Quiet decision. Melbourne, 1965, pp.112-13> 
- 152 -
legal periodicals) and on many other subjects which had a 
bearing on politics. He also continued to practise privately 
at the Bar, so there could be no questioning of his legal 
expertise. 
In a number of ways Latham was set apart from his 
Cabinet colleagues. Melbourne University men still referred 
to him sometimes as "radical Jack".^ In fact, he had never 
been a political radical, for he had always been a critic of 
socialism, was fervently anti-communist and believed in the 
essential worthiness of the British Empire, British political 
and legal institutions and the private enterprise system. 
But there was a common tendency to associate radicalism and 
rationalism, and before the War Latham had been supported by 
socialists in his attacks on the Churches. In the 1920s the 
o 
cry of "Atheist" was raised at elections, and conservatives 
in MelbouTne still felt doubtful about the Member for Kooyong. 
Moreover, Latham had retained his friendship with academics 
and vrriters with left-wing sympathies, a fact which worried 
his more orthodox colleagues. Latham probably had a weaker 
sense of party than the other Ministers: after all, he had 
only been a member of the iv'ationalist Party for a few months 
and he had little to do with the Nationalist organization. 
1. A.C.D. Rivett to Latham, 19 Feb. 1922. (A.N.L. MS 1009/1) 
2. In fact, at the 1922 elections Latham was branded both as 
as atheist and as a Roman Catholic. 
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It was significant that in 1926 Bruce consulted Pearce rather 
than Latham about Party strategy and the future of the Co-
alition.^ 
T770 factors had great influence on Latham's relations 
with other Ministers and also with employers and unionists. 
One derived from his training in philosophy and logic. Latham 
was not a particularly creative or imaginative thinker. He 
had, however, a deep belief in the importance of precise 
lang-aage and of following through an argument from clearly 
stated first principles to its logical conclusion. His speeches 
often took the form of extended syllogisms, the premise being 
perhaps the ultimate p'orpose of government or the theoretical 
basis of arbitration, and the speech proceeding step by step 
ujitil finally it reached the details of the bill or proposal. 
Even when he privately did not agree with the proposal, he 
still preferred to justify it by returning to a basic principle 
and to argue that the proposal was the only logical outcome» 
At the 1922 elections Latham complained that the Federal 
Parliament consisted largely of men determined to secure 
certain things rather than to put into action any definite 
principles,^ This was true of almost all his Cabinet colleagues 
1. Bruce to Pearce, 9 April, 1926. (A.N.L. MS 215/5). 
2. The jo-jrnalist G.E. Morrison, who met Latham at^ t^he_^ 1919 
Peace Conference, dismissed him as a "banal man". .See 
C. Pearl. Morrison of Peking. Sydney, 1967. p.581, 
5. A ^ . 5 Dec. 1922, p.lO. 
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and also of employers and unions. The result was that Latham 
frequently became exasperated when men blithely ignored first 
principles or stubbornly refused to follow through their argu-
ments to their logical conclusion. His relations with union 
leaders were further aggravated by their inarticulateness and 
by their outright refusal to discuss certain matters, such as 
their opposition to piecework. Latham generally practised what 
he preached and did not hesitate to make radical proposals on 
the grounds of logic, or to accept suggestions from his opponents 
if they appeared to be reasonable. Related to this concern 
for logic and exactitude was Latham's irritation with colleagues 
who persisted with laws that were not fulfilling their purpose 
or who cheerfully accepted inconsistencies in the administra-
tion of the law. Altogether, Latham was an outstanding example 
of the rationalist in politics, the man who, in Oakeshott's 
words, seeks after "the politics of perfection and uniformity."^ 
The other factor was that Latham had grown accustomed 
to achieving power and leadership in a number of fields through 
his own ability (and luck), without the help of family con-
nections, wealth, business firms or political parties. Self-
assured and aloof, he was not conscious of the need for a power 
base and he did not regard himself as the representative of 
any class or interest group. He belonged to neither the 
working class nor to the world of industry and commerce, but 
1. M. Oakeshott. Rationalism in politics and other essays. 
London, 1962. p.5. 
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to the intellectual elite, and he shared the intolerance of 
that elite for the mass of his fellow citizens. A few other 
Ministers had been to University, but their interests were 
mainly those of businessmen, doctors and farmers. Latham 
alone had been associated with a university for over 25 years 
and he alone mixed almost entirely with academics and pro-
fessional men. Much of his leisure was occupied with the 
Melbourne University Council, with meetings of the Round 
Table group and the mysterious Boobook Society,^ and with 
fishing holidays at Khancoban in the Snowy Mountains. The 
men he met and argued with on these occasions were always the 
same: academics such as Harrison Moore, Ernest Scott, H.W. 
Allen, Walter Murdoch and David Rivett, professional men like 
E.L. Piesse, R.H. Gregory or H.S. Nicholas, and very occasion-
ally a politician or public servant, such as Bavin, Eggleston 
or Garran. By the 1920s Latham was a wealthy man. In the 
Courts he had often appeared for large companies and as a 
result knew something of their problems and difficulties. He 
1. The Boobooks were a group of about thirty men, almost all 
of whom were graduates of Melbourne University, who dined 
together once a month. At the first meeting in 1902 
O'Dowd read a paper entitled "Democracy and the Poet" and 
at subsequent meetings the subjects discussed ranged from 
eugenics to German reparations, from wheat to Japanese-
Australian relations. Latham was a member of the Society 
from its inception until his death, and at one time was 
Archboobook. 
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had, however, only the slightest acquaintance with Melbourne's 
commercial and business leaders and he did not regard himself 
as being particularly sympathetic to their interests.^ He 
liked to thinh that he represented the Universities in Parlia-
ment, while men like Bruce and Pratten could look after the 
employers. He was not hostile towards the employers but he 
felt sufficiently detached to be critical of them, ,]ust as he 
was critical of the unions. He once asked Murdoch "How many 
men do you know with out point of view? with our general know-
1. Potts (op.cit. pp.105-109) has argued that Latham entered 
politics to the right of the Liberal-Nationalist movement 
and that, unlike Bruce, he was very dependent on the back-
ing of conservative political groupings and business 
interests. The first proposition is probably correct in 
that Latham had a laissez-faire attitude towards the role 
of government in economic development and social welfare, 
Y/hereas most of his colleagues tended to be more 
"socialistic" on developmental questions. On the other 
hand, he took a great interest in social welfare at the 
elecxorate level, while the "Latham style" - intellectual, 
logical, problem-solving, puritanical - had little in 
common with classical conservatism. Latham always regar-
ded himself as a liberal of the Kingston-Barton-Deakin 
school, although whether he would really have supported 
Kingston is doubtful. Potts' second proposition does not 
follow from the first and is based on very slender evidence, 
It is unwise to draw far-reaching conclusions from the 
fact that a barrister represents certain interests in the 
courts. It would be illogical to argue that Menzies was 
a left-winger because he regularly represented unions in 
the courts, or that Lathajn himself had bouts of radicalism 
(he appeared for Walsh in the High Court in 1925). The 
shipowners did not regard Latham as a close ally, for in 
1925 they privately expressed the hope that he would give 
up his retainer. An examination of the whole of Latham's 
correspondence, with its thousands of references to his 
friends and interests, suggests that while his sympathies 
were on the side of the employers, his association with the 
Liberal Union was very short-lived and he seldom met busi-
nessmen outside the courts. 
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ledge? What is commonplace to us is often very new to many 
men."^ This intellectual arrogance affected his relations 
with employers, unionists and many of his fellow-Ministers. 
Possibly due to his aloofness and intolerance, 
Latham appears to have had few close friends in the Bruce-Page 
Government. Pearce and Latham both enjoyed each other's 
company and Henry Gullett, Y/ho entered the Cabinet in 1928, 
was always one of Latham's closest friends. He had little in 
common with the Country Party Ministers and he was to become 
very antagonistic towards them after 1929. Latham's relations 
with Bruce are the most difficult to define. Latham had the 
greatest respect for Bruce. Bruce, in turn, said many years 
later that when Latham joined the Government he realized that 
at last he had a really intelligent Minister with a first-
class brain. He went on to say that he greatly enjoyed working 
with Latham and many of his actions were influenced by Latham's 
views. Yet the two men, who had so much in common, never 
learnt very much about each other. Latham knew nothing about 
Bruce's early legal career, while Bruce had not heard about 
Latham's experiences at the Peace Conference. They both lived 
for another forty years, they saw each other occasionally, and 
yet their letters were always forbiddingly formal. It was a 
1. Latham to W. Murdoch, 4 May, 1908. (A.N.L. MS 1009/16) 
2. Bruce to Edwards, 20 Nov. 1964. (A.N.L.). 
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purely working relationship. 
Similarly, within the Attorney-General's Department, 
Latham was found to be an aloof Minister, who had little con-
tact with officers other than Garran, Knowles and Boniwell«^ 
At times he was irritated by departmental inefficiency, but on 
the whole his relations with his staff were cordial and he 
took more interest in their careers than most of them realized. 
He came to the Department with a high reputation as a barrister 
and his prestige Y/as enhanced by his subsequent work: on many 
files there are notes by Latham correcting Garran or other 
officers on points of law, and many requests for legal opinions 
were answered immediately by Latham without reference to his 
advisers. Latham was in an unusual position in that he had 
known his Permanent Head and his deputy for many years. He 
had first met Knowles when the latter was an undergraduate, 
while he had become friends with Garran through the Boobooks 
and had come to know him extremely well at the Paris Peace 
Conference. With Latham's appointment as Attorney-General 
Garran's role in the formulation of arbitration policy declined. 
Latham had a greater knowledge of arbitration law than Garran, 
and he had such definite ideas on the subject and such a grasp 
of detail that Bruce ceased to consult Garran or to summon him 
1. Conversation with Mr. W.D. Fanning, 5 Dec. 1972. 
2. Knowles to Latham, 8 May, 1946. (A.N.L. MS 1009/1). 
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to Cabinet meetings. But Garran still exercised considerable 
power: Latham valued his opinion hignly, sought his advice 
on most questions and found that other Ministers were always 
interested to learn the views of the Solicitor-General. 
Latham was not given the opportunity to work his way 
gradually into his new office, for on the day of his appoint-
ment Bruce ordered him to prepare a paper for Cabinet summariz-
ing the decision of the High Court in the Deportation Case. 
Garran had already asked Dixon to set down his views on the 
effects of the decision.^ The judgement of the Court had 
directly conflicted with the will of both the Government and 
the people, and it was assumed on all sides that the Govern-
ment would have to find some alternative way of deporting 
'Jalsh and Johnson. Bruce himself said that the Court's 
decision could simply mean that the Immigration Act would 
have to be redrafted, but on the other hand it might require 
an amendment of the Constitution, When the Court handed 
down its reasons there was widespread confusion about their 
meaning, especially as there were three different judgements, 
and there was much speculation in the press and in legal circles 
about the proposals that Latham would make to resolve the con-
stitutional difficulties. Latham spent the Christmas of 1925 
1. Garran to Castle, 7 Jan. 1926. (C.A.O. A467/12). 
2. S.ALH. 14 Dec. 1925, p.11. 
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in the Dandenongs studying the judgements of the Court, and 
by the time Cabinet held its first meeting on 5th January, 
1926, he had come to some definite conclusions. 
Other constitutional authorities had already ex-
pressed their views on the meaning of the Court's decision 
in the Deportation Case. In December, 1925, Harrison Moore 
and W.K. Fullagar had said they believed that the Government 
could r>ass a law to create a judicial offence under the trade 
and commerce power, the penalty for which could be depor-
tation.^ The submissions of Dixon and Latham were longer 
but were in substantial agreement. The Court's interpre-
tation of "immigrant" virtually precluded the use of the 
Immigration Act to achieve the Government's objective. How-
ever, the Court was unanimous in holding that the Commonwealth 
Parliament could create offences, such as offences of inter-
fering with foreign or interstate trade, and that the punish-
ment for such offences could take the form of deportation,' 
The justices were not in agreement on whether deportation 
could be ordered by a Minister or whether it could only follow 
a judicial trialAfter hearing Latham's views Cabinet decided 
1. Herald. 12 Dec. 1925, p.3. 
2. Latham. Memorandum for Prime Minister: Ex parte Walsh, 
ex parte Johnson, 5 Jan. 1926. (C.A.O. A2865 1926 Crimes 
Bill file). 
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that he should draft an amendment to the Crimes Act to deal 
with the obstruction of transport and trade or interference 
with Commonwealth services (as Bruce had promised during the 
election campaign), and to include deportation as one of the 
penalties. 
The Crimes Bill which Latham introduced in Parlia-
ment on 28th January, 1926, was wider in scope than Bruce had 
suggested, as a large portion of it was concerned with defin-
ing unlawful associations and with enumerating the offences 
that could be committed by persons who joined, contributed 
money to, or printed or sold publications for such associations 
This section was drafted by Garran, who on several occasions 
in 1925 had urged Groom to introduce an Unlawful Associations 
Bill so that the Communist Party could be outlawed.^ There 
were tv/o other clauses of significance, one dealing with in-
dustrial disturbances, the other with Commonwealth services. 
Clause 30J provided that, while a proclamation was in force 
declaring that a serious industrial disturbance existed, any 
person who took part in or aided or encouraged a strike or 
lockout in relation to the interstate or overseas transport 
of goods or passengers, or the provision of Commonwealth 
1. Garran to Groom 17 Sept. 1925, Garran to Groom, 19 Sept. 
1925. (A.N.L. MS 236/2/5152). The Bill was originally 
drafted by Garran and Castle in December 1925 and was 
concerned' almost solely with unlawful associations, ihe 
clauses dealing with industrial disturbances were drafted 
by Latham in January, 1926. (C.A.O. A2863 1926 Crimes 
Bill file). 
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services, would be guilty of an offence. On conviction a 
person would be liable to imprisonment for up to a year and, 
in addition, if he was not born in Australia, the Attorney-
G-eneral could order him to be deported. Clause 30K provided 
that persons who, by violence, intimidation or boycott, 
obstructed the provision of Commonwealth services, or the 
transport of goods and passengers interstate or overseas, 
or prevented anyone from offering or accepting employment 
in relation to transport or a Commonwealth service, should 
be liable to a year's imprisonment. 
In his second reading speech Latham concentrated 
on describing the activities of the Communist Party of Aust-
ralia and on giving a learned exposition of the Commonwealth's 
deportation power.^ Later he said that the Bill was not 
directed generally against strikes, which were covered by the 
Arbitration Act, but was intended to protect the community 
from interference with vital services. Y/ithout such legis-
lation the Commonwealth had no power to handle a crisis such 
as the British seamen's strike, which could have brought to 
a standstill the whole economic life of the community. Latham 
also referred to the interference with Commonwealth services 
which had occurred in Western Australia and Queensland in 
1924 and 1925, and the threats of New South Wales unionists 
to bring about a general strike if unionists were ever deported. 9 
1. C.P.D. V. 112, 28 Jan. 1926, p.457. 
2. Ibid. V. 112, 18 Feb. 1926, p.1052. 
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Bruce, who was the only other Minister to speak, stated that 
the Bill was not an attempt to provide for the settlement of 
disputes but to deal with extremists who were trying to over-
throw constitutional governmentThe opposition of the Labour 
Party was halfhearted: the Government had a mandate for the 
Bill, its constitutional foundations seemed firm, and this 
time there would be no conviction without a court trial. 
The main criticisms of the Bill were that it was dealing 
with a mythical problem, as Australia was relatively free 
from strikes, it discriminated against workers in the trans-
port industries, it was unnecessary as strikers could be 
prosecuted under the Arbitration Act, and its application 
would not be automatic but would depend on political action. 
The bill was passed by Parliament on 12th March, 1926. 
In the early months of 1926 the Crimes Act aroused 
a good deal of controversy, particularly in the trade unions. 
The New South Wales Labour Council talked of combating it 
with direct action and condemned Labour parliamentarians 
for not opposing it with sufficient force. Yet it was not 
until 1928 that a proclamation was made under Section $0J 
of the Act, no one was ever deported under that Section, and 
altogether little use was ever made of the Crimes Act in the 
settlement of industrial disputes. The problem which the 
1. C.P.D. V. 112, 11 Feb. 1926, p.880. 
2. S.M.H. 22 Feb. 1926, p.11. 
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Crimes Act, like the various Acts passed in 1925, was supposed 
to resolve had virtually come to an end by 1926. These Acts 
had been aimed at the Seamen's Union, at stoppages which 
appeared to have revolutionary rather than industrial objec-
tives, and at the disruption of transport and other basic 
services. let after 1926 the Seamen's Union ceased to be an 
industrial force. It was not involved directly in another 
major strike for many years and job control almost faded 
away. In 1925? 90 interstate vessels had been delayed for 
a total of 3,138 days, in 1926, 26 ships were held up for 
401 days, and in 1927, 32 ships for 146 days.^ The energies 
of the seamen became dissipated in bitter feuding between two 
factions led by Johnson, who remained a militant, and Walsh, 
who in early 1926 completely lost his revolutionary faith 
and became more and more conservative. By 1928 V/alsh was 
addressing the Constitutional Association on the menace of p 
communism, and shortly after he Y/as involved in the formation 
of a breakaway seamen's union.^ By 1929 only a third of the 
seamen were members of the old Seamen's Union.4 After 1925 
the major strikes were at least concerned with genuine indus-
trial objectives and the unions' leaders could not be accused 
1. Annual "^ e^ports of Commonwealth Steamship Ov/ners Federation, 
1924-27. tC.S.O.A.). 
2. S.M.Ii. 10 July, 1928, p.11. 
3. IMd. 8 Nov. 1928, p.13. 
4. See Boraston. OD.cit. Chapter 4. 
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of being alien revolutionaries. Thus the passing of the 1926 
Crimes Act marked the end of a distinctive phase in the his-
tory of industrial relations with Australia. 
The G-overnor-General' s speech on 13th January, 1926, 
committed the Government to legislation to invest the Arbitra-
tion Court with judicial power, to lessen the conflict between 
Federal and State awards, to give members of registered organ-
izations control of their own affairs and of their officers, 
and generally to increase the efficiency of the arbitration 
machinery.^ The speech therefore merely repeated promises 
that had been made regularly by the Government during the 
previous year, and in the debates on the Crimes Bill there was 
criticism by the Labour Party of the Government's failure to 
take any steps to amend the many weaknesses of the Arbitration 
Act. In February, 1926, Bruce reported that the amending 
Arbitration Bill was not ready, as it involved "a tremendous 
amount of consideration and research to deal with one of the 
most difficult problems that ever confronted Australia". 
Bruce certainly gave very high priority to the 
reform of the arbitration system. On 8th December, 1925, only 
three weeks after the general election, he drafted and sent 
letters to the Central Council of Employers of Australia and 
the Commonwealth CouJicil of Federated Trade Unions. He informed 
1. C.P.D. V. 112, 13 Jan. 1926, p.7. 
2. Ibid. V. 112, 11 Feb. 1926, p.882. 
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the two orj^anizations that the Government was proposing to amend 
the Arbitration Act, its objectives being to reduce the length 
and cost of proceedings, to increase the powers of the Court 
to enforce awards, to prevent the duplication of Federal and 
State awards, and to ensure that unionists had full control 
over their own organizations. Bruce concluded by welcoming 
any suggestions which would make the Court a more effective 
instrument for the settlement of industrial disputes.^ 
The two letters of 8th December contained no new 
information about the plans of the Government in the field of 
arbitration, Nevertheless, they v/ere extremely significant 
in two respects. Firstly, they indicated a shift in the 
attitude of the Government to the role of pressure groups 
in the formulation of its arbitration policy. Ministers had 
always said they would welcome suggestions when they were 
drafting new legislation, but they seemed to take the view 
that it would be rather degrading to request the assistance 
of private organizations or individuals. For instance, in 
August, 1925, Bruce strongly denied that the Government had 
consulted any outside person or organization about its pro-
n 
posed arbitration legislation. let within a few months 
1. Bruce to L. Smith, Secretary, Central Council of Employers, 
8 Dec. 1925, Bruce to C. Crofts, Secretary, Commonwealth 
Council of rederated Trade Unions, 8 Dec. 1925. (C.A.O. 
A458 E502/1). 
2. C.P.D. V. Ill, 21 Aug. 1925, p.1645. 
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1 
he had changed his attitude, either because he felt that the 
GoYernment needed more information from the men who were most 
directly involved in industrial relations, or because he 
realized that co-operation and agreement at an early stage 
would lessen their freedom to criticize or thwart the legis-
lation after it was passed. However, the Government's new 
policy was rather half-hearted. It knew that the two organi-
zations were deluding themselves when they claimed to speak 
for all Australian employers and unions, yet it seemed to 
believe, or hope, that their views on arbitration would be 
shared by the great number of unaffiliated employers and 
unions. 
The two letters were also significant in that they 
provide evidence of the very important role played by Bruce 
in formulating the Government's new arbitration proposals, 
which were announced in May, 1926. The Attorney-General was 
the Minister responsible for the administration of the Arbit-
ration Act, and it is therefore understandable that writers 
have assumed that the new proposals of 1926 were largely the 
work of Latham, the new Attorney-General. However, Bruce took 
such a personal interest in arbitration that he went to the 
trouble of drafting the letters himself and he sent them a 
week before Latham became Attorney-General. Moreover, he was 
seeking the views of outside organizations when there ?/as already 
an Arbitration Bill, the product of months of preparation, 
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printed, and ready to be submitted to Parliament.^ 
Thus the t?70 seemingly irinocuous letters of 8th 
December, 1925, show conclusively that Bruce was dissatisfied 
with the 1925 Arbitration Bill and was anxious to reconsider 
the wnole subject of industrial arbitration, let Bruce on 
max-y occasions committed himself to granting the Couxt judicial 
power, reducing overlapping of awards, extending penalties and 
Droviding for umion ballots. The objects of the Bill were 
completely acceptable but in one respect it was a conspicuous 
lail'Jire: if passed, it would perpetuate both the division of 
authority between the Commonwealth axid States, with the resul-
ting duplication, inconsistencies, conflict and uncertainty, 
and also tne frustrating cons^itutional limitations on the 
exercise of the Commonwealth's industrial power. The failure 
was serious, but in the middle months of 1925 it was ujider-
standaole: Bruce would not consider restoring complete 
industrial power to the States, wnile the Nationalist and 
Country Parties, all the employer organizations, and Moore 
and jyason strongly opposed seeking complete industrial powers 
for tne Commonwealth. By the end of 1925, however, Bruce was 
^p :^tor^ev-Cener8l's Department had assumed that, with 
he re-election of the Covernment, the 1925 Arbitration 
11 Roor he inxroduced in Parliameni. ine Bill 
i. 
Bill woula soon oe inxroaucea in i^ ar^ : ^ _ 
was T^rinted on 2 Dec. 1925. (C.A.O. A26o:) Aroixra-
tion" Bill file.). 
- 169 -
far more critical of a Bill which, in the most fundamental 
matters, preserved the chaotic status quo. 
The change in Bruce's attitude in the last months 
of 1925 can only be explained hy the mounting problem of the 
44 hour week, a problem which became critical in the first 
half of 1926. In 1920 niggins had granted the 44 hour week 
to the engineering and timber industries. Previously, tri-
bimals had generally awarded the 48 hour week, although some 
workers, such as the men in the mines and the smelters, were 
required to work fewer hours because of the hardships faced 
in their industries. After Higgins' resignation, the Full 
Arbitration Court restored the 48 horn- week, with some 
exceptions, in the engineering and timber industries and re-
fused all further applications for the 44 hours, on the grounds 
of worsening economic conditions. In New South Wales a Labour 
C-overrjment had put through legislation for the shorter week 
in 1920 but it was quickly repealed by the Fuller Government. 
In Jyjie, 1925 J Labom" returned to power and within a few 
months had passed a Forty Fou-r Hours Act, thereby redeeming 
its foremost election pledge. The Queensland Government also 
introduced the 44 hou:r week in 1925. Overlapping awards were 
a grave problem; now the proolem was aggravated by Federal 
awards coriflicting with State laws, m-iichever prevailed 
there was boujid to be widespread discontent and industrial 
3 either men working under Federal awards Y/ould work inresx. 
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different hours, depending in which State they lived, or else 
men in New South Wales and Queensland would work different 
hours, with the unfortunate men under Federal awards working 
an extra 4 hours. The legislation of the two Labour Govern-
ments raised other problems. It seemed inevitable that pro-
duction costs would be increased in New South Wales and 
Queensland and, with freedom of interstate trade, this would 
place industries in the two States at a serious disadvantage 
if they faced competition from industries in Victoria and the 
other States. Finally, the New South Wales election showed 
that the shorter working week was an effective vote-winner 
and there would soon be pressure on the other State Govern-
ments to legislate on the subject. Working hours would 
dominate every State election and the Nationalist Party would 
start with a handicap every time. There would be no stability, 
for the length of the working week would vary according to the 
party in power, as New South Wales had already shown. 
Bruce was therefore faced with the daunting prospect 
of intense industrial conflict, which in 1925 had been confined 
to shipping, spreading to all the major industries in 1926 and 
intensifying as the other three Labour Governments followed 
the example of the Lang and McCormack Governments. The position 
would still be serious if the State tribunals, rather than the 
Governments, began to award the 44 hour week. (The Western 
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Australian Arbitration Court did so in 1926.) Conflict would 
be avoided for the time being if the i^ 'ederal Court granted 
the shorter week, but this would be interpreted, whether 
justifiably or not, as a surrender to pressure at the State 
level. The only real solution was a uniform working week 
for the whole of Australia determined by a single body. 
During the 1925 election campaign Bruce and Page began to 
proclaim the need for a conference of Commonwealth and State 
Arbitration Court judges which would determine the number of 
working hours on the basis of the health and productivity of 
the workers and the state of the economy. Bruce still referred 
publicly to the need for such a conference in April, 1926.^ 
However, there were obvious practical difficulties. Victoria 
and Tasmania had no arbitration courts and, more importantly, 
the decision of the conference would only have moral force; 
the State Governments would still be free to legislate for a 
shorter or longer working week, either directly or by arbi-
tration laws which would bind the State tribunals. In addition, 
some of the State arbitration judges were believed to show as 
1. 21 April, 1926, p.13. 
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little impartiality as Lang himself.^ 
There was nothing in the 1925 Arbitration Bill which 
would prevent the Commonwealth judges meeting the State judges 
to determine a uniform working week. Bruce's dissatisfaction 
with the Bill suggests that by December, 1925, he felt that 
much stronger measures, which would not depend on the goodwill 
of the State Governments, would be needed to cope with the 
crisis that was looming over working hours. The events of 
April and May, 1926, confirmed this belief and provided the 
backgroujid to the detailed proposals which he worked out with 
Latham and his advisers. 
The 44 hour week came into operation in New South 
7/ales on 4th January, 1926. A large number of Federal unions 
instructed their New South Wales members either to work the 
shorter week, by staying at home on Saturdays, or to work the 
usual 48 hours, but to claim 4 ho'urs overtime pay. This 
policy caused a great deal of friction and confusion but there 
1. The arbitrators who were most frequently condemned as 
Labour ^artisans were A.B. Piddington, who was appointed 
sole Irdustrial Commissioner in New South Wales in April, 
1926, and W.J. Lunstan and W.N. Gillies, who were 
appointed Lay Judges of the Queensland Board of Trade and 
Arbitration in October, 1925. Dunstan had been Secretary 
of the Queensland branch of the A.W.U. 1913-25 ^id Gillies 
had been Deputy Premier 1921-25 and Premier of Queensland 
1925. 
2. S.M.E. 7 Jan. 1926, p.9. 
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was no outright confrontation between employers and unions, 
pending a decision of the High Court on whether the Federal 
award or the State law should prevail. On 19th April, 1926, 
the Co'ort gave its famous judgement in the case of Cowhurn 
Y. Clyde Engineering Company.^ Dixon appeared for the 
employers and the Court accepted his argument about the true 
test of inconsistency of laws, rejectin.^ the V/hybrow doctrine 
that the test was whether each law could be obeyed without 
disobeying the other. The Court declared that a Federal 
award became part of the law of the Commonwealth. The 
decision of the Federal tribunal was therefore final and 
inconsistency depended on the intention of that tribunal. 
If it entered a field of legislation and showed its intention 
to regulate the conduct of the parties in respect of the 
subject matter of the legislation, its a¥/ard was to prevail 
over both State laws and awards. If the Federal Court awarded 
48 hours, it had thereby shovm its intention to regulate the 
working hours of the parties concerned, and no State authority 
could grant the same parties 44 ho^ jjrs. 
The High Court's decision in the Clyde Engineering 
case was welcomed by the employers, as it removed the worst 
form of overlapping. Employees could no longer work under a 
Federal award and a State award, enjoying the benefits of 
both. Once they were bound by a Federal award they would have 
37 C.I.R. 466. 
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to relinquish their State award, in so far as it was incon-
sistent, and the employers quickly realized that if they 
registered under the Commonwealth Arbitration Act they could 
almost always ensure that their workers remained bound by 
Federal av/ards. The employers bound by Federal awards would 
also be free from many of the onerous industrial laws intro-
duced by State Labour Governments. Justice Powers, who was 
very critical of the decision, said that Federal awards would 
be sanctuaries for the employers and the unions would leave 
the Federal Court in great numbers.^ To some extent this 
was an accurate prediction. At least in New South Wales, 
employers suddenly became defenders of Federal arbitration, 
while several unions sought to withdraw from the Federal 
Co'ort, especially when A.B. Piddington became State Indust-
rial Commissioner. However, the Federal Court allowed very 
few ujiions to leave its jurisdiction. 
While the Government could see long-term benefits 
arising out of the Clyde Engineering Case, its immediate 
effect was to convince the Government that differing working 
hours made industrial peace impossible. The day after the 
Co^ art's decision was given union leaders in New South Wales 
instructed their members to work only 44 hours. The metal 
1. 23 C.A.H. 386. 
2. S.M.H. 21 April, 1926, p.15. 
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- L -rades employers responded by threatening employees who dis-
obeyed their Federal awards with dismissal. On 3rd Maj, 
1926, 5,000 employees were dismissed for not working on the 
previous Saturday, and as many of them were in key positions, 
a total of 20,000 men were put out of work,^ Later in the 
month there were many dismissals in the motor vehicles in-
dustry and at the Garden Island Dockyard. Bruce refused 
requests by union leaders to convene a conference, "but stated 
that the houTs question would "be submitted to the reconstituted 
Federal Co'jrt and all parties should be preparing the necessary 
evidence. Powers, who was due to retire in a few weeks, 
embarrassed the Government by promising to hear applications 
for the 44 hour week immediately, but he was overruled by 
Quick and Webb.^ The dispute was settled on 28th Ifey, 1926, 
the Metal Trades Employers Association consenting to a 4^ -
houLr week, provided that the employees accepted a propor-
tionate reduction in wages and made no demand for increased 
rates ujitil the new Court dealt with the matter. 
Although Bruce took a strong personal interest in 
arbitration and decided on his own initiative that the pro-
posed legislation of the Government might have to be drastically 
revised, he respected Latham's knowledge of arbitration law 
1. S.M.H. 4 May, 1926, p.9. 
2. 1 May, 1926, p.17., 5 May, 1926, p.10. 
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and was certainly influenced by the views of his new Attorney-
General. However, Latham's views haa been changing over the 
previous two years and it is doubtful if, by January, 1926, 
he was committed to a definite policy. He was even wavering 
on the general principle of arbitration. In a paper Y/ritten 
in his University days he had declared his support for State 
labour regulation, on the ground that it ensured just treat-
ment for employees and for fair-minded employers.^ In 1922 
he took the view of most Melbourne conservatives that arbit-
ration courts should be replaced by conciliation councils 
o 
and wages boards, and in 1923 he said that an extension of 
the wages board system would end the constant litigation and 
the great power of union officials that resulted from the 
arbitration system.^ In August, 1925, he stated that workers 
should be free to bargain with employers; to force them to 
work at award wages seemed servile and savoured of Russian 
goverrmient. Latham's ideas on the conflict of Federal and 
State juz-isdictions in the field of arbitration were at first 
1. Latham. Essay on socialism. (A.H.L. MS 1008/12). 
2. Platform of Liberal Union, 24 Oct. 1922. 
3. Latham to W.S. Maughan, 6 Aug. 1923. (A.N.L. MS 1009/25) 
4. i^. 12 Aug. 1925, p.14. 
U O _ O 
L- — o 
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G'^ i^ e conTer-iionsJ. In 1922 he said that an amendment of 
Tne Consui'uTion vras needed to give xhe Commonrjealth lull 
in xhe le^ genuine interstate industries and the 
full poTrers in all other industries. He regretted 
;ision of the High Court in h^e Engineers Case, arguing 
:naT STaie Covernments should be directly responsible for 
Tne manner in Trhicn ineir employees were treated." Holding 
such TieTTS, it vras not surprising xhaT Latham should "be 
regarded oy Barin as his closest ally in the Federal Farlia-
mer.T," lex afxer 1925 Latham began to drift a^ ray from the 
dxion. In 1924 he iniroduced two 
banking, clerical and professional trade 
unions to Sroom. The depuxaxions opposed any plans to 
abolish comiDuIsory arbixraxion or xo exclude State enterprises 
i'urisdicTion. and asserted that xhe Federal Court 
. ^ ^ ^ d . — w u o — o — ^ •J ^ —-
"" e CL " ^  "'""e* 
industrial matters. Al-
rks xc crixicizin^; any attempx 
xne comiDulsorv element from labour regulation, 
j.xaxions ~ ~ ' X xnat he was s.' 1 C^. L ^ — - i 1 T T - - i — H — . W w — U — L — ^ c I - , ^ i - - " i Q c S . 
T ^ — ^  23 HOT xo H . -92 
. Smixh, 1 -1-
•L » V A • - 1 
Secre' T r^c^  lOu:;'; 
"I " C^i " f " " " O ' - C 
24). 
^ 11 y o Union, 
_ ^ • e^ — ^ ^ w ^ 29 JsJl. 1 
T " ^ n xo f J - -
O xs 
• — 92-, 
(A.H.L. YS 1009/23). 
3. Yinuxes of depuxatio Axtornev-Ceneral concernir_g com-- i C! — , _ , . ^ _ : -ri")- c? ^  J^s^j^ o 
« w s ^ N ^ a V— - — «»' • ^ — , 
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In 1925 Latham was impressed "by the arguments of his friend 
Judge Rolin, an experienced State arLitrator. Rolin was 
very critical of Bavin's ideas and said that Bruce should 
extend the powers of the Federal Court, even if it meant an 
amendment of the Constitution,^ 
It would therefore be a mistake to see Latham as 
a lifelong advocate of Commonwealth control of industrial 
relations,^ whose entry into the Government caused a major 
shift in its arbitration policy. It would seem that by 
January, 1926, he had come to share Bruce's belief that the 
powers of the Federal Court should be maintained and that, 
in view of the impending crisis over the 44 hours week, con-
sideration had to be given to extending those powers. There 
is no evidence that, at that stage, either man was convinced 
that the Government should seek an amendment of the Con-
stitution. 
Before deciding whether it was both desirable and 
1. Rolin to Latham, 28 Sept. 1925. (A.N.L. MS 1009/1). 
2. In 1952, when Latham retired from the High Court, he 
v^rote an article entitled "The arbitration system in 
need of reform", (S.M.H. 25 Nov. 1952), in which he 
ar^ed that the Commonwealth Parliament should have 
Dower to maiie laws concerning the terms and conditi9ns 
of industrial employment. As in 1926, his chief critics 
were the employers, who revived some of their ly^b 
arguments, ("it can be imagined how a Labour Government 
would use that power."). 
- 179 -
practicable to seek additional Commonwealth powers the Govern-
ment had to ascertain the views of both the employers and the 
unions. The Commonwealth had already failed at three referenda 
to secure these powers and there was little chance of success 
if either the employers or the unions were to oppose the 
proposal. Traditionally, their views on the Federal arbit-
ration system had been diametrically opposed. However, in 
1925 there were signs of cracks in the hitherto united front 
of the employers. Senator E.A. Drake-Brockman, the President 
of the Central Council of Employers of Australia, stated that 
he had been reluctantly forced to conclude that the only 
permanent solution to the chaotic overlapping of awards was 
to extend Commonwealth powers.^ In July, 1925, the Austral-
asian Manufacturer, which was published in Sydney, declared 
that it was essential that wages and v/orking conditions be 
uriiform throughout Australia and that no State have any 
advantage in these important matters. State industrial arbi-
'2 tration could lead only to confusion and dislocation,-
Following Bruce's letter to the Central Council of 
Employers, the Government received four detailed submissions 
1. 12th annual conference of Central Council of Employers, 
Dec. 1924. Presidential address. (A.C.E.F.). 
2. Australasian ^ianufacturer. v. 10, 11 July, 1925, p.11. 
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from employer organizations which confirined that they had 
become very divided on the subject oT Federal arbitration. 
The Central Council of Employers and the Associated Chambers 
of Commerce adhered to the traditional view. They approved 
of the 1923 Premiers' Conference proposals, provided that 
the jurisdiction of the Federal Court was limited to the 
shipping, shearing and theatrical industries. The other 
points that they raised were familiar to the Government: 
the hearing of cases was too slow, the Act and awards should 
be rigidly enforced, unions involved in strikes should be 
deregistered, picketing should be illegal, unions should 
deposit substantial securities when registering, awards 
should not apply retrospectively, preference to unionists 
should be eliminated and the Court should give unrestricted 
recognition to the principle of payment by results.^ 
A very different submission was made to Bruce in 
February, 1926 by W.C. Myhill, the Secretary of the Metal 
Trades Employers Association. The Association believed that 
the Federal Court should regulate industrial matters in all 
industries, that Federal awards should be made common rules, 
and that Federal awards should be supreme irrespective of 
any State laws.^ The radical change in the Association's 
1, Smith to Bruce, 4 Jan. 1926, W.L. Raws, President, 
Associated Chambers of Commerce, to Bruce, 15 April, 192o. 
(C.A.O. A458 E502/1). 
2. W.C. Myhill, Secretary, Metal Trades Employers Associa-
tion of N.S.W., to Briie, 5 Feb. 1926. TC.A.O. A458 E502/1). 
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arbitration policy v/as directly due to the introduction of 
the 44 hour week in New South Wales and to fears of further 
attacks on employers by the Lang Government. Myhill had 
originally drafted a letter stating that the regulation of 
industry should be left to the States,^ but pressure from 
members forced him to change it completely. For instance, 
the Clyde Engineering Company asserted that the Federal 
Court was preferable to any State Industrial Commission 
appointed by Lang, it could remove the anomalies and in-
justices of different working hours in adjoining States, 
and the Tariff Board would take more notice of the actions 
of the Federal Court than of State tribunals,^ 
Bruce and Latham treated the submission of the 
Metal Trades Employers Association with caution, for it was 
a predominantly New South Wales body preoccupied with the 
political and industrial situation in that State. However, 
when its views were supported by the Victorian Chamber of 
Manufactures, in April, 1926, the Government decided that 
employers generally must be swinging around in favour of 
Federal arbitration. There was less likelihood of a 44 hour 
week in Victoria than in any other State and it was frequently 
1. Draft letter to Prime Minister concerning proposed amend-
ments to Commonwealth Arbitration Act, n. d. (l.T.I.A. 
Box 68 (c) ). 
2. B. Taylor to Myhill, 16 Jan. 1926. (M.T.I.A. Box 68 (c) ). 
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claimed that Victorian industries would prosper while their 
rivals in New South ?/ales were burdened by the shorter week» 
let the Victorian manufacturers, after a long and detailed 
study of the question, decided that the Commonwealth Govern-
ment should have complete authority in industrial matters,^ 
From December, 1925, to April, 1926, both Bruce 
and Latham sought or were offered the assistance of many 
individuals who had long been involved in industrial arbit-
ration, A deputation was received from the Commonwealth 
Council of Federated Trade Unions and interviews were held 
with Justice Higgins, Sir Robert Gibson and S. McKay (both 
very active in the Victorian Chamber of Manufactures), Senator 
Drake-Brockman, W.R. Schwilk (the Industrial Officer of the 
New South Wales Employers' Federation), A.S. Elford (Deputy 
Chairman of the Commonwealth Steamship Owners Association) 
and E.J. Holloway and H.C. Gibson (leaders of the Melbourne 
Trades Hall Council),^ In addition, Garran^ and Stewart 
1. Minutes of Victorian Chamber of Manufactures, 22 Feb. 
1926. (V.C.M.); F.M. Ashby, Secretary, Victorian Chamber 
of ^lanufactu^es, to Latham, 5 May, 1926. (C.A.O. 
A432 29/5407). 
2. Arbitration Act; persons to be seen. (A.N.L. MS 1009/28); 
F. Strahan to'Crofts, 14-Dec. 1925. (C.A.O. A458 E502/1); 
Sun. 50 April, 1926. p.9; 
5. Garran's personal view was that the Commonwealth should 
have power to legislate on the common rule and all ques-
tions relating to wages and working conditions. See his 
evidence given to the Royal Commission on the Cons-
titution, 28 Sept. 1927." 
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were naturally consulted, and Bruce and Latham would have 
taken into consideration the well-known views of the President 
and Deputy Presidents of the Federal Court. No record was 
kept of these meetings. Nevertheless, on the fundamental 
question of the divided control of industrial regulation 
there can be little doubt of the attitudes of almost all 
the men consulted. The personal opinions of Sir Robert 
Gibson and McKay are not known, but they were associated 
with an organization which favoured Rederal control. Every 
other man whose opinion was sought was convinced that the 
Commonwealth should have full industrial powers. Some, like 
Higgins and Stewart, had always taken this stand, while 
others, such as Drake-Brockman and Schwilk,^ had only 
recently come to the same conclusion. Thus while the written 
submissions to the Government conflicted, the verbal advice 
was unanimous. 
By early May, 1926, when Cabinet met to discuss 
its arbitration policy, Bruce and Latham had decided to take 
the advice of their departmental officers and the majority 
of the organizations and individuals consulted, and to seek 
an amendment to the Constitution to make the Commonwealth 
supreme in the field of industrial relations. It was advice 
1. W.R. Schwilk to A.H. Moore, President, N.S.W. Employers 
Federation, n.d. (M.T.I.A. Box 68 (c) ). 
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which both men were eager to accept. Commonwealth supremacy 
seemed the only solution to the immeuiate problem of working 
hours, which in April, 1926, was threatening to lead to a 
general strike, at least in New South Wales, It also appeared 
to be the only way to overcome the inconsistencies, anomalies, 
ineffectiveness and waste that characterized the existing 
arbitration system, and it must be stressed that Bruce and 
Latham were unusually preoccupied with the need for Govern-
ment activities to be logical, rational and effective. 
Subsequent events showed that Bruce and Latham 
erred, not in concluding that a constitutional amendment was 
desirable, but in believing that it would receive widespread 
support. They were aware that two of the largest employer 
organizations still opposed Federal control, but if they had 
sounded out a wider range of opinion they would have found 
much more resistance to their proposals. They did not seek 
the views of the leaders of the Nationalist organization or 
the State Nationalist Parties.^ They did not consult the 
State Governments, perhaps assuming that the whole Labour 
movement believed in full powers for the Commonwealth. Yet 
even the Fisher Government had been opposed by a State Labour 
Government when it sought similar powers in 1911. Above all, 
Bruce and Latham should have sought advice from outside New 
South Wales and Victoria, for a referendum had to be carried 
1. M e . 27 Oct. 1926, p.11.' 
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in four States. In the smaller States they would have found 
a great deal of suspicion towards boih the Federal Government 
and the Federal Court among both the employers and the trade 
unions.' 
On 5th May, 1926, Bruce told his colleagues that 
the Victorian Chamber of Manufactures had reversed its long-
standing policy and now agreed with the unions that the con-
stitutional restrictions on the Commonwealth's arbitration 
power should be removed. Greatly encouraged, Cabinet accepted 
the proposals of Bruce and Latham and within five days Knowles 
had drafted the necessary legislation. It was presented to 
Parliament by Bruce on 20th May,^ 
The Constitution Alteration (Industry and Commerce) 
Bill proposed that the words "extending beyond the limits of 
any one State" be omitted from Section 51 (xxxv) of the 
Constitution. It also provided that three new placita be 
added to Section 51 to give the Commonwealth Parliament power 
to legislate: 
1. On 10th May, 1926, Knowles completed the draft of a Con-
stitution 'Alteration (Industrial Matters and Essential 
Services) Bill. Latham redrafted the clause relating to 
essential services, inserting and then deleting a 
reference to "revolutionary or industrial disturbance." 
He finally decided that the clause should be incorporated 
in a second Bill. Latham also greatly expanded the-
clause relating to unions and employer associationsJ 
(C.A.O. A2863 1926 Constitution Alteration Bill file).' 
- 1 8 6 -
(xl) Establishing authorities with such powers 
as the Parliament confers upon them with 
respect to the regulation and determination 
of terms and conditions of industrial 
employment and of the rights and duties 
of employers and employees with respect to 
industrial matters and things. 
(xli) Investing State authorities with any powers 
which the Parliament, by virtue of para-
graph (xxxv) or paragraph (xl) of this 
secHon, has vested or has power to vest 
in any authority established by the Common-
wealth. 
(xlii) Trusts and combinations (whether composed 
of individuals or corporations or both) 
in restraint of trade, trade unions, and 
associations of employers or of employees 
for industrial purposes, including the 
formation, regulation, control and dis-
solution thereof. 
The speeches of Ministers were mainly devoted to 
eniMerating the deplorable consequences of the overlapping of 
Commonwealth and State jurisdiction and of the limitations of 
the Commonwealth arbitration power, and to discussing the 
question of working hours. They all insisted that working 
hours were an economic question which should be determined 
by an impartial tribunal, able to hear and evaluate all the 
evidence relating to the cost and volume of production, the 
sale of products, imports, the establishment of new industries, 
unemplo.yment levels, and the health of the workers. It was 
not a social question to be determined in an atmosphere of 
political contention. Ministers did not reveal very much 
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about the new system that would be set up if the referendum 
was carried. Bruce merely stated that the Federal Court 
should only deal with fundamental questions such as standard 
hours and the basic wage, the Commonwealth would be able to 
appoint commissioners or perhaps lesser courts in the States, 
and the Commonwealth should be able to legislate for the 
compulsory auditing of trade union accounts and for the 
holding of secret ballots,^ The Labour Party, in spite 
of its platform, was not enthusiastic about the proposals. 
Charlton agreed that uniformity of wages and working con-
ditions was an absolute necessity, but there was no reason 
why the subject could not be dealt with by the proposed 
n 
Constitutional Convention, Bruce was natuirally anxious 
to obtain the support of the Labour Party, and in negotiations 
with Charlton he agreed also to seek an amendment of Section 
51 (xx), so as to give the Commonwealth power to legislate 
for the creation, regulation, control and dissolution of 
corporations, including corporations formed under the control 
of the States. Members on both sides were still somewhat 
critical of the proposals, but only two Nationalists and one 
Country Party member opposed the passing of the Bill,'^ 
1. C.P.D. V. 113, 20 May, 1926, p.2168. 
2. r ^ . V. 113, 2 Jime, 1926, p.2558. 
3. A.S. Rodgers (Nationalist), H. Gregory (Country Party), 
Senator Sir Henry Barwell (Nationalist). 
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The second Bill, the Constitution Alteration 
(Essential Services) Bill sought to amend the Constitution 
to give the Commonwealth Parliament power to legislate "to 
protect the interests of the public in the case of actual 
or probable interruption of any essential serviceso" 
Ministers were extremely vague about the meaning of the 
amendment, Bruce stated that in a strike such as the British 
General Strike, which had just ended, or a coal strike in 
New South Wales, the Commonwealth Government would be able 
to do nothing to protect the people,^ Actually, the Common-
wealth Government would only be helpless if the State Govern-
ment refused to seek its help and there was no violence, and 
the proposal would appear to have been aimed at recalcitrant 
State Governments. Pearce referred to the failure of the 
7/estern Australian and Queensland Governments to protect 
p 
Commonwealth officials, although the Crimes Act was 
supposed to prevent that situation arising again. The Labour 
Party was completely opposed to the Bill, Both Bills com-
pleted their passage through Parliament on 25th June, 1926.' 
Brace told Pearce a week later that he was sure 
there would be overwhelming support for the Goverrmient's 
1. C.P.D. V. 113, 20 llay, 1926, p.2171. 
2. Ibid. V. 113, 17 June, 1926, pp.3163-64. 
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proposals. He did not thint that it would be necessary to 
have an intensive campaign involving large expenditure. It 
would be sufficient if parliamentarians addressed meetings 
in their own electorates and there was no need to enlist 
many other speakers.^ The campaign was opened on 11th August, 
1926, but two days earlier Latham had left Australia to 
attend the League of Nations Assembly at Geneva. Before he 
departed he made several speeches in Melbourne, Sydney and 
Brisbane and prepared some background notes for his colleagues. 
During the campaign Bruce travelled widely throughout the 
Eastern States but other Ministers confined their campaigning 
to their home States. 
" 2 
Much has been written about the 1926 referendum 
For three months traditional political alignments were com-
pletely disrupted, with each of the three large parties split 
and with the employers, the unions and the press hopelessly 
divided. The Government's industrial proposals were supported 
by almost all Federal politicians and opposed by nearly all 
State politicians, regardless of party. Just as Bruce and 
Charlton were "united in supporting the proposals, old enemies, 
like Robinson and Blackburn in Victoria and Bavin and Lang 
1. Bruce to Pearce, 3 July, 1926. (A.N.L. MS 213/5). 
2. The most detailed account of the divisions within the 
political T3arties and among the manor interest groups 
is A. Wildavsky, The 1926 referendum. Melbourne, 1958, 
BANNING THE CHARL(ES)TON. 
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in New South Wales were united in opposition. New South. 
Wales employers, pastoralists and pilmary producers welcomed 
the proposals; Victorian employers supported, opposed or were 
undecided about them; and the employers in the other States 
rejected them. The Labour Party's Federal Executive main-
tained an equivocal position, while all the State Labour 
Parties condemned the proposals. The Victorian unions 
supported Federal arbitration, but the New South Wales Labour 
Council and large unions such as the Miners Federation, the 
Waterside Workers Federation and even the Australian Workers 
Union suddenly became defenders of the States. With so 
many factions, organizations, newspapers and individuals 
expressing contradictory opinions, often in the most extreme 
and vitriolic language, about a rather complex sub.i'ect, it 
was not surprising that the dominant feeling among the 
general public was one of intense confusion. 
Ministers realized that one of the main criticisms 
of their proposals would be that they were seeking to destroy 
Federalism and to bring about unification. They therefore 
took the initiative and declared that one of their main 
objects was to decentralize the arbitration system. Bruce 
said that it was absurd to suggest that there was still 
State control and decentralization. State authorities worked 
on sufferance, for it was possible to get any dispute, no 
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matter how small or fictitious, before the Federal Court, 
In fact, if the Constitution was not amended, the effect 
of the High Court's decision in the Clyde Engineering Case 
would be to make the Federal Court an omnipotent body, as 
either the employers or the unions could create a paper 
dispute and have it brought to the Federal Court, and State 
awards would become inoperative. Under the new system, 
however, the central authority would deal only with genuine 
interstate disputes.^ Ministers stressed that they were 
asking for concurrent, not exclusive, powers for the Common-
wealth, The Government would strengthen the Federal principle 
by a better distribution of powers between the constituent 
authorities. State authorities would be strengthened, as 
they would be invested with Federal jurisdiction and would 
be safeguarded from interference by outside av/ards. As 
Latham wrote on several occasions, the ideal that the Govern-
2 ment was seeking was co-ordination without centralization,' 
In their speeches and propaganda Ministers tried 
to have the best of both worlds. They gave qualified praise 
for the Federal arbitration system, Australia was not a 
1. S.M.H. 28 Aug. 1926, p.16, A ^ . 2 Sept. 1926, p.lO, 
2, Ibid. 22 June, 1926, p.10, 28 June, 1926, p.10, 
Age. 50 June, 1926, p.9, 
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country of perpetual industrial troubles. A large number 
of citizens were working peacefully under Federal awards,' 
The conflict in the transport and coalmining industries 
could not be attributed to the Federal arbitration system, 
for these industries were centres of industrial unrest in 
almost every country. The pastoral industry was controlled 
by the Federal Court, yet it was exceptionally peaceful.' 
If the Conmionwealth abandoned the whole field of arbitration 
there would be industrial chaos and anarchy. It was un-
deniable that there were some genuine interstate industries 
with which the States could not deal, and attempts to divide 
industries between the Commonwealth and the States had 
always broken down. 
At the same time Ministers acknowledged many of 
the weaknesses of the Federal arbitration system but argued 
that they could only be overcome, not by maintaining the 
status quo, but by agreeing to the constitutional amendments. 
Bruce said that the paraphanalia of Courts and summonses, 
claims and counterclaims and the lack of finality were a 
grave hindrance to industrial peace.^ It was true that 
the Federal system was slow, costly and cumbersome, but 
these defects arose directly out of its constitutional 
1. S.M.H. 1 Sept., 1926, p.15. 
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limitations. Ministers agreed that it was ridiculous that 
only the method of arbitration could he used, that the Court 
could act only if there was a dispute, and that employers 
whose workers were not unionists or new employers were not 
"bound to pay award rates. These absurdities would no longer 
exist if the Government's proposals were accepted. The 
Victorian Government and other critics asserted that the 
wages board system was preferable to arbitration. Bruce 
conceded that there was some truth in this assertion, but 
went on to say that the constitutional changes would enable 
wages boards, Whitley Councils, shop committees and district 
boards, as well as arbitration tribunals, to be incorporated 
within the Federal system.^ Thus the Government's basic 
argument was that its proposals would mean that all the 
advantages of the existing system would be retained, but 
with none of the disadvantages. 
On one issue Ministers found that they had the 
worst of both worlds. They continued to insist that indus-
trial matters should be regulated not by Parliament but by 
independent authorities set up by Parliament. Working hours 
and other industrial questions should not be political 
footballs but should be settled by trained minds on an 
1. S.M.H. 27 May, 1926, p.10. 
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economic "basis. Parliament had neither the time nor the 
knowledge to legislate on industrial matters.^ In a private 
argument with Eggleston Latham denied that to give tribunals 
powers which Parliament itself did not possess would mean a 
constitutional revolution, and said that if such powers were 
given to Parliament the next election would be on questions 
of hours and wages and "all chance of sound politics would 
go to the devil". The Government's policy on this issue 
was opposed by both the Labour Party and some of its suppor-
ters, such as Watt, Hughes and Stewart. The Government 
found itself in difficulties when it tried to conciliate 
both sides on this issue. Bruce assured the conservatives 
that Parliament would not be able to legislate on working 
hours,^ but Latham confirmed the Labour claim that Parliament 
would be able to direct that tribunals were to fix hours 
within certain limits; for instance, not to exceed 44 hours. 
Critics of the Government claimed that the Ministers them-
selves were in a state of confusion, and conservatives cited 
Latham's remarks to show that a Labour Government could 
1. C.P.D, V. 113, 20 Lfey, 1926, p.2165. 
2. F. Eggleston to Latham, 51 May, 1926, Latham to Eggleston, 
1 June, 1926, Latham to Eggleston 5 June. 1926, Latham to 
Eggleslon, 14 June, 1926. TA.N.L. MS 1009/1), 
5. kge. 25 June, 1926, p.12. 
4. S.M.H. 22 June, 1926, p.lO. 
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dismiss the members of tribunals, make biased appointments 
and seYerely limit the freedom of the tribunals. 
The GoYernment raised seYeral other points during 
the campaign. Latham, aware that opponents would refer to 
the defeat of three earlier referenda, argued that the pro-
posals were quite different to those rejected in 1911, 1913 
and 1919. It was the first time that it was proposed to 
giYe the powers to industrial authorities rather than to 
Parliament or to inYest Federal powers in State industrial 
authorities, and the proYisions relating to trusts, combines 
and trade unions were different.^ Ministers said that it 
was absujfd to argue that they did not haYe a mandate for 
their proposals, when that was precisely what they were 
seeking. They also ridiculed the claim that a future GoYern-
ment would be able to "stack" tribunals, to define the powers 
of trib^ Lin_als in a way that would faYom" one side or the 
other, or to legislate unions or companies out of existence. 
3oth Federal and State GoYernments could already abuse their 
powers in those ways, but the need to retain electoral 
support kept them in line,^ Very few references were made 
to the proposal relating to essential serYices. Page said 
that almost eYery Parliament in the world had power to deal 
1. S.M.H. 14 June, 1926, p.9. 
2. I ^ . 31 Aug. 1926, p.9. 
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with interruptions of essential services, but all the Common-
wealth Goyernment could do was to strain its deportation 
powers or to bring out the military forces.^ Latham alluded 
to the action of Queensland farmers who took the law into 
their own hands, and stated that if similar incidents were 
to occur on a large scale the absence of any Commonwealth 
2 
power would be a very serious matter. 
The Government's arguments had definite weaknesses. 
Ministers asserted that the detailed structure of the new 
system was a matter for Parliament to determine, and by 
keeping all their options open they were able to claim that 
the new system would overcome every drawback of the existing 
Court. Some critics found the proposals far too vague.' 
Lang asked how the Government would prevent every case 
decided by local authorities going on appeal to the Federal 
Court,^ and this drew attention to the great practical 
difficulties of reconciling co-ordination with decentraliza-
tion. However, few critics of the Government gave serious 
attention to its proposals. Instead, they portrayed Bruce 
1. Age. 31 July, 1926, p.18. 
2. Latham. Referendum proposals; draft circular, 15 July, 
1926. (A.N.L. MS 1009/29). 
3. S.M.H. 4 Sept. 1926, p.18. 
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as a ll'iussolini bent on unification or self-aggrandizement; 
they told unionists that the Governnient was seeking to 
destroy the unions, the 44 hour week, and the benevolent 
legislation of State Labour Governments; they warned employers 
that a future Labour Government would use its new powers to 
reduce hours throughout the country and to cripple compani.es; 
or they raised irrele^'ant issues such as deportation, the 
Crimes Act, or the Government's ujipopular financial proposals. 
The result was that, Y/hile the arguments v/ere too confusing 
to arouse much interest, most people knew they had something 
to fear from the proposed amendments. 
The referendum 7/as held on 4th September, 1926. 
There was a large number of informal votes and the Govern-
ment's proposals were completely rejected, with a majority 
of 372,000 against the Industry and Commerce amendment and 
402,000 against the Essential Services amendment. There 
were affirmative majorities in New South Wales and Queensland, 
but every electorate in Victoria, South Australia and V/estern 
Australia voted "No" on both issues.^ Two days after the 
referendum a disappointed Bruce left for England to attend 
the Imperial Conference. 
A few weeks before the referendum an amending 
1. Knowles. op.cit. pp.264-67. 
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Arbitration Bill was passed by Parliament. Since 1923 
Justice Powers had been warning the GoYernment that he would 
soon have to give up his onerous Arbitration Court duties 
and that it was unlikely that any of the High Court justices 
would be prepared to succeed him.^ In 1925 he announced 
that he would definitely retire in June, 1926.^2 In the 
same month the two-year terms of both Deputy Presidents 
would expire. The Government had decided that it was 
essential to confer on the Court judicial powers by appoint-
ing its members for life. It hoped that the reconstitution 
of the Court could coincide with the retirement of Powers 
and the completion of the terms of Quick and Webb. It would 
be completely impossible to hold a referendum and to put 
through a radical amendment of the Arbitration Act in a few 
months, and it was therefore decided in May, 1926, to re-
constitute the Court immediately, while other reforms would 
have to wait ujitil the referendum had been held. 
The 1926 Conciliation and Arbitration Bill contained 
three main provisions. Instead of the President and the 
1. Powers to Groom, 21 May, 1923. (A.N.L. MS 236/2/845). 
2. Herald. 18 Dec. 1925, p.l. 
3. The drafting of the Bill was completed on 10th May, 
1926, the day on which the Constitution Alteration 
Bill was submitted to Latham. (C.A.O. A2863 1926 
Arbitration Bill file). 
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Deputy Presidents, the Court would in future comprise a 
Chief Judge and an unspecified number of Judges, who would 
be barristers or solicitors of at least five years' stand-
ing, and who could not be removed from office except on the 
ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity. For the first 
time it would no longer be necessary for at least one 
member of the Court to be a justice of the High Court. The 
Bill contained clauses setting out the salaries and pensions 
of the judges. Its second object was to empower the Govern-
ment to appoint Conciliation Commissioners. The third of 
its principal provisions permitted the Attorney-General to 
intervene in the public interest in any proceeding before 
the Court in which the question of standard hours or the 
basic wage was in dispute. In such cases, any person or 
organization with an interest in the determination could 
apply to the Court for leave to be heard and to examine 
witnesses. Finally, the Bill stipulated that the Deputy 
Presidents were to continue in office until they had com-
pleted any hearings on which they were engaged when the 
Bill became law. 
Latham presented the Bill to Parliament on 21st 
May, 1926, and it was passed on 25rd June, two days before 
the terms of the Deputy Presidents expired. The debate was 
quiet and there was little opposition to any of the proposals, 
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Some Members regretted that it was necessary for the judges 
to have life tenu-re and that only lawyers would he qualified 
to he arbitrators, but they admitted that it was desirable 
for the Court to have judicial powers. The debate did give 
Latham an opportujiity to express his strong views on govern-
mental intervention in Court proceedings. The Labour Member, 
J.S. West, asserted that the evidence of the Attorney-
General wo^ old have a powerful influence on the judges. In 
reply, Latham stated that the Attorney-General would merely 
issue a notice of intervention; he would not become a party 
or give evidence. The clause was intended to empower the 
CouTt to hold test cases on either the standard hours or 
the basic wage, in which all the available evidence could 
be presented to the Court, so that its decision could be 
embodied in all subsequent awards.^ Latham thus rejected 
the idea, raised by Moore and Dyason and accepted by Groom, 
that in view of the effect of awards on the national economy 
the Government should be able to intervene and give evidence 
in any proceedir^s of the Court. Lathajn's concern with the 
economic consequences of awards was outweighed by his con-
viction that the Government could not intervene without 
being identified with one side or the other, which not only 
offended his ideas of government and the law but would 
C.P.J. V. 113, 18 June, 1926, pp.3512-14. This clause 
was drafted entirely by Latham. 
- 201 -
provoke serious industrial unrest. The clause relating to 
conciliation commissioners was a further example of the 
ease with which Latham overrode some of the recommendations 
of Moore and Djason. They had opposed Stewart's proposals 
that the Act should provide for the appointment of concil-
iation commissioners and committees, and Groom had evidently 
agreed with their vie?/s, hut Latham considered that there 
was an urgent need for at least one conciliation commissioner, 
It had heen assumed in the press that Quick and 
Webb would receive permanent appointment under the new 
Act and there v/as speculation that Stev^art, Garran or 
Drake-Brockman could fill a third position.^ Both Quick 
sjid Webb told Garran that they v/ere anxious to continue 
their work.^ Yet in July, 1926, Latham -wrote to them and 
told them that they would only be required to complete the 
cases on which they were engaged. lo reasons vrere given 
for their virtual dismissal.^ However, some attempt should 
be made to determine the reasons, especially as the course 
of arbitration history in the next few years might have been 
1. Herald. 28 Hov. 1925, p.8, 19 M ^ , 1926, p.6; Quick 
to Groom, 7 March, 1926. (A.I.L. MS 236/2/857). 
2. Her-ald. 8 Dec. 1925, p.l; Quick to Lathgjn, 10 May, 
1926. (C.A.O. A432 29/3412). 
3. Webb to Groom, 7 Feb. 1927. (A.N.L. MS 236/1/2598). 
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very difierent if Quick and Webb had become judges of the 
Arbitration Court. 
There is evidence that "political" considerations 
had some slight influence on Latham in dismissing the 
Deputy Presidents. Garran and Knowles, as well as some of 
Latham's colleagues in Cabinet, echoed the claim of the 
conservative press that all three members of the Court 
showed far too much sympathy for the unions and frequently 
gave in to ujiion press^jre.^ Latham, as a result of his 
experiences as co^ onsel for the shipowners and other employers, 
shared this view. Nevertheless, it is very doubtful if he 
thought that their lack of impartiality was so great as to 
warrant their dismissal. Most of the criticisms of the 
Co-Jirt were directed not at Quick and Webb, but at Powers. 
It was Powers who-had shown hostility to the shipowT_ers, 
praised 7/alsh, refused to deregister the Seamen's Union, 
was critical of 7/ebb for deregistering the Union, defended 
the union practice of going to both Federal and State 
tribujials, and completely mishandled the 44 hours dispute. 
In contrast, the chief criticism of Quick and Webb was that 
their awards were too generous to the employees, but this 
was also a criticism of one of the judges whom Latham 
appointed in their place. 
1. Garran to G-room, 20 Juily, 1926. (A.^ T.L. MS 236/2/3141). 
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It would seem far more likely that Quick and Webb 
were replaced because Latham and his advisers believed that 
they did not possess both the strength and the detachment 
which their semi-judicial, semi-legislative positions re-
quired. Powers, Quick and Vifebb were far too sensitive to 
be good arbitrators, and they each seemed compelled to draw 
attention to their humiliations by indulging in long speeches 
of self-justification and by engaging in public debate with 
critical politicians. They were unusually preoccupied 
with status, and Garran became exasperated when they talked 
of conspiracies by his officers to deprive them of their 
telephones or to replace their large tables.^ Quick always 
showed the most dignity and reasonableness, and it was 
quite likely that he was replaced simply on account of his 
age, as he was over 70. Actually, he remained in the Court 
a> 
ujitil 1930, as his term v/as extended nine times to enable 
him to complete the huge and highly complex railway cases. 
Webb, on the other hand, was the worst offender and Bruce 
suspected that he was paranoic. In 1924 Webb had written 
to Bruce: "I am ringed around by a body of men secretly 
instructed to dishonour, degrade, insult and mortify me. 
I have the status of a thief in the night, a clerk in the 
Attorney-General's Department revises my judgements, I 
doubt if any other person in the community is subject to 
1. Garran to Groom, 14 Dec. 1922. (A.N.L. MS 236/2/841). 
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more needless suffering",^ Other Ministers received similar 
o 
communications in 1925 ^ and it was hardly surprising that 
Bruce and Latham considered him to be unsuitable for a 
."judicial position. Webb pleaded with Latham to reconsider 
his decision^ but in October, 1926, he left the Court, 
In July, 1926, Bruce announced that G. Dethridge"^ 
was to be Chief Judge and L.O. Lukin^ and G.S. Beeby^ Judges 
of the Arbitration Court. Dethridge had been a Judge of 
the Victorian County Court since 1920 and Luiin a Justice 
of the Queensland Supreme Court since 1910. Beeby was the 
most widely known of the three and the only one experienced 
1. Webb to Bruce, 18 Dec. 1924. (C.A.O. A432 29/3415). 
2. Webb to H.C. Gibson, 19 Feb. 1925, Webb to Gibson, 
2 J^ larch, 1925. (C.A.O. A432 29/5413), Webb to Groom, 
16 Aprii, 1925. (A.N.L. MS 256/2/850). 
5. Webb to Latham, 14 July, 1926. (C.A.O. A452 29/5412). 
George J. Dethridge (1864-1938)c Called to the Victorian 
Bar 1895, Royal Commissioner inquiring into industrial 
disturbances on the Melbourne wharves 1919-20, Judge of 
Victorian County Co'art 1920-26, Chief Judge, Common-
wealth Arbitration Court 1926-58. 
5. Lionel 0. Lukin (1868-1944). Called to the Queensland 
Bar 1890, Judge of Queensland Supreme Court 1910-2o, 
Judge of Commonwealth Arbitration Coujrt 1926-50, Judge 
of Federal Court of Bankruptcy 1950-45, Judge of Supreme 
Co-art of A.C.T. 1955-45. 
6, See p. 66, footnote 2 . 
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in industrial arbitration. He had had a long career as a 
Labo^or politician in New South Wales, was the Minister 
responsible for the 1912 Industrial Arbitration Act, and 
from 1920 to 1925 was a Judge of the New South Wales 
Industrial Arbitration Court. There was very little critic-
ism of the appointments. Stewart thought they would work 
well together and was relieved to find that political con-
siderations had not influenced the selection,^ All three 
men had strong personalities. Dethridge had a reputation 
for both humour and sarcasm, which the press thought were 
assets in an arbitrator. It was suggested that unionists 
would find L'jkin a tough judge but this would be balanced 
p 
by Beeby's popularity with the unions. 
The new Court met for the first time on 1st August, 
1926. Its first case was between the Amalgamated Engineering 
Union and Jo Alderdice, with the Union claiming, among other 
things, a 44 ho^ or week. Latham intervened on the first day 
of the hearing, thereby eriabling the Court to make a long and 
exhaustive investigation of the most controversial question 
facing Australian industry. Latham said that the Government 
would take no farther part in the proceedings.'^ Four days 
later he left Melbourne on his journey to Geneva. 
1. Stewart to Higgins, 19 July 1926. (A.N.L. MS 1057/1/541). 
2« Herald. 17 July, 1926, p.8. 
5c A ^ . 3 Aug. 1926, p.10. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE 1928 CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION ACT 
The period from September, 1926, to November, 1927, 
proved to be a peaceful interlude for the Commonwealth Govern-
ment e For the first time for two years industrial relations 
ceased to be the most serious problem faced by the Government, 
and it was able to concentrate on other subjects, by far the 
most important bein^ Commonwealth-State financial relations. 
The Goverr^ent managed to avoid becoming involved in any 
industrial disputes and, as reports of strikes no longer 
filled the newspapers, optimists in the Cabinet concluded 
hat a new era of industrial peace might be dawning/ j - i b 
The lack of publicity given by the press to indus-
trial uJirest in 1926/27 was misleading. It was true that 
there were only two interstate disputes and that none of 
the stoppages had a sustained and serious effect on the life 
of the whole commujiity in the manner of the seamen's strikes 
of 1925. Nevertheless, there were a great many stoppages 
throughout Australia; in fact, the number of disputes and 
also the nmber of workers directly involved in them during 
1927 were not to be exceeded j^ntil 1941. The disputes 
followed the pattern of previous years in that they were 
mostly confined to the mining and transport industries. 
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Nevertheless, the two most important strikes in 
this period took place in other indastries. In June, 
1927, workmen at the South Johnstone sugar mill, near 
Innisiail, went on strike when a new manager dismissed a 
number of employees,^ The mill, however, continued 
operating with the aid of volunteers. It was boycotted by 
canecutters, but farmers who employed migrant labour con-
tinued to supply it with cane. Racialism intensified the 
hostility betv/een the farmers and the strikers, and there 
were many clashes, in one of which a striker was fatally 
2 
shot. Bruce visited South Johnstone and appealed for a 
speedy settlement, but said that he had no power to inter-
fere.^ In August, 1927, the dispute widened when railway-
men refused to drive trains to South Johnstone and were 
suspended. The Australian Railways Union supported the 
suspended men and on 1st September, 1927, the Queensland 
Railways Commissioner dismissed all.his employees. McCormack, 
who was alleged to have had a long-standing feud with the 
left-wing Australian Railways Union, refused to compromise 
and after two weeks of chaos throughout the State the Union 
1. S.M.H. 23 June, 1927, p.11. 
2. I M d . 6 July, 1927, p.15. 
3. I M d . 8 ^^g. 1927, p.11. 
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surrendered. The Labour Premier was extolled by the con-
servative press and denounced by unions throughout Australia.^ 
The South Johnstone strike was settled shortly afterwards by 
the Queensland Board of Trade. 
In July, 1927, there was a smaller strike, but one 
which had a greater influence on the policy of the Common-
wealth Government and which foreshadowed some of the great 
strikes of 1928 and 1929. On 1st July, 1927, Judge Beeby 
handed down his award for the engineering industry. It 
was immediately repudiated by mass meetings of the Amalgamated 
Engineering Union because it provided for the extension of 
the piecework system and because it gave employers the right 
to choose between the daily and weekly systems of hiring. 
The Union adopted a policy of irritation strikes and by the 
end of the month work had stopped in five engineering firms 
in Sydney and Melbourne.^ Neither the conciliatory efforts 
of Stewart and the Melbourne Trades Hall Council nor the 
injunctions issued by the Arbitration Court could end the 
1. S.M.H. 12 Sept., 1927, p.10; Ag^, 12 Sept. 1927, p.10; 
Labor Call. 15 Sept. 1927, p.6; Minutes of Melbourne 
Trades Hall Council, 1 Sept. 1927. (A.N.U. M14). 
2. 25 C.A.R. 364 
5. S.M.H. 11 July, 1927, p.11, 19 July, 1927, p.11, 
22 July, 1927, p.11, 26 July, 1927, p.11. 
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dispute. However, the men did return to work in late August, 
1927, when Beeby promised to hear immediately an application 
for a variation of the award.^ The Union was successful, as 
Beeby restored weekly hiring and castigated the employers for 
"flaunting" his original award as an industrial victory and 
for trying to enforce a universal return to the old system 
p 
of daily hiring. The fears that employers had expressed 
when Beeby was appointed seemed to be confirmed, and the 
Victorian Chamber of Manufactures and the Metal Trades 
Employers Association protested to Bruce about the Court's 
"instability".^ 
One reason for the comparative scarcity of large 
strikes in 1927 was the decision of the Federal Arbitration 
Court in the 44 Hours Case. After a six month hearing, the 
Full Court, with Judge Lukin dissenting, granted the 44 hour 
week to the engineers on 27th February, 1927. Lukin com-
pletely opposed the 44 hour week, while Beeby believed that 
it could be introduced in most industries. Dethridge, in 
handing down the deciding judgement, declared that, in the 
case of. the engineering industry, the strain, confinement, 
1. S.M.H. 23 Aug. 1927, p.7. 
2. 25 C.A.R. 385. 
5. Minutes of Metal Trades Employers Association of N.S.W., 






monotony and concentration required of the employees so 
affected their capacity or opportunity for enjoyment of 
leisure as to warrant their hours being reduced to 44. 
Employees in other industries with similar disadvantages 
to engineers would also be entitled to a reduction of 
hours.^ Thus while Latham had intended that the case 
should settle the question of hours once and for all, the 
Court, or more precisely Dethridge, decided that the 4^ -
hour week was still at an experimental stage and that the 
judgement should not be binding on all subsequent cases. 
In the next two years the three judges consistently 
applied the criteria that they had laid down in February, 
1927. Later in 1927 the 44 hour week was awarded to em-
ployees in the iron trades and the gas industry, and by 
February, 1929, it had been extended to carpenters, clothing 
trade employees, printing industry employees, glass workers, 
metalliferous miners, flour millers and to some sections of 
the liquor trades. In some cases, however, Dethridge sided 
with Lukin and rejected the unions' applications. For 
example, he considered that the agricultural implement-
making industry and the furniture trades were faced with 
such intense overseas competition that they would not be 
able to survive if the 44 hour week was granted. 
1. 24 C,A.R. 755. 
2. 25 C.A.R. 1148, 26 C.A.R. 41. 
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The 44 Hour Case was a triumph for the Common-
wealth Council of Federated Trade Unions, but within a few 
months the Council had ceased to exist. In May, 1927, an 
All-Australian Trade Union Congress decided to establish 
an Australasian Council of Trade Unions.^ The A.C.T.U. 
had no full-time officers for 16 years; several unions, most 
notably the Australian Workers Union, refused to join it; 
and trade union power continued to be concentrated in the 
State Labour Councils. Nevertheless, the A.C.T.U. was 
the first genuine interstate trade union organization. 
Unlike the Commonwealth Council of Federated Trade Unions, 
which it succeeded, it had the full support of Sydney 
militants like Garden, Beasley and Johnson, although its 
leaders, W.J. Duggan and Charles Crofts, were Melbourne 
moderates. The Government recognized from the outset that 
the A.C.T.U. was the most representative trade union organi-
zation in the country, but it was critical of the influence 
that Garden seemed to exercise and of the Council's affilia-
tion with the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat at Shanghai. 
The success of Holloway and Crofts against a formidable 
array of employers' representatives in the 44 Hours Case 
1. S.M.H. 7 May, 1927, p.15. 
2. See R.M. Martin, "The rise of the Australia Council of 
Trade Unions". Australian Quarterly v. 50 1958) 
pp.50-42; R.M. Martin. Trade union and state in Aust-
ralia. PhD. thesis, A.N.U., ly^d. 
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convinced many employers that in their relations with the 
unions they were handicapped by a serious lack of unity. In 
August, 1927, a meeting of Melbourne businessmen formed an 
Advisory Committee of Employers under the leadership of 
S. McKay and J. MacDougall of the Victorian Chamber of Manu-
factures.* In January, 1928, a similar body was set up in 
Sydney headed by C. McDonald, the President of the New 
p 
South Wales Employers Federation.^ Although they were 
informal organizations and did not survive long (the Vic-
torian Committee was dissolved in 1950), the Advisory 
Committees of Employers did ensure that there was much 
greater consultation between leading employers. 
The Commonwealth Government devoted little atten-
tion to industrial conflict in the latter months of 1926 and 
most of 1927, but it was forced to spend an increasing amount 
of time considering the causes and possible remedies for the 
deteriorating economic conditions of the country. Latham's 
proposals to amend the Arbitration Act were debated against 
a background of economic stagnation which was evident in 
many different industries and which provoked much argument 
about the national debt, the balance of payments, the tariff, 
prices, wages and unemployment. 
1. Bmplovers Monthly Review, v. 24, Aug. 1927, pp.77-78. 
2. C. McDonald, President, N.S.W. Employers Federation, to 
R.A. Marks, President, N.S.W. Chamber of Manufactures, 
19 Jan. 1928. (Woll.83). 
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Most of the export industries experienced some 
difficulties in 1926 and 1927. Wooi production increased 
steadily until 1928, with a record clip in 1926/27. How-
ever, wool prices had fallen by 57 per cent in 1925/26 and 
the value of wool exported by over £5ni. in 1926/27. A 
severe drought in New South Wales and Queensland in 1926 
resulted in a drastic decline in the production and export 
of wheat, beef and sugar, exports of sugar falling from 
£5.5m. to £1.7m. in 1926/27. British wheat prices declined 
steadily after 1926. The amount of butter produced de-
creased each year from 1924 to 1927 and exports were halved. 
The mineral industries, particularly silver and lead, also 
suffered from a fall in overseas prices. Coal prices con-
tinued to rise until 1927, but production and exports 
declined after 1924, although there was a slight revival 
in 1926/27. The cumulative effect of these developments 
was that the total value of exports dropped from £l62m. 
in 1924/25 to £148.5m. in 1925/26, with a further fall of 
£4m. in 1926/27. In manufacturing, investment fell away 
sharply after 1925 and the figures of factory employment 
showed a decline after 1926/27. Conditions in the timber 
industry deteriorated drastically after 1925 and the boom 
in the motor vehicles industry ended in 1927. Nevertheless, 
some industries continued to prosper. The woollen textile 
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industry revived after the 1925 tariff increases and the 
consumption of steel remained steady,^ 
Turning to the economy as a whole, the most serious 
problems were increasing indebtedness and continuing import 
surpluses. By 1927 the national debt had passed £1000m., com-
pared with £313m. in 1915. Half the debt was borrowed from 
overseas. The overseas interest burden had increased from 
£20m. to £24m. since 1925. After the prosperous year of 
1924/25, Australia did not again have an export surplus which 
could meet, either wholly or partly, its overseas interest 
obligations. Imports exceeded exports in value by £5ni. in 
1925/26, £20m. in 1926/27 and nearly £4m. in 1927/28, The 
finances of the Commonwealth Government continued to appear 
healthy, as there were budget surpluses of £5m. in both 
1925/26 and 1926/27. However, the surpluses were not really 
a sign of prosperity, as they resulted from customs receipts 
exceeding the estimates, which in turn were due to overseas 
borrowings and to tariff increases. The State governments 
had enormous budgeting problems. In both 1925/26 and 
1926/27 four of them had deficits and in the case of New 
South Wales in 1925/26 and South Australia in 1926/27 the 
deficits amounted to over £lm. The deficits were largely 
caused by the heavy losses incurred by the State railways, 
1. Commonwealth of Australia Yearbook. 1926-28; Forster. 
op.cit. 
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with the sole exception of the Victorian Railways. In every 
year after 1925 the Queensland Railways had a deficit of 
over £liii., while the losses of the South Australian Railways 
reached £4iii. in 1925/26 and £3iii. in 1926/27. Other aspects 
of the economy caused serious concern. Both nominal wages 
and prices continued to rise, although in other countries 
prices were falling. The unemployment figures in 1926 and 
1927 were relatively low, reaching 5.7 per cent in the last 
quarter of 1926. However, by the last quarter of 1927 they 
had risen to 8.9 per cent and they rose further in 1928.^ 
The Government received many warnings ahout the 
serious economic situation. Pastoralists in Parliament 
such as C.L.A. Abbott and W. Killen asserted that the 
primary industries were in a stagnant condition and there 
were predictions that the value of primary produce would 
fall by £30m. in 1927/28.^ W.L. Baillieu declared that 
the mining companies would not be able to support much longer 
the combination of increasing taxation, high production costs 
and falling metal prices,^ and McDonald said that the 
1. Labour Report. Nos. 17-19, 1926-28. 
2. C.P.D. V. 113, 17 June, 1926, p.5215; W.W. Killen to 
M S m , 17 Aug. 1927. (A.N.L. MS 1009/28). 
3. Australasian Manufacturer, v. 12, 10 Dec. 1927, p.10, 
4. Age. 29 Oct. 1927, p.25. 
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slackening of the coal trade had never been so intense and 
the export trade was heading towards extinction,^ Opinion 
was very divided on the state of the economy as a whole. 
Dyason wrote that, if the increase in population and the 
change in money values was considered, the external debt 
was less than in 1894 and 1904 and the external interest 
burden was less than in 1894 and only slightly more than in 
1904. He agreed with Sutcliffe that Australia was not 
living on borrowed money and it could sustain its burden of 
n 
debt with comparative ease. On the other hand, Latham's 
brother Bertram, who was President of the Actuarial Society 
of Australasia, gave an address in June, 1927, in which he 
criticized the expenditure of borrowed money on losing 
investments, such as railways, water supply, irrigation and 
electricity. The country had to increase its production or 
reduce its consumption if it was to live within its income 
and reduce its indebtedness. The Commonwealth Government's 
budget surplus was not a true measure of prosperity, yet it 
encouraged it to indulge in lavish expenditure.^ These 
criticisms were supported by the Melbourne Age and by a 
1. S.M,H. 8 Dec. 1927, p.12. 
2. E.G. Dyason. "The Australian public debt". Economic 
Record' v. 3 (1927) pp.161-74. 
3. Age. 14 June, 1927, p.10. 
4. Ibid. 24 June, 1927, p.8. 
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group of Melboiarne employers, businessmen and trade union 
leaders who wrote to Bruce in June, 1927. They stated that 
since the Government had come into office imports had ex-
ceeded exports by £32m. and the total debt had grown by 
£108m. When large sums were being borrowed merely to pay 
interest the country was headed for insolvency.^ 
In June and July, 1927, Bruce made several refer-
ences to Australia's economic problems, particularly in his 
address to the Premiers' Conference and in the Joseph Fisher 
lecture which he delivered at the University of Adelaide, 
He admitted that the economic position was causing the 
Government grave anxiety. However, he strongly defended 
the Government's loan and tariff policies and the scale of 
expenditure of both the Commonwealth and the State Govern-
ments. Of the total public debt of £l,013m., only £305m., 
incurred during the War, was a dead-weight debt, represented 
by no assets, and only a small proportion of the latter debt 
was borrowed from overseas. For the other £708m. Australia 
had assets valued at over £800m. In a new country govern-
ments had to undertake functions, such as railway services, 
and developmental projects, such as irrigation, which were 
not the responsibilities of governments in olde^ ^ countries. 
Only by the wise expenditure of borrowed money could the 
1. Quoted in 25 C.A.R. 1167. ' 
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Government provide for a rapid expansion of population 
without any decline of living standards. The great major-
ity of government revenues was allocated to obligations 
and services which were accepted and expected by every-
one: debts incurred during the War, defence, pensions, 
education, health, railways. Although the Government had 
no intention of increasing the burden on industry by 
setting up a system of child endowment, it was impossible 
for it to reduce taxation to such an extent that industry 
would be stimulated or production costs lessened. Less 
than half of the customs revenue was derived from duties 
of a protective character, and even if the Government 
abandoned its protectionist policy it would still be 
necessary, for revenue purposes, to raise approximately 
the same amount from customs duties. Bruce therefore con-
cluded that the Government could not solve the country's 
economic problems. Only improved efficiency and greater 
co-operation between all who were engaged in production 
would save the social system and living standards from 
disaster,^ 
In his lecture Bruce also referred to the "linked 
policies" of the protective tariff and the basic wage. 
Originally Australia's exportable surpluses had been very 
1. S.M. Bruce. The financial and economic position of 
Australia. Adelaide, 1927. 
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small or were of a character, such as wool, for which there 
was always a market. However, as exportable surpluses had 
grown, an acute problem had arisen: the necessity both to 
maintain a high standard of living and to compete against 
all-comers in the open markets of the world. There was wide-
spread argument about the relationship between the tariff 
and wages. The Victorian Chamber of Manufactures asked Bruce 
to ensure that the vicious circle was unbroken by providing 
for automatic tariff increases whenever wage increases were 
granted,^ This suggestion, which horrified the Chamber of 
Commerce, was dismissed by Bruce. The Tariff Board believed 
that the vicious circle should be broken at all costs. In 
its 1926 report it criticized Powers' statement that the 
Arbitration Court was concerned with the cost of living, 
not with the capacity of an industry to pay certain wages, 
and employers who found difficulty in paying the wages should 
have recourse to the Tariff Board. The Board insisted that, 
unless the unions realized the critical position into which 
Australia was drifting and the necessity to prevent the gap 
between British and European wages and Australian wages 
3 
widening, there would be nothing but economic disaster ahead. 
1. S.M.H. 27 May, 1927, p.12; Minutes of deputation from 
Victorian Chamber of Manufactures to Prime Minister, 
29 May, 1927. (A.N.L. MS 1009/28). 
2. Commerce, v.10, 7 June, 1927, p.132. 
3. Tariff Board. Annual report for 1925/26. pp.13-14o 
- 220 -
In 1927 the Board repeated its warning, claiming that the 
situation was even more serious. Rising costs of production 
Y/ere arresting the progress of the timber, engineering, iron 
and steel, glassware, clothing and textile industries.^ 
The deteriorating economic situation dominated 
Latham's thinking when, in December, 1926, he began to con-
sider the implications of the referendum defeat. In fact, 
it caused him to retreat from his centralist position and 
he quickly revived his old argument that the regulation of 
almost all industries was a matter best left to the States. 
His new position was siMmarized in some notes that he 
drafted during his stay in London, where he was appearing 
in a Privy Council case. Instead of the usual references 
to the overlapping, inconsistencies and waste of the existing 
system, the emphasis in the notes was on the vicious circle 
of rising wages, prices and tariffs and the resulting in-
creases in production costs, 
Latham argued that there was a tendency for 
employers and employees to combine to increase profits and 
wages at the expense of the rest of the community. The 
object of many customs duties was certainly to make indus-
tries more profitable, but it was not intended that they 
Tariff Board. Annual report for 1926/2.7. p. 18. 
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should also make higher wages possible. There were a number 
of possible solutions to the tariff-wage problem. For 
instance, Parliament could legislate to prevent the Court 
from awarding Y/ages above or below certain limits. Latham 
did not think that this proposal was either practicable or 
desirable. It v/ould be preferable to compel the Court to 
make its awards on the basis of the continuance of existing 
customs duties, so that it would be forced to consider the 
capacity of industries to pay the proposed wages. Alter-
natively, the Arbitration Act could be amended to limit its 
operation to a few specified industries. 
The last solution, with State authorities fixing 
wages, appealed to Latham for a number of reasons. Like 
the manufacturers, he realized that a high wage in one or 
two States, unlike a Federal wage, could not be used to 
justify an increase in the tariff. State tribunals would 
have to make their awards on the basis of existing economic 
conditions. With State regulation there would be variations 
in wages and conditions, and it would be much more difficult 
for employers and employees to combine to exploit the public. 
Moreover, large federal unions would become much less power-
ful and many would disappear, together with the tendency for 
local disputes to be magnified into national stoppages. The 
referendujn showed that the people wanted less Federal inter-
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ference in industry. It would be possible to make some 
improvements to the Arbitration Act, but they would not 
touch the realities of the problem. The only real solution 
was to restrict the operations of the Federal Court. Latham 
stressed that the change should not be made suddenly and 
that its advantages should be widely publicized before any 
practical proposals were made.^ 
It can only be assumed that Latham expounded his 
ideas to Bruce and other Ministers on his return to Australia. 
Nevertheless, subsequent events showed that the Government 
had no intention of taking any action to limit the juris-
diction of the Federal Court. Latham had argued that such 
action was the only logical course to adopt following the 
defeat of the referendum proposals. Such was not the view 
of Ministers who a few months before had asserted that it 
was impossible to define Federal industries, and that sooner 
or later greater powers would have to be given to the Common-
wealth. They naturally feared charges of inconsistency if 
they suddenly called for a return to State control. In 
addition, the Australian National Federation had reversed 
its arbitration policy and favoured Federal supremacy, while 
1. Latham. Some observations upon the tariff and the 
Arbitration Act, 17 Dec. 1926. (A.N.L. MS 1009/28). 
2. Australian National Review. 50 Nov. 1926, p.l2o 
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a number of employer organizations had become strong defen-
ders of the Federal Court. Both thb Federation and the 
employers would be embarrassed and perhaps hostile if the 
Government changed its position. Finally, it was highly 
likely that Ministers were tired of arguing about arbit-
ration and the easiest course of action was to allow the 
Federal Court to continue with its existing powers. 
Latham returned to Australia in February, 1927, 
and immediately turned from his reflections on arbitration 
policy to the perennial and very practical problem of the 
delays and slowness of the Federal Court. Stewart told 
him that 149 cases were awaiting hearing, including 41 
applications for a 44 hour week.^ Latham consulted 
Dethridge^ and in April, 1927, it was announced that the 
Court would be strengthened by the appointment of E.A. Drake-
Brockman as a fourth judge and Stewart as the first Con-
ciliation Commissioner.^ As Industrial Registrar, Stewart 
had often arranged meetings between employers and unions; 
with his new powers he was able to summon compulsory con-
1. Latham to Garran, 21 Feb. 1927, Stewart to Garran, 
24 Feb. 1927. (6.A.O. A432 29/5413). 
2. Latham to G. Dethridge, 22 Feb. 1927. (C.A.O. A432 
29/3413). 
3. S.M.H. 14 April, 1927, p.9. 
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ferences and he was to spend far more time away from Melbourne 
seeking to settle disputes aixd reporting to the judges on the 
circumstances surrounding stoppages. He was a popular man 
and his promotion was welcomed on all sides. In contrast, 
the appointment of Drake-Brockman^ aroused a furore in the 
Labour Party and among the unions, and even Government sup-
porters felt that Bruce and Latham had made an amazing 
political blundero^ Until 1926 Drake-Brockman had been a 
Nationalist Senator and President of the Central Council of 
Employers, and it was asserted that a man with such a 
partisan background was unqualified to hold judicial office. 
The Labour Party was in no position to criticize the appoint-
ment and Crofts' remark that the unions would boycott the 
Court^ was an idle threat. Nevertheless, the accusation of 
"biased appointments" was henceforth part of the standard 
repertoire of the Opposition. The Government was fortunate 
in that Drake-Brockman was not involved in any really contro-
versial cases and, ironically, it was the employers and not 
1. Edmund A. Drake-Brockman (1884-1949). Called to West 
Australian Bar 1909, com.manded 4th Australian Infantry 
Brigade in France, Senator for Western Australia 1919-26, 
Government Whip 1^22-26, President, Central Council of 
Employers of Australia 1924-26, Judge, Commonwealth 
Arbitration Court 1927-49, Chief Judge 1947-49. 
2. A ^ . 18 April, 1927, p.8. 
3. S.M.H. 18 April, 1927, p.11. 
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the unions who complained most about his awards. 
In June, 1927, Latham announced that the Government 
was considering amendments that could "be made to the Arbit-
ration Act under the Commonwealth's existing constitutional 
powers. The Government again sought the views of the Central 
Council of Employers and the A.C.T.U.,^ but no replies were 
received until August, 1927. By that time Latham and Boniwell 
had already drafted a Bill and it-had been sent to the other 
Ministers. 
The Bill that Latham circulated in late July, 1927,^ 
drew heavily on Groom's 1925 Arbitration Bill. Of its 
substantive clauses, ten had been included in the earlier 
Bill, although some in a more extended form. They dealt 
with such aspects of arbitration as the overlapping of 
awards, retrospective pay, lawyers in the Court, bonds, 
secret ballots, union rules, deregistration and the expulsion 
or suspension of union members. Latham added clauses pro-
viding for conferences of Commonwealth and State arbitrators, 
the appointment of inspectors, and the dissolution of de-
registered organizations and the distribution or vesting of 
1. Garran to C. Crofts, Secretary, A.C.T.U., 6 June, 1927. 
(C.A.O. A432 29/393); M e . 50 July, 1927, p.14, 3 Aug, 
1927, p.12. 
2. 1927 Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Bill.' 
Rou^h draft circulated by Attorney-General, 21 July, 
1927. (A.N.L. MS 1633/4). 
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their property in voluntary associations of their former 
members. His most important contribution was concerned 
with the economic effect of awards. In December, 1926, he 
had suggested, as an alternative to the limitation of the 
Co^art's jurisdiction, that the Court be compelled to con-
sider the capacity of industries to pay the prescribed 
wages. He now expanded one of the recommendations of Moore 
and Dyason. The Court should be directed to consider, in 
making its awards, the "standard of living, the increase or 
decrease in the productivity of industry and any provisions 
for family allowances applicable to employees." The first 
draft of the 1927 Bill did not contain many of the penal 
provisions of the 1925 Bill. In a covering note Latham 
wrote that he did not think that the present circumstances 
required as restrictive a code as in 1925, especially as many 
of the 1925 provisions would be regarded as a "subservient" 
imitation of the British Trade Union Bill.^ 
The Arbitration Bill was discussed by Cabinet in 
mid August, 1927. At this meeting Latham expressed in 
greater detail his belief that the 1925 proposals had been 
far too restrictive and negative. In fact, he made the 
radical suggestion that the penal provisions which had been 
1. Latham. Memorandum to all Ministers, 21 July, 1927. 
(A.N.L. LS 1653/4). 
- 227 -
in the Act since 1904 should be repealed. Except in the 
case of essential public services, ^hich were covered by 
State legislation, it was wrong to make refusal to work a 
criminal offence, thereby reducing workmen to a servile 
status similar to that of workers in Italy and Russia. The 
penal provisions encouraged lying and hypocrisy among union 
leaders: officials would arrange a strike, tell the press 
that a strike would take place unless certain concessions 
were made, and then swear to the Court that they had nothing 
to do with it and that the men were acting individually. 
Furthermore, it was wrong to impose a criminal penalty on a 
man for simply obeying the order of his union. Turning from 
the morality to the effectiveness of the penalties, it was 
impossible to force thousands of men to work on unacceptable 
terms, and as a result the law was brought into contempt and 
the power of revolutionary agitators was increased. On the 
other hand, lockout penalties could readily be enforced and 
employers therefore fought with their hands tied. Latham 
referred to the engineers' strike and stated that if the 
employers were free to lockout, many strikes would not take 
place. 7/hile it was right that employers should be bound to 
pay award wages, to deprive them of their right to close 
down their works left them with insufficient control of their 
own businesses. Latham recommended that all penalties on 
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strikes and lockouts be repealed.^ 
Latham's proposal echoed one of the major recom-
mendations of Moore and Dyason and he had certainly made a 
most detailed study of their report. However, the report 
merely strengthened views which he had held for many years. 
For instance, in 1925 he had told Parliament that Sections 
6 and 6A of the Arbitration Act, which prohibited strikes 
and lockouts, were a dead letter and in any case he doubted 
if there should be legislation of a general character against 
strikes. Despite the strength of his conviction and the 
logic of his argument, Latham found that Cabinet completely 
rejected his proposal. It is not known if he was supported 
by any Ministers. The outcome of the August Cabinet meeting 
was that Latham had to retain and even increase the penal 
provisions. Cabinet approved of all but two of the clauses 
in the draft Bill, but some were to be greatly modified or 
expanded. 
In July, 1927, Latham complained that he had 
received no substantial response to his request to employer 
bodies and unions for suggestions to improve the Arbitration 
1. Latham. Memorandum to Cabinet: Strike and lockout 
penalties in Arbitration Act, Aug. 1927. (A.N.L. MS 1633/4) 
2. C.P.D. V. 110, 9 July, 1925, pp.874-76. 
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Act.^ In the next month or so, however, he received lengthy 
proposals from a number of organizations, as well as from 
individuals who claimed to have found the solution to the 
country's industrial problems. On the employers' side, sub-
missions were received from the Central Council of Employers, 
the Associated Chambers of Commerce, the Victorian Chamber 
of Manufactures, the Metal Trades Employers Association, the 
Commonwealth Steamship Owners Association, the Stockowners 
Association of New South Wales and the Broken Hill Prop-
rietary Company. In addition, Latham had long disucssions 
with the three most prominent leaders of the employers in 
Melbourne, McKay, MacDougall and Ashworth,^ conferred with 
Schwilk, the Secretary of the New South Y/ales Employers 
Federation, received a deputation from the Metal Trades 
Employers Association, and had a protracted correspondence 
with its Secretary, W.C. Myhill, It was the third time in 
1. 30 July, 1927, p.14. 
2. Elford to Latham, 23 Aug. 1927, Myhill to Garran, 13 Sept. 
1927, Ashby to Latham, 21 Sept. 1927, H.A.L. Binder, 
Secretary, Council of Employers Industrial Representatives, 
to Latham, 6 Oct. 1927, J.A. Riley, Secretary, Associated 
Chambers of Commerce, lo Latham, 3 Lec. 1927. (C.A.O. 
A432 29/3407); C.L. Templeton (B.H.P.) to Latham, 7 Sept. 
1927, Latham to C. Binnie, President, N.S.W. Stockowners 
Association, n.d. (A.N.L. MS 1009/28). 
3. Minutes of Executive of Victorian Employers Federation, 
12 Sept. 1927. (V.E.F.). 
4. Garran to Myhill, 6 Aug. 1927, Myhill to Garran, 13 Sept. 
1927. (M.T.I.A. Box 68 (c) ); Myhill to Latham, 30 Sept. 
1927. (C.A.O. A432 29/3407). 
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three years that the Government had received suggestions 
from the employers and the great majority of their proposals 
were familiar. The most frequent demands were for compulsory 
union ballots, the creation of conciliation committees, the 
appointment of inspectors to police awards in place of union 
officials, an end to retrospective awards and the removal 
of all restrictions on piecework. They also called for the 
supremacy of Federal awards, the right to appeal against a 
decision of a single judge, the right to be assisted by 
counsel, the complete abolition of preference to unionists, 
the cancellation of awards or deregistration if awards were 
disobeyed, the deduction of penalties from employees' wages 
and harsh penalties against picketingo 
Latham, like Groom, rejected on principle the idea 
that legislation should be based on the submissions of 
economic pressure groups. However, he differed from his 
predecessor in his readiness to listen to the arguments of 
pressure groups and to make modifications, usually of a 
minor kind, to the Bill that he had already drafted. Pre-
dictably, he gave the closest attention to the views of the 
employer orjCjanizations. He tried to co-ordinate them as 
much as possible; for instance, he sent the suggestions 
of B.H.P. and the Victorian Chamber of Manufactures to 
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Schwilk to learn if they had the support of the Sydney 
employers.^ Yet considering the nomber and size of the 
employers' submissions they had very little direct influence 
on the 1927 Arbitration Bill. Latham had drafted the clauses 
on union ballots, inspectors, counsel and deregistration 
before he received the employers' suggestions, although he 
was aware that these had always been among the traditional 
demands of the employers. The final Bill, unlike the first 
draft, contained provisions for the appointment of conciliation 
committees and it was probably included in response to 
pressure from both the employers and from the Arbitration 
Court. Even so, the emplovers simply called for conciliation 
committees and left it to Latham and Garran to draft a long 
clause setting out exactly the ways in which they would be 
formed and would operate. 
The clause in the final Bill which most definitely 
originated in Latham's discussions with the employers related 
to sectional strikes and lockouts. Employers' leaders such 
as Ashworth, Brooks and Myhill agreed wholeheartedly with 
Latham that all penalties for strikes and lockouts should be 
repealed. If this was unacceptable, Myhill urged that 
1. Memoranda on suggestions of B.H.P. Steelworks and 
Victorian Chamber of Manufactures, 19 Aug. 1927. 
(A.N.L. MS 1009/28). 
2. Myhill to Garran, 13 Sept. 1927. (M.T.I.A. Box 68(c) ); 
Proceedings of 14th annual conference of Central Council 
of Employers, Nov. 1927, p.88. (A.C.E.F.); S.M.H. 15 Nov. 
1927, p.ll. 
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Sections 6 and 6A be amended to deal with sectional strikes 
by providing that where employees in some factories stopped 
work, employers in that industry would be able to lock out 
the rest of the employees without infringing the law. 
Myhill stated that it was impossible to inflict the penalties 
on the unions and gave Latham details of the engineers' 
strike, in which the employers were in a helpless position.^ 
As usual, the influence of the unions on the 
Government's legislation was negligible. The A.C.T.U. sent 
p 
a submission to Latham in August, 1927, but the Govern-
ment rejected all but one or two minor proposals. A 
deputation from the Council told Latham that the Arbitration 
Act could be advantageously replaced by the Industrial Peace 
Act. It also declared that the Beeby award constituted an 
attack on the conditions of the engineers, and that the 
metal trades unions would take ballots to decide whether 
they should withdraw from the Court. Lathajn replied that 
he would need much more evidence that the unions wanted 
their awards terminated and that they really preferred the 
Industrial Peace Act. The latter Act could well be uncon-
stitutional, tribunals could break down if one side refused 
1. Garran to Myhill 6 Aug. 1927, Myhill to Garran, 13 Sept. 
1927. (M.T'.I.A. Box 68 (c) ). 
2. Crofts to Latham, 2 Aug. 1927. (C;A.O. A432 29/393)o 
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to attend meetings, and their rulings would be subject to 
the same limitations as Court awards.^ Latham asked the 
A.C.T.U. on a number of occasions whether it favoured the 
abolition of all strike and lockout penalties, but it 
refused to give a definite answer. 
As well as consulting the employers and the unions, 
Latham sought the views of the Judges of the Arbitration 
Court. Dethridge confirmed his opinion that the strike 
sections in the Act were practically useless and thought 
that the unions would be much more cautious if the employers 
were free to lockout. However, he thought that the penalty 
clauses should be retained in cases affecting public utilities. 
Stewart asserted that the suspension of awards, and not de-
registration, was the most effective means of securing indus-
trial peace. 
By November, 1927, the Arbitration Bill was taking 
its final shape and Latham submitted five outstanding questions 
1. Minutes of deputation from A.C.T.U. to Attorney-General, 
13 Aug. 1927. (C.A.O. A432 29/393). 
2. Garran to Crofts, 17 Sept. 1927. Cpfts to Garran, 
20 Sept. 1927. (C.A.O. A452 29/393); C.P.D. v, 118, 
29 May, 1928, p.5281. 
3. Stewart to Latham, 29 Sept. 1927. (C.A.O. A452 29/3407). 
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to Cabinet.^ In only one case did Cabinet agree completely 
with Latham's recommendation. It agreed that the Bill should 
enable lawyers to appear in the Court with the consent of 
the judge, and rejected Dethridge's suggestion that parties 
should only "be represented by lawyers on questions of law. 
Two of the proposals were completely rejected, presumably 
because Ministers thought that they would arouse unnecessary 
controversy. Latham stated that although the Court had 
hardly ever awarded preference to unionists, it was bound 
by Section 40 (2) of the Act to order preference if it would 
assist to prevent or settle a dispute. If the unionists 
were to realize the effect of this Section, they could force 
a preference order in every case. He thought that the Section 
^ouLd contain a proviso, "and the Court is satisfied that 
preference is desirable and fair between all persons con-
cerned". The other suggestion which was put aside was for 
the complete or substantial repeal of the Industrial Peace 
Act. Latham quoted Higgins' criticism of the Act and said 
that it was indefensible in principle as long as the Arbit-
ration Court existed. If the Act was left on the statute 
book it would be possible for a Labour Government to appoint 
tribunals headed bv union officialso 
1. Latham. Memorandum to all Ministers, 5 Nov. 1927. 
(A.N.L. MS 1653/4); Latham. Memorandum to Cabinet: 
Arbitration Bill. 1 Dec. 1927. (A.N.L. MS 1009/28). 
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The most important question that Latham raised in 
Cabinet related to the economic effect of awards. He doubted 
whether Federal awards had entirely destroyed any industries, 
although the mining and timber industries were sometimes 
cited. However, there was no doubt that employers in secon-
dary industries had frequently used av/ards as grounds for 
claiming higher protective duties. Latham su^^gested two 
possible provisions to apply to industries which, in the 
opinion of the Court, might be destroyed by an award or 
agreement. The Act could direct the Court not to make an 
av/ard or certify an agreement if it thought it would imperil 
the existence of an industry. Alternatively, in such cases 
the Court could be directed to send the award or agreement 
to the Attorney-Genera^, who would place it before Parliament, 
and it would have no effect unless approved by a resolution 
of Parliament. Latham predicted that either suggestion would 
be represented as an attack on living standards. Yet no 
award could fix wages at less than the basic wage, collective 
or individual bargaining could still operate, and the States 
could take any relief action. Cabinet did not approve of 
either of Latham's suggestions and the clause v/as limited to 
directing the Court to consider the probable economic effect 
of an award or agreement in relation to the community in 
general and the industry or industries specifically concerned. 
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Latham presented the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Bill to Parliament on 15th December, 1927. In his prefatory 
remarks he asserted that it would be a mistake to expect too 
much from legislation. Far more important was positive co-
operation between employers and employees to ensure the 
success of individual industries and the well-being of the 
community. Australia was fortunate in that it had not 
suffered stoppages comparable with the British general strikes 
of 1920 and 1926, and most of its troubles had been confined 
to the transport, mining and engineering industries. Never-
theless, there were far too many strikes in Australia. 
Lockouts, in contrast, were rare, as they were easy to prove. 
Latham went on to say that the abolition of the Arbitration 
Court would not solve any problems and would create many new 
ones. But the continuance of the arbitration system depended 
on those who appealed to the arbitrator observing his awards 
and not resorting to direct action when it suited them.^ 
The Arbitration Bill was long and complex and 
covered most of the subjects which had been raised in dis-
cussions on arbitration in the previous five years. Several 
clauses had been foreshadowed in the 1925 Bill or were con-
cerned with grievances which had repeatedly been put forward 
1. C.P.D. V. 117, 15 Dec. 1927, p.3274. 
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by employers. Counsel would in future be able to appear in 
the Court with the leave of the judge. Employees would no 
longer be able to sue for recovery of wages once six months 
had elapsed from the date the payment became due. Awards 
would not be policed by union officials but by inspectors 
appointed by the Attorney-General, who would have the right 
to enter any property where there was a dispute or where an 
award was in force, and who would report to the Court or 
Registrar on any breach of the Act or an award,^ The Chief 
Judge was empowered to appoint Conciliation Committees, con-
sisting of representatives of employers and employees, with 
a paid chairman who would not have a vote. One -clause 
sought to remedy one of the main complaints of the unions. 
Where there were numerous persons with the same interest in 
a matter before the Court, the Court could appoint "repre-
sentative respondents" and plaints, summonses and other 
documents would only have to be served on the relatively 
small number of representative respondents.^ This proposal, 
which had been suggested by Moore and Dyason, would result in 
1. 1927 Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Bill, 
Clause 42. 
2. Ibid. Clause 28. 
3. Ibid. Clause 16, 
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the applicants, who were usually unions, being relieved of a 
great deal of expense and work. The Bill contained two pro-
visions giving guidance to the Court in the making of awards. 
Not only was the Court to consider the probable economic 
effects of its av/ards,^ but it was to ensure as far as 
possible that there would be uniformity of hours, holidays 
and general conditions in individual industries. In making 
this stipulation, the Government was conveyin;^; to the Court 
its preference for industry rather than craft awards. 
Four clauses dealt with the problem of overlapping 
Federal and State awards.^ Tvra of the clauses had been in 
the 1925 Bill. The Court was to consider in every case 
whether it would be more appropriate for a dispute to be 
referred to a State tribunal. Another clause echoed the 
Clyde Engineering Case decision by stating that where both 
Federal and State awards "dealt with" the same subject, the 
Federal award was to prevail and the Court could declare 
that the State award 7/as invalid. Latham added two more 
clauses to lessen the problem of overlapping. The Court 
1. 1927 Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Bill. 
Clause 22 (amendment to Section 25B) 
2. Ibid. Clause 22 (amendment to Section 25A) 
3. I M d . Clauses 17, 25, 29, 32.' 
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would be able to make an order restraining a State authority 
from dealing with a dispute if the subject of the dispute 
had been dealt with by the Federal Court. On a more concilia-
tory level, the Chief Judge of the Federal Court could arrange 
a conference with a State authority in order to secure co-
ordination between orders or awards. 
A number of clauses dealt directly with registered 
organizations or, more realistically, trade unions.^ Union 
rules again had to fulfil a few negative conditions: they 
were not to be contrary to law or an award, were not to be 
tyrannical or oppressive, and were not to impose unreason-
able conditions on membership. Unlike the 1925 Bill, the 
rules did not have to fulfil any positive conditions. Unions 
were to supply the Registrar with lists of their members and 
statements of their accounts and, furthermore, they were to 
arrange for an armual audit of their finances by a qualified 
auditor. If necessary, the Court could order an audit to be 
taken. An extremely long clause set out the elaborate pro-
cedures for holding union ballots and enumerated all the 
offences that could be committed in connection with the ballot. 
The Court would be able to order a ballot to be taken either 
on its own initiative or as a result of a written application 
by ten or more members of the union. In the latter case, the 
1. 1927 Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Bill 
Clauses 18, 19, 44-49, 51, 52 
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union would first be given an opportunity to state whether 
it considered a ballot was necessary. 
The most controversial sections of the Bill were 
concerned with the enforcement of awards.^ The penalties 
for strikes and lockouts were to remain, but the fine for 
individual employees was reduced to £50, while the fines for 
organizations and employers remained at £1,000, However, 
there were certain qualifications. If an organization 
expelled from its membership the officers whose acts had 
caused it to be convicted, the penalty for the organization 
would be reduced to £100. There was also a clause aimed at 
sectional stoppages. The Court could declare that a strike 
or lockout existed in a particular industry or section of 
an industry. While a declaration that a strike existed was 
in force, it would no longer be an offence to engage in a 
lockout in that industry. Similarly, when a declaration 
that a lockout existed was made, the employees in that in-
dustry would be free to go on strike. As in the 1925 Bill, 
there were clauses providing for cancellation of awards (less 
elaborate than in 1925), deregistration, the expulsion of 
members who committed breaches of the Act or an award, and 
the imposition of additional penalties on organizations if 
any of their officers were convicted under the Act,^ 
1. 1927 Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Bill. 
Clauses 4-6, 8, 10, 32, 38, 39, 54-57. 
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In its penal provisions the 1927 Bill was not as 
harsh as the 1925 Bill. Admittedly it created many additional 
offences: the use of violence, threats, abusive language or 
boycotts to prevent a person from offering or accepting 
employment in accordance with an award; the imposition of 
penalties by a union on members who were obeying an award; 
the moving of resolutions which insulted the Court or a 
judge; and the publishing of reports containing orders or 
incitement to commit a breach of the award. On the other 
hand, some of the harsh penalties of the 1925 Bill were 
excluded. The Court would not be able to sentence officers 
who ordered or advised their members to break an award to 
six months' imprisonment, it would not be able to order a 
union to expel certain of its members, and it would not be 
able to order individual members to pay the fines of an 
insolvent union. Above all, the 1927 Bill stated that 
organizations would be liable for the acts of their officers 
and committees of management, both Federal and branch, but 
unlike the 1925 Bill, it did not make them liable for the 
acts of the rank and file. 
There was an unusually long break of five months 
between Latham's second reading speech and the rest of the 
debates on the Arbitration Bill. Latham's speech was made 
shortly before Parliament rose for the summer recess. By 
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the time that it had reassembled, in March, 1928, Bruce had 
given an undertaking to postpone further consideration of 
the Bill until an Industrial Peace Conference had been held. 
Throughout 1927 Bruce had taken little interest in 
industrial relations, apart from making occasional references 
to strikes in his speeches. He had referred all deputations 
and submissions concerning arbitration to his Attorney-General 
and had made only casual enquiries about the drafting of the 
Arbitration Bill;^ in fact, he v;as absent from Melbourne 
throughout July, when most of the drafting was done. In 
October, 1927, he declined a request by the Victorian Chamber 
of Manufactures to convene an economic conference to discuss 
such matters as wage-fixation, the price of coal, the decline 
of exports and the tariff. However, on 51st January, 1928, 
in a speech at Box Hill, Bruce asserted that an industrial 
conference, similar to the one held in Britain in 1927, would 
be of the greatest value, and he would be prepared to summon 
one if it had the support of both sides. Australia needed a 
new spirit of co-operation between capital, labour and 
management,^ In the next few days Bruce elaborated on his 
proposals. He would prefer to select the delegates himself, 
1. Latham to Bruce, 12 July, 1927. (A.N.L. MS 1009/41). 
2. Victorian Chamber of Manufactures Gazette. 31 Oct. 1927. 
3. S.M.H. 1 Feb. 1928, p.l6V 
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partly to ensure that there were no extremists and also 
because a conference of representatives of organized capital 
and labouT had failed in 1922.^ But he soon withdrew that 
stipulation. Several leaders of both the employers and the 
unions welcomed the proposal, although the unionists declared 
that a conference would only have a chance of succeeding if 
the Arbitration Bill was withdrawn. On 18th February, 1928, 
Bruce invited several organizations to select representatives 
to attend a conference. There would be 54 representatives, 
they were to be men actually engaged in production or in 
industrial relations and their decisions would not be binding 
2 
on their organizations. 
Within a week of sending his invitation, Bruce 
again \7r0te to the organizations and suggested that the con-
ference be modelled on the League of Nations General Assembly, 
with a definite agenda and each item referred to a committee 
for a detailed report which would be finally considered by 
the whole conference.^ Most of the employer organizations 
accepted the invitation, but there was little response from 
1. S.M.H. 2 Feb. 1928, p.11, 7 Feb. 1928, p.11. 
2. Bruce to employer and employee organizations, 18 Feb.' 
1928. (C.A.O." A458 BH502/4'). 
5. Bruce to employer and employee organizations, 25 Feb. 
1928. (C.A.O; A458 BH502/4). 
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the unions. Crofts stated that the A.C.T.U. could only 
participate if the Government withdrew the "coercive and 
oppressive" Arbitration Bill and if all the workers' rep-
resentatives were endorsed by the A.C.T.U,^ In reply, 
Bruce made a lengthy defence of the Arbitration Bill, 
claiming that it extended the principle of conciliation, 
provided for effective government of the unions by the 
unionists themselves, and embodied the principle that com-
pulsory arbitration depended on obedience to awards by both 
parties. The Government would not withdraw the Bill, but 
as a compromise it would withhold further consideration of 
it by Parliament until the conference had been hel-d. The 
Government could not accept the other condition of the 
A.C.T.U.: the Council did not represent all the unions and 
it could not be allowed to veto the nominations of other 
or;S:anizations. Later in March Bruce received a reply 
from the A.W.U. The Union stated that it was not opposed 
to conferences between employers and employees on specific 
matters but it refused to participate in purely academic 
discussions. Measures to deal with unemployment were far 
1. Crofts to Bruce, 27 Feb. 1928. (C.A.O. A458 BH502/4). 
2. Bruce to Crofts, 6 March, 1928. (C.A.O. A458 BH502/4). 
- 245 -
more urgently needed than a conference.^ Bruce sent a long 
appeal to the A.W.U., arguing that only a conference would 
bring about industrial peace, the greatest efficiency and 
the best possible relations between employers and employees. 
The appeal failed, both the A.C.T.U. and the A.W.U. refused 
to nominate delegates, and on 30th April, 1928, Bruce 
announced that the conference would not be held. 
Even if the conference had taken place, it is 
difficult to imagine it achieving tangible results. Some 
of the employers and the press were critical of Bruce's 
failure to enumerate the exact subjects to be discussed.' 
The Age referred to Bruce's "vague, benevolent generalities" 
and asserted that "the conference will be a monument of 
garrulous futility unless it is given certain ideas to 
explore". At first Bruce refused to specify the subject-
matter of the conference. The arbitration system had failed 
to remove industrial disputes from the arena of antagonism 
to that of reason and conciliation. Australia did not need 
a new financial, economic or industrial policy but peace in 
1. E. Grayndler, Secretary, A.W.U., to Bruce, 15 March, 1928. 
(C.A.O'. A458 BH502/4).' 
2. Bruce to Grayndler, 20 March, 1928. (C.A.O. A458 BH502/4) 
3. S.M.H. 28 April, 1928, p.17. 
4. A ^ . 13 Feb. 1928, p.8, 21 Feb. 1928, p.8, 
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industry, a new industrial outlook and a new spirit of co-
operation. Duggan had obviously misunderstood the purpose 
of the conference when he said it should deal with protec-
tion, arbitration, banking and social legislation,^ Bruce's 
emphasis on "spirit" rather than "policies" irritated the 
Employers Advisory Committee, which, stated that a change of 
spirit was not needed, as both sides wanted peaceful progress, 
2 
but they were thwarted by complicated industrial legislation. 
Bruce eventually gave in to pressure and suggested that the 
conference could discuss the present economic position of 
primary and secondary industries, methods of increasing pro-
duction, the distribution of the proceeds of industry between 
capital and labour, the control and management of industry, 
and ways in which greater security of employment could be 
guaranteed to all classes of workers.^ 
The proposal for an Industrial Peace Conference 
was an example of Bruce's tendency to act impulsively, 
without consulting his colleagues, much less his departmental 
officers, and of his fondness for panaceas. It was Bruce 
1. S.M.H. 9 Feb. 1928, p.12. 
2. Industrial Australian and Mining Standard. 15 March, 1928, 
p.270. 
5. Bruce to employer and employee organizations, 25 Feb. 
1928. (C.A.O. A458 BH502/4)'. 
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alone who drafted all the statements and letters which en-
larged on his original proposal, and only once did he seek 
Latham's views on what he had written.^ The vagueness of 
his proposals resulted partly from his failure to enlist the 
support of officers in the Public Service, who could have 
supplied him with the drafts of detailed schemes and pointed 
out weaknesses in his proposal. Instead, Bruce announced 
the proposal before he had thought out all the implications 
and practical difficulties, and in the series of speeches 
which followed he was virtually thinking aloud. In addition, 
the vagueness reflected his belief that the act of conferring 
was as important as the subjects discussed, that frank talks 
would soon reveal the common interests of employers and wage-
earners, would break down old prejudices, and would promote 
the co-operation that was so vital if production costs were 
to be lowered. Both employers and unions regarded Bruce's 
attitude as naive: the wide-ranging agenda he had finally 
suggested could not be divorced from politics, there would 
be continual references to the Government's policies, and 
altogether the discussions would reveal the deep divisions 
between employers and employees and between the Government 
and the Labour Party, 
1. Deane to Latham, n,d. (A.N.L. MS 1009/28). 
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After the rejection of his proposal to simmon an 
Industrial Peace Conference, Bruce withdrew and allowed 
Latham to resume his position as the Government's chief 
spokesman on industrial matters. The Arbitration Bill, which 
had been tabled in Parliament in December, 1927, had aroused 
a great deal of comment, and Latham spent some time in the 
early months of 1928 studying criticisms of the Bill which 
had been made outside Parliament, 
Latham received detailed critiques of the Bill 
from the Arbitration Court. Lukin thought that "basic wage" 
and "standard hours" should be defined in the Act. Beeby 
disliked the idea of the Court declaring any State laws or 
awards to be invalid. He believed that the secret ballot 
provisions would be ineffective, and he was critical of 
some of the penal clauses. He was not opposed to penalties, 
however, and felt that arbitration might succeed if only 
employers would bring breaches of awards to the Court, so 
that the penalties could be rigidly enforced.^ The Judges' 
criticisms did not lead to any significant alterations to 
the Bill. 
1. Stewart to Garran, 8 May, 1928. (C.A.O. A432 29/3407); 
Beeby, Comments on proposed amendments of the Arbitra-
tion Act, n.d. (AJ.L. MS 1009/28). 
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The trade unions condemned the Arbitration Bill 
without qualification. They descrioed it as an unparalleled 
attack on the basic wage, State labour laws, the unions and 
on the sacred right to strike.^ The Government was prepared 
for such a reaction. However, Latham was surprised to find 
that the attitude of employers towards arbitration had been 
changing since mid 1927, and that they now had little enthu-
siasm for the Bill. As economic conditions worsened and 
industrial conflict intensified their old antagonism towards 
the whole idea of arbitration had been rekindled. In November, 
1927, the Central Council of Employers resolved that the com-
pulsory arbitration system had largely failed and the time 
p 
was ripe for its abolition. The Advisory Committees of 
Employers were formed in the following months with the main 
objective of ending arbitration. They stated that the value 
of the Arbitration Bill could only be judged by its capacity 
to remedy industrial strife, abnormal unemployment, decreased 
output, high production costs, under-population, and a lack 
of new capital and enterprise. Apart from their ineffective-
1. Minutes of N.S.W. Trades and Labour Council Executive, 
17 Jan. 1928. (A.N.U. M17/1); Minutes of Melbourne 
Trades Hall Council, 2 Feb. 1928. (A.N.U. M14). 
2. 14th annual conference of Central Council of Employers, 
Nov. 1927. Resolutions. (A.C.E.F.). 
- 2 5 0 -
ness, prosecutions and penalties merely increased bitterness 
and industrial turmoil.^ Some employer organizations 
o 
suggested further amendments to the Arbitration Bill, most 
01 which Latham rejected. Their general attitude, however, 
was summed up by the Metal Trades Employers Association in 
April, 1928, when it stated that it had no anxiety to see the 
Government proceed any further in amending the Act. Latham 
retorted that the Association's reference to the "clear, open 
economic ring" could only be interpreted to mean the repeal 
of all laws protecting the workers.^ As the Bill proceeded 
through Parliament other employers voiced similar criticisms. 
In June, 1928, McKay said the Act would be more difficult and 
complicated to administer than the old one, and a leading 
1. F.R. Lee, Secretary_j^ Advisory Committee of Employers. 
Melbo^arne, to C. LfciJonald, Chairman, Advisory Commit uee 
of Employers, Sydney, 10 Julj, 1928. (Woll.83)= 
2. Ashby to Latham, 5 Feb. 1928, minutes of deputation 
from' Victorian Chamber of Manufactures to AHorney-
General, 28 Feb. 1928. (C.A.O. A452 29/3407); Myhill 
to Latham. 10 May, 1928, G.H. Boykett, Secretary, 
South Australian Employers Federation, to Latham, 3 June, 
1928. (A.N.L. MS 1009/28). 
3. Metal Trades Employers Association of N.S.W. Secretary's 
annual report, 17 April, 1928. (M.T.I.A.); Australasian 
Manufacturer, v. 13, 28 April, 1928, p.12; Latnam to 
Myhill, 14 May, 1928. (A.N.L. MS 1009/28). 
4. Herald. 29 June, 1928, p.7. 
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South Australian employer claimed it represented an evasion 
of the referendum result and would make manufacturing more 
difficult and unemployment more widespread.^ 
On 1st May, 1928, Latham summarized for Cabinet 
the main criticisms made by the Court, the unions and the 
2 
employers. He did not recommend many substantial altera-
tions to the Bill. He agreed that parties other than the 
"representative respondents" should be-free to give evidence 
to the Court and that the clause relating to deregistered 
organizations should be clarified. The secret ballot 
provisions had received the greatest criticism and Latham 
admitted that ten members of a union would be able to hold 
up its business by demanding a ballot on trivial questions. 
He suggested that the subject-matter of ballots, such as 
elections or strikes, should be specified in the Bill or, 
alternatively, that it should stipulate that the matter was 
to be "of substantial importance". Cabinet accepted the 
second suggestion. Clause 25L, which was concerned with the 
economic effects of awards, had also aroused a good deal of 
controversy. State Government employees had claimed that 
they would never obtain improvements, as it would always be 
argued that they would involve increased taxation. Latham 
1. S,M.H. 19 May, 1928, p.21. 
2. Latham. Memorandum to Cabinet: Arbitration Bill, 
1 May, 1928. (A.N.L. MS 1009/28). 
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had considered limiting the clause to industries carried on 
for a profit, but this would have excluded State railways. 
A few weeks later Latham again asked Cabinet to consider 
Clause 25D/ It was not meant to be an attack on the basic 
wage principle. Latham, unlike many Nationalists, supported 
the principles laid down by Higgins in 1909 and in subsequent 
years. But the Government wanted to impress on the Court 
that it was to limit itself to industrial matters, and was 
not to usurp the duty of determining the general economic 
policy of the country. The ascending spiral of wages and 
tariffs had to be checked. Cabinet agreed to his suggestion 
that the clause should carry the proviso that it was not to 
affect the practice of the Court in fixing the basic wage. 
The debate on the Arbitration Bill was resumed on 
16th May, 1928, and occupied most of Parliament's time for 
the next month. The new Leader of the Labour Party, J.H. 
Scullin, launched his Party's attack by declaring that the 
Bill was the first serious blow struck by Parliament against 
the Arbitration Act, and in the following weeks he and his 
colleagues used every known tactic to block or hinder the 
passage of the Bill. Actually, the Labour Party had no 
ob.lections to many of the clauses and its criticisms were 
concentrated on five or six provisions. They claimed that, 
1. Latham. Memorandum to Cabinet: Arbitration Court and 
economic effects of awards, 28 May, 1928. (A.N.L. MS 
1009/28). 
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despite the amendment to Clause 25D, its purpose was to 
reduce the basic wage and the living standards of the workers 
The ballot provisions were not practical, for it would be 
impossible for the Court to know if the applicants were 
really members of the union, the ballot would be extremely 
expensive and time-consuming in large unions, and it would 
often delay the settlement of a strike. In addition, it 
was an absurd situation when the law provided that a union 
was to take a ballot to decide whether or not it should 
engage in an illegal act. This was a weakness which Lathain 
had privately raised with Bruce in 1925. Labour speakers 
emphasized that all the clauses concerned with penalties, 
sectional stoppages and registered organizations were 
clearly aimed at the unions, not the employers. The penalty 
for individuals on strike had been reduced to £50 not to make 
it fair but to make it enforceable. In condemning the clause 
on sectional strikes they quoted Hughes' criticism that the 
effect of the clause was that a small fire was to be fanned 
into a large fire in order to extinguish the small one,^ and 
pointed to the consequences of such a policy in the mining 
industry, where there were always a few small disputes taking 
place. Although criticism by Labour leaders outside Parlia-
ment had caused Latham to make a few amendments to the Bill, 
1. C.P.D. V. 118, 17 May, 1928, p.5054. 
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only one amendment resulted from Labour criticism during 
the debate: the Government agreed with Frank Brennan that 
only the Full Court should be able to interpret or vary an 
award when its decision would affect the standard hours 
in an industry, 
Bruce, Page and Pearce were the only Ministers 
apart from Latham to speak during the debate. They argued 
that it was undeniable that there was something wrong with 
the industrial relations system, and the Bill was designed 
to ensure that arbitration should continue and that both 
sides should observe it. Unions could not have both the 
arbitration weapon and the strike weapon. Full production 
was prevented by the obstructive tactics of certain trade 
union officials who exercised autocratic power. The secret 
ballot would reduce their power and should be used to 
determine the unions' policies on piecework, the bonus 
system and job control, as well as strikes. Penalties had 
been in the Act since 1904 and the Bill actually reduced 
certain penalties. Against some opposition from Nationalist 
backbenchers, Latham stated that State instrumentalities 
would not be exempt from the control of the Federal Court, 
at least for the time being. 
The 1928 Conciliation and Arbitration Act became 
law on 22nd June, 1928. Despite its broad scope, it did 
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not make a profound impact on industrial relations in Aust-
ralia. The provisions relating to sectional stoppages and 
the secret hallot were to he utilized in 1929, the former 
with much more success than the latter. But until the late 
1930s no conciliation committees or inspectors were appointed, 
no unions were deregistered, no union audits were ordered, 
and no conferences were held between Commonwealth and State 
tribunals. The unions prosecuted in 1928 and 1929 were 
charged under clauses which had been in the Act since 1904. 
Clause 251) would have been important if Powers had still been 
on the Arbitration Bench, but Dethridge, Lukin and Beebv had 
always shown a keen awareness of the economic consequences 
of their av/ards. Moreover, many of the provisions of the 
Act were to be repealed within two years by a Labour Govern-
ment. 
Nevertheless, the Government had at last passed 
the comprehensive arbitration legislation which it had been 
promising since 1923. Nationalist supporters acclaimed 
Latham as the architect of the Act, and there was no doubt 
that his performance during the long sittings in Parliament 
had been outstanding. Arbitration was a sub.lect in which 
the Labour Party showed far more fervour and expertise than 
the Government parties. let Latham with his patience, 
detailed knowledge of both the law and the practice of 
- 256 -
arbitration, and his quick mind, was able to withstand the 
Labour attack. As the Australian National Review wrote 
"He demolished the Opposition arguments one bj one; there 
was no heat, no sarcasm, .iust cold, unanswerable logic. 
Charles Hawker told Latham "Even from the dead print of 
Hansard one can feel you gathering a moral ascendancy. 
At the end your opponents were clamouring for your decision 
on points of law and accepting your dicta in the absolute 
confidence that besides being of the highest technical merit 
o 
they were always scrupulously clear and fair," 
Latham and Boniwell were certainly the architects 
of the 1928 Arbitration Act in the sense that they drafted 
the Act and worked out all the complex provisions relating 
to conciliation committees, secret ballots, and penalties. 
Yet Latham's contribution to the Act was far less significant 
than Hawker and other admirers imagined. Most of the subs-
tantive sections of the Act had been inherited from the 1925 
Bill and originated in proposals made some years before by 
many individuals and organizations, including Moore, Dyason, 
Powers, Stewart, Bruce, Garran, and the various employer 
bodies. Moreover, on the three most crucial questions 
1. Australian National Review. 20 June, 1928, p.12. 
2. C.A.S. Hawker to Latham, 30 June, 1928. (A.N.L. 
1009/1). 
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Latham's arguments failed to convince his colleagues in 
Cabinet. They did not agree that "che defeat of the 1926 
referendum proposals and the deteriorating economic situation 
necessitated a far more limited role for the Commonwealth in 
industrial relations. They did not think that it was possible 
for legislation to do more than direct the Court, in a very 
general way, to consider productivity and other economic 
factors when it made its awards. Above all, they could not 
accept Latham's views that tne penalties in the Act were 
unjustified on the grounds of both principle and effective-
ness and that they should therefore be abandoned. Thus 
Latham's outstanding performance in Parliament can only be 
compared with some of his successes as a barrister: he was 
defending with the greatest conviction legislation that, in 
many respects, he privately opposed, 
Latham's failure to influence the other Ministers 
may have been partly due to a conflict in his own personality. 
His liberalism and his perception of the needs of industry 
led him to believe that Australian industry was suffering 
from too much regulation by governments and courts. Yet, as 
a lawyer and outstanding draftsman, he instinctively tended 
to see the solution to industrial problems in the extension 
or modification of legislation. Latham's rather ambivalent 
attitude towards the efficacy of legislation was shared by 
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his colleagues; thej did not really think that amendments to 
the Act could do much to prevent worsening economic con-
ditions, but they did believe that tough penal clauses could 
lessen industrial conflict. The great disputes of 1928 and 
1929 were certainly to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of 
much of their legislation and were to place Latham in the 
unhappy position of implementing a policy that, in 1927, he 
had keenly opposed. 
CHAPTER 5 
THE GREAT DISPUTES 
In the second half of 1926 and ^ throughout 1927 an 
extremely large number of industrial disputes occurred in 
Australia, jet they failed to make a strong impression on 
the general community. Strikes received comparatively little 
publicity, as the great majority were short-lived, quiet 
affairs which affected only a small number of people in one 
city or locality. In 1928 and 1929 industrial conflict con-
tinued unabated, but it was of a decidedly different character 
from that of the previous two years. The number of disputes 
and the number of men directly involved in them dropped 
sharply, a trend which was to continue until 1934. There 
has always been a correlation between worsening economic 
conditions and diminishing industrial unrest, for the simple 
reason that men are reluctant to risk losing their jobs when 
there is a huge army of unemployed eager to replace them. 
However, when disputes did take place they were long, bitter 
and violent, for the employers realized that conditions were 
right to destroy the power of the unions and the men fought 
desperately to save their jobs and their living standards. 
In 1929 strikes were, on an average, six times longer than 
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in 1927 and nearly 4.5 million working days were lost. (In 
only two other years has the figure of 3 million ever been 
exceeded.) Three of the major stoppages in the last two years 
of the Bruce-Page Government were in the transport industry 
and therefore threatened the welfare of the whole community. 
After June, 1928, the people of the capital-cities became 
increasingly accustomed to huge marches and inflammatory 
speeches by the strikers, jeering pickets lining the streets, 
brutal assaults on strike-breakers, clashes between large 
mobs of strikers, volunteers and the police, and bombing and 
shooting. As in 1925, Ministers were confronted every day 
with reports and evidence of industrial conflict, and it was 
not surprising that Bruce should have become, in his own words, 
completely obsessed with the need to end this conflict.^ 
In 1924-25 intervention by the Commonwealth Govern-
ment in industrial disputes had taken three forms. Firstly, 
the Government took action to maintain essential communications 
with Tasmania and to prevent interference with Commonwealth 
services. Secondly, it summoned a conference of the parties 
to one dispute, when the Arbitration Co^ jxt had failed to 
obtain a settlement. Thirdly, it sought by deregistration, 
prosecutions and emergency legislation to destroy the power 
and reverse the policies of the union which it held to be 
1. Bruce to Edwards, Oct. 1964. (A.N.L.). 
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completely responsible for a succession of strikes. In the 
great disputes of 1927-1929 the Government only once felt that 
there was a need to resort to either of the first two forms 
of intervention. However, in each of the five large disputes 
it took steps to intervene against the side which it believed 
to be responsible for the stoppage. This represented both a 
continuation and a change from its 1925 policies. In 1925 
Ministers had often argued that drastic action was needed 
because the strikes had political, not industrial, objectives, 
the union leaders being revolutionaries who saw strikes as a 
means of destroying the Australian social system. Yet in 
1927-1929 stoppages, however unjustified, were undoubtedly 
concerned with genuine industrial objectives and there was 
no suggestion that the leaders of the unions were revolution-
aries. In 1925 Ministers also asserted that Government action 
was necessary to prevent or end a complete holdup of transport 
which would have catastrophic effects on the whole economy. 
The same argument was put forward in some of the disputes of 
1927-1929, but it could not be used to justify the Government's 
intervention in the timber or coalmining disputes. Thus it 
is apparent that in 1927 the Government did not simply decide 
that the penal provisions should remain in the Arbitration Act, 
to be utilized by either the employers or the unions. It also 
decided that when there was evidence that one side or the other 
had committed a major breach of the Act or of an award the 
Government itself should take legal action. 
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In the two years after the British seamen's strike 
of 1925 there was only one industrial stoppage in which the 
Commonwealth Government seriously considered taking punitive 
measures. On 19th November, 1926, the Sydney branch of the 
Waterside Workers Federation commenced an overtime strike as 
a protest against the registration by the Federal Court of 
the Permanent and Casual Wharf Labourers Union, a small rival 
union that had been formed in Sydney in 1917.^ The strike 
quickly extended to other ports, where it was associated with 
a demand for increased overtime rates. Within a week work 
on the wharves had decreased by a third and, with the wool 
season at its height and wheat exports about to commence, the 
Federation was condemned by the press and by producers' and 
employers' organizations. By 14th December, 1926, the 
overtime ban was still in force and Bruce and Latham, reading 
newspaper cables in London, became exasperated with Page's 
inactivity. Latham cabled "Pres^jme you will proceed under 
Section 50 (J) of the Crimes Act".^ In a longer cable Bruce 
told Page that reports indicated that the strike was of the 
character specifically dealt with at the 1925 election, and 
that, in view of the Government's undertaking at the election. 
1. S.M.H. 20 Nov. 1926, p.17. 
2. I ^ . 50 Nov. 1926, p.10, M©- 1 I^ ec. 1926, p.10. 
5. Latham to Page, 14 Dec. 1926. (C.A.O. A1606 G26/1). 
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it was essential that it take every action possible within 
constitutional limits and that the law of the Commonwealth he 
enforced. He trusted that Page would handle the position so 
that, if a general industrial upheaval ensued, the Govermient 
would be ensured of public support.^ To Page's relief, the 
strike was settled on the same day that he received Bruce's 
message. The incident illustrated Bruce's autocratic attitude 
towards his Ministers, even when he had only a scanty know-
ledge of the problems which faced them. It also revealed 
his willingness to risk a long and costly stoppage for the 
sake of punishing an organization which had resorted to direct 
action. 
Judge Beeby had ended the overtime strike by promis-
ing to hear the Waterside Workers Federation's claims for 
preference of employment and increased overtime rates within 
a month. In February, 1927, he granted higher rates and in 
May, 1927, he upheld the Federation's appeal against the 
registration of the Permanent and Casual Wharf Labourers 
Union. At the same time Beeby was becoming extremely annoyed 
at the practice of branches of the Federation in introducing 
and enforcing domestic rules which conflicted with the terms 
of its award. For instance, several branches enforced their 
1. Bruce to Page, 14 Dec. 1926. (C.A.O. A1606 G26/1). 
- 264 -
own rules on the maximum number of wheat bags that could be 
placed in a sling. The most celebrated local rule related 
to pick-up times. Waterside workers had traditionally 
attended the pick-up places for two or three hours in both 
the morning and afternoon. Since 1922, however, one branch 
after another had adopted a policy of boycotting the after-
noon pick-up. In 1927 the single pick-up came into force in 
Sydney. It was true, as the Federation argued, that pick-up 
times were not set down in the award, but they were supposed 
to be determined by Boards of Reference in each port, and not 
by unilateral action by the Federation. In March, May and 
October, 1927, Beeby refused to proceed with the hearing of 
the Federation's application for a new award until branches 
abandoned their practice of creating local disputes. 
The Federation became resentful when the hearings 
of its claims were repeatedly postponed and when the ship-
owners refused to make any concessions. On 20th November, 
1927, its Committee of Management ordered an overtime ban on 
all vessels in order to force the Court to hear its claims.^ 
For the first time there was close co-operation between the 
overseas and the interstate shipowners, and on 25th November 
their two organizations told the Federation that after 
30th November work would only be given to men who observed 
1. S.M.H. 21 Nov. 1927, p.11. 
- 265 -
all the terms of existing awards and agreements, including 
the two pick-ups.^ The Federation refused to give in and 
on 1st December, 1927, work on the wharves came to a complete 
standstill. Within a day or two 50,000 men were unemployed, 
for apart from the 20,000 wharf labourers, the great majority 
of coalminers, storemen and packers, trolley and draymen and 
other waterfront workers had to cease work. The stoppage 
was comparable with the seamen's strikes of 1925, as 60 
interstate and 50 overseas vessels were idle. It was the 
fourth year in succession that there was a shipping holdup 
precisely at the time when primary products had to be exported, 
There was general, although not complete, agreement 
that the Commonwealth Government should intervene in the 
strike but, predictably, the kind of intervention that was 
requested differed greatly. Labour leaders declared that 
Bruce should take the initiative and bring the parties 
together in conference. As early as 23rd November Lyons 
pointed out to Bruce that the strike would be disastrous for 
Tasmania, as it would lead to the closing down of the Zinc 
1. R. Murdoch, Chairman, Overseas Shipping Representatives 
Association, and W.T. Appleton, Chairman, Commonwealth 
Steamship Owners' FederaUon, to J. Morris, Secretary, 
Waterside Workers Federation, 25 Nov. 1927. (A.N.U. 
T62/20). 
2. S.M.H. 2 Dec. 1927, pp.13-14. 
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Works, severe losses to the fruit trade, and interference 
with the tourist traffic. The Tasmanian Parliament had no 
power to deal with the dispute and Lyons asked Bruce to urge 
the Arbitration Court to attempt a settlement as soon as 
possible.^ In a reply drafted by Latham, Bruce stated that 
he understood that the Court declined to hear the Federation's 
claims while it used direct action and retained domestic 
rules inconsistent with its award. He had no intention of 
asking the Court to abandon an attitude which was so obviously 
right. The Federation was completely responsible for the 
strike. Lyons should either use his influence with the 
Federation to end the strike or should prosecute it for an 
offence under the Arbitration Act. 
The Government maintained the same attitude when 
the subject was debated in the Federal Parliament on 1st 
December, 1927. Charlton stated that not one conciliatory 
move had been made by the Government to bring the parties 
together or to intercede with them separately.^ Bruce 
replied that it would be wrong for any government to interfere 
in a dispute when one of the parties had acted in contempt 
of the awards and decisions of the Court. He did not agree 
1. Lyons to Bruce, 25 Nov. 1927. (C.A.O. A458 AF502/2). 
2. Bruce to Lyons, 25 Nov. 1927. (C.A.O. A458 AF502/2). 
5. C.P.D. V. 117, 1 Dec. 1927, p.2598. 
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that industrial disputes had to he settled on any terms to 
keep industries in operation.^ Laxham asserted that it 
would be impossible to maintain the arbitration system if 
an organization that resorted to direct action gained more 
than an organization that obeyed its award. It should be 
pointed out that, in this particular dispute, mediation by 
Ministers Y/ould have been more difficult than in earlier 
strikes, as all the Ministers were in Canberra, a day's 
journey from the centre of the strike. Senator McLachlan, 
one of the Honorary Ministers, did visit Melbourne and spoke 
to Stewart, Holloway and some of the shipowners, but he 
stated that he was merely seeking more information and the 
Government had no plans to intervene. 
Actually, the Government did intend to intervene, 
although not in a conciliatory role. On 28th November, 1927, 
a group of Tasmanian parliamentarians asked Bruce 'to use 
his powers under the Crimes Act to end the strike. Bruce 
replied that he was not prepared to interfere until he saw 
the effects of the shipowners' ultimatum.^ However, the 
1. C.P.D. V. 117, 1 Dec. 1927, p.2386. 
2. I M d . p.2422 
3. Herald. 2 Dec. 1927, p.l. 
4. Bruce. Note for file, 28 Nov. 1927. (C.A.O. A458 AF502/2) 
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same daj Latham ordered C.Yif. Crowley, the Deputy Crown 
Solicitor in Melbourne, to ascertain whether there was suf-
ficient evidence to support a prosecution under either the 
Arbitration Act or the Crimes Act.^ A day later Crowley 
reported that he had seen Slford and other shipowners and 
they, in turn, had requested the assistance of their agents 
in every State. He had also visited one of the stevedoring 
companies, but although it had useful evidence it would not 
alio?/ it to be used against the Federation in Court proceed-
ings, as its foremen would be victimized. While Crowley 
was Y/aiting for evidence from the shipov/ners, a search was 
bein^ made by the Investigation Branch of the Attorney-
Ceneral's Department for telegrams from the Federation's 
Secretary to the branches.^ The Government took the unusual 
step of asking Parliament to affirm its support for any action 
that the Government might take, in co-operation with the 
States, to maintain law and order and to ensure the contin-
uance of essential services. The resolution was passed on 
party lines, although Hughes and Stewart were critical of 
the Government's uncompromising policy and Maxwell refused 
1. Lathsjn to Garran, 28 Nov. 1927. (C.A.O. A467 16A/41). 
2. C.W. Crowley, Deputy Crown Solicitor, to W.H. Sharwood, 
Crown Solicitor, 29' Nov. 1927. (C.A.O. A467 16A/41). 
3. Knowles to H.E. Jones, Director, Investigation Branch, 
28 Nov. 1927. (C.A.O. A467 16A/41). 
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to vote in favour of the GoYernmeiit having a blarii: cheque.^ 
As in 1926, the waterside workers' strike ended 
before the Government had time to institute legal proceedings. 
From the beginning the Government had been afraid that the 
Court, and especially Beeby, might give in to union pressure. 
On 28th November Stewart told Garran that no application had 
been made to the Court by any of the parties to the dispute, 
and he later assured Crowley that he would not preside over 
a conference and the judges were not contemplating any action. 
On 6th December Crowley reported that he had sufficient 
information from the shipowners, together with 25 telegrams 
sent by the Federation's Secretary, to justify a prosecution. 
However, on the previous day Dethridge asked Beeby to hear 
the Federation's plaint and on 7th December the Court was 
told that the overtime strike had ended. In his judgement 
Beeby said that the Federation was to compel its members to 
obey the decisions of Boards of Reference and was to order 
the abandonment of local rules. He made an interim award 
stipulating that the times and places of pick-ups should be 
those prevailing in January, 1927. No more interim awards 
1. C.P.D. V. 117, 1 Dec. 1927, pp.2418, 2427, 2454. 
2. Stewart to Garran, 28 Nov. 1927. (C.A.O. A467 16A/41). 
3. Crowley to Sharwood, 29 Nov. 1927. (C.A.O. A467 16A/41). 
4. Sharwood to Garran, 6 Dec. 1927. (C.A.O. A467 16A/41). 
A 
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would be made and in future the pick-up times would be decided 
by the Court, and not by Boards of Reference.^ 
The strike was regarded as a victory for the Union, 
as Beeby's award meant that only the Sydney branch had to 
revert to the two pick-upsc The Commonwealth Steamship 
Owners Federation lamented that "everything pointed to an 
early victory for the shipowners when, as was feared would 
p 
be the case, the Arbitration Court intervened". The press 
was very critical of the settlement, the Sydney Morning Herald 
asserting "Without penalties for its conduct, without loss of 
forceful gains, with only assurances no more binding than 
earlier ones, the Waterside Workers Federation is restored 
to an especially favourable standing in the C o u r t . O n c e 
again the employers vented their anger on Beeby, claiming 
that he "would probably go down as the man who struck the 
last blow needed to reduce compulsory arbitration to a heap 
of ruins. 
The Government's role in the 1927 waterside workers' 
strike had been negligible, but it had established a pattern 
1. S.M.H. 8 Dec. 1927, pp.11-12. 
2. Annual report of Commonwealth Steamship Owners' Federation, 
1927. (C.S.O.A.). 
3. S.M.H. 8 Dec. 1927, p.10. 
4. Industrial Australian and Mining Standard. 15 Dec. 1927, 
p.645. 
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of response that was to be followed in four subsequent dis-
putes. In three of these it not oniy expressed its complete 
sympathy for the employers but took legislative or legal 
action against the strikers. 
Unlike the strikes of the waterside workers, the 
marine cooks' strike took a long time to develop into a 
nation-wide stoppage. Early in March, 1928, the cooks on 
the Huddart Parker steamer Ulimaroa refused to work unless 
an extra cook and scullery man were employed. The Company 
refused the dernand and the ship v^ as laid up indefinitely in 
Sydney.^ In April the cooks v/alked off the other six Huddart 
Parker vessels for the same reason. The Commonwealth Steam-
ship Owners Association took the dispute to the Arbitration 
Court and on 4th May Dethridge suspended the award of the 
2 
Marine Cooks, Bakers and Butchers Association. A week 
later the shipomers stated that if the cooks did not work 
under the conditions of the suspended award they would cease 
to employ members of the Union. They also introduced a new 
issue by insisting that their agents have freedom of selection 
and that the Union abandon the roster system of employment.^ 
1. S.M.H. 5 March, 1928, p.17. 
2. 26 C.A.R. 449. 
3. S.M.H. 11 May, 1928, p.11. 
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On 14th May the shipowners began to dismiss crews and by 
5th June, 1928, all interstate vessels were idle. 
The marine cooks' strike recalled the seamen's 
strikes in that it was widely held that their alleged 
grievances were extremely trivial and that the dispute had 
been engineered by an autocratic union official. In reality, 
the basic cause of the strike was not trivial, for the Marine 
Cooks Union had been preoccupied for many years with the 
high level of unemployment aniong its few hundred members. 
In the early 1920s it had refused to admit new members and 
the demand for an extra cook for each ship was made in the 
hope of reducing the number of its unemployed members.^ 
The roster system was considered to be the only way of 
spreading employment evenly among the cooks. The dominant 
figure in the Union was its founder, J.H. Tudehope, who was 
Secretary from 1913 to 1963. Although he had a reputation 
as a strong upholder of arbitration, Tudehope calmly ignored 
the Court's decisions and antagonized the whole trade union 
movement by thwarting the conciliatory efforts of the A.C.T.U., 
the Waterside ?/orkers Federation and other maritime unions. 
In early May, 1928, a meeting of maritime unions placed the 
dispute in the hands of the A.C.T.U. Emergency Committee, 
1. See Boraston. op.cit. Chapter 3. 
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but Tudehope ignored invitations to participate in its dis-
cussions.^ Later in May informal negotiations took place 
between the shipowners and the Waterside V/orkers Federation, 
but the Federation withdrew when Tudehope repudiated its 
p 
authority to mediate. On 7th June, 1928, Duggan admitted 
that the A.C.T.U. had no disciplinary authority over any 
unions that refused to recognize it^ and this was the signal 
for Bruce to intervene. 
There had been few attempts to persuade the Govern-
ment to play a mediating role in the strike. On 15th May 
Bruce had told Parliament that he would not take any action 
unless the Union brought itself completely under the juris-
diction of the Court.^ Later he said that Tudehope did not 
have the confidence of the rank and file, and the secret 
ballot provisions of the forthcoming Arbitration Act would 
take care of such officials in the future.^ On 8th June, 
1928, the Labour Premier of Victoria, E.J. Hogan, asked 
Bruce to use his influence to bring about a compulsory con-
ference of the shipowners and the cooks, under the chairmanship 
1. S.M.H. 16 May, 1928, p.15. 
2. 
ib ID
Ibid. 28 May, 1928, p.11, 30 May, 1928, p.15. 
3. Age. 8 June, 1928, p.9. 
4. C.P.D. V. 118, 15 May, 1928, p.4820. 
5. Herald. 22 May, 1928, p.5, Age, 23 May, 1928, p.11. 
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of Dethridge. Bruce passed on Hogan's suggestion to the 
Coiurt, but insisted that the GoveriMent had no intention 
of controlling or influencing the discretion of the Court.^ 
As was expected, Dethridge refused to convene a conference -
until the cooks returned to work. 
From the very inception of the strike the Govern-
ment had considered the possibility of prosecutions. In 
March, 1928, Latham had instructed the head of the Inves-
tigation Service in Sydney to forv/ard any information he 
found about the Ulimaroa dispute, but not to enlist the 
2 
assistance of either shipowners or unionists. The stipu-
lation had made the task difficult and no evidence had been 
collected v/hich could be used in legal proceedings. Crowley 
encountered similar difficulties in Melbourne.^ By early 
June the strike involved all interstate ships and the Govern-
ment decided to take drastic action. On 6th June Latham 
ordered his officers in Melbourne and Sydney to keep a close 
watch on the strike and to report every incident that could 
be used against the Union. He informed them that the 
Government intended to prosecute Tudehope and any other 
1. E.H. Hogan to Bruce. 8 June, 1928,^ Bruce to Stewart, 
8 June, 1928. (C.A.O. A458 AJ502/2). 
2. E. Longfield Lloyd to Jones, 11 June, 1928. (C.A.O. 
A467 lbA/41). 
3. Crowley to Sharwood, 11 May, 1928. (C.A.O. A432 29/3452). 
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memlDers of the Union who had breached the Crimes Act.^ Two 
days later the Governor-General issued a proclamation that 
there existed a serious industrial disturbance prejudicing 
or threatening overseas or interstate trade. Bruce sent 
telegrams to all the State Premiers stating that his Govern-
ment intended to use all its powers to ensure that there was 
no interference with the resumption of transport services 
and asked for their co-operation. At the same time he 
asked the shipowners to take whatever steps were necessary 
to resume the running of the ships.' 
I. 
The Government thus broadcast its intention to 
attack the marine cooks with the extensive powers it pos-
sessed under the Crimes Act. On 11th June the Governor-
General made a further proclamation, suspending Section 43 
of the Navigation Act which required all vessels on the 
coastal trade with more than 25 people aboard to carry one 
certified cook.^ In the next two dayp a few vessels left 
Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide, either with volunteer cooks 
1. Sharwood to Garran, 12 June, 1928. (C.A.O. A467 16A/41). 
2. Commonwealth Gazette. 8 June, 1928. 
3. Bruce to Premiers of all States, 8 June, 1928. (C.A.O. 
A458 AJ502/2). 
4. Bruce to Appleton, 8 June, 1928. (C.A.O. A458 AJ502/2). 
5. Commonwealth Gazette. 11 June, 1928. 
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or no cooks, and it was apparent that the strike was collap-
sing. On 12th June Garran reported that a large number of 
affidavits had been collected from both shipowners and cooks, 
and while there was no evidence of threats or boycotts, thej 
had sufficient evidence to prosecute Tudehope. A summons 
had been prepared.^ However, Latham delayed taking action 
and on 14th June the cooks capitulated. The roster system 
was abandoned and the cooks guaranteed to assist the owners' 
agents when they selected galley staffs. 
The Government had good reason to believe that the 
threat of prosecutions, with up to one year's imprisonment 
as a penalty, had brought the strike to an end, although it 
would seem that the suspension of the Navigation Act was 
sufficient for that purpose. It must be assumed that Latham 
did not prosecute Tudehope in case it prejudiced the settle-
ment of the strike. However, two months after the cooks 
returned to work Jacob Johnson was convicted of an offence 
which was committed during the strike. Late in June, 1928, 
the Crown Solicitor received affidavits from the shipowners 
in Sydney, signed by a number of seamen, that Johnson had 
boarded a vessel and used intimidation to prevent the crew 
1. Sharwood to Garran, 12 June, 1928. (C.A.O. A467 16A/41) 
2. S.M.H. 15 June, 1928, p.13. 
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from sailing without a cook.^ On 10th July Latham ordered 
evidence to be collected against Johnson and on 26th July 
he was charged with an offence under Section 30K of the 
Crimes Act. He was tried in the Sydney Police Court and 
sentenced to six months' imprisonment. Later there were 
allegations that Johnson was convicted on the basis of false 
evidence as a result of a conspiracy between the Walsh 
faction of the Seamen's Union, the shipowners, the Inves-
tigation Branch and the Crown Solicitor's Office. A Royal 
Commission in 1951 reported that the allegations were un-
founded.^ 
Two weeks after the marine cooks returned to work 
Beeby handed down his proposed award for the waterside 
workers. His judgement contained one of the most sustained 
indictments of a union ever made by an arbitrator. He 
believed that the attitude of the Waterside Workers Federa-
tion had changed during recent years. The Court could no 
longer leave anything to undertakings or understandings, 
1. G.A. Watson, Deputy Crown Solicitor, to Sharwood, 
4 July, 1928. TC.A.O. A452 29/437). 
2. Knowles to Sharwood, 11 July, 1928. (C.A.O. A432 
29/437). 
3. Report of a Royal Commission on Jacob Johnson, 1 Oct. 
19^1. (Commissioner: Judge G. Beeby). (C.A.O. 
A452 31/1597). This report was never made public. 
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but was forced to lay down the exact terms and conditions of 
employment and to prescribe strict penalties for breaches of 
awards. In the new award all references to "prevailing 
customs" would be omitted. The Federation had adopted a 
policy of blatant defiance of the Court. Sectional stoppages 
had continually been occurring as a result of demands for 
restrictive conditions not authorized by the Court, attempts 
to enforce local rules that conflicted with the award, 
refusals to accept decisions of Boards of Reference, demands 
for excessive rates for onerous or unpleasant work, and a 
policy of "fair division of work among members". The Fede-
ration's general attitude was that it should have control, 
without responsibility, of the stevedoring industry, and 
that the high rates awarded to casual employees should be 
maintained while all the disadvantages of casual employment 
were eliminated.^ 
The provisional award made by Beeby was condemned 
by the waterside workers largely on account of five of its 
clauses. It removed the limit on sling loads; it empowered 
foremen to transfer workers from one hatch, hold or sling to 
another, instead of employing a new gang; it enabled seamen 
to load and unload mails; and it differentiated between 
1. 26 C.A.R. 867. 
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night shifts and overtime, men commencing work in the even-
ings receiving lower rates than men who worked continuously 
through the day into the night. Above all, the two pick-ups 
would be restored at all ports. In addition, Federation 
officials complained that refusal to offer for work, and not 
only refusal to continue work, would constitute a strike and 
also that the Federation would be liable for the misdeeds of 
its branches and members.^ 
Despite protests from the Federation, Beeby made 
his award final on 21st August, 1928, stating that it would 
come into operation on 10th September, 1928. It was generally 
assumed that yet another shipping holdup was about to take 
place. Beeby himself was later to tell Latham that he knew 
when he made the award that there would be a strike, but he 
was convinced that the power of the arrogant faction that 
controlled the Federation had to be broken. He hoped that 
a strike would result in a re-organized Union, from which 
the unreasonably militant element would be excluded. Al-
though the Federation's Committee of Management was charac-
teristically indecisive about the action which should be 
1. Morris to A.E. Turley, 13 July, 1928. (A.N.U. T62/14); ^ 
M. Stewart to Latham, 10 Sept'. 1928. (C.A.O. A467 lbA/41). 
2. Beeby to Lathajn, 25 Oct. 1928. (A.N.L. MS 1009/1). 
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taken when the award came into force, 26 of the 47 branches 
declared categorically that the Beeby award was unacceptable. 
On 6th September, 1928, 74 delegates arrived in Melbourne to 
attend the Federation's Conference, and on the next day they 
decided that the award should be repudiated and that members 
should work under the conditions prevailing in November, 
1927.^ The Federation sought a conference with the ship-
owners, but the request was rejected on 10th September. On 
the same day the waterside workers in most ports refused to 
attend the afternoon pick-up, and on 11th September work 
ceased altogether.^ One of the most famous strikes in 
Australian history had begun. 
It is extremely difficult to unravel the sequence 
of events that made up the 1928 waterside workers' strike. 
The weak leadership of the Federation completely lost control 
and, as Du^gan sarcastically remarked, Bruce's objective was 
achieved: the rank and file controlled their own affairs. 
1. S.M.H. 8 Sept. 1928, p.l7o' 
2. Elford to Morris, 10 Sept. 1928. (A.N.U. T62/20). 
5. S.M.H. 12 Sept. 1928, p.18. 
4. For a brief summary of the strike see W. Jethro Brown, 
"The strike of the Australian waterside workers : a 
review". Economic Record, v. 5 (1929) pp.22-33. The 
most detailed account of the strike is M. Rechter. 
The strike of waterside workers in Australian ports, 
1928. and the lockout of coalminers on the northern 
coalfields of New South Wales. 1929-30. M.A. thesis, 
University of Melbourne, 1957. 
5. Herald. 21 Sept. 1928, p.3. 
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Conditions at every port differed, a few branches did not 
strike at all, some returned to work after a few days, others 
resumed work only to go on strike again a few days later, the 
nominal control of the strike was transferred from one con-
ference or organization to another, and even after the strike 
ended flare-ups continued for another six months. The strike 
can be divided into two phases, the first ending about the 
22nd September and the second on 19th October. The second 
phase was brought about largely through the actions of the 
Commonwealth Government. 
The strike began on 10th September and by 13th 
September 65 vessels were held up in 10 ports throughout 
Australia. Beeby declared that a strike existed in the steve-
doring industry, thereby leaving the shipowners free to lock-
out all the waterside workers.^ The Federation's Conference 
reaffirmed its rejection of the Beeby award on 13th September 
but on 15th September, the last day of the Conference, it 
decided to order all branches to return to work under the new 
award, asserting that its former resolution had served its 
p-urpose for the time being.^ For a day or two it appeared 
that the strike was ending, especially as the Sydney and 
1. 26 C.A.-R. 1041. 
2. Waterside Workers Federation. Circular to all branches, 
15 Sept. 1928. (A.N.U. T62/16). 
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Melbourne Wharf Labourers Unions resumed work. However, other 
branches ignored the Conference's oraer, and on 21st September 
the Committee of Management in despair handed over "control" 
of the dispute to the A.C.T.U.^ By that t ime the Federation 
was already faced with the threat of large numbers of volun-
teers seeking work on the wharves. There were over 1000 
volunteers at Port Adelaide, while at Newcastle the waterside 
workers accepted the Beeby award for a few days rather than 
lose their jobs to strike-breakers. At Townsville and Innis-
fail farmers came in from the surrounding districts and loaded 
the ships. 
The reaction of the Commonwealth Government to the 
strike was influenced by three factors. No stoppage could be 
more serious than a shipping holdup, for it would soon spread 
to other sections of the transport industry and also to the 
coalfields, and if it continued indefinitely coal reserves in 
many cities would be depleted and all secondary industries 
would be affected. Moreover, shipping holdups meant that 
primary products could not be exported, and so threatened the 
financial stability of the country. Secondly, while many 
strikes had violated awards or been directed against specific 
sections of an award, this was the first time that a union had 
1. S.M.H. 22 Sept. 1928, p.17. 
- 283 -
calmly repudiated a whole award and declared that it would 
continue to work under the old award. A union that took this 
action was heyond the pale; the Government could not nego-
tiate with it, for any concession it made would condone an 
action that transgressed the principle of arbitration. 
Finally, the strike was not an isolated event, for it was the 
fourth interstate strike perpetrated by the same union in 
four years and only once did it have a genuine grievance. 
Added to the endless local disputes that had been taking 
place, the record of the Waterside Workers Federation was 
so damning that the Government concluded that its main task 
was not to obtain a speedy settlement of the strike but to 
take punitive action against the Federation, 
Labour parliamentarians were later to contrast the 
tireless work of Scullin and Hogan in trying to reach a 
settlement with the inaction of Bruce and Latham.^ However, 
the contrast was unfair. The Federation had to accept the 
Beeby award and there was no room for negotiation or com-
promise. Holding this view, the sensible course of action 
for the Government was to leave the task of persuasion to the 
Labour politicians, who naturally had far more influence with 
the Federation's leaders. The Government did delay taking 
1. C.P.D. V. 120, 15 Feb. 1929, p.336. 
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punitive action and it did send written appeals to the 
Federation to end the strike. As early as 7th September, 
the repudiation of the Beeby award by the Federation's Con-
ference could have resulted in its immediate prosecution by 
the Government. Yet the Government waited. On 11th September 
Bruce wrote to the President of the Federation stating that 
the Government could not remain inactive if there was a 
serious dislocation of transport services; in fact, it would 
be forced to use every means in its power to protect the 
interests of the whole community. He had told the shipowners 
to take any action under the award that was necessary to 
carry on the transport services and he called on the Federa-
tion to accept the award.^ On 13th September Bruce replied 
to the Federation's request that he convene a conference 
between the shipowners and the Union. If the Government 
took such action it would be a party to an unlawful act. He 
made a final appeal to the Federation to obey the law and to 
carry out its undertaking to observe all the terms of the new 
2 award. 
While Bruce was making his appeals, the branches of 
the Crown Solicitor's Office and the Investigation Service in 
1. Bruce to W. Mather, President. Waterside Workers Fede-
ration, 11 Sept. 1928. (C.A.O. A432 29/593). 
2. Bruce to Mather, 13 Sept. 1928. (C.A.O. A432 29/393). 
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each State were devoting all their time and resources to 
obtaining evidence against the Federation. On the first 
day of the strike Latham had spoken to the leaders of the 
Commonwealth Steamship Owners Association who had asserted 
that it would be preferable for the Government, rather than 
the owners, to prosecute the Federation.^ ' On 11th September 
Bruce told the State Premiers that the Government would 
prosecute those who interfered with the transport services 
and, if the strike continued, it would issue a proclamation 
under the Crimes Act. He asked for their co-operation, 
particularly by protecting the men who were prepared to 
carry on the marine transport industry. On the same day 
Garran ordered his officers in each State to confer with the 
local shipowners and to ascertain if there was any evidence 
of a breach of either the Arbitration Act or the Crimes Act, 
particularly by officials of the Federation.^ The task was 
difficult, as the officials were acting most discreetly. 
However, by 14th September the Crown Solicitor had definite 
evidence that J. Cadden, the Secretary of one of the Melbourne 
branches, had addressed a large gathering of waterside 
workers and told them that they were not to work under the 
1. Latham. Note for file, 10 Sept. 1928. (C.A.O. A467 16A/41) 
2. Bruce to Premiers of all States, 11 Sept. 1928. (C.A.O. 
A467 16/39). 
3. Jones to Garran, 12 Sept. 1928. (C.A.O. A467 16A/41). 
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new award. In addition, he had obtained a copy of a letter 
from the Federation to the shipowners notifying them that 
the award had been repudiated and a search in the Post Office 
had located the telegrams in which branches were instructed 
to continue working under the terms of the old award.^ 
Dixon advised the Government that the evidence was sufficient 
to secure a conviction under the Arbitration Act, although 
not under the Crimes Act, and summonses were served on the 
p 
Federation on 17th September. Latham believed that more 
evidence was needed and became irritated with the obtuseness 
of his officers. On 19th September he complained to Garran 
that they were getting nowhere and reminded him that it was 
no use quoting statements by officials that members would 
not work; there had to be evidence that the officials had 
ordered or urged members not to work.^ Latham's fears 
were unjustified. The case was heard in the Melbourne City 
Court on 21st September and the Federation was convicted of 
striking and fined the maximum penalty of £1000, 
1. F.F. Clausen, Deputy Crown Solicitor, to Garran, 15 Sept. 
1928. (C.A.O. A46ri6A/41). 
2. Clausen to Garran, 17 Sept. 1928. (C.A.O. A467 16A/41). 
3. Latham to Garran, 19 Sept. 1928. (C.A.O. A467 16A/41). 
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In the first few days of the strike Bruce and 
Latham had intended, if possible, prosecuting individual 
officials as well as the Federation as a whole.^ However, 
they changed their minds after 15th September when it became 
clear that the rank and file were acting on their own 
initiative and were defying their leaders. ^  Dozens of 
affidavits were received from the Commonwealth Steamship 
Owners Association and the Investigation Service, but when 
Garran told Knowles to examine them on 19th September he 
stressed that the Government was only interested in offences 
committed by the Federation, not by individuals. Affidavits 
continued to be made by the agents of the shipowners and the 
stevedoring companies, and by early October, 1928, 183 of 
them had been received by the Attorney-General's department. 
Latham showed only a casual interest in them and after 
21st September his officers were only marginally concerned 
with the strike. It was pointless seeking to prosecute the 
Federation again and, unlike the Seamen's or Marine Cooks 
Unions, there were no strong and militant officials who could 
be held responsible for the strike. The most militant leaders 
were in Sydney, where the strike lasted only three or four days 
1. Jones to Garran, 12 Sept. 1928. (C.A.O. A467 16A/41). 
2. Garran to Knowles, 19 Sept. 1928. (C.A.O. A467 16A/41). 
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Latham, unlike many of his colleagues, did not 
believe that prosecutions and penalties hastened the settle-
ment of strikes or even acted as a deterrent against further 
stoppages. He felt that other means had to be used if there 
was ever to be peace on the waterfront. Long strikes usually 
ended when the numbers of volunteers became so large that the 
strike ceased to have much effect on the operations of the 
employers. But when strikes were over the volunteers were 
usually driven away or absorbed by the unions. There had 
been very little unrest on the Sydney wharves after 1917 
because the shipowners had ensured that.a significant pro-
portion of the wharf labourers were non-unionists. It 
occurred to Latham that the Government could ensure that 
similar conditions existed at all ports. At an early stage 
in the strike he ordered his officers to draft a Waterside 
Workers Bill.^ The Bill was designed to empower the Govern-
ment to make regulations prescribing the terms and conditions 
of employment of waterside workers, providing for the licen-
sing of waterside workers, preventing and settling disputes 
on the waterfront, and setting out penalties for breaches of 
the regulations. The Government did not intend submitting 
the Bill to Parliament until after the strike had ended, 
especially as an election was due in November, 1928, and 
1. Confidential draft of Waterside Workers Bill. 
(C.A.O. A467 16A/41). 
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Parliament would be dissolved in a few days. However, Pearce 
persuaded his colleagues that it would be politically advan-
tageous for the Government if the Bill could be passed 
immediately.^ It was also decided to widen the Bill to make 
it applicable to all transport workers. It had only one 
substantive clause which stipulated that the Government could 
make regulations for the engagement, licensing, protection and 
discharge of transport workers and for prohibiting the employ-
ment of unlicensed persons as transport workers. 
Bruce, as the Acting Minister for Trade and Customs, 
presented the 1928 Transport Workers Bill to Parliament on 
20th September. In his second reading speech the next day he 
dwelt on the serious economic position of the country, with 
both Commonwealth and State Governments faced with deficits 
and with growing unemployment in the secondary industries. 
The export season was about to commence and only increased 
exports of primary products could enable Australia's financial 
position to be maintained. The Bill was an emergency measure 
to protect the men who were prepared to offer for employment. 
Latham forestalled any attacks on the legality of the Bill by 
referring to a High Court decision of 1914, when it was held 
1. Edwards, op.cit. p.145. 
2. C.P.D. V. 119, 21 Sept. 1928, p.7072, 
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that the Cominonwealth Parliament, under its trade and commerce 
power, could legislate with respect to the conditions of 
employment in the marine transport trade. He also stated 
that the people would not tolerate the continuance of the 
expensive arbitration system if an important section of 
labour treated awards with contempt.^ Page revealed the 
main motive of the Government when he said that the Bill 
would enable maritime unions to remove the small but extremist 
minorities that dictated their policies. He blamed the 
drastic decline of coastal shipping, especially passenger 
shipping, since 1913 on the tactics of the waterside workers 
and the seamen.^ Some of the supporters of the Government 
assumed that the Bill was either a reserve or temporary 
measure, but they were quickly enlightened by Ministers. 
Labour parliamentarians expressed qualified support for the 
waterside workers' strike by defending the single pickup and 
by attributing much of the trouble in the industry to.the 
intransigent shipowners. They claimed that the Bill gave 
the Government unlimited powers and would aggravate the dispute 
1. C.P.D. V . 119, 21 Sept. 1928, p.7085. 
2. I M . p.7137. 
3. IMd. pp.7115, 7155, 7224. 
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The Transport Workers Bill was passed on 22nd Sep-
tember, 1928, after an all-night sitting. Parliament rose 
the same day. The Act ushered in the second phase of the 
waterside workers' strike. On 25th September the regulations 
under the Act were gazetted. They gave the Comptroller-
General of Customs power to appoint licensing officers at 
any ports, only licensed waterside workers would be permitted 
to work on the wharves at those ports, and licences could be, 
cancelled if a worker refused to obey a lawful order, com-
mitted a breach of the award, or was convicted of an offence 
lunder Commonwealth or State law or under the regulations. 
Bruce announced that the regulations would apply to Melbourne, 
Brisbane, Fort Adelaide, Fremantle, Newcastle and some of 
the Queensland ports.^ From 1st October, 1928, only licensed 
workers were employed at these ports. 
There was such anarchy within the Waterside Workers 
Federation that it is impossible to say when the strike would 
have ended if the Transport Workers Act had not complicated 
the issue. In the last ten days of September the numbers of 
volunteers on the wharves were mounting, with over 2000 at 
Melbo-orne and over 1000 at Brisbane and Port Adelaide. On 
24th September the position of the volunteers was strengthened 
1. S.M.H. 27 Sept. 1928, pp.11-12, 
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when Dethridge suspended the preference clauses of the water-
side workers' award in respect of eight ports,^ Even 
militant union organizations were advising the strikers to 
p 
return to work. However, a settlement of the strike was 
deferred for weeks through the action of the Government in 
putting the Transport Workers Act into operation. On 
24th September a conference of maritime unions urged the 
Y/aterside workers to resume work under the Beehy award "but 
not to apply for licences, and it reaffirmed its decision on 
3rd October. In Melbourne the Act caused an extension of 
the strike, as the members of the Melbourne Wharf Labourers 
Union, who had been working since 15th September, saw no 
reason why they should have to be licensed. The result was 
that, despite the large numbers and alleged efficiency of 
the volunteers, much of Australian shipping remained idle. 
As late as 10th October only 20 of the 80 interstate vessels 
were being worked.^ Gradually, however, as more and more 
volunteers received licences, the waterside workers realized 
1. 26 C.A.R. 1097. 
2. Minutes of N.S.W. Trades and Labour Council, 20 Sept. 
1928. (A.N.U. M17/7). 
3. S.M.H. 25 Sept. 1928, p.16, Age, 4 Oct. 1928, pp.9-10 
4. Argus. 10 Oct. 1928, p.7. 
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that they were defeated. 1600 licences had been issued at 
Melhourne on the first day and by 17th October 4400 volun-
teers were enlisted at that port alone.^ No regard was 
paid to the amount of work available: 2900 licences were 
granted at Port Adelaide, although there was only sufficient 
work for 1500 men. Faced with permanent uiiemployment, the 
men surrendered. The Port Adelaide branch took out licences 
on 4th October, the Fremantle branch on 8th October, the 
Brisbane branch on 18th October and the two Melbourne branches 
on 19th October. 
In the second phase of the strike the main task of 
the Government was the setting up of the administrative 
machinery necessary to implement the Transport Workers Act. 
This was the task of the Marine Branch of the Department of 
Trade and Customs, and most of the decisions were taken by 
its Secretary, Louis East. Although Bruce was nominally the 
Minister responsible for the Act, East referred questions of 
policy to Latham and a close partnership developed between 
the two men which continued, with a break, until 1934. 
Latham's own officers had very little to do with the later 
stages of the strike. 
1. L. East, Secretary, Marine Branch, Department of Trade 
and Customs, to L. Cameron, Secretary to Attorney-General, 
10 April, 1§29. (C.A.O. A452 29/1563). 
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Bruce was urged on several occasions not to put 
the Transport Workers Act into operation. In late September 
both Crofts and Ho^an told him that the regulations would 
frustrate all their efforts to reach a settlement and sugges-
ted that only volunteers should be licensed. Bruce replied 
that the strike had continued for so long and had such 
serious effects, that there could be no further delay. He 
told Crofts that the assurances of the A.C.T.U. were worthless, 
as it had urged defiance of a Commonwealth law. In early 
October Collier asked that Fremantle be exempted from the 
provisions of the Transport Workers Act and a deputation from 
the conference of maritime unions requested that the whole 
Act be suspended.^ Bruce suimnarily rejected both requests. 
As the number of volunteers grew, the resistance 
of the waterside workers took two forms, both of which received 
the close attention of the Commonwealth Ministers. At the 
official level, there were repeated attempts to persuade 
other transport unions to boycott cargoes handled by non-
unionists. In September the Australian Railways Union, the 
Storemen and Packers Union, and the Amalgamated Road Transport 
2 
Workers Union refused to become involved in the strike. In 
1. Bruce to Crofts, 25 Sept. 1928. Bruce, Note for file, 
27 Sept. 1928. (C.A.O. A467 16/39); Age, 6 Oct. 1928, 
pp.21-22. 
2. Rechter. op.cit. p.59. 
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October the Central Strike Committee asked the Carters and 
Drivers Union to boycott the Melbourne wharves, but it de-
clined.^ Only the seamen acted in sympathy with the water-
side workers. In Melbourne the crews of seven ships walked 
off when volunteer wharf labourers came aboard and soon 600 
seamen were on strike. On 10th October Elford asked that 
the manning provisions of the Navigation Act be suspended, 
so that the shipowners could employ volunteer seamen. At 
Latham's suggestion, Bruce wrote to the Sydney branch of the 
Seamen's Union, stating that the Government could not allow 
the loss, suffering and unemployment to continue but would 
first appeal to the Union to man all interstate vessels,^ 
A few days later work was resumed. 
The second form of resistance was practised by 
sections of the rank and file. After 23rd September there 
were continuous reports of violence at the various ports. 
Volunteers were fired at in Melbourne and stoned in Brisbane, 
whilst at Port Adelaide 5000 unionists attacked volunteers 
1. S.M.H. 1 Oct. 1928, p.9. 
2. Elford to East, 10 Oct. 1928. (C.A.O. A467 16/39) 
3. Latham to Bruce, n.d. (C.A.O. A467 16/39); 
S.M.H. 12 Oct. 1928, p.11. 
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and stoned police, who responded with a baton charge.^ On 
28th September the homes of two foremen stevedores in 
Melbourne were bombed and there were six more bomb attacks 
on the homes of volunteers and foremen in the next two months. 
The worst violence occurred after the strike had ended. In 
Newcastle hundreds of strikers hurled stones and bricks at p 
volmiteers. In Melbourne on 30th October volunteers were 
pushed on to railway tracks and others were thrown into the 
sea and stoned. A few days later 1500 unionists threatened 
to board ships on which volunteers were working, but were 
dispersed when police fired into the mob, fatally wounding 
one man, and then made several baton charges.^ Although 
there were reports of violence in several ports, Commonwealth 
Ministers concentrated on the position in Melbourne. On 
24th September Bruce told Hogan that, before deciding if 
action by the Commonwealth was necessary, he would like an 
assurance that the Victorian police were taking measures to 
prevent further serious assaults on volunteers.^ A few days 
later Latham and Pearce had discussions with Victorian 
1. S.M.H. 28 Sept. 1928, pp.11-12. 
2. Ibid. 17 Oct. 1928, p.15. 
3. Herald. 1 Nov. 1928, p.l, S.M.H. 3 Nov. 1928, p.17. 
4. Bruce to Hogan, 24 Sept. 1928. (C.A.O. A467 16/39). 
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Ministers about police protection.^ let at that stage the 
worst assaults had taken place at Port Adelaide and it was 
significant that the Nationalist Premier of South Australia 
was allowed to deal with the situation without pressure from 
the Commonwealth. In late October Latham told Bruce that 
the Victorian Government was not doing its duty, and he 
suggested that Bruce publicly raise the possibility of a 
Commonwealth Waterside Police Force if the situation did not 
improve. He believed that far more licences should be can-
celled and that perhaps absolute preference of employment 
should be given to volunteers. His criticisms were 
silenced a day or so later when the Victorian Police fired 
on the strikers. 
During the waterside workers' strike the Government 
had to make a choice between doing everything to facilitate 
a settlement, thereby keeping the loss of export sales to a 
minimum, or taking action that would prevent any further 
shipping holdups occurring for many years to come. It chose 
the latter alternative and it achieved a complete victory. 
The "Dog Collar Act", although it committed the Government 
to a new field of administration with many attendant problems, 
1. Herald. 28 Sept. 1928, p.5. 
2. Latham to Bruce, n.d. (C.A.O. A467 16/39). 
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meant that it permanently exercised a firm control on the 
activities of the wharf labourers. The Waterside Workers 
Federation was not to recover from the strike for over ten 
years: its membership fell from 20,000 to 12,000,^ branches 
seceded or disappeared, and a large proportion of its members 
gradually realized that they would never find jobs on the 
wharves again. The 1928 strike became part of the mythology 
of the waterfront and the hatred that it engendered against 
the volunteers, the shipowners and the Government was to last 
for decades. But its most immediate result was that the 
Federation had been defeated and the principle of arbitration 
had been upheld. 
The waterside workers' dispute was followed by 
three months of comparative peace. However, by the end of 
1928 there were unmistakable signs that Australia would be 
burdened by another interstate strike, this time in an in-
dustry where there had been no large stoppages for over ten 
years. The Commonwealth Government played a less active 
part in the 1929 timber workers' dispute than in the trans-
port strikes of the previous year. Moreover, a lockout 
commenced on the New South Wales coalfields in March, 1929, 
1. Rechter. op.cit. p.111. 
2. A.E. Turley, Secretary, Waterside Workers Federation, 
to A. Brown, Secretary, Brisbane branch, W.W.F., 4 April, 
1929. (A.N.U. T62/8). 
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and the attention of Ministers was divided between the two 
stoppages. Nevertheless, it was the timber workers' strike 
that highlighted the great problems of economic depression, 
the vulnerability of the arbitration principle, the refusal 
of the trade unions to accept any decline in living standards, 
and the increasing violence associated with!' industrial unrest. 
Even if the Government had remained completely detached, the 
strike would still have formed much of the background against 
which the debate on the future of arbitration took place. 
The main issue in the timber workers' strike was 
the 44 hour week. In 1922 the Arbitration Court had altered 
Higgins' award of 1920 by restoring the 48 hour week to the 
timber-cutting and log-sawing sections of the industry, but 
allowed the other sections to retain the 44 hour week. 
Generally speaking, this meant that timber workers in the 
country worked longer hours than the men in the cities. In 
1927 the Timber Workers Union applied for a new award and 
among its claims was a 44 hour week for the whole industry. 
The timber merchants responded by seeking a 48 hour week for 
the whole industry. On 18th December, 1928, the Full Court 
announced its decision on the hours question. The three 
judges all dismissed the Union's claim, as the bush mills 
were faced by intense overseas competition and wages made up 
a high proportion of their production costs. Beeby believed 
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that the city timber yards should retain the shorter week, 
as the slight financial advantages that would accrue from 
extending working hours would be more than offset by the con-
sequent industrial conflict. Dethridge, however, sided with 
Lukin in emphasizing the extremely precarious position of 
the industry, with profits as low as 2 per cent, and the 
majority decision was that the 48 hour week should prevail 
throughout the timber industry.^ 
The new working week came into operation on 1st 
January, 1929, but Lukin did not deliver his final award 
until 23rd January. He elaborated on his earlier remarks 
on the deteriorating conditions in the timber industry since 
1924. In the country the position had never been worse and 
in the cities conditions were only slightly better. This 
situation resulted from the general economic depression, 
high production costs, the depletion of the better classes 
of timber, the use of substitutes, high freight charges, and 
increased imports. Lukin agreed with the Tariff Board that 
the industry could not bear further wage increases or improved 
labour conditions. His award contained some slight improve-
ments, but they were outweighed by reductions of the basic 
wage in the country and most of the margins for skill, 
1. 27 C.A.R. 396. 
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reductions in the wages of boy employees, and an increase in 
the ratio of boys to adults.^ 
Lukin's proposed award was made available to the 
Timber Workers Union in December, 1928, and as early as 
p 
5rd January, 1929, it was "repudiated" by the Sydney branch. 
Leaders of the A.C.T.U. and the Labour Councils feared that 
the award heralded a general return to the 48 hour week, and 
there were numerous conferences on the policy that the timber 
workers should follow. In January the timber workers in the 
cities refused to do any Saturday work but, until the award 
was finalised, the employers merely deducted a sum from their 
wages. At the end of the month the timber merchants announced 
that all employees who refused to work the extra four hours 
would be instantly dismissed.-^ On 30th January, 1929, 2000 
timber workers in Melbourne were dismissed, followed by a 
similar number in Sydney two days later. On 1st February Lukin 
declared that a strike existed in the timber industry and by 
5th February 9000 men were idle® 
The timber workers' strike resembled the 1928 water-
side workers' strike in that it arose from a complete rejection 
1. 27 C.A.R. 577. 
2. S.M.H. 4 Jan. 1929, p.11. 
3. Ibid. 30 Jan. 1929, p.13. 
4. Ag^. 6 Feb. 1929, p.10. 
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loy a union of its new award and its demand that the conditions 
prescribed by the old award be maintained. Such a demand 
was unprecedented, although for years there had been predic-
tions that there would be a crisis if ever the Court tried 
to deal with deteriorating economic conditions. In other 
respects the two strikes differed considerably. The timber 
workers' strike was not so widespread and it soon developed 
into two strikes. The men in South Australia, Western Aust-
ralia and Tasmania only stopped work for a few days, and in 
general the strike was confined to Sydney, Newcastle and to 
much of Victoria. Both employers and unionists in Sydney 
acted independently of their counterparts in Melbourne. The 
strike was extremely long and involved a large number of 
men. In Melbourne alone there were 15,000 men out of work 
as a result of the strike in lHaj, 1929,^ and the strike in 
Victoria was not settled until late June. In Sydney the 
employers stated that as far as they were concerned the 
strike was over in late July, 1929, but it was not until 
October that the die-hards expressed their willingness to 
return to work.^ Unlike the waterside workers' leaders, 
the officials of the Timber Workers Union did not reverse 
1. Age. 7 May, 1929, p.9. 
2. S.M.H. 50 July, 1929, p.11. 
5. Ibid. 17 Oct. 1929, p.11. 
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their decision to strike after a few days, but they, too, were 
moderates who consistently pursued a policy of "confinement". 
Wherever possible they sought to make agreements with indi-
vidual firms where the conditions of work were acceptable, 
and the result was that there were several "white" mills and 
yards.^ In addition, there were men who refused to become 
involved in the strike and after April many strikers drifted 
back to work. Consequently, the shortage of timber was not 
disastrous and this weakened the effectiveness of the strike. 
Paradoxically, it was the employers who sought to extend the 
strike, and thereby force a showdown with the Union, by 
causing the building workers to become involved. Finally, 
the two strikes differed in that the timber workers, at least 
in Victoria, did not have to admit complete defeat. The 
conference called by Sir Robert Gibson that settled the 
strike in Victoria decided that the reduction in the country 
basic wage should be halved and it also decided that there 
should be an investigation into the financial position of the 
industry,^ so that there was a remote possibility that the 
44 hour week would be restored. 
1 See M. Dixson. "The timber strike of 1929." Historical 
Studies, v.lO (1963) pp.479-92. 
2. S.M.H. 25 June, 1929, p.11. 
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In two important respects the waterside workers' 
and the timber workers' strikes were similar. In both 
stoppages the employers sought the assistance of non-unionists, 
and among the tens of thousands of unemployed there were 
large numbers of men who were willing to risk the assaults 
and derision of the pickets. In Sydney many firms were able 
to continue operations on a restricted scale throughout the 
strike with the help of volunteers. In Melbourne there was 
a general call for volunteers in early June which was an 
important factor in bringing about a settlement a fortnight 
later. The protection of volunteers was a major concern of 
governments and employers, especially as violence and intimi-
dation continued throughout the strike. There were no 
bombings and few shootings, but there were numerous assaults, 
widespread picketing, and several attacks on trucks carrying 
"black" timber, with the timber hurled on to busy city streets. 
The press reported cases of arson and many incidents involving 
the notorious "basher gangs". In addition, thousands of men 
marched through Sydney and Melbourne, demonstrated outside 
the Arbitration Court, burnt effigies of Lukin and listened 
to fearsome speeches by Jock Garden. 
The timber workers' strike was the first strike 
since 1924 that had the wholehearted and passionate support 
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of the whole Labour Movement. Scullin denounced the Luiin 
award^ and Theodore inarched with the strikers and encour-
aged them to defy the award. The A.C.T.U. took over the 
leadership of the strike at an early stage and at least 60 
unions gave financial assistance to the timber workers. All 
made the same declaration: if the strikers were defeated 
there would be a general onslaught by governments, courts 
and employers on the living standards of the working class. 
Up to 1929 the Bruce-Page Government had only 
become involved in shipping strikes, which affected the 
whole community, and there was no necessity for it to have 
taken any action in the timber workers' strike, the economic 
and social effects of which were limited. It could well 
have left it to the employers to take legal proceedings 
against the Union under the Arbitration Act. Yet Latham 
declared emphatically that it was impossible for the Govern-
ment to stand idly by and allow a Court award to be repudiated 
by mass action, and his colleagues agreed with him. They 
differed, however, on the action that should be taken. In 
a submission written on 22nd January, 1929, Latham revived 
the Moore-Dyason argument of 1925 and his own argument of 
1. C.P.D. V. 120, 1 March, 1929, p.663. 
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1927 and asserted that cancelling awards or deregistration 
were much more effective penalties than the usual criminal 
penalties. It was difficult to obtain legal evidence that 
a strike had been brought about by a Union, witnesses were 
victimized, and it was useless to prosecute individuals when 
20,000 of them had committed the same offence. The Arbit-
ration Court was most congested and it was desirable that 
unions which were not prepared to accept the arbitration 
system should be excluded from it. Latham therefore sugges-
ted that the Government appeal to the Timber Workers Union 
not to violate the principle of arbitration and warn it that, 
should it do so, it would face the loss of its award and 
deregistration,^ The persistency with which Latham adhered 
to his belief in the ineffectiveness of penalties was matched 
by the stubbornness with which his colleagues held to the 
opposing view, for once again he was overruled by Cabinet. 
The result of the decision of Cabinet was that the 
intervention of the Government in the early stages of the 
strike followed the pattern established in the 1928 strikeso 
This time it was Latham, not Bruce, who called for an end to 
the strike. On 7th February, 1929, he wrote to Crofts and to 
1. Latham, Memorandum for Cabinet: Timber workers dispute, 
22 Jan. 1929, (A.N.L. MS 1009/37). 
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the Timber Workers Union, stating that both the law and the 
principle of arbitration rested on the unqualified observance 
of awards by both sides. Any party that appealed to the 
jurisdiction of the Court by filing a plaint was in honour 
bound to carry out the Court's award. It was unreasonable 
to expect that awards would always satisfy'both sides or that 
they would always conform with the principles laid down by 
one side. Latham appealed to the union leaders to honour 
the principle of arbitration and to serve the cause of 
industrial peace by ordering a return to work in accordance 
with the award.^ On 12th February Crofts replied that the 
Government was responsible for the strike; the implication 
was that the award would have been different if the Court 
had not been directed by the 1928 Act to consider the economic 
effects of its awards. He said that the Government could end 
the strike by calling off the attack on the workers' standards 
and the 44 hour week. 
Three days before he made his appeal to the Timber 
Workers Union Latham had ordered the Crown Solicitor's Office 
1. Latham to Crofts and R. Bowers. Secretary. Australian 
Timber Workers Union, 7 Feb. 1929. (C.A.O. A432 29/393). 
2. Crofts to Latham, 12 Feb. 1929. (C.A.O. A432 29/393)» 
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to collect evidence which would prove that the Union had 
committed a breach of the award.^ The task was again found 
to be difficult: after several days the Deputy Crown 
Solicitor in Melbourne reported that although he had received 
many affidavits from the Timber Merchants Association there 
was no evidence that Union officials had ordered or encouraged 
members not to work. However, on 12th February, 1929, there 
were press reports that officials had told the men at War-
burton to defy the Lukin a w a r d . T h e Deputy Crown Solicitor 
sent an officer to the town and, after a good deal of trouble, 
he collected sufficient evidence to prosecute the Union, 
A few days earlier Latham himself had seen reports that 
Holloway had stated that the best way to defeat bad laws was 
to ignore them and the Lukin award should therefore be dis-
obeyed. Latham ordered an investigation-^ and the Deputy 
Crown Solicitor found that Holloway had actually handed the 
statement to reporters and there could be no doubt about its 
accuracy.^ Latham and Garran discussed the possibility of 
1. Latham to Garran, 4 Feb. 1929. (C.A.O. A432 29/393). 
2. Clausen to Sharwood, 11 Feb. 1929. (C.A.O. A432 29/393). 
3. Clausen to Sharwood, 12 Feb. 1929. (C.A.O. A432 29/393). 
4. Clausen to Sharwood, 16 Feb. 1929. (C.A.O. A432 29/393). 
5. Garran to Sharwood, 8 Feb. 1929. (C.A.O. A467 14/34). 
6. Clausen to Sharwood, 26 Feb. 1929. (C.A.O. A432 29/665). 
- 509 -
prosecuting the newspapers for publishing an incitement to 
break an award,^ but in the end suimnonses were served only 
on Holloway and the Union. On 1st March, 1929, Lukin fined 
the Union £1000 for committing a breach of its award by 
striking. On 7th March Holloway was fined £50 with costs by 
the Melbourne City Court for an offence under the War Pre-
cautions Act Repeal Act in that he encouraged a breach of a 
Commonwealth law. Neither fine was ever paid. 
The prosecution and conviction of Holloway, the 
most respected and fairminded of all union leaders, caused 
a furore in the Labour Movement. Nevertheless, until well 
into April, 1929, the Government continued to seek evidence 
for prosecutions. Officers of the Investigation Service 
attended strike meetings and sent detailed reports to Latham.^ 
They found that he was less concerned with inflammatory 
speeches than with the activities of the pickets. Victorian 
timber merchants told him that they were afforded greater 
protection under Commonwealth law than under State law, and 
Latham urged Victorian Ministers to enforce the Commonwealth 
1. Latham to Garran, 8 Feb. 1929. (C.A.O. A467 14/34). 
2. Garran to F. Brennan, 5 Dec. 1929. (C.A.O. A432 29/393). 
3. Clausen to Sharwood, 3 March, 1929, Lloyd to Jones, 
8 March, 1929, Watson to Sharwood, 11 March, 1929. 
(C.A.O. A432 29/393). 
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law. However, the Victorian police insisted that State laws 
were adequate and the assistance of the Commonwealth Arbit-
ration Act was not required.^ In Sydney Latham^s own officers 
told him that a close watch was being kept on the pickets but 
they seemed to be adhering to the peaceful policy of their 
Union.^ On 28th March, 1929, Latham wrote to the New South 
Wales and Victorian Chief Secretaries informing them that the 
Commonwealth Government was prepared to prosecute where there 
was evidence of intimidation. Violence, intimidation and the 
boycotting of goods were offences under the Arbitration Act 
and the whole object of picketing was to intimidate the men 
who were working. If the police took action to prevent 
pickets assembling the strike would come to a speedy end.^ 
Both Ministers assured Latham that action had been taken 
whenever there was violence or intimidation, but most of the 
pickets were peaceful and loitering was only an offence if 
pedestrians were annoyed or obstructed, Latham became 
exasperated with the whole situation. Timber merchants 
1. W.P. Heathershaw, Under Secretary, Victorian Chief Secre-
tary's Department, to W.W. Alcock, Manager, Timber 
Merchants Association of Victoria, 23 March, 1929. 
(A.N.L. MS 1009/37). 
2. Lloyd to Jones, 18 March, 1929. (C.A.O. A432 29/393). 
3. Latham to S.S. Argyle, 28 March, 1929, Latham to M.F. 
Bruxner, 4 April, 1929. (C.A.O. A467 16/40). 
4. Argyle to Latham, 4 April, 1929, Bruxner to Latham, 
9 April, 1929. (C.A.O. A467 16/40). 
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petitioned him with demands for protection against inter-
ference with customers, the stone-tnrowing and abusive lan-
guage of the pickets, and threats made to the families of 
volijnteers.^ Yet State Ministers and officials claimed 
that reports of violence were exaggerated and that their 
powers were sufficient. Latham told Bruce that the strike 
illustrated the dangers arising from the dependence of the 
Commonwealth on the States for the enforcement of its laws; 
it was frightening to consider what the position would have 
been if Labour had been in power in New South Wales and p 
Victoria. 
The Government's arbitration policy suffered from 
one incident in the strike. On 25th February, 1929 Lukin 
ordered the Sydney and Melbourne branches of the Union to 
hold a secret ballot on the question of resuming work. 
Voting ended on 5rd April and showed that 5518 members 
opposed a resumption, while only 752 supported it. Less than 
50 per cent of the members voted and there was evidence of 
1. F. Corke to Bruce, 19 Feb. 1929. (C.A.O. A467 l6A/4p; 
Alcock to Garran. 4 March. 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/57); 
A.H. Heath to Lai;ham, 15 March, 1929. (C.A.O. 29/595) 
2. Latham to Bruce, 4 April, 1929. ^A.N.L. MS 1^/57); ^ 
Latham to A.B. W o r d , 26 Sept. 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/45) 
5. 27 C.A.R. 859. 
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some malpractices during the poll, Latham ordered inves-
tigations to "be made into the ballot hut they were fruitless.^ 
There had been allegations that hundreds of ballot papers 
had been burnt in a public demonstration in Sydney, but the 
police believed that in reality only a very small number 
were burnt, and in any case, they presumably belonged to 
supporters of the strike. Latham had stressed before the 
ballot was held that a vote against resumption would not 
make the strike legal, but would merely show that the rank 
and file supported their officials.^ This was precisely 
what the ballot did reveal and Ministers could no longer 
attribute all strikes to the machinations of extremist 
leaders. There was to be no more talk of the virtues of the 
secret ballot. 
After mid-April, 1929, the Commonwealth Government 
gradually assumed a more detached position in relation to 
the timber workers' strike. Events in the coalmining dispute 
had caused it to be much less enthusiastic about the effective-
ness of prosecutions and penalties. In public it did not 
1. Clausen to Sharwood, 28 March, 1929. (C.A.0.A432 29/593); 
R. Browne, Inspector, Investigation Branch, to Latham, 
6 April, 1929, Browne to Latham, 15 April, 1929. 
(C.A.O. A467 16/40). 
2. Cameron to Stewart, 9 April, 1929. (G.A.O. A467 16/40) 
5. S.M.H. 4 April, 1929, p.11. 
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change its stand. In May Bruce said that the only proper 
course was an unconditional return to work and the use of 
constitutional methods to rectify any injustice.. He added 
that one of the most significant developments in the strike 
has been the acts of sympathy by other unions.^ In private, 
Latham admitted that it was unrealistic to expect a compromise 
by either side, prosecutions would not settle the strike, and 
it had to be fought out on the economic plane. He had dis-
cussions with the leaders of both sides, but it was Sir William 
McPherson, the Victorian Premier, and Sir Robert Gibson who 
convened the conferences that settled the strike in Victoria. 
The strike was settled on the economic plane, the principle of 
arbitration had again been upheld, but the active intervention 
of the Commonwealth Government in the early stages of the 
strike, especially the prosecution of Holloway, was ultimately 
to prove to be one of the Labour Party's electoral assets. 
Like the timber industry, New South Wales coalmining 
was faced with major problems in the second half of the 1920s. 
1. Age. 18 May, 1929, p.21. 
2. Latham to Tancred Brothers, Sydney, 9 May, 1929. (A.N.L. 
MS 1009/37). 
3. Many articles on the problems of the coal industry appeared 
in the press in 1928 and 1929. This paragraph is based 
largelv on F.R.E. Mauldon. "The problem of Australian coai 
E c o W c Record, v. 4. (1928) pp.107-10; Report of the 
Roval Commission on the Coal Industry, 1929-30. (Chairman: 
Justice C.W.G. Davidson); A.G.L. Shaw and G.R. Bruns. 
The Australian coal industry, Melbourne, 1947. 
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Some of the problems were cominon to the industry in all 
countries: the increasing use of substitute sources of energy, 
such as oil and hydro-electricity, and the easing off in the 
consumption of coal by the gas industry and by railways and 
shipping. Most of the industry's difficulties, however, 
resulted from conditions peculiar to Australia. Unlike other 
countries, prices and wages had been continually spiralling 
upwards. Before the V/ar Australian coal had been comparatively 
cheap, but from 1918 to 1928 its price increased by 138 per 
cent, compared with 9 per cent in France and 46 per cent in 
Britain. The price of Australian coal reached its peak in 
1928, whereas overseas prices had been declining since 1920-21. 
High prices had resulted in the industry being greatly over-
capitalized, with many small collieries being worked inter-
mittently. On the northern field 24 collieries accounted for 
80 per cent of the output, while 98 collieries produced only 
6 per cent of the output. Prices had been increased with 
every wage rise and wage rates had risen by 130 per cent 
between 1914 and 1928, compared with 82 per cent in Australian 
industries generally. High wage rates had encouraged the 
migration of British miners and there was a surplus of at 
least 4000 men in the industry. Yet actual earnings were 
generally low: 50 per cent of miners received less than the 
average wage-earner and 25 per cent less than the basic wage. 
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This was a result of intermittency, with the average number 
of days worked in the mines falling from 227 in 1920 to 168 
in 1928. Another result of intermittency was a fall in 
Australian production from 13.75m. tons in 1924 to 11.6ni. 
tons in 1928, Intermittency, falling production and high 
unemployment on the New South Wales fields were largely due 
to the loss of markets, both in Australia and overseas. In 
1913 Australia had exported 17 per cent of its coal output, 
but after the War it lost most of its New Zealand and South 
East Asian markets and the proportion exported declined to 
less than 5 per cent. Within Australia the output of Queens-
land and Victorian coalfields was increasing, and the New 
South Wales industry received a further blow in 1928 when the 
South Australian Government awarded a large coal contract to 
a British firm, whose price was 7 shillings a ton less than 
the New South Wales price. It was agreed on all sides that 
these grave problems could only be overcome by reducing the 
price of coal. 
Colliery owners had been predicting disaster for 
several years, but it was not until the middle of 1928 that 
the desperate plight of the industry was widely publicized. 
The New South Wales Government had the greatest interest in a 
solution to the problem, especially as it was anxious to reduce 
expenditure on both the railways and on unemployment relief 
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in the Newcastle district. In July, 1928, Bavin, who had 
succeeded Lang as Premier, declared that the only hope of 
retrieving the position lay in the substantial reduction in 
the price of coal, and temporary sacrifices would be essential 
if disaster was to be avoided.^ In August, 1928, he had 
discussions with Bruce, Page and Latham and he subsequently 
made a proposal that was to be revived many times in the 
next year or so. The price of coal at Newcastle averaged 25 
shillings per ton and Bavin proposed that the price should be 
reduced by four shillings. The State Government would meet 
two shillings of this reduction, provided that the employers 
and the miners each met one shilling. The proposal would 
necessitate a 12i per cent reduction in the miners' wage 
rates and, on Bavin's estimate, a 50 per cent reduction in 
the owners' profits. In addition, Bruce announced that the 
Commonwealth Government was prepared to pay a bounty of one 
shilling per ton on New South Y/ales coal exported to other 
States and overseas. The assistance given by both Governments 
2 
would only be for one year. 
The miners had been fearing such a proposal for a 
long time. In August, 1927, they had been undecided on whether 
1. Age. 24 July, 1928, p.10. 
2. Ibid. 15 Sept. 1928, p.21. 
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to join the owners in deputations to the Federal and State 
Governments about the industry's difficulties.^ In June, 
1928, the President of the Miners Federation predicted that 
the owners would soon make an onslaught on the miners, and he 
urged the Federation to support the Goal Industry Tribunal, 
p 
which would be its only defence. In September, 1928, the 
Federation rejected the Bavin plan. The owners had asserted 
that the plan would result in increased business for the 
collieries and therefore, even if wage rates were lower, 
actual earnings would be higher. But with so many of its 
members already receiving less than the basic wage, the Fede-
ration could not accept any scheme involving wage reductions. 
In January, 1929, Bavin had discussions with the Federation's 
leaders, but their attitude remained the same. In February 
they journeyed to Ganberra and asked Bruce for a royal com-
mission into the coal industry, including a study of prices, 
profits, over-capitalization, the watering of stock, freight 
charges, exports and by-products. Bruce agreed that an enquiry 
was justified but it would be a year or more before any action 
1. Minutes of Gentral Gouncil of Workers' Industrial Union of 
Australia (Mining Branch), 16 Aug.-20 Aug. 1927. 
(A.N.U. E165/2). 
2. Report of second Miners' Gonvention, June, 1928. (A.N.U. 
E165/3/2/2). 
3. S.M.H. 26 Sept. 1928, p.17. 
4. Ibid. 23 Jan. 1929, p.15, 
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was taken and something similar to the Bavin scheme was needed 
at once.^ Meanwhile, the Northern Colliery Owners Association 
2 
had denied that it was contemplating drastic action. Yet 
on 15th February its members presented 10,000 miners with 
notices of dismissal and on 1st March, 1929, the longest 
mining stoppage in Australian history commenced,^ 
The events of the 1929 lockout were remembered for 
decades in the Newcastle and Maitland districts, but it was 
not until the Scullin Government had come into power that 
they demanded the close attention of the Commonwealth Govern-
ment. There was never any likelihood of a critical shortage 
of coal. In order to ensure continued financial support for 
the locked out men, the Miners Federation followed a policy 
of confinement and the dispute did not spread to the western 
or southern coalfields. In addition, there were several 
"unassociated" mines on the northern field, the owners of which 
were not members of the Northern Colliery Owners Association, 
and they were not involved in the lockout. Being a lockout, 
the problem of volunteers did not arise and there was com-
paratively little violence. The only clashes occurred when 
1. S.M.H. 15 Feb. 1929, p.13. 
2. Ibid. 1 Feb. 1929, p.13. 
3. For accounts of the lockout see Gollan. op.cit. Chapter 
9, and Rechter. op.cit. Chapters 4-8. 
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pickets accused enginedrivers and other craft unionists, who 
were still employed on maintenance duties in the closed mines, 
of engaging in mining work.^ There were long marches, fiery 
speeches and occasional assaults, but it was not until December, 
1929, that the situation became dangerous. In the later stages 
of the lockout there were numerous conferences and hearings 
in the Arbitration Court, but it was only in May, 1930, that 
hunger and the inflexibility of the owners forced the miners 
to accept reductions of per cent in contract rates and 
sixpence per day in day wages. 
As soon as he heard that a lockout was to take place, 
Latham realized that it would be damaging to the Government's 
reputation and its arbitration policy if no action was taken 
against the colliery owners, as it would be open to the charge 
of bias in the administration of the law. However, the legal 
position was unusually complicated, as employment in the mining 
industry was regulated by an award of the Coal Industry 
Tribunal, appointed under the Industrial Peace Act. The Act 
incorporated provisions of the Arbitration Act and there was 
considerable disagreement on whether these provisions included 
Section 28, which stipulated that awards were to remain 
in force unless terminated by the Court. In February, 
1. S.M.H. 30 May, 1929, p.11., 11 June, 1929, p.11., 
29 June, 1929, p.15. 
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1929, Garran had discussions with the Secretary of the Coal 
Industry Tribunal on the question of the duration of the 
Tribunal's awards,^ but on 5th March he was told by Latham 
to leave it to the Court to decide the matter. Latham ordered 
Garran to institute a prosecution for a lockout against a 
leading colliery owner, whose mines were believed to be 
payable, and he suggested John Brown, the owner of the Pelaw 
p 
Main and Richmond Main Collieries. 
In the next two weeks Latham, Garran, the Crown 
Solicitor and two leading Sydney barristers debated the two 
legal questions that were in dispute. Latham believed that 
the prosecution would fail, as the Court would hold that the 
miners' award had expired and that the action of the owners 
did not come within the terms of Section 6A of the Arbitra-
tion Act.^ The barristers held the opposite opinion.^ The 
second question was whether the owners' action would be held 
to be a lockout. There was no evidence that the mines had 
been closed in order to force the men to accept alterations 
in the terms of their employment, for the dismissal notices 
1. Garran to Latham, 28 Feb. 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/38). 
2. Latham to Garran, 5 March, 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/38). 
3. Latham to Sharwood, 12 March, 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/38). 
4. Opinion of E.M. Brissenden and J.R. Neild. (A.N.L. 
MS 1009/38). 
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contained no conditions or qualifications. A prosecution 
would have to be based on the alternative definition of a 
lockout, namely, that the refusal to give work had been 
"unreasonable". Latham considered that little evidence would 
be needed to prove that charge: if conditions were onerous 
for the employers the reasonable course would have been to 
apply to the Tribunal for a variation of the award but, as 
this was not done, the closure was prima facie unreasonable.^ 
Once again, counsel disagreed with Latham; they believed 
that it would have to be shown that the mines had been 
profitable, for the closing of an unprofitable mine would 
not be unreasonable.^ On 12th March an officer of the 
Investigation Service was sent to Newcastle and he found a 
good deal of evidence that Brown's mines were profitable. 
For instance, at the end of 1928 Brown had told some of his 
employees that he wanted the mines worked continuously and 
that he could sell all the coal that was produced. Counsel 
thus considered that a prosecution was warranted. Latham 
did not believe that even if there was a conviction it would 
help to settle the lockout, but the essential thing was for 
the Government to show its impartiality by taking action 
1. Garran to Sharwood, 15 March, 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/58)o 
2. Watson to Sharwood, 16 March, 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/58). 
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against an employer. On 21st March he told Garran to issue a 
summons as soon as possible and not to wait until there was a 
conclusive or even a strong case for Brown to answer.^ The 
following day Latham announced to a surprised House of Rep-
resentatives that Brown would be prosecuted under the Indus-
p 
trial Peace Act and the Arbitration Act. 
The case was listed for hearing at the Central 
Police Court at Sydney on 10th April, 1929. On 29th March 
Bruce and Bavin conferred with the leaders of the Northern 
Colliery Owners Association and Bavin later saw officials of 
the Miners Federation. On 3rd April Bavin announced that 
Bruce and he would sujimion a conference of representatives of 
the owners and miners to see if a settlement to the dispute 
could be reached.^ Three days later Bruce telephoned Latham 
in Melbourne and told him that, if there was to be a full 
discussion on the financial state of the industry, it would 
be necessary to withdraw the prosecution of Brown. Latham 
retorted that it was hard to see how such an action could be 
justified, either in principle or politically. The problem 
would only be overcome if the miners requested, or at least 
1. Latham to Garran, 21 March, 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/38). 
2. C.P.D. V. 120, 22 March, 1929, p.1727. 
3. S.M>H. 4 April, 1929, p.11. 
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agreed to, the withdrawal. In fact, Bruce could decline to 
go on with the conference if the miners did not give their 
consent to the withdrawal. Bruce said he would see what could 
be done and Latham did not hear from him again for five dajSo^ 
Bruce did not seek the miners' approval but simply announced, 
when he opened the conference on 8th April, that the Govern-
p 
ment was not proceeding with the prosecution,, He stated 
that an impending Court case would inhibit discussion and a 
conviction would do nothing to help the people who were 
suffering, nor would it secure the opening of the mines. 
The next day he ordered Garran to apply for a withdrawal of 
the prosecution. When Latham read of Bruce's actions in the 
press he sent telegrams appealing for a public statement by 
Bruce that the prosecution had been abandoned with the con-
currence of the miners.^ Bruce ignored his appeal. The 
conference broke down on 18th April: the Miners Federation 
1. Latham. Notes on the abandonment of the prosecution of 
J. Brown. 22 April, 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/38). 
2. C.L.A. Abbott, who was Minister for Home Affairs, wrote 
many years later that Latham advised Bruce to obtain in 
wri'iing the agreement of the unions to the withdrawal of 
the prosecution. Bruce told the Cabinet that he had 
forgotten to do this. C.L.A. Abbott. Family background, 
p.323. (A.N.L. MS 1674). 
3. Proceedings of the Coal Mining Industry Conference, Sydney, 
April, 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009738)» 
4. Latham to Bruce, 9 April. 1929, Latham to Bruce, 10 April, 
1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/38)o 
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insisted that the mines should be opened at the rates which 
were prevailing before the lockout, while the owners demanded 
wage reductions on an even larger scale than Bavin had pro-
posed.^ 
The Bruce-Page Government took little interest in 
the subsequent course of the lockout. On 7th May, 1929, 
after consultation with B.S.B. Stevens, the Acting Treasurer 
of New South Wales, Bruce announced the terms of reference of 
a Royal Commission into the coalmining industry. The Commission, 
headed by Justice Davidson, began its investigation in June. 
Bruce was criticized for showing no further interest in a 
settlement of the dispute, but he insisted that while the 
inquiry was proceeding the Government would take no action to 
p 
open the mines. In September, 1929, the Commission con-
firmed Bavin's estimate on the size of the owners' profits, 
but the Miners Federation once again rejected the Bavin scheme 
and stated that it would not accept any reduction of wages. 
Parliament was not sitting when the John Brown 
prosecution was withdrawn and the incident only gradually 
became one of the principal weapons of the opponents of the 
Government. The Miners Federation considered that the pro-
1. S.M.H. 19 April, 1929, p.11. 
2. C.P.D. V. 121, 23 Au^. 1929. p.278o 
3. S.M.H. 3 Oct. 1929, p.11. 
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secution was a side-issue and made no protest when it was 
withdrawn, although its Secretary later suggested that it 
had been assumed that the proceedings would only be suspended 
while the conference was in progress.^ Scullin and Crofts 
quickly realized that the Government had placed itself in an 
awkward position and asserted that it was not the first time 
it had shown remarkable leniency towards rich law breakers, 
and the Government should remit the fine paid by the Water-
side Workers Federation. Labour leaders contrasted the 
Government's attitude towards Holloway, who for nearly 20 
years had been settling industrial disputes, with its attitude 
towards Brown, a miserly millionaire who lavished care on his 
racehorses but who had nothing but contempt and abuse for 
his miners.^ It was not until 15th August, 1929, that the 
Labour Party was able to move a censure motion against the 
Government, on the grounds that it had shown in the adminis-
tration of the law that it unjustly discriminated between the 
rich and the poor. Bruce said many years later that he believed 
1. Herald. 12 April, 1929, p.4. 
2. I M d . 9 April, 1929, p.4o 
3. For details about John Brown (1851-1930), reputedly the 
wealthiest man in Australia, see Melbourne Punch. ^ bept. 
1925, p.29, Herald. 22 March, 1929, p.l, S. Encel. 
Equality and authority. Melbourne, 1970, p.389. ihe 
article in Punch asserted that Brown was a typical Forsyte, 
but this was being rather unfair to the Forsytes. 
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if Scullin had not been absent from the House the Government 
would have been defeated on this motion and would have had to 
resign. However, Theodore performed poorly and antagonized 
independent Nationalists like Maxwell by claiming that the 
Government had been "bought" by the mineowners.^ The motion 
2 
was defeated on 22nd August by four votes. 
The Government had made itself vulnerable because 
in earlier stoppages Ministers, and especially Latham, had 
made speeches and statements in which moral overtones were 
very pronounced. There had been continual references to 
"principle", "justice", "honour", "sanctity of the law" and 
"the public welfare", and an ideal concept of impartial 
government had been set up which the Government failed to 
attain in practice. In the mining lock-out the Government 
was biased in both its attitudes and its actions. There was 
nothing extraordinary about this, for industrial disputes 
involved fundamental ideas and interests, and it would be 
surprising if Ministers could view them with complete detach-
ment. Governments could refrain from intervening in disputes, 
but often their very lack of action indicated where their 
sympathies lay. In 1924 Bruce had felt that a union had the 
1. Conversation between Bruce and Edwards, 1964. 
2. C.P.D. V. 121, 22 Aug. 1929, p.187. 
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better case and he called a conference which would grant the 
union its claim and end the stoppage. He succeeded and there 
was very little criticism of his actions. In 1929 the situa-
tion was similar except that this time he gave in to pressure 
from the employers. However, his intervention failed and he 
exposed himself to widespread condemnation. Yet even Theodore 
admitted that if the conference had succeeded there would 
have been little criticism.^ 
Nevertheless, Bruce had committed a political 
blunder, as the colleagues who defended his motives frankly 
admitted. There was some truth as well as spite in Hughes' 
remark that knowing the parties, anyone who thought that the 
conference was likely to be effective was a fool. Bruce 
and some of his colleagues appeared to be slow to realize 
the change in the nature of industrial disputes between 1925 
and 1929. The timberworkers' and coalmining stoppages did 
not have flimsy pretexts, but were concerned with fundamental 
questions: the ability of industries to survive with high 
costs and diminishing markets on one side and the ability 
of families to live on wages far below the basic wage on the 
other. Both sides were desperate and they were not goin^ to 
1. C.P.D. V. 121, 15 Aug. 1929, p.11, 
2. Ibid. p.45. 
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be stopped by courts or conferences but only by economic 
pressures. In the waterside workers' strike the Government 
had forced the strikers to submit to economic pressure, but 
in the other two stoppages it had to leave it to timeo 
Thus the Government finally accepted Latham's 
argument that penalties would not settle industrial disputes. 
It was obvious that, except in an emergency involving essen-
tial services, it would not again be able to penalize a union 
merely for striking and it would have to remain much more 
detached during strikes. However, Latham's views prevailed 
not because of the logic of his argument but through circum-
stances which he found personally humiliating. In fact, he 
told Bruce that he nearly resigned but did not think that it 
would be fair to his colleagues.^ He was upset that Bruce 
should ignore his advice and that he should bypass him and 
give instructions directly to the Solicitor-General. Latham 
was influenced by the English ideal that in legal proceedings 
the Law Officers should be free from directions from their 
p 
political colleagues. More importantly, Latham, for whom 
1. Latham. Notes on the abandonment of the prosecution of 
J. Brown, 22 April, 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/38). 
2. See J.L.J. Edwards. The law officers of the Crown, 
London, 1964. Chapter_10. (The "independence of the 
Attorney-General in criminal prosecutions) and Chapter 
11 (The Campbell case and its aftermath). 
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principle and logic were almost obsessions, had to acknowledge 
great inconsistencies and contradictions in the Government's 
policies and actions. The Government had claimed that it was 
not concerned with the grievances of the unions but only with 
the illegal act of striking: in contrast, it showed great 
sympathy for the problems of the colliery owners and uttered 
no criticism of their illegal action. The Government had 
always said that a return to work must precede talks and that 
to summon a conference would be implicitly to defy the autho-
rity of the Court: in April, 1929, it reversed its policy. 
Latham had often asserted that it was easy to prove a lockout: 
he now had to contradict himself at great length. Finally, 
Ministers had bracketed strikes and lockouts, thereby indica-
ting the impartiality of the law: the John Brown case re-
vealed that all strikes were illegal, but only "unreasonable" 
lockouts were illegal. Yet Latham would have been saved 
these humiliating admissions if, as late as January, 1929, 
Cabinet had accepted his advice and discarded its policy of 
penalties. It was not surprising that in April, 1929, he 
felt thoroughly disillusioned with politics. 
CHAPTER 6 
MAY 1929: THE FINAL DECISION 
On 17th November, 1928, the Bruce-Page Government 
was returned to power at a general election. Seven seats 
were lost by the Nationalist Party and one by the Country 
Party, but the Government still had a comfortable majority 
of ten in the House of Representatives. 
The 1928 election was extremely dull. As Eggleston 
said, Bruce "made no great promises, but neither did he admit 
any great difficulties and he had no policy to meet the adverse 
economic situation."^ He repeated the arguments which he 
had first propounded in early 1927. The Government could 
not solve the country's economic problems. When employers 
and employees finally recognized their common interests and 
mutual dependence, a new spirit would emerge in industry 
which would lead to a reduction of production costs and there-
fore to a lower cost of living. ' Only greater efficiency, not 
Acts of Parliament, would bring about decent living conditions. 
Wage reductions would achieve nothing. At a time when exports 
1. F.W. Eggleston. "Australian politics and the Federal 
election". Australian Quarterly, v. 1 (1929) p.13. 
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were falling, to reduce the purchasing power of the Australian 
consumers would only exacerbate the position.^ 
As in 1925, the election was held in the shadow of 
a great strike. However, industrial arbitration was but one 
of several issues raised during the campaign. Latham was the 
only Minister to devote whole speeches to the sub.iect of 
industrial legislation and industrial conflict. He asserted 
that there would be chaos if the Federal Arbitration Court 
was abolished without substituting another form of conciliatory 
machinery. The employment conditions of some workers, such 
as shearers, waterside workers, seamen, theatrical employees 
and journalists, could only be regulated on a Federal basis. 
Both employers and wage-earners wanted uniform labour conditions, 
yet this objective would never be achieved if the Federal Court 
was abolished, leaving six State tribunals to make conflicting 
awards for every industry. There were 149 unions registered 
in the Federal Court and only a very small proportion had 
taken part in any recent strikes. Latham defended the 1928 
Arbitration Act, especially its conciliation and secret ballot 
provisions. At the same time, the Government would consider 
amending the Act in accordance with any recommendations made 
by the forthcoming Industrial Conference, which was being 
1. S.M.H. 8 Nov. 1928, p.15.. 
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organized by the Victorian Chamber of Manufactures.^ During 
the campaign various Ministers referred to the firm action 
taken by the Government in the maritime strikes and appealed 
to the voters to endorse both the principle and the provisions 
of the Transport Workers Act. 
The Goverrjnent claimed that neither the Labour 
Party nor the A.C.T.U. had any industrial policy. The A.C.T.U. 
had threatened to call a general strike if the 1928 Arbitration 
Act was passed, and it had urged unions to withdraw from the 
Federal Court. The unions had ignored both resolutions and 
it v/as obvious that the vast majority of their members sup-
ported the Federal arbitration system. The A.C.T.U. had 
advocated a kind of compulsory conciliation, which was a con-
tradiction of terms. Both the A.C.T.U. and the Labour Party 
were so divided that they could not come to a decision on the 
question of strike and lockout penalties. In every dispute 
the Labour Party, in Latham's words, "stood quivering, with 
folded hands, imploring the Government to do nothing to 
It 2 
protect the people, because any action would be "provocative" 
Industrial unrest had culminated in murderous attacks on law-
abiding citizens, yet all Scullin could suggest was a conference 
1. Latham. Notes for speech to be given at Prahran. (A.N.L. 
MS 1009/33). 
2. Latham. Notes on industrial relations. (A.N.L. MS 1009/33)» 
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with the forces of disorder. As in 1925, Ministers claimed 
that the Labour Party was controlled by the Communist "element", 
and they castigated the A.C.T.U. on account of its affiliation 
with Moscow or, more precisely, the Pan-Pacific Trade Union 
Secretariate 
Within a few weeks of the 1928 election Bruce had 
made several changes in the Cabinet and in Government depart-
ments. Two new Ministers were appointed, one of whom, H.S. 
Gullett, had been a severe critic of the Government's financial 
and tariff policies. He had equally strong views on indust-
rial conditions, especially on the 44 hour week.^ Latham 
was given the new portfolio of Industry and was to be assisted 
by a new Honorary Minister, Senator J.E. Ogden. The name 
of the Department was misleading and Bruce himself sometimes 
referred to it as the Department of Labour, which was more 
accurate. Ogden was supposed to bring into the Cabinet a deep 
knowledge of trade unions. He had been a member of various 
Tasmanian Labour Governments before his election to the Senate 
in 1922. Like many of his colleagues in Tasmania, he had been 
1. 25 Nov. 1928, p.5. S.M.H. 25 June, 1929, p.10. 
2. James E. Ogden (1868-1932). Member of Tasmanian House_of 
Assembly 1906-22, Treasurer 1909, Chief Secretary, Minister 
for Mines and Labour 1914-16, Senator 1922-32, Honorary 
Minister assisting Minister for Industry 1928-29. 
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extremely moderate and in 1925 he had parted with his Party by 
supporting Bruce's attack on the Seamen's Union. The press 
assumed that, as Latham would still be Attorney-General, he 
would leaye the administration of the new Department to Ogden.^ 
Howeyer, Latham did not haye a high opinion of Ogden's abilities 
and this, tOi^ether with his loye of hard work and his intense 
interest in arbitration, made it most unlikely that he would 
occupy a figurehead position. 
In December, 1928, Bruce set down for Latham the 
functions of the Department of Industry. It would administer 
the Arbitration Act, the Industrial Peace Act and the Arbit-
ration (Public Seryice) Act, and would take care of the adminis-
tratiye problems of the three arbitration tribunals, the 
Conciliation Commissioner and Conciliation Committees. Most 
of its staff would consist of inspectors who would police 
Commonwealth awards. It would appoint the Australian dele-
gations to the International Labour Organization and ensure 
that its conyentions and decisions were implemented. Finally, 
the Department would work in conjunction with the proposed 
Economic Research Bureau in inyestigating and reporting on 
complex problems, such as the coal crisis. Bruce added that 
he did not intend increasing the number of Arbitration Court 
1. S.M.H. 22 Dec. 1928, p.19. 
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judges or conciliation commissioners in the immediate futureo^ 
The Department of Industry was stillborn. In January, 
1929, the positions of Secretary and Clerk in the new Depart-
ment were advertised, hut no appointments were made. It was 
several years before any industrial inspectors were employed 
by the Commonwealth. The establishment of the Department had 
coincided with a ruthless economy campaign by the Government, 
and Latham had to admit that the appointment of inspectors was 
not a matter of vital urgency. Ogden, with no advisers and 
little personal authority, was confined to writing an occasional 
memorandum or speech during the industrial disputes of 1929. 
Another administrative change made by Bruce was of 
some significance. In December, 1928, the Prime Minister's 
Department took over the administration of Australia's external 
territories. Bruce announced that, as a consequence, he had 
decided that Deane and J.G. McLaren, the Secretary of the 
Department of Home Affairs and Territories, should exchange 
positions.^ Thus, after eight years as the Prime Minister's 
» 
chief adviser, Deane moved out of the inner circle and, although 
he was only 58, he was never again to occupy a position of 
1. Bruce to Latham, 12 Dec. 1928. (A.N.L. MS 1009/55). 
2. Herald. 8 Dec. 1928, p.4o 
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power within the Government.^ His fall was not due to 
differences over policy but to his disrespectful attitude 
towards Bruce, his cavalier approach to his work and his 
reputation for high living, which in the small town of Canberra 
o 
could not be concealed. He was not a policy-maker, but he 
had an intimate knowledge of politics and was skilled in pre-
dicting how a proposal would be received. Deane's advice 
could have been valuable in 1929, if Bruce had cared to 
listen to it. His successor, McLaren, was an extremely 
orthodox public servant: loyal, hard-working, careful, but 
a ponderous thinker and a man who would not presume to comment 
on, much less criticize, major Government policies. 
The 1928 election results were deceptive. In the 
early months of 1929 a succession of crises revealed that the 
Government's parliamentary majority was extremely slender, 
with two or three of its erstwhile supporters becoming very 
1. Deane's fall from power was swift. In April, 1932, the 
Department of Home Affairs ,was merged with the Department 
of Works and the Department of Transport to form the 
Department of the Interior. H.C. Brown was made Secretary 
Deane was not consulted and he was (quoted as saying of the 
move: "It is clear unadulterated dirt". He was made a 
member of the War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal, 
his Minister being his old master, W.M. Hughes. Deane 
resigned in 1936 because of ill-health and died in 1946. 
2. Conversation with Mr. F. Strahan, 30 July, 1972. Abbott, 
Family background, p.317. (A.N.L. MS 1674). 
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critical and increasingly ready to vote with the Opposition.^ 
The last and greatest crisis concerned the future of the 
Conunonwealth arbitration system. The maritime and timber-
workers strikes and the coalmining lockout formed an essential 
part of the background to this event. But there were other 
factors that also influenced the Government's policies: its 
new involvement in industrial relations on the waterfront, 
the worsening economic situation, and the changing attitudes 
of employers and unions towards Federal arbitration. 
The Government's continued interest in conditions 
on the waterfront, long after the 1928 waterside workers' 
strike had ended, was a result of the emergency legislation 
that had been passed during the strike. The Transport Workers 
Act contained only one section, worded in the most general 
terms, and during the election campaign Bruce promised that 
a new and more detailed Bill would be submitted to Parliament. 
Three days after the election Louis East was asked to give 
his views on the regulations that had been issued under the Act. 2 
1. The principal rebels were Hughes, Stewart and A.E. Mann. 
In February, 1929, an Opposition motion that a deter-
mination of the Public Service Arbitrator (which the Govern-
ment wished to disallow) be printed was defeated on the 
casting vote of the Speaker, Sir Littleton Groom. In 
August, 1929, the Opposition's censure motion, arising 
from the John Brown incident, was defeated by four votes, 
with Hughes, Stewart, Mann and W.J. McWilliains voting 
with the Opposition. 
2 Garran to E. Hall, Comptroller-General of Trade and Customs, 
20 Nov. 1928. (C.A.O. A467 16A/41). 
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Most of his suggestions were accepted by Latham^ and a new 
Transport Workers Bill was passed by Parliament in March, 
1929, after a most uninspired debate. 
Latham always believed that the Transport Workers 
Act was responsible for peace on the waterfront. The Act 
ensured that "unsuitable" workers were forced to leave the 
wharves, and, more importantly, it enabled a large force of 
non-unionists to retain employment indefinitely. At Melbourne 
and Brisbane the volunteers made up a majority of the work 
force and at the smaller Queensland ports they had a virtual 
monopoly of the work. The principle of protection of the 
volunteers formed the basis of Latham's approach to the 
problems of the waterfront. On almost every occasion he 
defended the intransigence of the shipowners and he resisted 
all moves to increase the amount of work allocated to union-
ists. His inflexible stand was best illustrated by his 
failure to support the efforts of R.L. Butler, the South 
Australian Premier, to secure agreement on a definite ratio 
between the number of unionists'and volunteers employed at 
Port Adelaide. Latham told Butler that it was essential that 
the Waterside Workers Federation should not regain control of 
1. East to Hall, 14 Dec. 1928. (C.A.O. A467 16A/41); East 
to Hall, 8 Jan. 1929, East to Hall, 14 Feb. 1929, Garran 
to Hall, 19 Feb. 1929. (C.A.O. A467 16/40). 
2. Latham to Menzies, 19 Sept. 1934. (A.N.L. MS 1009/53). 
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the transport services,^ and he confided to Bruce that any 
attempt to limit preference to the original volunteers would 
lead to violence, as every volunteer driven from the wharves 
would "be replaced by a Federation man. He was rather 
relieved when Butler's suggestions were rejected by both the 
shipowners and the unions.^ Latham believed that the National-
ists in Queensland and South Australia were too ready to com-
promise with the Federation, and he was convinced that the 
Commonwealth Government should continue to regulate waterside 
labour. 
Despite his unforgiving attitude towards the Fede-
ration Latham was genuinely concerned about the harsh working 
conditions on the wharves and hoped that relations between 
unionists and volunteers could be improved. He went down to 
Port Melbourne and watched the men being selected, and later 
told Bruce that ideally the Government should erect shelter 
1. R.L. Butler to Latham, 13 June, 1929, Latham to Butler, 
20 June, 1929, Latham to Butler, 16 July, 1929. (A.N.L. 
MS 1009/36). 
2. Latham to Bruce, 20 June, 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/36). 
3. Appleton to Latham, 19 July, 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/36); 
Appleton to Latham, 31 July, 1929. (C.A.O. A467 16/40). 
4. Latham to R.E.M. King, 26 April, 1929. (C.A.O. A432 29/372); 
Latham to J.G. Bayley, 27 June, 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/36). 
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for the men at all the pick-up places.^ Although the ship-
owners claimed that the volunteers were efficient and worked 
in harmony with the unionists, he decided that the Govern-
ment itself should investigate conditions on the waterfront. 
In December, 1928, and January, 1929, an officer of the 
Investigation Service, R.W. Yates, surveyed the work of the 
waterside workers at five major ports. Yates was not the 
most objective of men^ and his report contained an unqualified 
denunciation of the shipowners and the volunteers. He asserted 
that a large proportion of the volunteers were "physical degen-
erates", whose loading rate was far inferior to that of the 
unionists. The shipowners regarded the men as beasts of 
burden and, by allocating work almost entirely to incompetent 
volunteers, had reduced many decent old workers to destitution. 
Harmony on the wharves depended entirely on the permanent 
presence of hundreds of police. Despite the manifest bias 
of the report, Latham seems to have accepted its accuracy, 
merely commenting that if the owners were dictatorial and 
1. Latham to Bruce, 31 Oct. 1§28. (C.A.O. A467 39/16). 
2. Elford to Latham, 22 Jan. 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/36). 
3. In 1931, in the report of the Royal Commission on Jacob 
Johnson, Judge Beeby was to castigate Yates, dismissing 
another of his reports as "reckless and biased". By that 
time Yates had left the Public Service. 
4. Yates to Jones, 28 Dec. 1928, Yates to Jones, 9 Jan. 1929, 
Yates to Jones, 25 Jan. 1929. (C.A.O. A467 16/39); Jones 
to Garran, 15 Feb. 1929. (C.A.O. A467 16/40). 
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harsh, the Federation had been arrogant and insensitive to 
the interests of the puhlic.^ 
In his report lates dealt with the evils of the 
pick-up and put forward a scheme for self-regulation in the 
stevedoring industry. The Transport Workers Act would be 
extended to all ports and would be administered by labour 
committees, consisting of representatives of the shipowners 
and unionists. The number of licences would not exceed the 
normal requirements of the port and work would be allocated 
on a rotation basis. Latham was most impressed with these 
ideas, for he considered that only the decasualization of 
waterfront labour would bring industrial peace. In April, 
1929, he submitted an amended version of Yates' scheme to the p 
Federation and he later sent it to the shipowners, the 
volunteers' organizations and the Marine Branch.^ Their 
reactions varied: the owners were surprised but dubious,^' 
the volunteers were enthusiastic but made unacceptable con-
ditions,^ and East and the licensing officers dismissed the 
1. Latham to Garran, 19 Feb. 1929. (C.A.O. A467 16/40). 
2. Minutes of Waterside Workers Federation Committee of 
Management. 17 April, 1929. (A.N.U T62/1/2): Latham to 
Turlly, 26 April, 1929. (A.N.U. T62/26). 
3. Latham to Elford, 1 May, 1929. (C.A.O. A467 16/40). 
4. A ^ . 1 May, 1929, p.13. 
5. D. Shields, Secretary, Permanent and Casual ferf Labour-
ers Union, to Latham, 16 May, 1929. (C.A.O. A467 16/59). 
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scheme as unworkable.^ The Federation at first showed 
interest, but in July, 1929, it told Latham that it opposed 
the extension of the Transport Workers Act to all ports and 
the inclusion of the volunteers' representatives on the 
labour committees. A disappointed Latham announced that 
the system of engaging waterfront labour would have to remain 
unchanged. 
The attempt in 1929 to reorganize the stevedoring 
industry was an interesting example of decision-making within 
the Government. It showed that the few public servants with 
a ^ood knowledge of a subject, such as East or Yates, could 
completely bypass their departmental heads and exercise a 
major influence on the Minister's policies. This was partic-
ularly the case when a Minister was anxious to push through 
hasty reforms. Despite his restrained manner, Latham, like 
Bruce, could act with surprising impulsiveness; for instance, 
he publicized Yates' scheme without waiting to consult East 
and the officials who would have to administer it. Latham's 
prolonged interest in the problems of the waterfront was a 
significant factor in the Government's deliberations on the 
1. East to Latham, 27 May, 1929. (C.A.O. A467 16/39). 
2. Turley to Latham, 24 July, 1929. (A.N.U. T62/26). 
3. Latham to Turley, 29 July, 1929. (A.N.U. T62/26); 
S.M.H. 30 July, 1929, p.12. 
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future of arbitration. If the volunteers were to be protected 
and if his schemes to decasualize and rationalize the industry 
were to succeed, it was essential that the Commonwealth should 
continue to control labour conditions in the shipping industry. 
In addition, Yates' scheme and the reaction of the unionists 
suggested that industrial peace would be promoted, not by 
regulation by tribunals, but by greater self-regulation by 
the parties in industry. 
The success of the Government in subduing the water-
side workers was partly due to the continuing economic 
depression and the consequent decline in the volume of ship-
ping.^ The instability of the economy which had caused Bruce 
and his colleagues a ^ood deal of anxiety in 1927 had, in 
several respects, worsened by the beginning of 1929. The 
unemployment position had become critical. The proportion of 
unionists unemployed, which in 1927 had been 6 per cent, had 
risen to 11 per cent by the end of 1928. There was a slight 
improvement early in 1929, but by the middle of the year the 
figure had reached 12 per cent.^ The overseas interest 
burden continued to rise, while the national income continued 
1. By the end of 1929 a fifth of the interstate fleet was 
idle. 
2. In Queensland the unemployment rate was relatively low, 
but in South Australia if had reached nearly 18 per cent. 
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to fall. The proportion of exports committed to overseas 
interest payments had grown from one sixth to one quarter 
since 1921. Since 1926 the value of exports had remained 
fairly steady. There was again an import surplus of £5m. 
in 1927/28, even though there had been a dramatic decline 
in imports. An export surplus was finally achieved in 
1928/29. Yet the rapid decline in imports meant that customs 
revenue also declined and in 1927/28 the Bruce-Page Govern-
ment was, for the first time, faced with a budget deficit 
of over £5m. There was a further deficit of over £2m. in 
1928/29. The majority of State Governments had deficits in 
both years. 
As has been seen, the coal industry was faced with 
formidable problems and the textile, timber, building and 
other secondary industries were in a similar position, with 
a slack market and growing unemployment. The steel industry 
had to curtail its production in 1928.^ Investment in 
capital equipment in industry had become negligible. Yet 
the export industries were increasing their production and 
there were many people who agreed with Eggleston's comment 
of March, 1929, that while Government finance was in an 
1. Australasian Insurance and Banking Record. 22 Oct. 1928, 
pp.865-64. 
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ominous position, the loasis of the economy was sound.^ The 
amount of wheat produced and exported was exceptionally high 
in 1928/29 and in the same year there was a record wool clip. 
The exports of other primary products remained steady until 
1929, with butter exports increasing substantially. However, 
the total value of Australian exports was not increasing, and 
this pointed to the grim fact that overseas prices were falling, 
Metal prices had been declining steadily and the value of 
Australian metal exports in the 1925-29 period had fallen from 
£24.5m. to £17.9m. In the same period wheat prices dropped 
by 40 per cent. Wool prices drastically declined in the last 
quarter of 1928/29, with the result that, despite its record 
production, the value of Australian wool exports was £5m. less 
than in the previous year, Australia's economic position had 
become really critical. 
As late as August, 1929, Page stated, "That sooner 
or later we should enter upon a period of some depression was 
inevitable. This condition is merely a passing phase of our 
economic life".^ He had been saying tlie same thing for over 
twelve months and he had decided not to increase taxation or 
1. Eggleston. op.cit. p.13. 
2. Commonwealth of Australia Yearbook. No. 23 (1930) p.526 
3. C.P.D. V. 121, 22 Aug. 1929, p.240. 
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curtail expenditure, in spite of the Government's deficit. 
Overseas borrowing, he argued, was not the cause of the 
adverse balance of trade; the main cause was the industrial 
unrest that had interfered with production.^ In the earlj 
months of 1929 there were signs of recovery. Due to the 
substantial decline in imports, overseas competition was 
less- intense and the balance of trade was extremely goodo 
The trading banks were seeking new business for the first 
time for some years. The unemployment level had fallen. The 
rains had been good, the harvest was outstanding, and wool 
and wheat prices had not yet fallen sharply. In March, 
1929, Page told Parliament that while industrial disputes 
were reducing the purchasing power of the Commonwealth, it 
would seem that the country was no longer in the trough of 
the depression, and he vi/as hopeful that another deficit 
might be avoided. 
Since 1927 Bruce had been declaring that Australian 
industries would overcome their problems if they reduced 
f • ' 
1. S.M.H. 27 June, 1928, p.14. 
2. Melbourne Stock Exchange Official Record. March, 1929, 
pp.125, 130; Australasian Insurance and Banking Record. 
22 April, 1929, p.297; Schedvin. op.cit. pp.110-12; 
E.A. Boehm. "Australia's economic depression of the 
1930s". Economic Record, v.49, (1973), pp.613-15. 
3. C.P.D. V. 120, 18 March, 1929, p.1356. 
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their production costs. As he opposed wage reductions, this 
meant that industries had to increase their efficiency. This 
was the theme of his addresses at employers' dinners and the 
employers became most resentful of his sermons. They believed 
that high production costs resulted from compulsory arbitra-
tion, heavy taxation and either excessive or insufficient 
tariffs. A Government with a deficit was unlikely to reduce 
taxation, and tariffs divided the employers. The employers 
therefore turned to arbitration as the scapegoat for all the 
ills of Australian industry. 
It will be recalled that Latham first became aware 
of a shift in the employers' stand on arbitration in the 
early months of 1928. Several of their organizations told 
him that they no longer specifically opposed Federal arbit-
ration or State arbitration; they now opposed all forms of 
compulsory arbitration. One writer has suggested that the 
employers' resolutions calling for an end to arbitration had 
a theatrical quality and should be treated sceptically.^ 
Such assertions are difficult to refute. Nevertheless, even 
if certain employers were making gestures instead of advanc-
ing policies, their performances were remarkably sustained, 
for their determination to dispense with the arbitration 
1. D. Carboch. The fall of the Bruce-Page Government. 
Melbourne, 1958, p.269. 
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system was as evident in their private letters and discussions 
as it was in their public statements. It was natural that, 
at a time where there was a large labour surplus, collective 
bargaining should have many attractions for employers. Some, 
like Ashworth and McDonald, openly called for wage reductions,^ 
most asserted that longer hours and an extension of piecework 
were essential and others believed that the abolition of com-
plicated and conflicting awards would, by itself, end so much 
litigation, argument, resentment, small stoppages and waste 
that production rates would soar. Whatever their reasons, 
most employer organizations made it perfectly clear to the 
CommonY/ealth Government that they found arbitration intoler-
able. The Central Council of Employers, the Associated 
Chambers of Manufactures, the Associated Chambers of Commerce, 
the Australian Mines and Metal Association and the Metal 
Trades Employers Association all shared this view. The 
Advisory Committees of Employers were formed expressly to 
secure an end to arbitration, and McDonald stated that their 
aim was to create an atmosphere that would make legislators 
I 
realize that they would have to do away with all forms of 
compulsory arbitration.^ W. Brooks asserted that arbitra-
1. Age. 9 Feb. 1929, p.24. 
2. Minutes of meeting of presidents of eployers' associa-
tions, Sydney, 25 Jan. 1928. (Woll.83). 
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tion had been responsible for the loss of millions of pounds 
by the railways, the failure of the Commonwealth Shipping 
Line, and the loss of the export trade in coal.^ Yet not 
all employer bodies condemned arbitration: the Commonwealth 
Steamship Owners Association, the Graziers Federal Council 
and the New South Wales Chamber of Manufactures continued to 
support the Federal Arbitration Court. 
In 1923 and 1924 the employers had been very 
critical of Federal arbitration but had defended State arbit-
ration. In 1928 and 1929 the State systems were also critic-
ized. The Victorian Employers Federation asserted that wages 
boards were just as compulsory as the Arbitration Court; 
moreover, their chairmen usually lacked the impartiality 
and analytical minds of the judges.^ The New South Wales 
Employers Federation believed that arbitration was at the 
root of all industrial ills, and it rejected any compromise 
whereby either the Commonwealth or the State would retire 
from the field of arbitration.^ The Victorian Advisory 
Committee of Employers argued that there was no logical 
reason why anything should replace the arbitration system 
although, as a concession to political and public opinion, 
1. S.M.H. 10 Oct. 1928, p.16. 
2. Employers Monthly Review, v. 26, Feb. 1929. p.23. 
3. Employers Review, v. 1, 31 Jan. 1929, p.lo 
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employers should be prepared to put forward an alternative 
system.^ Other organizations, such as the Australian Mines 
and Metals Association, held the same view, although as a 
compromise they were prepared to continue with State arbit-
ration. 
Related to the refusal to differentiate between 
the Federal and State systems was the diminishing concern 
with the evils of overlapping awards. Employers had not 
completely ceased to bemoan the effects of overlapping, 
McDonald insisted that conflicting Federal and State indus-
trial legislation was becoming more acute every day.^ In 
March, 1929, the New South Wales Employers Federation referred 
to clashes between Federal awards and the State Factories and 
Shops Act and the Workers Compensation Act, and also between 
the Federal basic wage and the Family Endowment Act. In 
addition, men working alongside each other worked different 
hours and received different rates of pay.^ Overlapping 
was still a serious problem and always would be, as long as 
both the Commonwealth and the States regulated industry. 
1. Statement of Advisory Committee of Employers, n.d. (Woll.85) 
2. Evidence of T. Maughan, Secretary, Australian Mines and 
Metals Association, to Royal Commission on Constitution, 
19 March, 1928, pp.1385-96. 
3. Industrial Australian and Mining Standard. 4 Oct. 1928, 
p.322. 
4. Emplovers Review, v. 1, 30 March, 1929, pp.1-2. 
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Nevertheless, the problem was slowly becoming less acute, and 
this was apparent in the deliberations and resolutions of 
the employers. The employers admitted that the worst form 
of overlapping had ended with the Clyde Engineering Case. 
In addition, the years of criticism by the employers and 
the provisions of the 1928 Arbitration Act were showing 
results and both Federal and State tribunals were making 
genuine attempts to mitigate the problem. In 1928 the Federal 
Court issued its first order restraining a State tribunal 
from hearing a case.^ In the same year, in the Hotel and 
Restaurants Case, Dethridge laid down the criteria that were 
to determine whether the Court should hear an application or 
whether it should refer it to a State authority. His 
successors were to make frequent use of this judgement. In 
the 1950s and 1940s overlapping became a comparatively minor 
problem, especially as State authorities were increasingly 
directed to grant the same rates as were provided in the 
corresponding Federal awards.^ 
1. 25 C.A.R. 1570 
2. 26 C.A.R. 489 
5. See 0. de R. Foenander. Better emplovment relations and 
other essays in labour. Sydney, 1954, Chapter 8 ; C . P . 
Mills. "Federal-State dualism in industrial relations". 
Journal of Industrial Relations, v.l (1959) pp.119-22; 
J.H. Portus. "Aspects of the Commonwealth and State 
division of arbitration power" m J.E. Isaac and G.W. 
Ford (eds.) Australian labour relations: readings. 
Melbourne, 197TI 
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\Vhile the employers were divided in their attitude 
towards Federal arbitration, the trade unions adopted an 
ambivalent position. The A.W.U. always tended to favour the 
Federal Court. In contrast, the A.C.T.U. Congress in July, 
1928, resolved that all unions should hold ballots on the 
question of withdrawing from the Federal Court.^ One union, 
the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners, obeyed 
the resolution. In February, 1929, the A.C.T.U., as a com-
promise decided that unions should withdraw their claims 
from the Federal Court and should not appear before the Court. 
Once again a single union, the Amalgamated Road Transport 
Y/orkers Union, requested that it be allowed to withdraw its 
claim, but Lukin refused its request. Thus the unions' 
resolutions of hostility towards arbitration should be 
treated sceptically. In fact, many leaders insisted that 
they supported the arbitration system created by Higgins, 
but it had been perverted by the amendments of the Bruce 
Government and was now administered by a prejudiced Court. 
This was apparently the attitude of thousands of the rank 
I 
and file unionists, for although they refused to withdraw 
from the Court they were willing_to give generous financial 
assistance to the Timbervrorkers Union in its defiance of the 
Court. 
1. S.M.H. 23 July, 1928, p.11. 
2. Ibid. 11 Feb. 1929, p.11. 
2 
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Any hopes that the employers and the unions might 
reach agreement on the subject of arbitration were quickly 
dispelled early in 1929. The Industrial Conference called 
by the Victorian Chamber of Manufactures finally began its 
deliberations in Melbourne in December, 1928, Many prominent 
leaders of the unions and the employer organizations were 
present and the press went into rhapsodies about the con-
structive speeches made by both sides and the general atmos-
phere of goodwill.^ But when the conference resumed in 
February, 1929, the timberworkers' strike and the impending 
mining lockout embittered relations and the speeches were 
much more provocative and uncompromising. Predictably, the 
p 
conference broke down after a few days. The only matter 
on which there was substantial agreement concerned the Common-
wealth Arbitration Act: it was felt that its penal clauses 
were not conducive to industrial peace. A sub-committee of 
the conference met Bruce and Latham in April, 1929, and dis-
cussed the objections to the penal clauses.^ 
1. Herald. 10 Dec. 1928, p.6. 
2. S.M.H. 25 Feb. 1929, p.11. 
3. Ibid. 17 April, 1929, p.18. 
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Other people besides the employers and the union-
ists took a strong interest in industrial arbitration, 
especially in its economic consequences. In New Zealand 
academic economists were in the vanguard of the opposition to 
arbitration and A.H. Tocker visited Australia in 1928 and 
gave lectures on the subject, financed by some of the employer 
organizations. Latham read and annotated one of his addresses.^ 
However, Tocker was unable to arouse much support among the 
small group of Australian economists. D.B. Copland said that 
it was absurd to attribute all the country's troubles to arbit-
ration. Copland believed that industry was over-regulated and 
favoured a system of self-regulation by means of works com-
mittees. The lack of support for Tocker's ideas was evident 
in an address given by R.C. Mills to the Industrial Conference 
in February, 1929. He asserted that the tariff and wage 
regulation were in danger of becoming scapegoats for Australia's 
industrial sins. Industrial regulation had abolished sweating, 
had been moderately successful in minimizing industrial dis-
turbances, but had effected little if any improvement in 
living standards. Like most economists. Mills believed that 
1. Lecture delivered by Prof. A.H. Tocker at King's Hall, 
Sydney, 2 February, 1929, on compulsory arbitration. 
(A.N.L. MS 1009/28). 
2. D.B. Copland to Higgins, 6 July, 1928. (A.N.L. MS 1057/1/586) 
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Australian wage rates were too rigid; the Court should pay 
less attention to the cost of living and should consider 
economic factors, particularly the level of unemployment in 
different industries. At the same time a policy of wholesale 
wage reductions was likely to defeat its own ends, as it would 
lessen the demand for commodities.^ 
It was not until the 1930s that academic economists 
began to influence Government policy-making. Bruce and his 
Ministers took much more notice of the views of four leading 
British industrialists who visited Australia in the second 
half of 1928. The British Economic Mission was appointed by 
the British Government, at Bruce's request, to report on the 
development of Australian resources and any other matters of 
mutual economic interest to the two countries. In its report, 
completed in January, 1929, the Mission rejected the notion 
that Australia was heading for economic disaster. However, 
it was extremely critical of the arbitration system. It 
referred to the vicious circle of ascending wages, tariffs 
and prices, and declared that Australia's most urgent task 
was to break the circle by bringing down the costs of produc-
tion without lowering living standards. The Mission catalogued 
1. Proceedings of Industrial Conference, 19 Feb. 1929. 
(C.A.O. C.P.103/11). 
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the familiar weaknesses of the arbitration system: it was 
slow and expensive, it occupied a disproportionate amount of 
management's time, it engendered a spirit of antagonism, it 
created a vast maze of conflicting decisions, and it assigned 
the task of determining complicated economic and industrial 
questions to men whose only training had been in the law. 
The intrinsic faults of arbitration would be intensified 
unless an end was put to the overlapping of Commonwealth and 
State jurisdictions and unless the Court was directed, without 
qualification, to consider the economic effects of its awards. 
Thus the Mission was implicitly criticizing Latham's belief 
that the basic wage should be sacrosanct. It considered that 
the Court's wage-fixing methods constituted one of the worst 
features of arbitration. With wages based on the cost of living, 
the worker received no rewards if production was increased and 
consequently he had no interest in bringing down the cost of 
living or in greater efficiency.^ 
The employers, unions, economists and the British 
Economic Mission tended to praisfe or condemn the whole idea 
and practice of arbitration, even though it was usually Federal 
arbitration that they had in mind. In contrast, some of the 
State Governments maintained the position that they had taken 
1. British Economic Mission. Report, 7 Jan. 1929. pp.14, 17-18 
- 357 -
in 1925: the complete abolition of arbitration would not be 
acceptable to a majority of the electorate, but the abolition 
or drastic limitation of the powers of the Federal Court was 
a matter of urgency. The State Governments believed that if 
the railways were not regulated by the Federal Court, they 
would have some hope of balancing their budgets. However, 
they were not solely concerned with State instrumentalities, 
for they believed that the problem of overlapping jurisdictions 
was as serious as ever. 
Bavin had always been the most vocal proponent of 
this view. In March and April, 1929, he called conferences 
of the seven largest employer organizations in New South Wales 
to consider the whole subject of arbitration.^ Bavin told 
them that the Federal system was the main cause of the expense 
and confusion arising out of the chaotic conditions of indus-
trial law. It was agreed that if arbitration was to continue, 
industry had to be relieved of the evils arising out of 
duplication, and also that State employees should be outside 
the jurisdiction of the Federal 'Court. But the conferences 
then became deadlocked: the Chamber of Manufactures believed 
p 
that the Federal Court should regulate all private industries; 
1. Bavin to J. Heine, President, Metal Trades Employers 
Association, 8 Feb. 1929. (M.T.I.A. Box 54); S.M.H. 
9 March, 1929, p.8. 
2. Minutes of N.S.W. Chamber of Manufactures Executive, 
4 April, 1929. (N.S.W. C.M.). 
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Bavin was convinced that the Federal Court was the source of 
their trouble, but did not thint that a case had been made 
for entirely scrapping arbitration;^ and the Employers 
Federation argued that all forms of arbitration were equally 
obnoxious. In March, 1929, Bavin met the Premiers of Victoria, 
South Australia and Tasmaniao They agreed that the duplication 
of Federal and State tribunals was causing widespread unemploy-
ment and that the Federal Court had deprived the States of 
control over their own finances. Bavin urged all the Premiers 
to meet and discuss the matter before the forthcoming Premiers' 
2 
Conference. The Victorian Ministers shared Bavin's views 
wholeheartedly, the Attorney-General stating that the Common-
wealth Arbitration Act should be repealed immediately.^ Bavin 
left Sydney on an overseas trip in April, 1929, but his actions 
had ensured that arbitration would be one of the main subjects 
to be discussed at the Premiers' Conference in May. History 
was repeating itself: as in 1925, Bavin was forcing the 
Commonwealth Government to commit itself to a definite arbitra-
tion policy. 
I 
1. S.M.H. 22 March, 1929, p.15. 
2. A ^ . 12 March, 1929, p.12; 
5. Herald. 24 May, 1929, p.5. 
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From 30th April to 17th May, 1929, the Commonwealth 
Goveriment held a series of Cabinet meetings. The chief 
business on the agendas was the timberworkers' strike, the 
mining lockout, and the Premiers' Conference that was to take 
place at the end of May. The invitations that Bruce had sent 
to the Premiers on 17th April had not included industrial 
matters among the possible subjects for discussion.^ However, 
Bavin and the other Premiers were anxious that the sub.i'ect 
should not be avoided, and consequently it was listed on the 
p 
agenda that was circulated on 10th May.^ The Federal Cabinet 
therefore had to make a quick decision on whether it should 
maintain, modify or discard the arbitration policy - adopted in 
1927 o 
Two written submissions provided Ministers with a 
basis for their discussions. Ogden had prepared a paper on 
the function of the Department of Industry, in the course of 
which he referred to the Arbitration and Industrial Peace 
Acts. He believed that an amended Arbitration Act would pro-
vide the best method of dealing'with industrial disputes.^ 
The Government should seek to persuade the States to abolish 
their arbitration machinery. This would end the irritating 
1. Bruce to Premiers of all States, 17 April, 1929; 
(C.A.O. C.P. 317/3). 
2. Bruce to Collier, 10 May, 1929. (C.A.O. C.P. 317/3). 
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and costly overlapping and conflict of awards, and would give 
greater security to the employers and satisfaction to the 
workers. State tribunals could be created which were respon-
sible to the Federal Court, and the Court could then confine 
its attention to genuine interstate disputes. Thus Ogden 
believed that the Government should revive its policy of May, 
1926, and he evaded the obvious objection that, with the well-
known views of most of the Premiers, Federal supremacy could 
only be achieved by means of another referendum.^ 
The second and more important submission was written 
by Latham on 28th April, two weeks after the John Brown prose-
cution was withdrawn. The whole paper reflected his dis-
enchantment with the Government's arbitration policy, his 
despair over the succession of huge industrial stoppages, and 
his disgruntled attitude towards his colleagues, who for two 
years had stubbornly rejected his arguments relating to the 
penal provisions of the Arbitration Act. The submission began 
with a long quotation from his 1927 memorandum on strike and 
lockout penalties. Latham declared that he adhered to its 
recommendations, as subsequent experience had entirely con-
firmed his views. The Waterside Workers Federation had been 
fined, but it had not been the fine which brought the strike 
1. J.E. O^den. Memorandum: Department of Industry, April, 
1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/42). 
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to an end. The Timloer Y/orkers Union had also been convicted, 
"but its fine had not been paid and, if anything, the convic-
tion had extended the strike. Thousands of members of both 
unions had committed offences by striking, but they had not 
been prosecuted. Even greater numbers of men were encouraging 
the strikers and giving them financial assistance, without 
any fear of prosecution. The law had already been brought 
into contempt and mass prosecution would only make the position 
worpe. The withdrawal of the Brown prosecution had given new 
strength to the Opposition, disheartened Government supporters, 
made the timberworkers more uncompromising and rendered the 
penal provisions unenforceable. The Government had to realize 
that in the present economic situation strikes and lockouts 
were inevitable. If the Court reduced wages there would be 
strikes, while if it maintained wages there would be lockouts. 
?/hen the issues were really serious, the Court and its 
penalties would be completely ineffective. 
Latham then turned to the Government's future policy. 
Federal regulation of industry had gone too far. With State 
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regulation, disputes would be smaller and federal unions would 
fragment, and would cease to threaten the authority of parlia-
mentary government. But Latham did not advocate the abolition 
of the Federal arbitration system. He merely reaffirmed his 
suggestions of January, 1929: the strike and lockout penalties 
should be repealed and unions that engaged in strikes should 
be deregistered. If this proposal was adopted, perhaps six 
unions would be placed outside the Federal system and the 
remainder would give up striking and work in accordance with 
their awards. Federal arbitration would only work if it was 
limited to industries where there was definite support for 
arbitration. The Government would have to decide how serious 
a strike should be to justify deregistration, and whether the 
Court or the Government itself would make all deregistration 
orders.^ 
There are no other written records of the arguments 
and suggestions which were put forward at the Cabinet meetings. 
By 17th May, 1929, a decision had been reached and reports 
soon appeared in the press that'the Government was planning a 
1. Latham. Memorandum for Cabinet: Industrial legislation 
and penalties, 28 April, 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/28). Parts 
of this memorandum were quoted in the Sun, 14 Aug. 1929, 
p.12, and were used by Theodore in the John Brown censure 
motion debate. 
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drastic reyision of its arbitration policy.^ However, the 
exact nature of its proposals was not revealed until 28th May, 
1929, when Bruce opened the Premiers' Conference in Canberra. 
In his speech to the Premiers, Bruce dwelt on the 
serious economic difficulties facing Australia. The prices 
of staple commodities had fallen, exports of primary products 
had become unprofitable, and the outlook for most secondary 
industries was bad. For the first time since the War, the 
Commonwealth Budget had a deficit. Yet increased taxation 
could defeat its own end by reducing the volume of production. 
The basic cause of the country's economic troubles was not its 
indebtedness but the high cost of production. Legislative 
safeguards of wages and working conditions were essential. 
But the duplication of Commonwealth and State arbitration 
powers was not only unsatisfactory in principle but was 
responsible for much economic waste and for a lack of under-
standing between employers and employees. Industries could 
not be categorized as "Federal" or "State" and this left two 
solutions to the problem. The states could refer full indus-
trial powers to the Commonwealti. If they refused, the 
Commonwealth Government would b^ forced to recommend to Parlia-
ment that it repeal the Federal arbitration laws, thereby 
1. S.M.H. 18 May, 1929, p.11. 
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giving the States full industrial powers. The only exceptions 
would be the shipping and waterside industries, which the 
Commonwealth could completely regulate under its trade and 
commerce power.^ As everyone expected, five of the Premiers 
immediately declared that they could not recommend to their 
respective Parliaments that full industrial powers be granted 
p 
to the Commonwealth. 
The decision of the Commonwealth Government to make 
no further use of its arbitration power must rank as one of 
the most dramatic and far-reaching reversals of policy in 
Australian political history. Some attempt must be made to 
determine who made the decision, why it was made, and what it 
was hoped would be achieved under the new system of industrial 
arbitration. 
1. S.M.H. 29 May, 1929, p.16. 
2. Proceedings of Premiers' Conference, Canberra, May, 1929. 
pp.9-14. The Queensland Nationalist Government was 
.lesitant and in June, 1929, it proposed that a conference 
of Commonwealth and State wage-fixing authorities be 
called to work out uniform principles of wage-fixation, 
standard hours, the statistics on which determinations 
should be based, and subjects which should be regulated 
by parliaments. Latham opposed a conference of judges, 
as State Parliaments could reject their suggestions and 
thereby place the judges in an embarrassing position, and 
he suggested instead a conference of Premiers and Ministers 
for Labour and Industry. See A.E. Moore to Bruce, 15 June, 
1929, draft reply by Latham, 1 July. 1929, Bruce to Sir 
William McPherson, 16 Aug. 1929. "(G.A.O. A432 29/1945). 
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All the evidence indicates that it was Bruce who 
suggested to his colleagues that the Federal arbitration 
system should be brought to an end. Only five Ministers would 
have had either the authority or the courage to make such a 
radical proposal: Bruce, Page, Pearce, Latham or Ogden. Page 
had never made any important suggestions about industrial 
relations and the pastoralists' organizations, which were his 
main source of information outside the Government, were rela-
tively satisfied with Federal arbitration. Pearce had said 
only a few weeks before that if the Arbitration Court was 
abolished they v/ould revert to the bad conditions of the 
early 1890s.^ He ¥/as regarded, at least by his colleagues, 
as the most astute politician in the Cabinet and he would not 
have made such a remark if, at the same time, he was privately 
working for the abolition of the Coujrt. The memoranda of 
Latham and Ogden, both written in April, 1929, give the 
impression that they had taken it for granted that Cabinet 
would reject any suggestion to end Federal arbitration. Thus, 
by the process of elimination, it must be concluded that it 
t 
was Bruce who astonished the other Ministers by proposing 
that they leave the field of arbitration to the States. 
Even Bruce, who often treated his Ministers in an 
autocratic manner, could have been overruled by the rest of 
1. S.M.H. 12 Feb. 1929, p.10. 
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the Cabinet on such a fundamental question. He always insis-
ted that the Cabinet was unanimous over the new arbitration 
policy. Yet it took numerous meetings over two weeks before 
the decision was finally made,^ and it is likely that initially 
there was a good deal of opposition, Ogden had expressed his 
unqualified support for full industrial powers for the Common-
wealth. Another new Minister, C.L.A. Abbott, who was a 
leading spokesman for the pastoralists, urged Cabinet to retain 
n 
the Federal Court. Other Ministers, while believing that 
Bruce's proposal had much intrinsic merit, believed that it 
would have dangerous political consequences for the Government. 
1. Page to J.A.J. Hunter, 25 May, 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1633/2525). 
2. Abbott. Family background, pp.323-25. (A.N.L. MS 1674). 
The great difficulty in tracing the origins of a major 
policy decision is illustrated by the fact that Abbott, 
a Cabinet Minister, was not sure' who had first put 
forward the idea to abolish the Federal Arbitration Court, 
although his guess was that it was Pearce. Abbott wrote 
that Bruce, Page and Pearce were the real decision-makers 
and Pearce was "undoubtedly the power behind the throne". 
Abbott addressed his arguments to each of the three men, 
but "the Prime Minister looked at me with friendly 
sympathy, but shook his head". Page "grinned and popped 
another' piece of chewing gum in his mouth", and Pearce 
"listened courteously, with his hand behind his ear, but 
was immovable". Ogden was the only other Ministerial 
critic of the Government's proposals mentioned by Abbott. 
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It conflicted directly with Latham's advice, given two years 
before, that a change to State control should not be made 
suddenly and that the public should be educated to appreciate 
the advantages of the change long before any practical pro-
posals were made.^ It is apparent, from some of Bruce's 
letters written just before the Premiers' Conference, that 
the Cabinet had been greatly concerned about the political 
dangers of the new policy. For instance, Bruce told the 
leaders of the National Federation that there was a strong 
possibility that the Government would be defeated on account 
of its decision to withdraw from arbitration. As an election 
was not due until late in 1951, the remark suggests that Bruce 
felt that he would not be able to count on the full support 
of his own Party and that another election would have to be 
held fairly soon. If the supremely confident Bruce had such 
doubts, it was hardly surprising that several of his Ministers 
would only agree to the proposal after long consideration. 
The speech of Pearce and the submissions of Latham 
and Ogden showed that Bruce's silggestion was quite unexpected, 
and that it had not been seriously discussed by Cabinet before 
30th April, 1929. It is pointless to ask who initiated the 
1. See above, p. 222. 
2. Bruce to E.H. Willis, 25 May, 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/39). 
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new policy; men had been calling for the abolition of the 
Federal Court for twenty years, and Ministers had been 
threatening to take such action since 1920. However, it is 
reasonable to ask whether pressure from any individuals or 
groups was finally decisive in April, 1929, in moving Bruce 
to take action. Deane was no longer Bruce's chief adviser 
and McLaren refused on principle to criticize Government 
policies. The same applied to J.T. Heathershaw, the Secretary 
to the Treasury. The only public servants whose views on 
arbitration were valued by Bruce were Garran and Stewart. 
It is most unlikely that Bruce would have consulted Garran 
without Latham's knowledge and, in any case, there is no 
evidence that Garran had altered his view that full indus-
trial powers should be given to the Commonwealth. Stewart 
still believed fervently in the superiority of the Federal 
system; in-fact, he came dangerously close to opposing 
publicly the Government's new policy. Bruce's letters to 
the leaders of the National Federation indicate that he had 
not consulted them, a fact which was later to arouse some 
1. Schedvin, op.cit. p. 
2. Stewart supplied Groom, one of the rebels, with a good 
deal of information which he hoped could be used against 
his own Minister's policies. See Stewart to Groom, 
17 Sept. 1929, Stewart to Groom, 18 Sept. 1929, Stewart 
to Groom, 3 Oct. 1929. (A.N.L. fc 256/2/5680). 
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criticism from the Federation.^ Employers, of course, had 
been telling Bruce for over a year that arbitration should 
be abolished, and he was certainly influenced by their hos-
tility towards the Federal arbitration system. However, he 
appears to have had little contact with any employers in 
April, 1929, apart from MacDougall, with whom he discussed 
the penal clauses of the Arbitration Act. Two of the most 
influential business leaders, W.L. Baillieu and S. McKay, were 
overseas in 1929 and the only other man who Bruce may possibly 
have consulted was Sir Robert Gibson. Thus it would seem 
fairly certain that Bruce was acting under the pressure of 
events, and not under pressure from individuals or organizations, 
It is a much more difficult matter to determine the 
reasons for the change in the Government's arbitration policy. 
At the Premiers' Conference Bruce referred to the financial 
depression and the overlapping of awards, two problems which 
the Commonwealth Government shared with the States. It was 
apparent later that there were other reasons, and some 
historians have been sure that 'there were reasons which were 
1. Herald. 24 Sept. 1929, p.7. Bruce referred rather proudly 
to the fact that in both 1926 and 1929 his decisions had 
been in direct conflict with the official policy of his 
Party. Latham felt that it was unwise to emphasize that 
the 'Government, in its policy-making, paid no regard to 
the Party organization. See Latham to Sir Arthur Robinson, 
1 Oct. 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/45). 
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never admitted. As far as is known, Bruce never set down at 
any length his motives in reversing the arbitration policjo 
This has forced historians to take either of two approaches,, 
They have followed Collingwood's dictum and tried to re-enact 
the thoughts of the Ministers faced with certain definite 
problems. That is no easy matter, for the historian's own 
interests usually colour his assessment of the problems. 
Thus economists have argued that Bruce was mainly concerned 
with Australia's financial difficulties, while lawyers have 
insisted that he was troubled by the inadequacies of arbit-
ration law. The other approach is to examine the proposals 
themselves and to assume that they were the logical outcome 
of the Ministers' diagnosis of the problems. Thus historians 
have been sceptical of the emphasis that Bruce placed on 
overlapping awards, on the ground that State control would 
not end overlapping. Yet it is a risky assumption. Men 
confronted with a huge problem, with questions of power and 
authority at issue, and with very little expert assistance, 
cannot be expected to make a completely logical decision or 
to be aware of all its implications. 
Fortunately, there are a few private letters that 
shed some light on Bruce's motives. On 25th May, 1929, he 
told Sir David Gordon: "The financial position is becoming 
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more and more serious and arbitration is becoming a farce 
On the same day he told Archdale Parkhill: "Unless we take 
some action the Government will become the laughing stock of 
Australia". Leaving aside the financial position, it could 
be argued, by linking the letters with Bruce's speech, that 
arbitration was becoming a farce because the problem of 
overlapping awards was becoming more serious. However, 
Latham's memorandum of 28th April would not substantiate this 
argument. Latham had asserted that arbitration was a farce 
because huge interstate stoppages took place in direct defiance 
of awards and, despite all the penal provisions of the Arbit-
ration Act, any action that the Government had taken had been 
futile. He had not mentioned overlapping awards, for the 
problem had no bearing on the great stoppages of 1928 and 
1929. Overlapping might be serious, but it was hardly making 
the Government "the laughing stock of Australia", 
It was therefore the great stoppages, not the 
overlapping of awards, which made the situation critical and 
which impelled the Government to take action. In May, 1929, 
two of the stoppages were at their height and Ministers' minds 
were full of reports of the tens of thousands of men who were 
1. Bruce to Sir David Gordon, 25 May, 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/39) 
2. Bruce to Parkhill, 25 May, 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/39). 
- 372 -
idle, the inarches and the pickets, the violence on the wharves 
and in the streets, the ineffectual prosecutions and the John 
Brown incident. The Cabinet felt that it was being humiliated 
because it could do nothing at all about the thousands of men 
who were breaking the law by striking, and because it could 
only appeal, often vainly, to the State Governments to enforce 
Commonwealth laws against picketing and intimidation. Minis-
ters were not likely to talk publicly about their virtual 
helplessness or their declining authority and prestige, but 
their constant references in private to "contempt for the 
law", "futile action" and "farcical situation" show that 
these concerns were very much in their minds. In the case 
of Latham they were always the chief considerations. In all 
his submissions and letters in 1929 there was hardly any 
mention of the economic depression or the overlapping of 
awards; instead, there was a preoccupation with the unions' 
defiance of the law and with the Commonwealth Government's 
inability to enforce its own laws. As late as October, 1929, 
by which time the economic position was extremely grave, he 
I 
was still obsessed with the question of law and authority. 
"Unless the proposal of the Government succeeds I think it 
will have to be necessary to consider taking a big step 
towards unification, because if industrial matters are to be 
handled by the Commonwealth I cannot see how they can be 
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satisfactorily handled without passing over to the Conunon-
wealth the general responsibility for the maintenance of law 
and order. 
It would seem that, more than anything else, a 
crisis of authority forced Ministers to change their arbitra-
tion policy in May, 1929. Yet if that had been the only 
question it would have been sufficient to adopt Latham's 
suggestion and repeal the penal clauses and deregister unions 
that went on strike. The radical policy that was in fact 
adopted pointed to tv/o contradictory reasons that were also 
in the minds of different Ministers. Although the new policy 
had come as a surprise, Latham welcomed it: he had been 
arguing for over two years that State control would reduce 
the power of the unions and would eliminate interstate strikes 
Thus Latham and possibly other Ministers believed that the 
new policy would lessen large-scale industrial conflict. 
There was some force in his argument, as the waterside 
workers' and timberworkers' strikes would not have been so 
devastating if the Beeby and Lilkin awards had only been State 
awards. On the other hand, genuine interstate strikes were 
very rare and stoppages within one State could be just as 
harmful, as the mining lockout showed. The other reason 
1. Latham to K.H. Bailey, 11 Oct. 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/38). 
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influenced those Ministers, particularly Bruce, who were not 
convinced by Latham's argument. They believed that the only 
real solution to industrial conflict was supremacy for the 
Commonwealth, provided that there were no constitutional 
limitations on the means that the Government could use to 
deal with industrial matters. In other words, they adhered 
to their views of 1926. They believed that the State Govern-
ments would soon find themselves faced with chaos and strife 
on a grand scale. They would bear the full brunt of the 
attacks of the large, militant unions, disputes would con-
stantly arise because the discrepancies in labour conditions 
between the different States would be multiplied, and indus-
tries in some States would find themselves at a serious dis-
advantage as a result of interstate competition. The time 
would come, therefore, when the States would be most anxious 
to offer full industrial powers to the Commonwealth.^ Thus 
some of the Ministers were following a most devious policy: 
they advocated a policy that they believed would cause even 
t 
1. The main source for this hypothesis is a speech that 
Bruce made on 4 June and ix must therefore remain rather 
tentative. But a number of people interpreted the 
speech in this way and Bruce did not correct them at 
all. See S.M.H. 5 June, 1929, p.15; Bailey to Latham, 
8 Oct. 19297TA.N.L. MS 1009/39). "It is quite possible 
that the wary and cynical Prime Minister hopes, by 
submitting the Premiers to the acid test of proving 
their superior ability, to cover them with ridicule and 
make them unwittingly' demonstrate the necessity of 
Commonwealth control of all industrial legislation." 
A1 ]stralasian Manufacturer. v. 14, 8 June, 1929, pp.11-13. 
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greater industrial unrest in order to achieve the long-term 
ohjective of a single Commonwealth arbitration system. 
These considerations which influenced Ministers to 
varying degrees were obscured in public speeches by the 
incessant references to the overlapping of awards. It is 
impossible to be certain as to how much was rhetoric and how 
much reflected a genuine concern with a long-standing problem. 
It has been seen that the decision of the High Court in 1926, 
the legislation of the Commonwealth Government in 1928, and 
the concern and efforts of the Federal Arbitration Court had 
resulted in an easing of the problem, although this only 
became apparent very gradually. Bruce should have realized 
that the employers were no longer obsessed with overlapping 
awards. Latham had not mentioned overlapping in his memoranda 
and Bruce himself had shown little concern with the subject 
since early in 1928. It would seem that Bruce deliberately 
exaggerated the seriousness of the problem because he knew it 
was a question that preoccupied the Premiers. Nevertheless, 
overlapping was not a trivial ma'tter. When both Federal 
awards and State labour laws and awards were in force in the 
same factory, resulting in different wage rates for similar 
work, different hours, and innumerable differences in working 
conditions, there was bound to be resentment,, minor stoppages 
and litigation, confusion and misunderstandings. All these 
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factors had a detrimental effect on productivity. Bruce, as 
a businessman, keenly appreciated the difficulties and loss 
resulting from overlapping awards, as did the British indus-
trialists who were in the 1928 Economic Mission. 
The Government's proposed solution, although it 
might mitigate the problem, supports the suggestion that the 
overlapping of Federal and State awards did not occupy such 
an important place in the thinking of Ministers. State 
tribunals were in a position to co-ordinate the awards of 
related classes of workers, and they would ensure that their 
awards did not conflict with State industrial laws. There 
would be complete harmony of working hours in each State, 
and differing hours had hitherto caused more unrest and waste 
than any other factor. It had been completely impossible for 
the Federal Court to try and reconcile its awards with State 
laws and awards. Under the new system there would be resent-
ment and perhaps stoppages if there were large discrepancies 
in the wages paid to the same class of workers in different 
States. However, Ministers were' probably correct in claiming 
that workers were far more concerned with differences within 
the same factory than with differences between the States. 
Thus the advantages accruing from the new policy should not 
be airily dismissed. On the other hand, if overlapping had 
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been the most important question the Government would have 
paid more attention to the problem of migratory workers. 
Even the most ardent opponents of Federal arbitration acknow-
ledged that the seamen, shearers and perhaps theatrical 
employees should come under Federal control. Yet only the 
maritime industries would still be regulated on a Federal 
basise There was bound to be trouble with the shearers, 
especially as the Queensland and New South Vfeles rates would 
almost certainly be different. Thus, for the migratory 
workers overlapping and confusion would increase under the 
new order.^ Perhaps, once again, Bruce hoped that increased 
conflict would make the States more accommodating. 
In his letters Bruce referred to the two problems 
of overlapping awards and the deteriorating financial position. 
In both cases it is difficult to assess just how much impor-
tance Ministers attached to the problem. The weaknesses and 
instability of the national economy had caused the Government 
concern since early in 1927, and some writers have attributed 
the new arbitration policy solely to the Government's desperate 
need to prevent the financial position worsening. Yet it must 
be remembered that the Government only commenced its consider-
ation of the future of Federal arbitration in April, 1929, and 
1. This was admitted by Latham. See Latham to Bruce, 21 Aug. 
1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/39). 
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in the early months of 1929 it appeared that the worst stage 
of the depression might be over. The unemployment figures 
were falling, the balance of trade was extremely favourable, 
the harvest had been good, wool and wheat prices had not yet 
dropped sharply and Government revenue looked much healthier 
than earlier in the financial year. By May, 1929, the position 
was much worse, but this was not immediately apparent, for 
employment and trading statistics took some time to collate. 
Page seemed very optimistic about the economy in March, 1929, 
and Latham made only one reference to economic difficulties 
in his Cabinet submission in the next month. In assessing 
the various factors that influenced Ministers' thinking, 
attention must be paid to the urgency of each problem. Every 
day the Government was compelled to face the seriousness of 
industrial conflict and the partial breakdown of law and 
order. In contrast, it was much easier for the Government 
to postpone consideration of the economic problems in the hope 
that unemployment would continue to decline and a deficit 
would be avoided. Ministers all had ideas about industrial 
disputes and understood the advantages and disadvantages of 
the various courses of action open to them. The economic 
depression was much more intangible, had much wider remifica-
tions, was part of a world-wide development and seemed, to 
many Ministers, completely insoluble. It is hard to separate 
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the different factors that influenced Bruce in April, 1929, 
but it would seem that the great industrial stoppages and the 
challenge to the Governinent's authority were decisive. How-
ever, the state of the economy was an important consideration 
and by September, 1929, it had probably become the chief 
concern of Ministers, with the exception of Latham. 
Bruce claimed that, by overcoming the problem of 
the duplication of the Federal and State arbitration systems, 
production costs would be considerably lowered. Duplication 
and inconsistencies undoubtedly caused inefficiency and 
wastage of resources and Bruce was .I'ustified in believing 
that State control would reduce costs. However, it was hard 
to imagine that the reduction would be so marked as to have 
an appreciable effect on the national finances. It must 
again be concluded that Bruce had given only a partial 
explanation of the purpose of the new policy. 
The economist Pigou wrote in 1937: "Until recently 
no economist doubted that an all-round reduction in the rate 
> 
of money wages might be expected to increase the volume 
of employment".^ Some writers have assumed that Bruce 
1. A.C. Pigou. "Real and money wage rates in relation to 
unemployment". Economic Journal, v. 47 (1937) p.405. 
- 380 -
adhered to the orthodox economic ideas of those pre-Keynesian 
times, and that his new arbitration policy was primarily 
designed to open the way for general wage reductions.^ Yet 
Pigou's statement was too categorical. In Australia men 
like Beeby and Mills argued that to reduce the workers' pur-
chasing power would merely worsen the economic position, and 
this was a view consistently propounded by Bruce. He may have 
privately thought otherwise, but it is difficult to see why, 
if he thought that a catastrophe was imminent, he would wish 
to conceal his real views. He did not lack courage and he was 
not faced with an impending election. Bruce's views would 
have carried a good deal of weight in the Arbitration Court, 
but in fact it received no guidance from the Government. 
This was surely a strange policy for a man determined to 
bring down wages. In all their private correspondence with 
Nationalist backbenchers, Party officials and the employers, 
Bruce and Latham insisted that it was not their intention to 
bring about a general lov/ering of wages. Bruce was still 
maintaining this attitude when he was no longer in Parliament.-^ 
I 
1. Schedvin. op.cit. p.110. 
2. Latham'to G.S. Maclean, Secretary, National Federation, 
24 May, 1929, Latham to Myhill, 24 May, 1929. (A.N.L. 
MS 1009/39). 
3. Australian National Review. 30 Oct. 1929, p.7. 
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Admittedly, the Government was worried that its proposal 
would be regarded as an attack on the wage-earners. A few 
days before the Premiers' Conference Bruce and Latham wrote 
to conservative newspapers, employer organizations and the 
National Federation appealing to them not to "greet the 
announcement with paeans of joy and triumph" at the "supposed 
return to the clear economic ring".^ Different meanings can 
be read into these letters, but the most likely one is that 
the Government did not wish to be associated with a policy 
of wage reductions until it was convinced that such a policy 
was essential. This conclusion does not overlook the undeniable 
fact that the Government believed strongly that lower wages 
were necessary in a few specific industries, such as coalmining. 
The new arbitration policy supports this conclusion. 
The Government was not abolishing compulsory arbitration and 
restoring collective bargaining, for the State Governments 
were committed to retaining their arbitration systems. This 
meant that any wage reductions would only take place slowly 
I . . 
1. Latham to Myhill, 24 May, 1929, Latham to Maclean, 24 May, 
1929, Bruce to Gordon,' 25 May, 1929, Bruce to Hunter, 
25 May, 1929, Bruce to J.A. Perkins, 25 May, 1929, Bpce 
to Willis, 25 May, 1929, Bruce to Parkhill, 25 May, 1929. 
(A.N.L. MS 1009/59); Latham to Bruce, 27 May, 1929. 
(A.N.L. MS 1009/41). 
2. Latham. Election notes. 16 Sept. 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/45) 
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and, while this would lessen the probability of industrial 
conflict, it would delay the effect that they mi^ht have on 
the economy. If Bruce had been mainly concerned with wage 
reductions it would have been wiser for him to have kept the 
Federal Court.^ Dethridge and Lukin were more likely to 
lower the basic wage than were most of the State arbitrators, 
and their decision would immediately have affected the wages 
of 420,000 workers. 
While Bruce and Latham appear to have still believed 
that wage reductions could be avoided late in 1929, it is 
quite probable that other Ministers had come to hold the 
contrary view at an earlier stage. The whole Cabinet was 
certainly united in holding that the Federal Court had over-
regulated industries and that employers must have much greater 
freedom to extend payment by results. In June, 1929, Bruce 
stated explicitly that the only way by which both wages could 
be maintained and costs reduced was to remove all restric-
tions on piecework.^ Employers had told Ministers that 
State awards were much less detailed and complex than Federal 
awards. Latham hoped that the State tribunals, in dealing 
with the occupations that had previously been controlled by 
1. Latham. Election notes. 16 Sept. 1929. (A.N.L. MS 
1009/45). 
2. S.M.H. 18 June, 1929, p.10. 
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the Federal Court, would restrict their attention to wages 
and hours, and would leave it to the employers and workers 
to determine the working conditions.^ He termed this policy 
self-government in industry, although in reality it would 
have restored to the employers much of their old power to 
control conditions. Gullett openly called for a return to 
the 48 hour week^ and other Ministers probably shared the 
same view. Thus it is clear that the Government believed 
that the new policy would increase productivity, not only by 
eliminating overlapping, but also by freeing employers from 
the minute regulation of their businesses by judicial tribunals, 
Two other factors influenced the Government's new 
arbitration policy. Bavin had persuaded the State Govern-
ments to present a united front, and had thereby forced the 
Commonwealth Government to commit itself to a definite policy. 
The Government had to forestall action by the Premiers, as if 
it adopted a policy after the Premiers' Conference, it would 
have been accused of giving in to pressure from the States. 
The result was that, considering* its many implications, the 
new policy was determined hurriedly and there was no time to 
1. Latham to Garran, 22 June, 1929. (C.A.0.A2863. Maritime 
Industries Bill file); S.M.H. 21 Aug. 1929, p.16. 
2. H. Gullett. Speech to New South Wales Chamber of 
Manufactures, 11 Feb. 1929. (Woll.461). 
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subject it to the analysis of the few experts within the 
Public Service or to sound out opinion in the parties, inter-
ested organizations or the press. Arguments were not co-
ordinated and the press soon pointed out that while Bruce was 
deploring the overlapping of awards, Latham was preaching on 
the law and its enforcement, and Gullett was talking about 
piecework and the 48 hour week.^ Another result of Bavin's 
agitation was that the proposals were first announced at the 
Premiers' Conference and not in Parliament. Apart from the 
Whips, the members of the Federal Nationalist and Country 
Parties knew nothing about them until the morning of the 
Conference, when they all received telegrams smnmarizin^ the 
proposals. A few backbenchers were upset by the lack of 
consultation; at least in 1926 they had discussed the Govern-
ment's referendum proposals before they were made public. 
Maxwell was the most annoyed and declared that he would not 
feel bound by a policy that had never been discussed with the 
Partyc^ 
The other factor was Latham's close association in 
1928 and 1929 with the problems of emplo.yment on the water-
front. It would seem that he made his support for Bruce's 
1. Age. 2 Aug. 1929, p.8. 
2. Herald. 15 June, 1929, p.4. 
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proposal conditional on the exemption of the shipping and 
stevedoring industries from the general reorganization of 
arbitration. He had no desire to see all his work wasted, 
the Transport Workers Act repealed, the volunteers abandoned 
to the dubious care of the State Governments, and his plans 
for the reorganization of the industry completely nullified. 
Latham argued that, in any case, the Commonwealth had all the 
powers it needed to control the two industries and it offered 
a solution to the awkward problem of the future work of the 
four Arbitration Court judges, who all had life tenure. These 
arguments won over Latham's colleagues, even though the 
exemption of the waterside workers from State control was 
rather anomalous. 
It has been shown that on different occasions the 
Government, and especially Bruce, put forward panaceas that 
were to solve the industrial problems of Australia. The new 
arbitration policy was a panacea on a vast scale, for Minis-
ters believed that it would restore the Government's authority 
and also respect for the law, eliminate interstate stoppages, 
overcome overlapping awards, reduce costs of production, 
promote harmony and self-government in industry, ensure the 
extension of piecework, and ultimately pave the way for the 
granting of complete industrial powers to the Commonwealth,' 
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Different reasons influenced different Ministers, and a factor 
that may have carried little weight in May, 1929, was perhaps 
a major consideration by September, 1929. Attention has been 
concentrated on the ideas of Bruce, who first raised the 
proposal in Cabinet, and Latham, who had given far more 
thought than anyone else to the Govermient's industrial policy. 
But even with these two men there can be no certainty about 
their motives when they made the momentous decision to abolish, 
after 25 years, the Federal arbitration system. 
In June and July, 1929, Ministers made numerous 
speeches explaining their new arbitration policy. They 
asserted that both sides were profoundly dissatisfied with a 
system in which arbitration was the only method of settling 
the terms and conditions of employment. Ideally, federal 
arbitration should only have been used in cases where better 
methods had failedo Duplication had deprived industrial 
regulation of the essential element of certainty, and this 
had strengthened the power of agitators and extremists. In 
addition, it was imposing a greslter financial burden on 
Australia than the Federal income tax, which raised £10m. per 
annum. Another referendum on the question of full industrial 
powers for the Commonwealth would be most expensive and would 
have no chance of success, in view of union hostility towards 
arbitration. Only co-operation between the parties in industry 
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could overcome the present difficulties. Bruce was critical 
of the Court's method of fixing the basic wage, as the workers' 
conditions would never improve as long as the cost of living 
criterion was used. Wage reductions would alienate the 
workers at a time when their co-operation was essential. But 
the workers would have to accept payment by results if there 
was to be both high wages and increased productivity.^ 
The attitudes of the employers and the unions to 
the Government's proposal were to some extent determined by 
political considerations. With the very real possibility of 
the Government being defeated ou the arbitration issue, the 
great majority of employer organizations voiced their support 
for the proposal and all the unions opposed it. The support 
of many employers was genuine, for if they believed that 
compulsory arbitration was the source of all their troubles, 
the abolition of the Federal Court could be seen as the first 
step towards their objective of a free collective bargaining 
system. A few employer bodies had doubts. The graziers' 
organizations were most dubious about the advantages of 
regulation by the States, but in the end the Graziers Federal 
1. S.M.H. 18 June, 1929, p.10; 2 July, 1929, p.11; 
31 July, 1929, p.13. 
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Council supported the Government.^ The New South Wales 
Chamber of Manufactures was very divided and, although it 
expressed qualified approval for the Government's policy, 
it also gave financial support to the Labour Party at the 
1929 election. The real attitudes of the unions towards 
State industrial regulation are impossible to determine. 
The immediate reaction of the General Secretary of the 
Waterside Workers Federation was one of delight but when, a 
day or so later. Scullin announced that the Labour Party 
would oppose the new policy with all its resources, he 
felt it was his duty to join in the general condemnation of 
the Government. This was probably the attitude of many 
other union leaders, as they had lost their liking for the 
Federal Court. It will be recalled that even the A.W.U. 
had opposed the 1926 referendum proposals and could be a 
strong defender of State arbitration when it suited its 
purposes. 
1. Allen to Bruce, 11 July, 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/59); 
Canberra Times. 51 May, 1929, p.4, S.M.H. 25 June, 
929, p.10, 9 Oct. 1 ^ 9 , p.?l. 
2. Minutes of New South Wales Chamber of Manufactures, 
4 July, 1929, 17 Sept. 1929. (N.S.W.C.M.); S.M.H. 
16 Aug. 1929, p.10. 
3. Minutes of Victorian Chamber of Manufactures, 28 Oct. 
1929. (V.C.M.). 
4. Turley to F.H. Carr, 51 May, 1929, Turley to P.T. 
Walsh, 10 June, 192§, (A.NlU. T62/14). 
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After the Premiers' Conference the initiative in 
working out the details of the future arbitration system 
passed to the State Governments and the employers. On 27th 
June, 1929, the New South Wales Minister for Labour and 
Industry convened a conference of leading employers and 
Government officials to consider the arbitration machinery 
that would be most acceptable. The conference continued at 
intervals until late September, 1929. The Employers Fede-
ration made repeated attempts to gain support for the 
"Utopian State" of freedom from regulation, but the Minister 
insisted that the Government would not consider abolishing 
arbitration, except in the rural industries. The conference 
finally agreed that there should be a tribunal to fix the 
basic wage and standard hours, and that boards in each 
industry would determine labour conditions. The chairmen 
would not have a vote and the agreements would have the 
force of law.^ In Victoria the Chamber of Manufactures 
organized a number of conferences of employers. They decided 
that there should be a tribunal, headed by a Supreme Court 
judge, to determine the basic wag^, that a conciliation 
1. Minutes of conference of employers' representatives and 
the New South Wales Minister for Labour and Industry, 
27 June, 1929 - 16 July, 1929. (M.T.I.A. Box 54). 
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committee should regulate each industry, and if no agreement 
was reached the chairman could either act as arbitrator or 
refer the matter to the Minister for Labour.^ In September, 
1929, meetings were held between New South Wales and Vic-
torian employers in an attempt to reach agreement on a 
common arbitration policy. However, the meetings were 
suspended when it appeared that the Commonwealth's proposals 
p might be defeated. 
While the State Governments and employers were 
debating the whole subject of arbitration, the Commonwealth 
Government was concentrating on the future regulation of the 
shipping and stevedoring industries. Within two weeks of 
the Premiers' Conference Latham had outlined his proposals 
to Cabinet. He suggested that the Arbitration Act should 
be amended by repealing the strike and lockout penalties 
and by limiting the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to 
both disputes and matters in the shipping and stevedoring 
industries affecting interstate or overseas trade. He also 
believed that the Commonwealth should provide arbitration 
I 
machinery that could be utilized voluntarily by both sides 
in all industries, regardless of whether there was an inter-
1. Minutes of special committee of Victorian employers con-
vened to consider questions arising out of the system oi 
compulsory arbitration, 19 June, 1929 - 24 July, 1929. 
(V.E.F.).' 
2. H.B. Sevier, President, New South Wales Ctaber of 
Manufactures, to TulloSh, 11 Sept. 1929. (M.T.I.A. Box 54) 
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state dispute in existence.^ Cabinet rejected the latter 
proposal and it also decided that Latham should draft a new 
Act, instead of amending the Arbitration Act. 
By the end of June, 1929, Boniwell had completed 
the first draft of the Maritime Industries Bill and he and 
Latham spent much of July checking and revising its numerous 
clauses. It had two purposes. It completely repealed the 
1904-1928 Conciliation and Arbitration Act and the 1920 
Industrial Peace Act. Awards and agreements made under 
both Acts would continue in force until 30th June, 1930, and 
the Federal Arbitration Court would continue to interpret 
and enforce its awards until that date. The second purpose 
was to regulate labour conditions in the maritime industries, 
and this was to be achieved through a three-tiered structure. 
At the base there would be several Maritime Industries 
Committees. They would consist of representatives of both 
the employers and the employees, and would be chaired by 
either a Judge, Conciliation Commissioner or Industrial 
} 
1. Latham. Memorandum for Cabinet: Industrial policy, 10 
June, 1929. (C.A.O. A432 29/1945). 
2. Latham had always been critical of the Industrial Peace 
Act. Shortly a'fter the 1928 election he made some notes 
on the Government's legislative programme for the next 
three years, and the repeal of the Industrial Peace Act 
was listed for the September-November, 1929, session. 
(A.N.L. MS 1009/42). 
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Registrar. The Chairman would have a casting vote. The 
determinations of the Committees would be common rules in 
the "branch of the industry concerned and would remain in 
force for three years. The Committees would not be able to 
hear verbal evidence. They would be required to consider the 
probable economic effects of their determinations. Except 
in the cases of Committees chaired by a Judge, all deter-
minations would be submitted to a Judicial Board of Review, 
consisting of the Chief Judge and other Judges. The Board 
would consider^the public interest and the state of the 
economy, and it could disallow or vary determinations. The 
third tier of the new system would be a Maritime Industries 
Court, which would have the power to interpret determinations 
and to deal with offences. The present Judges of the Arbit-
ration Court would all be appointed Judges of the Maritime 
Industries Court. Finally, the Government could appoint 
conciliation commissioners and inspectors, whose duties 
would be confined to the maritime industries. The Bill 
represented a rather unsatisfactory compromise between Latham's 
conflicting objectives: to reduc^ the legalism of arbitra-
tion, to promote greater self-regulation in industry, to 
protect the public interest and to provide continued employ-
ment for the four Arbitration Court judges. 
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The draft Bill was sent to Dethridge and the comments 
of the Judges were received by Latham on 8th August, 1929. 
They pointed out that there was a danger of overlapping 
awards in the stevedoring industry. "Maritime industry" was 
defined as an industry concerned with the transport of 
passengers or goods in relation to overseas or interstate 
trade. The problem was that many waterside workers were 
employed on both interstate and coastal vessels. The Judges 
suggested that the Arbitration Court be retained to deal 
with employees who worked on intrastate vessels and who 
could not be regulated by the proposed Committees.^ Latham 
replied that the Govermnent had given much thought to this 
problem, but it was determined to make no further use of 
the arbitration power with all its constitutional limitations. 
The terms of the Committees' determinations could easily be 
incorporated in either State awards or voluntary agreements 
so as to apply to all maritime workers. The Judges also 
made several suggestions about the powers and functions of 
the Judicial Board of Review, most of which were included in 
the Bill. 
1. Stewart to Latham, 8 Aug. 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/39); 
Beeby to Latham, 9 Aug. 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/1). 
2. Latham to Stewart, 13 Aug. 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/39). 
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Neither the employers nor the unions had any in-
fluence on the form of the Maritime Industries Bill. Latham 
continued his curious habit of first drafting a bill and 
then inviting suggestions from interested organizations. In 
this case he did not seek the views of the shipowners and 
the maritime unions until the end of July, 1929,^ only 
three weeks before it was intended to introduce the Bill 
in Parliament. The shipowners submitted a rather elaborate 
scheme consisting of District Panels, which would regulate 
conditions in the six branches of the industry in each port, 
National Panels and a National Maritime Board, with repre-
sentatives from each of the six National Panels. The 
chairman on each Panel would not have a casting vote and, 
if no agreement was reached, the matter would be referred 
to an independent arbitrator. ^ No strike or lockout could 
take place until the relevant National Panel or the Board 
had considered the dispute. Latham told the shipowners that 
the scheme was too cumbrous for legislative adoption. He 
did not intend dealing with strikes and lockouts, as they 
1. Garran to Crofts, 29 July, 1929, Garran to secretaries 
of eight maritime unions', 29 July, 1929, Latham to 
Elford, 1 Aug. 1929, Latham to Walsh, 8 Aug. 1929. 
(C.A.O. A432 29/2280). 
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were fully covered by the Crimes Act and the Transport 
Workers Act.^ In contrast, the mari+ime unions suggested 
a very simple scheme. There should be a Council if Indus-
trial Representatives for each branch of the industry, with 
three representatives from each side and a chairman. A 
quorum would consist of two thirds of the members and the 
agreements would be legally binding on all parties. Latham 
replied that the idea of a quorum was unacceptable, but he 
believed that the Bill would provide for a system that was 
in accord with their suggestions. However, when the Bill 
was made public the unions objected strongly to the idea of 
Judicial Boards of Review, one official declaring that it 
would have been easier "to pay the salaries of Dethridge 
and Co. for life and allow them to enjoy a permanent holiday". 
Bruce introduced the Maritime Industries Bill in 
Parliament on 23rd August, 1929. His arguments were pre-
sented in a very logical form: reduced production costs 
required the co-operation of the parties in industry; co-
operation was prevented by the duplication of control in 
1. Elford to Lathajn 9 Aug. 1929, Latham to Elford, 10 Aug. 
1929. (C.A.O. A432 29/2280); Elford to Latham, 30 Aug. 
19§, Latham to Elford, 2 Sept. 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/39) 
2. Turley to Latham. 9 Au^. 1929, , Latham to Turley, 
13 Aug. 1929. (S.A.O. A432 29/2280). 
3. Turley to N. Makin, 3 Sept. 1929. (A.N.U. T62/26). 
M 3 
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industry; full industrial powers to the Commonwealth would 
require another expensive referendum, with almost no chance 
of success; the States had refused to grant the powers to 
the Commonwealth; therefore the Commonwealth had no alter-
native but to vacate the field of industrial relations. 
Federal arbitration had been a failure, for there had been 
no conciliation, the unionists had not gained control over 
their own organizations, and awards had proved to be unen-
forceable. The Government's proposals would not destroy 
uniformity of industrial conditions, for there had been no 
uniformity. Even the A.W.U. had sought State awards if they 
were more favourable than Federal ones. Instead of judges 
thrusting awards on to men, there should be round-table con-
ferences, where the union representatives would appreciate 
the difficulties facing industry, and could modify their 
claims. Bruce spent little time on all the provisions of 
the Bill relating to the maritime industries.^ 
Ministers were well aware that their past state-
ments that the abolition of the Federal Court "was. unthinkable", 
or "would solve no problems", or "would result in industrial 
chaos" would be eagerly quoted by the Opposition. Latham 
sought to forestall such attacks byqioting comments by Bruce 
1. C.P.D. V. 121, 23 Aug. 1929, p.280. 
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and himself over the previous two years that arbitration 
could only continue if both sides obeyed the awards. He 
claimed that circumstances had changed since 1926. The huge 
strikes, A.C.T.U. resolutions, and the widespread support 
for the timber workers, showed that there was no longer any 
loyalty to arbitration, as a principle, in the trade union 
movement. He supported Bruce's remark that there had always 
been a lack of uniformity: in five of the States there were 
more State awards in force than Federal awards. The repeal 
of the Industrial Peace Act would be a blessing, as it had 
only functioned when it suited both parties.^ Page pointed 
out that the 700,000 men working under State awards did so 
voluntarily, as they could have easily created interstate 
disputes if they had wished to come under the Federal Court. 
He persisted in attributing unemployment largely to the 
tactics of the labour leaders. 
The leaders of the Labour Party approached the Bill 
with genuine hostility towards its objectives and growing 
confidence that it would bring about the downfall of the 
Government. Theodore declared, quite justifiably, that the 
Bill involved the most sweeping change in statutory law ever 
1. C.P.D. V. 121, 28 Aug. 1929, p.550. 
2. Ibid. V. 121, 5 Sept. 1929, p.612. 
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proposed in the history of the Commonwealth. Due to the 
caprice of one man, 140 awards and 260 registered agreements 
were being treated as "scraps of paper". He denied that 
industrial disturbances were becoming more numerous in 
Australia, or that they were more serious than in other 
countries. Admittedly, the overlapping of craft awards 
caused confusion, but abolishing the Federal Court would not 
solve the problem.^ Brennan asserted that the need for 
federal authority in industry was much greater than in 1901, 
yet the Government wished to scrap the work of a generation p 
of statesmen. The speeches that attracted the most 
attention were not those of the Labour Members, whose attacks 
on the Bill were predictable, but those of about ten "waverers" 
in the Government Parties. Hughes and Mann had been expelled 
from the Nationalist Party a few weeks before^ and their 
unqualified opposition to the new arbitration policy was 
soon apparent. Hughes rejected Latham's claim that con-
ditions had changed since 1926. The defects of the arbit-
ration system were not new. The States could not control 
national industries or deal with itiajor disputes.^ As the 
1. C.P.D. V. 121. 5 Sept. 1929, p.612. 
2. Ibid. 28 Aug. 1929, p.367. 
3. S J L H . 23 Aug. 1929, p.11. 
4. C.P.D. V. 121, 5 Sept. 1929, p.396. 
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dajs passed tension mounted, lobbying increased and there 
were numerous "counts" of expected supporters and opponents. 
On 7th September, 1929, the second reading was carried by 
three votes, with Hughes, Mann, Stewart and Maxwell voting 
with the Labour Party. Three days later, in the Committee 
stage, Hughes moved an amendment that the Bill should not 
be proclaimed until it had been submitted to the people, 
either at a referendum or at a general election. Marks and 
McWilliams joined the rebels. Groom abstained from voting, 
and the amendment was carried by one vote. Hughes and Groom 
had been among the strongest supporters of Federal arbit-
ration since 1901, but they were also motivated by a common 
desire for revenge against the upstart Bruce, who had brought 
their Ministerial careers to an end.^ 
The defeat of the Government in Parliament was 
followed by two days of uncertainty and wild rumours. Then, 
on 12th September, 1929, Bruce announced that Parliament 
would be immediately dissolved and a general election would 
be held.' ^ 
1; Hughes' hatred of Bruce and especially of Page had in-
creased as their period in office had lengthened. Early 
in 1928 he wrote '^As I am not precisely persona grata 
with the Bruce-Page menage, I must be up and doing 
three or four months before the election. There are 
rocks ahead - for me, I mean (I also piously hope for 
my dear friends the Bruce-Page combine) . Hughes to 
A.W. Palfreyman, 9 Feb. 1928, (A.N.L. MS 1538/1571). 
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Ministers insisted throughout the election cam-
paign that the only issue was the industrial policy of the 
Commonwealth Government. Understandably, most of their 
ideas and arguments had already been expressed in Parliament 
or in public speeches following the Premiers' Conference. 
Federal arbitration had failed, due to the defiance of 
awards by the unions, the constitutional limitations on the 
Commonwealth's arbitration power, and the existence within 
each State of two independent arbitration systems. Federal 
arbitration had stimulated class hatred and industrial 
warfare. The overlapping of awards destroyed all finality 
and all sense of absolute justice. In no other fields of 
government was there the problem of overlapping jurisdic-
tions. There would be a weakening of respect for all laws 
if the Federal industrial laws, which could not be enforced, 
were not repealed. Under the new system the Federal Parlia-
ment would be free to deal with national questions without 
being constantly interrupted by industrial discussions. 
The States were willing to accept their new obligations and 
there was no suggestion that all industrial regulation should 
be abolished. Finally, Ministers consistently denied that 
the Government's policy would open the way for wage reductions.^ 
1. Age. 21 Sept. 1929, p.24., 25 Sept. 1929, p.4. 
S.M.H. 27 Sept. 1929, p.13. 
V^ ili.DoMikco 
THE STABLE BOY: "Crikey! if I can only clope Arbitration, the favorite, the 
Bosses' outsider will win hands down." 
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Despite Bruce's assertion that there was only one 
issue to be decided, the Government's opponents raised 
several other questions: the John Brown incident, the 
Government's financial administration, Page's amusements 
tax and the difficulties of the film industry, and changes 
in Public Service arbitration. The main newspapers, with 
the notable exception of the Age, continued to support the 
Government, but most pressmen who were covering the cam-
paign claimed that it was clear from the outset that the 
Government was doomed. The Labour Party was united and 
well-led, it exploited to the full the widespread grievances 
against the Government, and it made some rash promises 
that were to prove embarrassing later, when the depression 
worsened. In addition, the Government was faced with 
effective campaigns by Hughes and some of the other rebels, 
who had large personal followings and who were not opposed 
by the Labour Party. The election took place on 12th October, 
1929, and the Government was overwhelmingly defeated. It 
lost 18 seats, including those of five Ministers. The most 
astonishing result was the defeat'of Bruce himself by 
Holloway. On 21st October, 1929, Scullin became Prime Minister 
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and a few weeks later Latham was elected the Leader of the 
Opposition.^ 
There were several issues in the campaign which 
aroused strong feelings among large numbers of people, and 
it is not possible to state with certainty that the Govern-
ment was defeated on account of its arbitration policy. In 
fact, the seats that it lost were mostly rural and semi-
rural, and in these electorates it is doubtful if arbit-
p 
ration was a major issue. Nevertheless, Ministers 
1. Bruce returned to England shortly after the election. 
He was re-elected to the Federal Parliament in 1931 and 
was a Minister in the Lyons Government from 1932 to 
1933. He was a High Commissioner in London from 1933 
to 1945 and represented Australia in the British far 
CabineL Latham was Leader of the Opposition from 
1929 to 1931, when he stood down in favour of Lyons, 
who had left the Labour Party. Their new party, the 
United Australia Party, was victorious at the elections 
in October, 1931, and from 1931 to 1934 Latham was 
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for External Affairs, 
Attorney-General and Minister for Industry. He rep-
resented Australia at the 1932 Disarmament and Repara-
tions Conferences -and in 1934 was the leader of the 
Australian Eastern Mission. He did not contest the 
1934 elections and in 1935 he was appointed Chief 
Justice of the High Court, a position he held until 
1952. In 1940-41 Latham was, Australia s first Minister 
to Japan. Until well into his eighties Latham held 
office in numerous or^'anizations: he was Chancellor of 
the University of Melbourne 1939-41, Vice-President of 
the Australian Red Cross Society 1944-61, President of 
the Australian-American Association 1951-61, President 
of the Australian Association for Cultural Freedom 1954-
1961 and President of the Australian Elizabethan theatre 
TrusI; 1954-61. 
2. See Carboch. op.cit. p.126.' 
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attributed their defeat to their industrial policy. Bruce 
said that the reason was clear: the fear of reduced wages 
and a lower standard of living,^ Latham agreed with him. 
He said that the Government could have avoided dealing with 
the critical economic and industrial situation, "but there 
were four or five men who were determined to break the 
Government, regardless of the issue. Ogden and some of 
the backbenchers believed that the John Brown incident had 
been the greatest hurdle.^ All subsequent Commonwealth 
Governments accepted Bruce's verdict and arbitration became 
one of Australia's settled policies. No other Government 
was to submit the industrial laws to such detailed scrutiny 
or was to make such radical proposals to eliminate the 
inconsistencies and anomalies of the arbitration system.' 
In fact, never a^ain viras a Commonwealth Government to devote 
so much time, energy and thought to the problems of indus-
trial relations for such a large proportion of its period 
in office. 
t 
1. Australian National Review. 30 Oct. 1929, p.7. 
2. Latham to F. Morris, 14 Oct. 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/45). 
3. Ogden to Latham, 24 Oct. 1929. (A.N.L. MS 1009/1). 
CONCLUSION 
The 1920s was a period of industrial conflict and 
the Bruce-Page Government was preoccupied to the point of 
obsession with trying to reduce this conflict. Yet, despite 
the priority that it gave to the problem, its role in indus-
trial relations was rather limited. In a few days the High 
Court was able to do more to mitigate the difficulties caused 
by overlapping awards than the Government was able to do in 
its seven years in office. The decisions of the Arbitration 
Court and the Coal Industry Tribunal had far more influence 
than the Government's legislation on the working of the 
arbitration system and, consequently, the ideas and policies 
of Powers and Hibble, Dethridge and Luiin, were of more 
practical significance than those of Bruce, Groom or Latham. 
None of the Government's legislation had the far-reaching 
effects of Deakin's Arbitration Act of 1904, Hughes' Indus-
trial Peace Act of 1920, or Lang's Forty Four Hours Act of 
1925. The State Governments were involved in numerous indus-
I 
trual disputes, while the attention of the Federal Government 
was concentrated largely on mining amd maritime stoppages. 
Even in some of the large interstate disputes it was the 
State Governjiients, the Chambers of Manufactures and the A.C.T.U, 
that took decisive steps to bring about a settlement. 
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The role played by the Bruce-Government in indus-
trial relations was occasionally successful, frequently in-
effectual, and ultimately disastrous. Its two attempts to 
transform the structure of arbitration, in 1926 and 1929, 
were completely rejected by an unsympathetic electorate. 
Ten Bills relating to industrial regulation and industrial 
conflict were drafted in less than five years. Eight were 
passed by Parliament, but only three of them - the 1926 
Arbitration Act and the 1928 and 1929 Transport Yforkers Acts -
fulfilled the objectives of the draftsmen. The Government's 
major contribution to industrial legislation, the 1928 
Arbitration Act, despite four years' preparation, discussion 
and debate, made a very limited impact on the actual operation 
of the arbitration system. The Government intervened in a 
relatively small number of disputes and only in the water-
side workers' strike of December 1924, the seamen's strike 
of January 1925, and the marine cooks' and waterside workers' 
strikes of 1928, did its intervention lead to a settlement of 
the disputes. The ultimate test was the relationship between 
policy and power, and while the Gdvernment's industrial 
policies contributed to its great election success in 1925, 
they were a major factor in its downfall in 1929. 
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The Government's failure was partly due to the 
weakness of its policy. In the first place, the transforma-
tion of the arbitration system could only be brought about 
with the support of the majority of the electors. Yet the 
two policies that always determined the Government's whole 
approach to industrial relations alienated a large part of 
the electorate. The Government believed that the Common-
wealth and State arbitration systems should be rationalized 
and harmonized and secondly, that unions should be forced to 
observe the awards of the Arbitration Court. Neither policy 
was new, but in the past non-Labour governments had been 
complacent about the duplication and inconsistencies that 
arose from the division of the arbitration power, while 
Labour governments had been complacent about the continuance 
of strikes. Bruce always believed that the rationalization 
of the arbitration system would only be achieved when the 
Commonwealth was supreme in the field of industrial regulation, 
From February 1925 to I^Iay 1929 he ignored or dismissed all 
appeals to restrict the jurisdiction of the Federal Arbit-
ration Court, thereby antagonizing many of the Nationalist 
Party's traditional supporters, especially in the smaller 
States. At the same time, the Government pursued an uncom-
promising and hard-line policy towards the militant unions 
and many working class people accepted the charge that it was 
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a class gOYerment intent on destroying the unions. The 
result was that in both 1926 and 1929 nost Yoters found a 
reason for rejecting the Government's far-reaching proposals. 
Another fundamental weakness also caused a decline 
in popular support for the Government. Its natural bias in 
favour of the employers eventually turned into blatant 
partisanship. It was inevitable that Ministers should equate 
the interests of the community with the interests of the 
employers, and that they should hardly ever show any real 
concern for the interests of the employees. In drafting 
legislation they sought to alleviate many of the problems 
of the employers: the overlapping of awards, retrospective 
awards, the Court's criteria in fixing wages, legal repre-
sentation in arbitration cases, union militancy, union 
opposition to piecework, and preference to unionists. Yet 
some Ministers, particularly Latham, had an intense belief 
in the ideal of the impartiality of the law. They believed 
that the 1904 Arbitration Act was essentially a pro-union law 
which had brought enormous benefits to employees; events 
since 1916 had shown that the law could be exploited by the 
unions, and therefore it was necessary to restore the balance 
by putting through amendments that favoured the employers. 
Similarly, they considered that their bias in many of the 
major disputes was based on a detached study of the points 
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at issue. They genuinely believed that most of the strikes 
were unjustified and that it was the daty of any gOYernment 
to prevent the complete disruption of communications and the 
export trade. It is pointless to criticize bias - impartial 
government is a myth - and the appointments to the Arbitration 
Court in 1926 showed that the Government did resist pressures 
from its own side. No government controlled by employers 
would have appointed Beeby or even Dethridge. But in January 
1929 the Government made a serious mistake. The action of the 
timberworkers might be unjustified but it did not affect 
interstate or overseas communications and there was therefore 
i 
no reason why the Government should take action against the 
strikers. Yet it prosecuted the Union and Holloway. A few 
weeks later it withdrew the prosecution of John Brown. Its 
bias in favour of the colliery owners was understandable but 
its inconsistency was bad politics and a large part of its 
arbitration policy had to be abandoned, 
A genuinely conservative government would have 
recognized that its role in industrial relations was neces-
sarily limited. Bruce and Latham expressed the conservative 
view in their speeches, but their frequent legislative and 
administrative intervention suggested that, like Hughes, they 
believed that industrial unrest could be mitigated by govern-
mental action. In 1925 and 1924 the Government did nothing. 
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"but from 1925 to 1929 its policy was continually changing as 
it tried to cope with intensifying industrial conflict and 
worsening economic depression. 'The greatest question facing 
us all' was, at different times, the overlapping of awards, 
the Seamen's Union's challenge to constitutional authority, 
the 44 hour week, economic recession, high production costs, 
union defiance of the Arbitration Court, the violence and 
picketing of strikers, the coal crisis and the need for less 
regulation and more co-operation in industry. As the question 
changed, so did the solution: the definition and delimitation 
of Federal industries, the deregistration of the Seamen's 
Union, the deportation of its officials, secret ballots, 
increased strike penalties, the removal of the constitutional 
limitations on the Commonwealth arbitration power, the 
revision of the Court's criteria for wage-fixation, the pro-
secution of strikiUj^ unions, an industrial peace conference, 
the protection of non-union labour, payment by results, the 
repeal of the penal clauses, and finally the dismantling of 
the Federal arbitration system. Bruce and Latham, who both 
practised a syllogistic style of ^-easoning, presented many 
of these solutions as panaceas and, when they were tried and 
failed, the authority of the Government suffered. Ministers 
were extremely vague about the long-term effects of some of 
their proposals and, with each abrupt change of policy, it 
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became increasingly obvious that they did not know how to 
deal with the enormous problems that had arisen. 
To some extent the weaknesses and vagueness of the 
Government's policy resulted from the concentration of govern-
ment decision-making in the hands of a very small number of 
men. Industrial regulation and industrial conflict affected 
the lives of almost the whole population, yet employers, 
trade unions, political parties, the press and even public 
servants had very little direct influence on the decisions 
of Ministers. 
As pressure groups both the employers' organizations 
and the unions were failures.^ The unions exerted indirect 
pressure by striking and the mineowners forced Bruce to with-
draw the Brown prosecution. But pressure in the form of 
submissions, deputations and meetings was largely ineffec-
tual. The unions took it for granted that no benefits could 
be extracted from a Nationalist Government and, instead of 
seeking concessions, made extreme demands that were inevitably 
rejected. The relationship between the employers and the 
1. The tone of the private discussions and correspondence of 
the employers, the unions, and of Commonwealth Ministers 
in 1927-29 was remarkably similar. It was one of iatalism 
and impotence: each group felt that it must act in a 
certain way, but that there was no hope of changing the 
C9urse of events nor of averting the impending economic 
disaster. 
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Goverment was more complex. Consultations were frequent 
and several of the employers' major demands, voiced over a 
period of ten or more years, formed an important part of 
the Government's arbitration policy. Yet the employers' 
submissions rarely had an immediate effect on legislation. 
Groom did not seek the views of the employers at all in 
1925 and Latham had drafted most of the substantive clauses 
of the 1927 Arbitration Bill and the 1929 Maritime Indus-
tries Bill before he received any submissions. Some decisions, 
such as Latham's plans to reorganize employment on the water-
front or Bruce's proposal to give the States control of 
arbitration, v/ere announced before there had been any con-
sultation with interest groups. In several strikes Govern-
ment officials worked closely with employers in collecting 
evidence against the strikers, but this co-operation did not 
affect the Government's overall policies. Latham found 
employers to be illogical, inconsistent and unrealistic, 
although they sometimes gave him information that would 
support the policies that had already been decided on by 
Cabinet. However, it was only in 1926 that employers 
decisively influenced the formulation of policy; by drama-
tically reversing their stand on arbitration they encouraged 
the Government to seek an amendment of the Constitution, 
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Other interests and organizations outside the 
GoYernment were even more ineffectual The press, and 
particularly the Argus, naturally influenced Ministers' 
interpretation of certain events, such as the activities of 
the seamen in 1925. In 1925 and 1929 it contributed to the 
widespread feeling that the authority of the Government was 
"being challenged. But there is no evidence that Ministers 
took much notice of editorials, except at elections and 
duTing the referendum campaign. The Nationalist Party 
organization occasionally criticized the Government, but 
generally it did its best to keep in step with the Govern-
ment's changing policies. It was not consulted by Bruce in 
either May 1926 or May 1929 about the future of the arbitra-
tion system. Only occasionally were either Nationalist 
backbenchers or Labour parliamentarians able to persuade the 
Goverrjnent to modify its policies. Many Nationalists believed 
that the jurisdiction of the Federal Court should not extend 
to State instrujnentalities, but Ministers were always unres-
ponsive on this question. Even after the 1928 election, when 
his majority was much diminished,' Bruce took no steps to 
ensure the support of the waverers among the backbenchers. 
In 1926 he needed the backing of the Labour Party and agreed 
to Charlton's request that the referendum proposals be 
extended. In 1928 Latham made two important changes to the 
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Arbitration Bill following criticisms by Labour Members. But 
the Labour Party was never able to force the Government to 
mediate in disputes. 
Public servants played a minor role in Government 
policy-formulation. The officials in the Prime Minister's 
Department made no attempt to question, much less change, 
the Government's arbitration policies. In the great strikes 
Ministers frequently consulted Garran but while his views 
may have influenced the Government's strategy, they did not 
lead to any changes in its general policy. In 1925 he worked 
very closely with Bruce, who accepted his arguments concerning 
the deregistration of the Seamen's Union, the deportation of 
Yifalsh and Johnson, and the need for greater penalties for 
militant unions. After 1925 Garran's power declined. He 
was no longer Bruce's closest adviser, most of the arbitra-
tion bills were drafted by Latham, Knowles and Boniwell, and 
Latham mainly sought Garran's opinion on legal rather than 
industrial questions. In fact, Latham often bypassed Garran 
and dealt directly with Boniwell and Stewart. Stewart and 
East were the public servants with the greatest knowledge of 
industrial relations and many of their proposals (and those 
of Pov/ers and Dethridge) were incorporated in legislation. 
But Stewart's long submissions were studied carefully only 
if they accorded with the thinking of Ministers. For instance 
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M s views carried weight in 1926 but were completely dis-
regarded in 1929. Latham valued East's knowledge of the 
waterfront, yet he did not consult him before announcing his 
ideas on the reorganization of waterfront labour. Thus the 
experts found that working with Bruce and Latham could be 
very frustrating. On the one occasion that the Government 
decided to review the whole arbitration system it enlisted 
two men from outside the Public Service. However, most of 
the original ideas put forward by Moore and Dyason were 
rejected and their report was important chiefly because it 
summarized ideas and facts drawn from a wide range of sources. 
It is easy to exaggerate the contrasts in the 
abilities and achievements of the two Attorneys-General. 
Groom's achievements in the field of industrial regulation 
were negligible. He was responsible for the 1925 Arbitration 
Bill, but none of its clauses can be attributed to his own 
ideas. He simply did his best to co-ordinate the proposals 
of Garran, Powers, Moore and Dyason. He did not intervene 
in the seamen's disputes of 1925, he made hardly any public 
statements on industrial unrest and it is probable that he 
opposed the policies of deregistration and deportation 
adopted by Cabinet. His successor had a far greater knowledge 
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of the law, he worked tirelessly to familiarize himself with 
every weakness in arbitration law and all aspects of large 
disputes, he questioned the basic premises of the Government's 
policies and presented his conclusions to Cabinet in a dis-
concertingly logical way, he personally drafted much of the 
Government's industrial legislation, he handled most of the 
negotiations with employers and unions, he was the most pro-
minent Government figure in every industrial dispute, and he 
made hundreds of speeches to Parliament and the public. 
Yifithin a short time most of the community was aware of this 
austere, inflexible, legalistic and self-righteous man and 
it was natural that employers and union leaders should regard 
him as one of the few strong Ministers and the man who deter-
mined the Government's industrial policy. Latham was indeed 
responsible for many of the provisions contained in the 
arbitration bills and for the Government's role in several 
disputes. Nevertheless, some of his colleagues believed that 
he was too inexperienced and was too ready to return to first 
principles and to advocate drastic reversals of policy. In 
1927 they could not accept his arguments that the Federal 
arbitration power should be severely limited, that arbitra-
tion awards should be related far more closely to productivity 
and the tariff, and that the strike and lockout penalties 
should be repealed. In 1929 Latham was again thwarted when 
- 417 -
he opposed toth the prosecution of the Timber Workers Union 
and the withdrawal of the John Brown piosecution. Some of 
the most significant decisions were therefore taken by either 
the Prime Minister or the Cabinet against the advice of the 
Attorney-General. 
The role of Cabinet was negative: it vetoed Latham's 
most original proposals. The role of the Prime Minister was 
positive and dominant. Bruce left most of the problems 
concerning industrial regulation to Latham, but he took a 
deep interest in industrial conflict and time and again he 
took the initiative in this area. He alone decided on the 
action that ended the maritime strikes of November 1924 -
January 1925 and it was he who determined the Government's 
policy in the seamen's strikes later in 1925. Without 
consulting Latham he decided to call an Industrial Peace 
Conference in 1928 and, despite Latham's protests, he 
resolved to withdraw the prosecution of Brown. Above all, 
it was Bruce who, in December 1925, took the first steps to 
seek greater industrial powers for the Commonv/ealth and it 
was he who, in May 1929, suggested to his colleagues that 
the Federal arbitration system should be abandoned. It was 
to be expected that the Prime Minister would play a major 
role in these events but Bruce's propensity to act alone, to 
ignore the views of his closest colleagues, and to make the 
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most hurried decisions, created many problems for the 
Government. The frequent and confusing changes in emphasis 
in the Government's arbitration policy was largely due to 
the fact that Bruce did not obtain sufficient information, 
ideas and advice from his Ministers and officials. 
Another government might have been more efficient 
in its decision-making and might have had more realistic 
policies. But no government could have overcome the intense 
conflict that took place in the transport, mining, timber 
and building industries between 1928 and 1930. In 1925 
Bruce's Government did not really know what to do to bring 
to an end the job control of the Seamen's Union. It feared 
that its authority was being challenged, it made a few 
dramatic gestures, the electors applauded, and meanwhile the 
challenge of the seamen collapsed. The stoppages of 1928-29 
were of a different character. Every union felt that its 
interests were involved, thousands of strikers knew that 
defeat would mean unemployment and hunger, and employers 
feared that any concessions would drive them out of business. 
It was an elemental struggle in which laws and prosecutions 
were irritants that had no bearing on the final outcome. 
Latham realized this at an early stage, but the other Minis-
ters again believed that their authority was at stake and 
that they had to be seen to be doing something. Paradoxically, 
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their actions weakened their authority and they eventually 
gave up. They had always declared that governments could 
not solve Australia's economic problems. They now made it 
clear that they could do nothing to end two of the largest 
stoppages that Australia had known. Virtually paralyzed, 
the Bruce-Page Government came to an end. 
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